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Abstract 
This is an in-depth case study of urban water services to poor households and their interactions with local 
state power in the community of Eastwood, Pietermaritzburg, in the province of KwaZulu-Natal, South 
Africa, for the period 2005-2007. It draws especially on the experiences of poor women, exploring the 
conceptions and implications of the movement of municipal services into the realm of welfare-based 
urban service concessions. It interrogates what value municipal services, framed in the language and 
form of welfare but within a commodification milieu and in the context of shifting citizen-state relations 
offer the state apparatus and how such free basic service offerings are experienced by poor households at 
the level of domestic, social and economic functioning. The study adopts a fluid mixed-methodological 
approach to optimise exploration and interpretation. It argues that the interface of state service delivery 
and citizens is fraught with contradictions: core to this is the nature of state ' help.' Free basic water 
encompassed in the social wage did not improve the lives of poor households; instead it eroded original 
water access. Free basic water stole women's time spent on domestic activities; compromised appropriate 
water requirements, exacerbated service affordability problems and negatively affected household 
functioning. Poor households experienced the government's policy of free basic services as containment 
and punishment for being poor. The Indigent Policy activated the state's surveillance, disciplinary and 
control apparatus. In the absence of effective national regulation over municipalities and with financial 
shortfalls, street-level bureaucrats manipulated social policies to further municipal cost recovery goals 
and subjugate poor households. Social control and cheap governance were in symmetry. Citizens, 
desperate for relief, approached the state. Poor households were pushed into downgraded service 
packages or mercilessly pursued by municipally outsourced private debt collectors and disconnection 
companies. Municipalities competing for investments brought about by favourable credit ratings 
abandoned the humanity of their citizens. Such re-prioritisation of values had profound implications for 
governance and public trust. Citizens were jettisoned to the outskirts of municipal governance, resulting 
in a distinct confusion and anger towards the local state - and with it, major uncertainties regarding future 
stability, redistribution and equity. 
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Chapter 1 
THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING 
1 INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH CONTEXT 
This is a study of urban water services to poor households in Pietermaritzburg, m the province of 
KwaZulu-Natal, in South Africa. Households in the community of Eastwood, a historically working class 
community within Pietermaritzburg, will form the core site for the study. The study is framed against the 
milieu of South Africa' s increasing inequality and poverty and in the context of increases in social 
expenditure since 2001 , when the ANC launched a skeletal welfare system. Free basic water (FBW) was 
introduced in 200 I as a major 'pro-poor' intervention that forms part of the 'third way' between 
welfarism and neoliberalism. The FBW policy on the one hand seeks to provide all citizens, but 
particularly the poor, with a basic supply of free water (6 kilolitres per household per month) but on the 
other seeks to school the poor in values of responsibility. The policy was initiated by national 
government in 2001 to promote equity, to meet the constitutional right of South Africans to water and as a 
developmental concession in the context of post-apartheid redress. By 2003 the state argued that FBW 
was a component of the ' social wage· and was increasingly to be delivered to targeted populations on a 
means-tested basis through local municipal ' Indigent Policies.' 
This study will explore the implementation of FBW and the intimate inflections of the commercialisation 
of water and welfare through the tap for domestic households and women. This thesis is broadly situated 
within the critical tradition of scholarship on the state and welfare. Via the optic of ·pro-poor' policies 
(free basic services, specifically free basic water and the Indigent Policy), this study considers what, how 
much and how services are offered. It examines the responses and perceptions of poor households. Core 
to such interrogation is the concept of state ' help· and whether and how such concessions have rendered 
affordable municipal bills to the poor. The question of the volume of free services offered and the 
implications for containment and restriction in relation to notions of water-related needs, dignity and 
gendered equity perceptions is explored. This is done not only via an analysis of consumption patterns as 
reflected in total municipal bills, but through examining the effects of such concessions within the 
functioning of homes and the broader community. Municipal services are understood as more than a 
resource and positioned within a closer proximity to poor households' notions of time, dignity and 
citizenship within the post-apartheid context. 
In this regard, the thesis investigates what these new forms of welfare mean for poor households, and how 
the concessions and uptake conditions are viewed by households. How has the giving of free basic 
services affected the relationships between citizens, community and the local state: has this enhanced 
public trust or damaged it? Has the offering of a quantum of free municipal services opened the space for 
improved citizen/state engagement and negotiation? How do citizens experience and interpret the state, 
and, with the introduction of free basic services, have such relationships, responses and strategies 
changed? 
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Indeed, much of this thesis revolves around the study of the local state. It considers what the broader 
intentions of both national and local levels ofthe state are in granting free basic services. and interrogates 
the timing and form of such concessions and conditions. In short, the thesis explores how the giving of 
municipal services has served the state. For example: has the giving of free basic services expanded the 
reach of the state into the homes of poor households via an augmented surveillance and governance 
apparatus? If so, how, and what strategies are used by the state to reinforce and reproduce its force? Has 
the capacity of the state to grasp, contain, control, discipline and manage poor households been increased 
via the offering of state concessions? If so, how and what does this mean for poor citizens and their 
relationship with the state? In the broader realm of governance, has the provision of free basic services 
acted to secure the state against an unruly populace or has it exacerbated dissent and resistance? If so, 
what does this mean for the local state and its citizenry? 
This study prioritises the perspective of poor households, particularly women, for whom the implications 
of this ' new form ' of welfare has a greater effect on domestic life and citizenship. lt is a case study of 
336 households complemented by in-depth lifestories of25 households in Eastwood. 
2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The study will demonstrate how the offering of free urban water services, framed in the language of 
welfare, has afforded the state spaces and justification to intensify the proliferation of the state apparatus 
to discipline, control and govern poor households. The argument of this thesis is that pro-poor 
programmes often do not alleviate the poverty and struggles of poor households, but instead intensify the 
domestic, social and economic burden of the poor, particu larly women. The research objectives are: 
I. to explore the notions and conceptions of appropriate water needs of poor households in the 
context of the free basic water offering of 6kf per household per month 
2. to explore the water tariffs and charges on total municipal bills for poor households, payment 
response characteristics and implications thereof for the household purse 
3. to explore analytically and substantively the contribution of the municipal service component of 
the social wage to the alleviation of household poverty 
4. to explore the micro-implications of restricted welfare m the form of free basic water and 
indigent subsidies for the homes and communities of the poor, particularly women, and their 
perceptions thereof 
5. to consider the broader rationalisations of the state in imagining free basic services and indigent 
subsidies as a welfare measure and state strategies to enforce such an interpretation 
6. to consider household and community resistance and coping strategies to the state's offering of 
free basic services. 
2 
This thesis will address six critical gaps in knowledge. The aim is to contribute to understanding the 
contested discourse on welfare in municipal services in South Africa from an angle substantially absent in 
contemporary scholarship. A praxis-based approach to the angles explored are listed below. 
1. The study explores the issue of the volumes of water received by households to meet their 
appropriate water requirements. Here I engage not only with municipal consumption records but also 
with how women actually use water in the home. This moves a step beyond the quantitative 'basic water 
requirement' debates and contributes to a more robust picture of the water volumes within an 
understanding of the mode of delivery deemed appropriate (by poor women) in acting as a transformative 
measure (per household and per capita). That is, I move the debate beyond simple numbers on the 
adequacy of 6kf, to give expression to notions and conceptions of appropriate water needs from the 
perspective of women, in their own voices. 
2. Analyses of free basic water have thus far failed to consider the impact of water tariffs beyond 
the 6ki offering of free basic water. Noting that the objectives of free basic water are not only to improve 
accessibility but a lso to jointly promote affordability in order to alleviate poverty, there is therefore a 
critical gap in knowledge in considering the full impact offree basic water on affordability thresholds and 
payment rates. To this end, the study will analyse household municipal service bills across diverse 
service ptlckages to provide a more comprehensive and critical view of the financial impact of free basic 
water for poor households and the municipal financial apparatus. 
3. There is as yet no substantial nor analytical valuation of the contribution of the municipal service 
component of the social wage to poverty alleviation (apart from Meth and Dias's [2004] examination). In 
response to the gaps identified in Meth and Dias 's (2004) work, I wil l employ billing data (not arbitrary 
estimates) within a time frame that might show the real impact. In addition, I wi ll compare those 
households receiving the social wage with those which are not in order to analyse the appropriateness of 
the social wage as a poverty alleviation tool. The exploration of the municipal services component ofthe 
social wage may also be valuable in understanding the proliferation of social delivery protests in South 
Africa (why they occur not how they occur). 
4. There has not been a substantial exploration of the gendered 1 micro-implications of free basic 
services and their accompanying punitive measures as experienced and perceived by poor households in 
general and women in particular. Specifically, I will add knowledge about the prosaic everyday lives of 
women as they manage homes within the confines of the new welfare-linked services. Furthermore, 
women 's perceptions of encountering the local state bureaucracy will be sought together with broader 
citizen perceptions of state he lp. In this regard, there is a lacuna in the localised study of the South 
A frican state and relations between citizen and the state. Such exploration will draw on the literatures of 
1 Deedat (2006) has explored the gendered implications of free basic water, yet more needs to be done to consider the ·day-to-day· 
li ved experiences of poor women as they struggle within the confines of the social wage. 
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international scholars (Jessop, 1990; Foucault, 1991; Aneesh, 2002; Abrams, 2006; Althusser, 2006; 
Gupta, 2006; Painter, 2006; Rose, 2006; Weber, 2006) who provide great insight into the state apparatus. 
5. Past analyses of free basic services no longer suffice; I conceptualise free basic services within 
the sphere of social services proper and not as a stand-alone redistributive measure undertaken by 
municipalities. By framing free basic services as a component of the social wage, I hope to move the free 
basic services debate beyond neoliberal critiques, to explore and interpret the new shifts to welfare and to 
position free municipal services within a critical reading of contemporary South African social policy. 
Core to such a qualitative exploration is what ' welfare through the tap ' means for the poor, particularly 
women. In this regard Lund's (200 I) suggestion that the poor often concede disproportionately more 
than they receive will be examined by a consideration of the restrictive or possibly onerous nature of the 
welfare concessions and conditionalities attached to them. Although such tensions have been extensively 
explored in critical international welfare literature (by Offe, 1984; Alcock, 1987; Goodin, 1988; Dean, 
1991; Piven & Cloward, 1993; Walker, 1993; Gronemeyer, 1993; Brown, 2006; Rose, 2006), there has 
not been an adequate qualitative exploration of these dynamics in contemporary South African social 
policy, and in particular after 2001 , where the provision of free basic services as a developmental measure 
was refashioned as a welfare concession. 
6. Drawing on ferguson's (2006 : 271) thesis wherein poverty relief programmes are found to 
"serve to govern," (instead of "governing to serve"), I expand this interpretation by exploring the 
qualitative implications of the new procedures of regulation - an amalgam of bureaucratic, panoptic and 
algocratic power modes (Aneesh, 2002) - for poor households, with particular reference to free basic 
services. Here I consider the qualitative implications of an enhanced reach of the state into the homes and 
spaces of the poor and explore the perceptions and responses of poor households to such intrusions. 
Drawing on the local social control literature of, in particular Naidoo and Veriava (2005), Ruiters (2005) 
and Naidoo (2007), who have begun to interrogate whether the offering of free basic services simply 
provides the state space to grasp control of unruly populations, this thesis will explore what type of value 
the offering of free or subsidised municipal services has afforded the national and local state, in the shape 
of welfare and in the current socio-political milieu. 
3 SCOPE AND STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
The geographic scope of the study is one community, Eastwood, in Pietermaritzburg, KwaZulu-Natal, 
allowing for in-depth interpretation and analysis, primarily concentrated at the household level. 
Eastwood is urban and poor. The inquiry is limited to domestic residential households which received 
billed, metered and in-house water supplies before and after the introduction of the Free Basic Water and 
Indigent Policies. The study covers the period from January 2005-June 2007. 
The thesis has ten chapters. Chapters 1-4 provide the framework for the study. Chapters 5-9 present the 
results of the study and Chapter 10 concludes the study. 
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Chapter 1 gives an overview of the study, outlines the research objectives and identifies gaps m 
knowledge. 
Chapter 2 presents a review of study-related literature and provides the broader research context for the 
study. 
Chapter 3 outlines the epistemological and methodological theories as applied in the study. It further 
outlines the sampling frame and procedure, study design, data collection techniques and data analysis 
undertaken. 
Chapter 4 presents the institutional and policy architecture contextualising the delivery of municipal 
services in Pietermaritzburg. This chapter serves as a policy and implementation reference point for the 
thesis. 
Chapter 5 analyses what selected Eastwood residents are charged for their municipal services (water, 
electricity, refuse, sanitation and rates) and the additional ' non-service items' such as interest, service 
penalties and Value Added Tax levied on total bills. 
Chapter 6 explores how selected Eastwood residents respond to such charges. Moreover, it considers 
payment rates in relation to affordability thresholds and concludes with an exploration of the contribution 
of the municipal service component of the social wage to the alleviation of household poverty for 
' indigent ' households. 
Chapter 7 considers the notions and conceptions of water usage, the actual volumes of water used (per 
household and per capita), comparisons across and within groups, and problems around the adequacy of 
free basic water. It further considers the influence of restriction, tampering and payment scope on 
consumption levels; and analyses under what conditions households access free basic water. Lastly, 
limited water volumes are contextualised within a broader framework of the containment of poor 
households. 
Chapter 8 explores the micro-implications of restricted welfare for the homes and communities of the 
poor and their political attitudes to welfare and the state. This chapter considers the social, practical and 
perceived micro-implications of water restrictions for poor households. The whole spectrum of water 
activities is considered. Thereafter the perceptions of households to free basic services and indigent 
subsidies and conditions are explored as are household perceptions of the local state. I close the chapter 
with a consideration of the perceptions of municipal bureaucrats and staff to the poor and that of the 
services and subsidies given. 
Chapter 9 explores how free basic services and indigent subsidies have strengthened the control and 
disciplinary apparatus of the state and explores the resistance responses and strategies employed by poor 
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households thereto. It further considers the broader rationalisations of the state in imagining free basic 
services and indigent subsidies as a welfare measure. state strategies to enforce such an interpretation and 
the implications thereof for community cohesion. 
Chapter 10 offers conclusions for the study. It reviews the core contributions in line with identified gaps 
in knowledge and study objectives, and provides further theoretical implications consistent with the 
study's review of literature and context. 
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Chapter 2 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND CONTEXT 
The aim of this chapter is to review the various literatures on municipalities and services in South Africa 
but also to consider international literature to provide a wider lens on social policy, water services and 
welfare. The chapter presents the national context in which social policy has evolved since 1994 so that 
the significance of the shift to free basic water and indigent policies might be assessed. As part of the 
context we will review various studies of poverty and social policy in South Africa. The chapter does not 
seek to provide a definitive interpretation of shifts in macro-economic policy. 
1 PRE-2001 ECONOMIC AND SERVICE DELIVERY CONTEXT 
Before 200 I all water actually consumed had to be paid for, since the new government only committed 
itself initially to the Reconstruction and Development Programme's (RDP) objective to providing access 
(i.e. infrastructure) (African National Congress [ANC]. 1994; DWAF, 2002b). People had to pay for all 
their water and their ability to pay restricted access even when infrastructure was offered (Kasrils, 2001 b). 
In 1993 the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) presented its version of the RDP to the 
ANC with the intention of it being used as the ANC's 1994 election platform (Gumede, 2005: 76). The 
ANC retained the social equity tenets initially proposed by Cosatu, such as land redistribution, basic 
service delivery, housing. education, health. telecommunications and the democratisation ofthe state and 
society (ANC. 1994), yet revised it many times, attempting to make it more market-friendly and therefore 
more acceptable to business (Gumede, 2005: 76). 
From its first year in office the ANC was under severe pressure from local and international business. 
The RDP's ambitious social and economic targets were always going to be difficult to achieve, given the 
government's resource constraints (Marais, 200 I ; Gumede, 2005) and the economy, in the view of the 
ANC, was far more fragile than initially thought (Sparks, 2003). It was concluded that social spending 
and redistribution would have to wait (Marais, 200 I). The ANC was still viewed with scepticism. 
International capital demanded more concessions and assurances that the ANC was committed to 
establishing a market-friendly economy and had eschewed its traditional revolutionary alliances (with the 
Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Cuba and Socialist African states) and that the ANC had changed its 
apparently nationalist, communist and socialist nature (Gumede, 2005). Bond (2004a) contested the 
assumptions of this ' no space for manoeuvre· scenario. Bond (2004a: 45) argued that the ANC had two 
possible routes forward , and abandoned the first - distinctly people-centred and based on social justice 
and redistribution - in favour of the "neoliberal capitalist path." This resulted, according to Bond (2004a: 
4 7), in limited contestation of the global capitalist discourse and meant that South Africa made certain 
choices which cemented an economic policy based on principles of neoliberalism, which simply moved 
state policies of "racial apartheid" into the realm of "class apartheid." Bond (2004a: 54) argued that the 
path chosen by the South African government, dictated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
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actually made the country weaker, by actively permitting capital flight and signing on to accords which 
eroded national sovereignty and strength: silencing calls for nationalisation; committing to the repayment 
of apartheid debt; ratifying the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and moving faster than 
required; abolishing exchange control: freeing up the independence of the Reserve Bank and allowing 
local and indeed South Africa's biggest companies to move their financial headquarters outside South 
Africa to London. 
In December 1994, at the ANC's national conference Mbeki and his band of centrists - Manuel, 
Mboweni and Erwin - staged a ruthless coup, convincing delegates that the delivery targets of the RDP 
would not be met unless government changed tack. This move had the support of Mandela (Gumede, 
2005). According to Habib (2004: 5) "The greatest policy shift in the history of the ANC" (Calland, 
2006: 114) was faci litated by the fact that there was a lack of "substantive uncertainty," in the electorate. 
That is, the ANC's polit ical base was solid and therefore the leverage of the vote of the black majority 
demanding "poverty alleviation, service delivery and transformation" ceded to that of foreign investors 
and domestic business demanding '·privatisation, deregulation, financial and trade liberalisation, and low 
budget deficits" (Habib, 2004: 3). With declining economic prospects, Mbeki was tasked with drawing 
up a 'growth and development strategy. ' 2 one which would inspire business confidence and stabilise the 
macro-economy (Gumede, 2005: 85-87). Jay Naidoo's RDP office was jettisoned and Mbeki, with his 
commissioned team of economists, under the watchful eye of the IMF and World Bank, set about crafting 
an orthodox, market-friendly economic policy, essentially a stabilisation package favourable to domestic 
and international finance corporations (Gumede, 2005: 86-87). 
T he Growth Economic and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR) sought to attract foreign direct investment 
and improve South Africa's credibility via improved industrial competitiveness, greater fiscal and 
monetary discipline, the removal of tariff barriers and greater trade liberalisation, the expansion of 
privatisation, stabilisation of the exchange rate, increased labour flexibility, reduction of the budget 
deficit to contain debt servicing obligations, counter inflation and the reprioritisation of public 
expenditure (RSA, 1996a). Yet, as Marais (2001 ) argued, GEAR was flawed: the policy itself was 
rushed, lacked rigour and was based on shaky assumptions about the linkages between fiscal austerity, 
g rowth, job creation and social equity. Despite all the compromises made and concessions given by the 
ANC to international capital with GEAR; the promised investment was not forthcoming (Gumede. 2005). 
The left critique held that by reducing the fiscal deficit, dramatically cutting corporate tax and keeping 
inflation low: GEAR effectively ensured that growth and j ob creation slumped and social spending was 
pushed to the margins (Bond, 2000; Marais, 2001; McDonald, 2002a). 
Despite critical contestations on the left regarding the direction the South African government was going, 
in 1996, GEAR subsequently replaced3 the 1994 RDP. It was introduced by the ANC without 
consultation with its labour or civic all ies (Gelb, 2005; Calland, 2006). It was shaped by the thinking of 
2 See Marais (2001 ). Sparks (2003) and Bond (2004a & c) for a comprehensive account of processes and policy documents leading 
up to the adoption of GEAR. 
;; The ANC claims that the GEAR strategy was already pre-figured in the RDP (Sparks. 2003). 
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the IMF and World Bank, whose influence over the private sector and neoliberal local and international 
consultants substantially shaped the texture and direction of certain infrastructure policies (Khosa, 2000). 
The GEAR strategy indicated a broad ideological shift to the right. steered South Africa away from a 
developmental state, ushered in a new era of institutionalised neoliberalism and resulted in a period of 
fiscal austerity, leading to a reduction in social expenditure, stagnation of service delivery, the erosion of 
the public sector, widespread embrace of cost recovery and increased social conflict (Bond, Dor & 
Ruiters, 2000; Khosa, 2000; McDonald, 2002a). 
While GEAR succeeded in achieving a certain level of macro-stability vta fiscal restraint, improved 
international competitiveness, reduced tariffs and liberalised trade, lower budget deficits and stabilised 
inflation; growth and employment did not follow the same path: investment remained low, the currency 
floundered and interest rates remained high (Gumede, 2005: 93-94). There was always a chance that the 
magic foreign investment, no matter how much orthodoxy South Africa delivered, was never going to be 
forthcoming (Sparks, 2003). By pinning its success to the whims of finance capital with its ruthless 
globalised speculation and relaxing domestic controls, enabling the flight of locally-based capital (Marais, 
2001); and in period of global downturn, the South East Asian Crisis, the emerging Zimbabwe crisis and a 
rampant HIV/AIDS pandemic; South Africa's economy staggered (Sparks, 2003). The panacea of the 
market, South Africa's economic and social delivery phoenix. stubbornly did not materialise (Sparks, 
2003); the bird remained an ashen heap. Scholars pronounced that GEAR had failed in the delivery of its 
economic targets (Marais. 2001 ; Padayachee & Valodia, 2001 ; Gumede, 2005). Those closer to 
government were more circumspect: and confined GEAR's failures to the lack of job growth and 
investment (Hirsch, 2005). 
Apartheid 's policies of separate development ensured that services were delivered along racial lines, with 
black South Africans receiving inferior and inequitable services. or no services at all (Cottle, 2004). This 
resulted in a dual water service delivery challenge: to reduce the apartheid backlog4 whilst concurrently 
raising the level of service delivered (Hemson, 2004). The delivery of water and electricity services, 
historically a duty of national government, was devolved to local government with national government 
now taking on a regulatory role (Department of Water Affairs and Forestry [DW AF], 2003). ln effect. 
the local state chosen by national government to deliver on its promises of universal water access became 
a chief hindrance in this quest (Hemson, 2004). 
In the early 2000s the critics diverged in their understandings of poor municipal delivery, although it 
would be simplistic to categorise such variances into separate ' schools of thought, ' there were clear 
differences: some analysts emphasised the problems of reorganising and redemarcating the entire local 
government system after 2000 (Atkinson, 2002 & 2007; van Donk & Pieterse. 2006). Others, particularly 
"The extent of the backlogs is contested. and the figures range from 10.6 million at the RDP standard of a tap within 200 metres of 
homesteads (Hemson. 2004: 10-11) to "down 10 just more than four million people ... as reported by Mike Muller. the Director 
General of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (Muller, 2004: 32-33). Government statistics are frequently contested (see 
later in Chapter 4 & 7). This is not the place to debate the accuracy of such figures. suffice to indicate that water service delivery 
and beating the backlog presents a significant challenge. 
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on the left, located problems of delivery within a framework of the reduction of intergovernmental 
transfers offunds from national to local government and privatisation (Bond, 2000; McDonald, 2002a). 
The former analysts, for example, highlighted problems with the municipal re-demarcation process, 
based. according to van Donk and Pieterse (2006: 115), on an "untested" " ideological" perspective that 
redistribution was best achieved via " linking municipalities with a tax base and significant institutional 
capacity to those that lacked a proper tax base and adequate human resources." Thus in 1995, and then 
again in 1999,5 Atkinson (2002) argues that South Africa went through a painful municipal re-
demarcation process which resulted in the amalgamation of urban areas and their rural hinterlands, the 
combining of several urban areas within single municipalities, the consolidation of municipalities into 
effective spatial areas, and the coupling of richer and poorer areas. Together, rapid urbanisation and 
municipal re-demarcation meant that municipalities were to serve larger jurisdictions and significantly 
more people within those jurisdictions (Piper, 2006). Municipalities traditionally run and managed by 
white interests and serving relatively small white populations now had to rapidly transform to serve 
extensive black populations without the necessary proportional increase in capacity, skills and staff to 
support such population growth and service demands (Atkinson, 2007). Atkinson (2007: 70) provides a 
revealing racial slant and states: " ... many white officials have been replaced by inexperienced [read 
black] officials, sometimes with little more merit than their political affiliation." Furthermore, the role of 
local government has enlarged from delivering limited services (refuse removal, street cleaning, verge 
cutting etc.) to providing a full developmental function,6 without the necessary national government 
support (Atkinson, 2007). They argue further that municipal governance became increasingly unwieldy 
and wholly complicated, basic statutory requirements were often impossible to attain (especially without 
the input of consultants), decisions often had to be made with the input of all four spheres of government 
[local (administrative and political arms), district, national council of provinces and national government 
and (sometimes) also unions and civil society] (Palmer, 2004; Piper, 2006; van Donk & Pieterse, 2006). 
In recent years the emergence of local government "corruption, nepotism and self-enrichment" has been 
added to reasons for local government failure (Atkinson, 2007: 66). 
Critics of neoliberalism (the latter 'school ') however, went further and pointed to reduced 
intergovernmental transfers (at a time when real increases were needed to meet backlogs and improve 
levels of racially-based service delivery) from national to local. showing that operating and maintenance 
grants to local government had "declined by 85% in real terms from 1991-1998" (Bond, 2000: 1 05). ln 
addition, national government put caps on property rates (benefitting primarily white middle class 
residents, business and industry), which were traditionally a significant source of municipal revenue and a 
subsidy mechanism for the poor (McDonald, 2002a). Municipalities, having a limited tax base and few 
~ In 1995 South Africa·s I 260 racially defined municipalities were amalgamated into 843 District Councils. Transitional Local 
A uthorities and Transitional Rural Councils. In 1999 these 843 municipalities were further reduced to 284: comprising 6 
metropolitan municipalities. 47 district municipalities and 23 1 local municipalities (Atkinson. 2002). 
6 Bond (2000) disputes Atkinson·s (2007) argument of an ·enlargement· and offers a rebuttal that apartheid-era municipalities 
catering to white residents were in fact much more developmental (offering water, electricity, housing etc) than implied by Atkinson 
(2007) and more so too than current municipalities. 
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alternative sources of income, and expected to implement unfunded mandates, transferred the pressures 
onto their citizens at a time when the relaxation of tariffs caused job losses to escalate and employment 
opportunities to become increasingly elusive (McDonald, 2002a). As McDonald (2002a) argued, a crisis 
was emerging, s ince the poor could not absorb the burden of paying for municipal services. 
Consequently municipal debt soared, revenue collapsed, tariffs increased, households defaulted. 
disconnections became rampant, all of which produced a vicious spiral into debt (Khosa, 2000; Bond, 
2001 ; McDonald, 2002a). This led to the water supply of an estimated ten million South African citizens 
being cut off/ with an increasing number having their electricity disconnected and more than two million 
people evicted from their homes (McDonald, 2002b). Moreover, with local governments in crisis and 
scrambling to meet development mandates, public sector doors were thrown open for widespread 
commercialisation as an attempt to gain legitimacy with investors (McDonald & Ruiters, 2005). Critics 
such as Desai and Pithouse (2003) and Pithouse (2005) went as far as suggesting that the government had 
declared war on the poor: 
... people have been putting their bodies in harm's way and fighting revolutionary struggles to stay 
in the places where apartheid put them, to retain access to basic services like water and electricity 
and resist exclusion from education. Not even the most cynical anticipated that the millennia! 
hopes that fuelled the mass and micro struggles against apartheid would be crushed this quickly 
and this brutally (Desai & Pithouse, 2003: 3). 
The payment boycotts, prominent in the 1980s and early 1990s, which formed a large part of the black 
majority 's struggle for equity and citizenship, returned as a site of struggle - but this time the reasons 
were based on the financial inability of poor households to pay for their municipal services as well as a 
response, by poor households, to inferior service infrastructure and poor service delivery progress 
(McDonald, 2002a: Desai & Pithouse, 2003 ; Bond, 2006). 
2 POST-2001 ECONOMIC AND SERVICE DELIVERY CONTEXT 
However in this context in 200 I national government made an apparent 'about-turn.' The principle that 
all services had to be paid for was reversed; there appeared to be a softening in government thinking 
regarding its aggressive pro-privatisation policy stance and a movement towards a more interventionist, 
Keynesian type of approach (Gumede, 2005; Padayachee & Valodia, 2001 ; National Treasury, 2004). 
Since 200 I, along with free basic water, social welfare expenditure began to increase (Hirsch, 2005). The 
2001 budget prioritised investment in roads, water and sanitation, employment and an expanded public 
works program (Padayachee & Valodia, 2001; Habib. 2004). For example: national government to local 
government transfers have increased, albeit slowly from a low 2.7% in 1999/00 (Intergovernmental F iscal 
Review [IGFR], 2003) to 7.6% in 2007/08 (IGFR, 2008): 
... local government is getting a rapidly rising proportion of nationally raised revenue, although it 
is starting from a low base. This realignment shows that the provision of basic services like water, 
sanitation and electricity is becoming more of a government priority (IGFR, 2008: 54). 
7 This figure has been contested by government (see Muller. 2004). 
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Scholarly explanations for this reversal pointed to (I) the declining traction of the Washington consensus; 
(2) policy debates following the 1997/8 global financial crisis: (3) pressures within the tripartite alliance, 
particularly regarding GEAR's impact on delaying social and economic transformation (Padayachee & 
Valodia, 200 I); and (4) the increasingly embarrassing indices of poverty, inequality, underdevelopment 
and unemployment (Gumede, 2005). 
Government and its advisors (Hirsch, 2005) explain that new investment in infrastructure and social 
expenditure from 2000 became possible because ofthe 'success' of GEAR: the reduction in government 
debt after 1999, improvement of public finances at the end of the 1990s as a result of the fiscal austerity 
of the Finance Ministry; improved public revenue collection in the early 2000s; prolonged reduction in 
government borrowing which allowed for renewed capital investment in the form of bonds. Moreover, 
GEAR's economic projections all focused on the period 1996/7-2000/1 (RSA, 1996a). Yet Bond (2004c) 
questioned GEARs glorified claims of delivering a surplus and wondered whether the inherited deficit 
(9% of GDP) could have been maintained; whether apartheid-era debt should have been repaid; whether 
exchange controls should have been lifted if capital was short: and whether Keynesian multipliers could 
have been revoked. 
Nevertheless, some still considered the shift too "timid" (Gumede, 2005: 116) and doubted government's 
insistence that policies were more expansionary (Gelb, 2005). Many suggested that the timing of 
progressive changes had to do with the run-up to elections, seeing these as an attempt to temporarily 
appease leftist elements within the tripartite alliance (Habib, 2004; Calland, 2006). Indeed, Marais (200 1: 
189) noted that social spending could improve periodically, if tax collection continued to improve and 
government redirected its past public expenditure 'savings' and recommitted them to social programmes 
(and indeed this was relatively consistent with Hirsch's [2005] explanation). Despite an apparent 
renewed commitment in 2001, to policies and targets to address poverty, and improve service delivery 
and employment levels; Habib (2004) and Gelb (2005) noted that the fundamental economic policy 
framework (prudent fiscal and monetary policy, financial and trade liberalisation and privatisation) 
remained in place. Perhaps what we were seeing is a 'third way' rather than a reversal ofneoliberalism. 
In this regard Mbeki, an avid admirer of Britain's New Labour, under the helm of Tony Blair, is 
commonly held to have steered the ANC into its subscription to the third way (Gumede, 2005); albeit to a 
''third way of a special type''8 (Marais, 200 I: 271 ). 
In line with this th ird way shift, South Africa in 2001 adopted a free basic services policy which saw a 
free package of basic municipal services (water, electricity, refuse and sanitation) extended to all South 
African citizens, but the primary target of the policy was poor households for whom free basic services 
represent a significant poverty alleviation measure; and poor households would benefit the most from an 
k Marais (2001) posits four distinctions between the British and South African models: (I) South African unions are strong and 
vocal unlike that of Britain ·s. smashed under the Thatcherite realm: (2) South Africa has far less leeway with regards the impacts of 
globalisation. which render it far more vulnerable: (3) South Africa has a very different set of equity and social objectives rendering 
a greater sensitivity to social inclusivity. equity and affirmative action: and (4) instead of ·de-ideotog:ising· politics based on class: 
South AtTica has instead ·re-ideologised · race as a basis for cohesion. 
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affordable basic water supply (ANC, 2000; DWAF, 2002a). The extension of free basic water to poor 
households was meant to improve public health, gender and equity (DWAF, 2002a): " ... the provision of 
free basic amounts of water and electricity to our people will alleviate the plight of the poorest among us" 
(Mbeki: President's speech, 2001 ). The free basic amount approved by Cabinet was 6 000 litres/6 
kilolitres [6kf) of potable water per household per month. Disaggregated 6 000 litres per household per 
month provides 200 litres per household per day, or 25 litres per member of an 8-member household per 
day (Kasri ls, 2001 a). If households consumed more than 6ki per month, they would be expected to pay 
for the additional water consumed at the standard tariff rate (DW AF, 200 I). 
Despite some initial trepidation, free basic services were seen as a major step towards overcoming 
apartheid inequities and developing meaningful social citizenship (Yeotte, 200 1; Bond, 2002a; 
McDonald, 2002b; Greeff, 2003). With free basic services and expanding welfare (the Child Support 
Grant, health and education-related initiatives), the ANC was seen to be recommitting to its freedom 
promises borne out of the Freedom Charter, the RDP and South Africa' s Constitution. Those close to 
government (Muller, 2008) and scholars (Remson, 2000; Mosdell, 2006) alike expressed that the shift 
was a major departure from past water policies, which prioritised water as an 'economic good,' and 
indeed, the preceding ANC policies themselves. For example: "The free basic services policy represents 
a dramatic shift in government policy in that previously, the approach had been that government would 
pay for the capital cost of schemes, provided that beneficiaries would undertake to pay the recurrent 
costs" (Mosdell, 2006: 283). 
Some of this praise, however was linked to the fact that Kasrils (Former Minister of Water Affairs and 
Forestry), and his department had undertaken their quest to provide South African citizens with free water 
at a time when the international neoliberal paradigm was fiercely opposed to any intervention that might 
re-prioritise the public and 'social good' qualities of water (Muller, 2008). International finance 
institutions were afraid of the precedent it would set for financing water access, specifically the 
implications for cost recovery (as we will see later on, cost recovery proponents had no need to be 
alarmed). In March 2000, a month after Kasrils hinted at a Free Basic Water Policy. the World Bank' s 
Sourcebook on Community Driven Development in the Africa Region was circulated. It indicated the 
Bank's position unequivocally: "work is still needed with political leaders in some national governments 
to move away from the concept of free water for all ... and [to] promote increased capital cost recovery 
from users ... and (to] ensure 100% recovery of operation and maintenance costs" (cited by Bond, 2002a: 
242 & 254). In this regard, when criticisms started to emerge (see later) some civil society organisations 
initially defended Kasrils and felt that the sudden jump to questioning government intentionality was 
unfair (Greeff, 2003) and indeed Kasrils took criticism very personally. For example: (in response to an 
article arguing that "free basic water is a ploy'') Kasrils (writing in The Witness: 20 November 2003) 
rejoined: "As someone who has spent the better part of his life fighting for freedom and democracy, I 
find ... [the] allegation insulting to our government's best achievements." 
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We now consider various interpretations that have been offered for the ANC's shift from full cost 
recovery to a more concessionary services regime. Those on the left suggested that the ANC was 
responding to the largest cholera epidemic in at least a quarter of a century, which infected 120 000 
people and claimed 265 lives, in August 2000. It was caused by the introduction in 1998/9 of pre-paid 
water meters into formally free communal standpipes; poor people, unable to pay, were forced to drink 
from polluted rivers (Bernson, 2000; Cottle & Deedat, 2002). The consequences of the epidemic 
coincided with the joint South African Municipal Workers Union/Rural Development Services Network's 
(RDSN) 'Water for All ' campaign for 50 litres free water per person per day, and the fight for other basic 
services by ordinary citizens which spawned a variety of concerned residents· movements (Yeotte, 2001 , 
RDSN, 2000). The epidemic together with the campaign for water rights and community protests forced 
a compromise. In this. the left claimed a class struggle victory forced out of national government through 
popular struggle (Veotte, 2001; Cottle, 2004).9 
Not wanting to be seen to be backing down, Kasrils claimed that the concession was based on a personal 
epiphany10 on seeing a woman collect water at a riverbed in Lutsheko, Eastern Cape (Kasrils, 2001 b), 
thereby signalling a return to heroic nationalism (Kasrils, 2003) and the extension of the 'South African 
miracle' and recognition that despite progress in infrastructure implementation; affordability constraints 
still proved a barrier to access (Kasrils, 2001 b). With the looming December 2000 municipal elections 
and citizen impatience and resistance growing, the ANC saw water as a key part of their electoral 
campaign. lt announced that (the ANC-led) local government, "will provide all residents with a free 
basic amount of water, electricity and other municipal services, so as to help the poor" (ANC, 2000). 
Government has der.ied that the timing of the introduction of free basic water was related to election 
gains: 
... the ANC's election promise of free basic services to the poor is not a hollow electioneering ploy 
nor an empty promise ... the provision offree basic water is not an opportunistic piece of 
electioneering but is part of a process to ensure that the legacies of apartheid in the water sector are 
addressed (Kasrils: media statement, 2000a). 
Bureaucrats closer to the machinery of implementation of service delivery interpreted the shift as a 
pragmatic recognition of the failure of full cost recovery and the failure of punitive disconnections which 
resulted in increased civil militancy and threats to the security of the water infrastructure itself since many 
residents were illegally reconnecting to the water network: hence the realisation that it might be better to 
just give poor people some free water. This school of pragmatic thought was linked to a growing 
recognition of the apparent success of the 'Durban experiment,· the forerunner of free basic water (see 
later in section 7), which found that access to a limited volume of water could be given free whilst 
simultaneously making good economic sense (Sussens & Vermeulen, 2001 ; Bailey, 2003; Macleod, 
9 The landmark victory ofGrootboom vs Republic of South Africa in 2000. whereby Irene Grootboom. a shack dweller in the 
Western Cape. challenged government to provide the pooresl sectors of society with at least a lifeline supply of basic services to 
meet the constitutional rights of dignity. freedom and equity and voter apathy revealed in the 2000 National election added to 
government pressures to realise the rights of South African citizens. 
10 Expanded further in section 7. 
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2007) and engendering the good faith of the populace. Grounded in such a philosophy, free basic services 
was a type of administrative logic and strategy: in the words of then Director-General Muller: 
... the free basic water strategy is an innovative approach that will enable us to separate the can't 
pays from the won' t pays. Only the really proven poor should get these (free services) while 
anyone else should be forced to pay even at higher tariffs (Muller. 2001: 1). 
Government proceeded to spin itself as being benevolent with noble intentions, doing its best to meet the 
needs of its people within its limited resources (Kasrils, 2004). ln time, however, stronger criticisms 
surfaced from all sides of the ideological spectrum: on the right, conservatives and liberals expressed 
alarm at the idea of free services. They argued that it would undermine fragi le cost recovery gains, 
decrease financial sustainability, limit individual economic ' choices,' increase environmental scarcity, 
overburden the state and erode market confidence (Still, 2001; Bate & Tren, 2002; Rogers, de Silva & 
Bhatia, 2002; Savenije & van der Zaag, 2002; Whittington, 2003; Bernstein, 2005). Government 
documents and statements however assured that free basic water was consistent with cost recovery. 
Municipal bureaucrats who contended that messages of free basic water would be construed by 
consumers as providing free rein to stop paying for all water volumes used were assured that this was not 
so. For example: 
What should consumers be told about the 'free basic water' policy? 
They [local government) should ... communicate to consumers that cost recovery remains a key 
objective of local government and that consumers will have to pay for services above the basic 
level (DWAF, 2001: 10). 
Indeed, such pronouncements J will argue reflected a broader plan, which was that the introduction of free 
basic water would not only not deviate from the ' user pays' principle but could actually strengthen it 
(DWAF, 2001; DWAF, 2003) . 
... the free basic water policy strengthens the ["user pays"] principle in that it clearly requires 
consumption in excess of the basic water supply service to be paid for while enabling free access 
by the poor to a basic water supply service necessary to sustain life (DWAF, 2003: 29, their 
italics). 
In this regard, as asserted by Schreiner (2007: 62), "Effective credit control is a critically important 
component of providing a reliable and effective service to all communities and consumers." Trade unions 
and the Left (leftist academics, social movements and broader civil society) drew on well-rehearsed anti-
neoliberal critiques to criticise free basic services, and noted its continuity with cost recovery, but could 
not demonstrate this adequately. Fixated with quantitative delivery statistics, left critics questioned the 
timing of concessions, inadequacy of free service volumes offered (to meet, for example: water 
requirements of large households and increased water requirements of persons living with HIV/AIDS) 
and modes of delivery, access-linked concessions, geographic biases, and continuing household 
affordability constraints (Hemson, 2000: Bond, 2002a & b; McDonald. 2002b; Cosatu & Samwu. 2003; 
Harvey. 2003; McDonald & Ruiters. 2005; Smith & Green, 2005). It became clear, the left argued, that 
free basic water had become detached from the spirit in which it was apparently conceived and instead 
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reattached to 'help '. In Gronemeyer's (1993: 56) critique of 'help' , situated within the economics of a 
calculated cost-benefit analysis, " ... help owed its existence to the benefits which resulted for the giver." 
With free basic services, commercialisation could no longer be damned by questions of inhumanity and 
profits at the level of the poor - the poor were catered for via the securing of ' li fe sustaining' free basic 
services, and capital could continue its march unabated as the state ' s economic fundamentals were still in 
place (McDonald, 2002c; Pape, 2002; Loftus 2005) and, as it happened, poor households required much 
more water than 6k~ (which had to be paid for in full). 
3 REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENT TO WELFARE LITERATURE 
The shift from provision of only infrastructure to providing tangible benefits such as free basic water has, 
as we have seen, been debated by various scholars. More than ten years into a democratic South Africa, 
poverty and inequality surveys continued to paint a bleak picture of the nature and extent of poverty in 
South Africa (May, 2004). For example: South Africa, ranked 121 on the human development index. 
peaked in 1995 at 0.741 and then regressed to 0.653 in 2004 (UNDP: Human Development Report, 2006: 
290). the same level registered in 1975 - in the heart of the apartheid years. The findings of nearly every 
post-apartheid study on income-poverty and inequality (Measuring poverty in South Africa [Stats SA, 
2000], Earning and spending in South Africa [Stats SA 2002] , KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study 
[Carter & May, 200 1], with exception the All-Media Products Survey), indicate that ordinary citizens are 
getting poorer (in money-metric terms) (Meth & Dias, 2004; Roberts, 2005; Magasela, 2006). Critics 
blamed the time lag between policy implementation and measurable changes (Roberts, 2005); the "poor 
availability of timely credible data:' over-reliance on income-poverty measures, statistical measurement 
errors (Roberts, 2005: 484; Netshitenzhe of Government Communications and Information Systems 
[GCIS], cited in Business Day: 26 March 2003) and the continuing uncertainty over poverty definitions 
and measurements (Roberts, 2005; Magasela, 2006). Moreover, scholars (Meth & Dias, 2004; Parnell, 
2004) acknowledged that South Africa's miserable poverty statistics were particularly vexing for a 
government that had consistently prioritised poverty-reduction strategies. 
Contesting poverty statistics, Government- chief defender of poverty alleviation progress - further noted 
that contemporary poverty and inequality studies failed to consolidate all poverty alleviation programmes 
when considering the total impact on poverty relief (Netshitenzhe of GCIS, cited in Business Day: 26 
March 2003; Mbeki, 2007). Netshitenzhe of the GCIS (cited in Business Day: 26 March 2003) stressed 
that although apartheid's legacy of institutionalised poverty and inequality continues to dog South 
Africa's democratic transformation, poverty indices often ignore the social wage. In this regard, the 
Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) [2004: 3] and Roberts (2005: 485) have argued that 
government. as an attempt to remedy the deficiency of income-poverty measures, has shifted towards 
indicators which include all ' in-kind· state benefits, encapsulated by the social wage: 
Although most conventional measures of poverty and inequality ignore the value of benefits in 
kind, their inclusion is potentially very significant in monitoring the impact of government policies 
on the poorest households. The social wage is therefore of great policy relevance given 
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government's concern with inequality and a more specific commitment to reducing poverty 
(Roberts, 2005: 485). 
The term 'social wage,' emerged around 2003 and referred to the ' entire package of social assistance' 
extended to poor households from government, which includes access to conventional social grants, 
health care, education and recently also municipal services - water, electricity, sewage and refuse 
removal (Lund, 2001; HSRC, 2004; Meth & Dias, 2004). That is, while most analysts continued to 
interpret the shift to free basic services as being in line with past policies; few picked up on the subtle 
change in language and form, which saw free basic services. and free basic water in particular, shift from 
a stand-alone development/equity concession into the space of social services proper; culminating in the 
appropriation of the term 'the social wage" 1 (Netshitenzhe cited in Business Day: 26 March 2003; 
Schreiner, 2007: 8; Mbeki, 2007). 
It should be stressed that the free basic water policy is but one element of a broader approach to 
the development of a comprehensive social security framework in South Africa. In terms of this, 
there are a number of pillars in the system establ ished to ensure that all South Africans enjoy 
protection against social contingencies. The first pillar, of basic universal protection for all 
citizens, comprises conventional social grants as well as the ' social wage,' the package of essential 
social services provided by government. Free basic water should be seen as an element of this 
social wage (Schreiner, 2007: 8). 
Under this approach, when evaluating support to the poor and indigent. the value of the full menu 
of government services should be considered to allow the analysis of redistribution trends in a 
normalizing society (Muller, 2008: 75). 
It is clear that national government in the face of stubborn unemployment and municipalities in crisis 
(total accumulated municipal services debt, as at 30 June 2002, was R24.3 billion [Mufamadi, 2002: 1]), 
sees the social wage as increasingly playing a pivotal role in its mitigation of poverty strategy, but also as 
an attempt to bail out municipalities (the prime sphere of government to deliver to the poor). In 2003 
national government through the Department of Local and Provincial Government (DPLG) introduced the 
means-tested Indigent Policy as an instrument to deliver free basic services (see Local Government 
Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 [RSA, 2000b), s74: cii). This signalled a shift from the transformative 
development accompanying the introduction of free basic services in 2001 for all households (to heal the 
wounds of apartheid and promote equity) to the stratification characteristics of welfare which targeted 
certain households and introduced stigma and logistical difficulties among others. For example: The 
DPLG (2005: 22) now put a financial threshold on access and stated, "Free Basic Services are a defined 
amount of free services that are provided to households with a collective monthly income of less than 
Rl 100." 
S uch a move is consistent with Van Ryneveld, Muller and Parnell (2003: 7) who argued that Indigent 
Policies often adopt a limited scope; prioritising municipal income generation via the focus on chronically 
poor households within a limited set of administrative and debt management procedures; instead of 
broadening the optic to include a more comprehensive set of basic needs and rights protection: 
11 The social wage was popularised by Britain's Labour government in the 1970s (Dean. 1991 : 38). 
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Most commonly these indigent policies ... seeking to define indigence in terms of a particular 
household income level, administratively identifying households falling below this level, and 
providing them with a grant to facilitate their payment of the municipal account. Sometimes it is 
extended to how debt management policies are to be applied to households so defined (Van 
Ryneveld, eta!., 2003:7, my emphasis). 
Schreiner (2007) however introduces further questions around the move to welfare-based water provision 
by positing justifications of augmented supplies and better capacity to deliver to specific groups of people 
via additional funding, welfare, administrative and technical mechanisms: 
Government recognized that the free basic water allowance might not meet the needs of all users 
and that additional welfare and administrative mechanisms (as well as technical solutions) might 
be required in specific circumstances for example, households with disabled people or sites where 
a number of households share a single connection. In these cases, it is important to have another 
instrument to ensure that household water needs could be adequately addressed although this was 
more likely to occur in the context of a generic social welfare policy. The introduction by DPLG 
of a municipal indigent policy (which was also considered to be a possible mechanism to fund the 
provision of basic water supplies to poor families) met this requirement (Schreiner, 2007: 42, my 
emphasis). 
Here we start to see the emerging machinery of welfare which, imbued with the rationality of intervention 
(Escobar, 1993 ; Ferguson, 1994), introduces notions of the "ambiguity of helping" (Gronemeyer, 1993: 
63). That is, Gronemeyer (1993:54) argues: "Far from being unconditional, modern assistance is frank ly 
calculating. It is much more likely to be guided by a careful calculation of one's own advantage than by a 
concerned consideration for the other's need." She goes on, " ... it is no longer true that help is an 
unpredictable, anomalous instance. Instead it has become institutionalized and professionalized . It is 
neither an event nor an act; it is a strategy" (Gronemeyer, 1993: 54). 
4 THE THIRD WAY: INTERNATIONAL WELFARE TRENDS AND SOUTH 
AFRICA 
These South African debates to some extent mirror international social policy scholarship particularly 
about the third way's regime, referred to earlier in this chapter. The third way, also referred to as "social 
democratic renewal" or "a new mixed economy," is in Giddens ' s view (2004a: 4, 13) essentially an 
"attempt to avoid an excessive domination of the state over social and economic life, but does not accept 
that the market can be left to its own devices" and seeks to "combine social solidarity with a dynamic 
economy." Although the third way is not a new concept,12 and countries such as Germany (under 
Gerhard Schroeder), America (Bill Clinton), Holland (Wim Kok) and Britain (Tony Blair), among others, 
have adopted its tendencies, it is most commonly defined by Britain's New Labour, under the tutelage of 
Tony Blair (Giddens. 2004a & b). It has gained credence as a response to the demise of the classical 
ideological resonance of the binary ' left'/' right' in light of the 'death' of socialism and the rise of 
globalisation and an attempt to compromise between the overburdening and bureaucratic state of classical 
social democracy (old left) and the unfettered market fundamentalism of Thatcherism or neoliberalism 
l l See Giddens (2004a & b) for a comprehensive history of lhe third way, the debates and criticisms. 
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(new right) (Giddens, 2004b: 7 and Giddens, 2004a: II). Both, in Giddens' s (2004b) view are of and in 
themselves, problematic and the third way, in his opinion offers a solution to the impasse. 
Giddens (2004b) sees the core components of the third way as espousing: a 'de-ideologising' of politics 
and shift to the centre-left; a smarter, more efficient government, quicker and more able to adapt to 
change (a realistic approach to globalisation and markets and learning corporate efficiency); a role of 
gentle referee with regard to the market. thereby reducing regulatory constraints yet simultaneously 
reducing social risks and ensuring social responsibility; a more flexible, capable and competitive labour 
force; greater investment in social capital and infrastructure; a more committed stance to social inclusion 
and equality; and a ' positive welfare' framework that involves less direct transfers, more work-fare, 
greater 'personal responsibility' and ' no rights without responsibilities.' In contrast, South African 
scholars see the third way more cautiously: Jess governance that is more modern (reorganisation and 
centralisation of power, improved efficiency, co-ordination and discipline); neutralising or reducing 
labour unions; market-related delivery along the lines of the second wave of New Public Management 
(cost-effective and corporatised delivery); and closer proximity to business (Marais, 2001; Gumede, 
2005; Harrison, 2006). 
A key part of the third way's political philosophy is welfare reform (Giddens, 2004a: 103); and this, at 
least may partly explain South Africa's shift to increased social spending, within an apparently 
contradictory fiscal framework. In this regard, it is useful to briefly review the core paradoxes and 
inflections of welfare. Welfare scholars contend that welfare is not simply a gesture of humanity from the 
'benign to the benighted ' (Hochschild, 2006), nor does it necessarily reduce inequality nor provide 
adequately for the needs of the poor (Alcock, 1987; Goodin, 1988; Walker, 1993). That welfare, as a 
concept and system, houses so many internal contradictions to accommodate broadly heterogeneous 
forces whilst simultaneously allowing for the realisation of diversely singular ends and strategies, is what 
makes it so appealing across a taut political spectrum (Gilbert, 1983; Offe, 1984). Indeed, welfare 
functions to serve many purposes but chiefly as a buttress to the economic and political order: welfare 
quells civil disorder, regulates labour, reduces the scale of poverty, slows the advancement to 
' indigency,' 13 and acts as a powerful mechanism of social control via population regulation and 
segmentation (Rose, 1971; Gough, 1979; Alcock, 1987; Dean, 1991 ; Piven & Cloward, 1993). Hence 
welfare may contribute positively14 to the needs of poor households (albeit inadequately and not 
necessarily reducing inequality) whilst concurrently serving the needs of capital and the state apparatus 
(Gough, 1979; Alcock, 1987; Walker, 1993; Painter, 1995). Of special relevance for South Africa, with 
13 Core to this distinction, is the construction of the ·utility· of poveny in relation to capital or the · ruling classes. Patrick 
Colquhoun (a close friend of Jeremy Bentham), in his Treatise on indigence (1806) noted that poveny is the key to a well-
functioning and prosperous society·' ... without poveny there would be no labour. and without labour: there would be no riches .. 
(Colquhoun, 1806 cited by Rose, 1971: 47). 'Indigence,· on the contrary is: ·evil. · it is ·antisocial.· immoral and promiscuous.· it is 
a ' defonnity. · dangerous and hostile to the economy and society (Colquhoun. 1806: cited by Rose. 1971 :47: Procacci. 1991 ). 
Historical responses to the ·gangrene· of indigence were serious: whole institutions were set up and a plethora of judicial and 
policing regulations where exercised to refonn. discipline, control and contain people (Rose. 1971 : Schwanz. 1988). The 
partitioning of poverty. was and is still a very ·useful strategy· adopted by those in power to exercise social control (Dean, 1991: 
Foucault. 1991). 
1
' It is noted that the extent of welfare assistance is largely differential: nowhere more evident than the cross-national differences in 
the types and nature of welfare states e.g. Britain's system is a little better than that of the United States but a lot worse than the 
Swedish model (see The Three Worlds of We/far. Capita !Ism. Esping-Anderson. 1990). 
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the shifts, as Piven and Cloward ( 1993) note, is that poor relief concessions are cyclical: provision is 
expansive in response to civil discontent and restrictive to reinforce work norms. 
This is none so evident when tracing the expansion and contraction of welfare in relation to the social 
democratic or Keynesian consensus after the Second World War (Offe, 1984). Post-WWI1 to the mid-
1970s saw the expansion of welfare (Offe, 1984 ). However, the mid-1970s under the rubric of state fiscal 
crises saw the rise of the 'New Right,' and the championing of greater market provision in lieu of state 
involvement (Savage & Warde, 1993). Subsequently, the 1980s under the stewardship of Thatcher and 
Reagan, signalled the start of a wide-scale pull-back on direct social welfare expenditure in response to 
the ' overload' on state revenues caused by the escalating and apparently endless demands on welfare 
(Savage & Warde, 1993) and a move towards "a more market-orientated provision" (Painter, 1995: 89). 
In Britain and the United States, for example, neo-conservative thinkers suggested that state welfare 
benefits undermined traditional family structures via the encouragement of"young, single women to have 
children without getting married, or establishing a secure home environment" (Painter, 1995: 90). The 
years following were largely described as manifestly neoliberal (Savage & Warde, 1993; Waddan, 1997), 
yet such interpretations appear no longer sufficient (Rose, 2006). It is here where Giddens (2004a & b) 
contends that welfare yielded unabashedly to a type of third way; that is traditional welfare services did 
not disappear but were refashioned. Congruent with this view, Painter ( 1995) and Rose (2006) noted that 
despite the growth of neoliberalism, the state apparatus remained intact and instead of a wholesale 
reduction in state expenditure: there was actually a restructuring of state spending to serve different ends 
in different ways, thereby reflecting a broader shift in 'the politics of social welfare.' 
Returning to Piven and Cloward's ( 1993) assertion of the cyclical nature of poor relief concessions, it is 
plausible that South Africa presented a setting whereby the expansion of welfare might be in response to 
civil discontent and impatience in the light of stubborn poverty. The relaxation of apartheid influx 
controls, pass laws, Group Areas and Group Separation Act (etc.) and attempts to escape the poverty-rife 
and neglected former homelands (Robinson, 1996) and rural areas (May, 1998) in search of a better life 
(better services, education, health and jobs), culminated in rapid urbanisation (Kok & Collinson, 2006). 
That this discontent converged in urban centres also created a situation whereby government struggled to 
control an increasingly unknown, ungovernable and restless populace demanding the realisation of socio-
economic rights and accountability of de-racialised service delivery promises. In the early 2000s, 
municipal service delivery protests (9 446 for the year 2006/7 ; Minister of Safety and Security, 2007) and 
service payment boycotts (now affordability-linked) abounded. Local scholars questioned if South 
Africa 's emerging developmental welfare state might in fact be a form of expanding its bureaucratic 
apparatus and re-inserting social contro l in the face of a government that struggled to control 
·ungovernable' people (Naidoo & Veriava, 2005; Ruiters, 2005 ; Naidoo, 2007). 
5 THE UTILITY OF WELFARE FOR STATES 
Previously I have explored the tensions within welfare and suggested that welfare serves many ends. 
would like to expand on this via the literatures of international social control scholars who suggest that 
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the consideration of the extension of welfare must start with the interrogation ofthe broader intentionality 
ofthe state (Foucault, 1991; Dean, 1991; Ferguson, 1994; Rose, 2006). In this regard there are variances, 
for example some scholars (Offe, 1984; Alcock, 1987; Goodin, 1988) take a pragmatic view and suggest 
that states have to navigate a careful balancing act between 'giving and controlling.' Others, however 
take a stronger and more sceptical view and suggest that all government interventions serve to ' make 
visible; to shape, control and manipulate ordinary citizens (Foucault, 1991; Escobar, 1993; Scott, 1998). 
Consistent with this latter view, Dean (1991) suggests that welfare may serve to dilute the notions of 
rights and entitlements and Ferguson (1994) notes that poverty interventions serve to depoliticise both 
poverty and the state. 
Core to these critiques, regardless of where critics fall along the spectrum, is that welfare, as a system, 
constructs its legitimacy on the paradox of a state that does not trust its citizens. That is, poor relief 
makes a central distinction between the ' deserving' and ' undeserving' poor (Rose, 1971; Schwartz, 1988; 
Dean, 1991; Procacci, 1991; Gronemeyer, 1993). This simple but significant principle opened the space 
for not only the most visible effects typically encountered at administrative offices. for example in-built 
humiliation, discrimination, 15 suspicion, bureaucratic bungling, corruption, and general reluctance to 
extend welfare (Walker, 1993; Gupta, 2006; Deacon, 2002): but more importantly, and espoused by the 
second school, it served as a credible vehicle for the broader intentions of the state to reinforce and 
expand the state bureaucratic apparatuses (Ferguson, 1994) via the entrenchment of surveillance and 
d iscipline (Foucault, 1991; Piven & Cloward, 1993; Gronemeyer, 1993). lest the ' undeserving' citizens 
deceive the state (Hobsbawm, 1969; Scott, 1985). That is, the receipt of concessions means that the poor 
must submit to certain constraints, they must be "made capable of being helped" (Gronemeyer, 1993: 56) 
or, in the words of Brown (2006: 189) [the price of such concessions is] " . .. always a measure of the 
dependence and agreement to abide by the protector's rules." In this way, as articulated by Gronemeyer 
(1993), Brown (2006) and Rose (2006), welfare concessions via remedial and surveillance mechanisms 
afford the increasing reach and intrusion of the state apparatus into the homes and spaces of the poor. 
6 SOUTH AFRJCAN WATER RIGHTS 
M ost scholars and commentators on water start by emphasising the right to water (Khosa, 2000; 
McDonald & Pape, 2002; Ruiters & Stein, 2002; Bond, 2004b). The Reconstruction and Development 
Programme of 1994 is cited as the first major statement of intent by the state to redress South Africa's 
skewed water resource and service legacy. It recognised the right of all South Africans to access clean 
water and adequate sanitation for the attainment of household water security (ANC, 1994). The RDP saw 
water as a means to promote health and hygiene. Water service access was to be achieved through the 
establishment of a national water and sanitation programme which, as its short-term aim would provide 
1 ~ For example: international historical evidence sho~s that welfare measures are predisposed towards unpleasantness: see Rose 
{ 1971 & 1972) on English Poor Laws of 1597 and 1601 and Schwartz (1988) on France's ' Royal Declaration of 18 July 1724." 
which saw the administration of poor relief via the notorious parish ·workhouse· and ·poorhouse,' ' hopitaux generaux· (municipal 
hospital) and later ·royal workhouse· respectively. In apanheid South Africa. social welfare was broadly interpreted yet 
discriminatorily exercised (Makino. 2004) to protect and elevate white citizens. as a strategy to divide and entrench hatred and 
prejudice between racial groups (benefit levels highly variable). to ensure a ready supply of unskilled cheap labour; and as a tool of 
political and social contro l. 
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all households with 20-30 litres of clean and safe water per capita per day within 200 metres of dwellings, 
increasing to 50 litres in the medium term (ANC, 1994). Water supplied should be affordable through the 
mechanisms of lifeline tariffs, progressive block tariffs (increasing block tariffs) and cross-subsidisation 
(ANC, 1994). These writers also stress the White Paper on Water Supply and Sanitation (1994), which 
gave effect to only the RDP's short-term objective, as a minimum standard for a basic water supply 
(Schreiner, 2007: 35). The South African Constitution of 1996 guarantees the right to access water which 
was to be realised progressively (RSA, 1996b). Commensurate with this, legislative obligations in the 
Water Services Act of 1997 elaborated an implementation framework to ensure that "Everyone has a 
right of access to basic water supply and basic sanitation" (RSA, 1997: 12). The "sufficient" volume of 
water referred to in the Bill of Rights (RSA, 1996b: s27 .1 [b]) was re-worded as "basic" and defined as the 
"prescribed minimum standard of water supply services necessary for the reliable supply of a sufficient 
quantity and quality of water to households to support life and personal hygiene" (RSA, 1997: 8). There 
are major debates about the minimum standards of services to meet 'basic' needs. Definitions of the 
volume of water required, to meet 'basic' needs, then become politically important. For much of the 
scholarship on service delivery these legal foundations framed their subsequent critiques. Non-
governmental organisations and civil society broadly reflected this thinking (For example: South African 
Water Caucus and Southern African Regional Poverty Network). 
According to Schreiner (2007: 36), this volume was not yet conceived as a free volume but as a basic 
supply. The minimum standard for basic water supply services, as provided by regulations under section 
9 (1) of the Water Services Act is: (I) "the provision of appropriate education in respect of effective 
water use" and (2) "a minimum quantity of potable water of 25 [ per capita per day or 6k [ per household 
per month, within 200 metres of a household" (DWAF, 2002c: 26, my emphasis). The White Paper on 
Water Supply and Sanitation (1994) was replaced by The Strategic Framework for Water Services (2003) 
and, like the Free Basic Water Policy (2001) before it. retained the minimum of25 litres per capita per 
day as promulgated in the Water Services Act (DWAF, 2002c). From the start therefore, water provision 
went beyond simple provision to include elements of state 'guidance· over the behaviour and attitudes of 
needy residents (consistent with Gronemeyer, 1993; Brown, 2006; Rose, 2006). 
The South African state insisted that "water and sanitation services should be delivered equitably, 
affordably, effectively, efficiently, sustainably and gender sensitively to satisfy sector goals" (OW AF, 
2003: 9, my emphasis). The theme of environmental scarcity and sustainability pervades much of the 
literature on domestic water services. South Africa is a water-stressed country, rainfall is well below the 
global average and rainfall is unevenly distributed: " ... [in] global terms, South Africa's water resources 
are scarce and extremely limited" (Intergovernmental Fiscal Review, 2008: 90); " ... South Africa 
... among the 'driest' countries in the world" (Muller, 2008: 69), "We live in a semi-arid country ... " 
(Environmental Monitoring Group, 2005: 1) and '· ... water is scarce and it is important that water be used 
wisely and that due attention be paid to water conservation and demand management" (DW AF. 2003: 6). 
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Scholars (Turton. 1998; Bond, et al., 2000) note that environmental and government commentators make 
much of scarcity; very little is made of water resource allocation. For example: The Intergovernmental 
Fiscal Review (2008: 92), citing DW AF, accounts the total use of water by sector (2006/7) as the 
following: 61% for agriculture/irrigation/livestock watering. 32% domestic/ industrial (municipal), 6% 
forestry and I% unbillable. Such statistics belie the racial and domestic slant of allocation. For example: 
water resource allocation is still drawn predominately along the inequitable lines of race, land and 
economic ownership or access (Cottle, 2004; Bond, 2002b). Domestic consumption accounts for 12%, of 
which half is used for swimming pools and gardens in wealthy and largely white residential homes. Less 
than one-tenth of this domestic amount is consumed by all black South African households (Motala 
&Tilley, 2000; Bond, et al., 2000; Bond, 2002b). 
The White Paper on a National Water Policy for South Africa (OW AF, 1997: 4) states that "only that 
water required to meet basic human needs and maintain environmental sustainability wi ll be guaranteed 
as a right. This will be known as the Reserve." In this sense, of course, we are talking about the right to 
water and not 'free' water (as per RSA, 1997). It is argued by Calland (writing in The Cape Times: day 
unknown, 2002) that, in the case of free basic water, the "reserve" or " minimum core right" represents the 
entirety of the right itself. Indeed, Walker (1993: 41 ) warned of the dangers of conflating minimum 
standards of services to meet 'basic' needs with the absolute level necessary to sustain life. In the realm 
of a ' rights-based' framing of 'basic' needs; definitions then became even more s ignificant and indeed 
point to the limits of rights. 
More critical legal scholars stress that water rights are directly related to civil society's ability to pressure 
the state to deliver. That is, by the abi lity to defend socio-economic rights in law (Flynn & Chirwa, 2005 ; 
Bond & Dugard, 2008). "Ultimately, defining and enforcing these legal rights is a political struggle 
requiring the active participation of the poor and allied organizations" (Flynn & Chirwa, 2005: 74). For 
example : Dugard and McKinley (Public lecture, 2008) spoke of the judgement in Mazibuko vs City of 
Johannesburg: 
The greatest credit for this extraordinary legal victory must go to the residents of Phiri who 
resisted the installation ofPPMs [prepaid water meters], and to all the other residents of poor 
communities, both in Johannesburg and across the country, who have been fighting, and continue 
to fight, for accessible. affordable and sufficient water provision/delivery. 
Moreover, other legal writers (De Waal, Currie & Erasmus, 2001) stress the differences between positive 
and negative rights (civil and political or ' first-generation ' rights). Negative rights impose a duty on the 
state "not to act in certain ways," that is to protect society from the state (De Waal, et a!. , 200 I: 432) . 
Negative protection is the usual form of judicial protection given to civil and political rights. 
Applied to socio-economic rights the term means that a court can prevent the state from acting in 
ways that infringe the socio-economic rights directly ... The rights to ... water ... may therefore not 
be subjected to what have been termed ' deliberate ly retrogressive measures'. A deliberately 
retrogressive measure is one which has the effects of denying individuals their existing access of 
water, food or housing. or preventing them from using whatever resources they have at their 
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disposal to satisfY their water, food and housing needs. More generally, law or conduct leading to 
a decline rather than progressive improvement in living and housing conditions would be a 
violation of this negative aspect of the socio-economic rights and could be declared invalid for this 
reason (De Waal, eta!., 2001: 434-435). 
7 FREE BASIC WATER IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The Free Basic Water policy of 200 I based on the principles of improving public health, gender and 
equity. recognised by govemment as a significant poverty alleviation measure, was announced in the 
local government election manifesto (September 2000). It was to be implemented in July 2001, 
progressively until June 2003 (DWAF, 200 I). 
The writings on free bas ic water swivel around two major axes: the benevolent principled state versus the 
Machiavellian 16 state. The movement between the two is knotted in the progression from origin to 
intention. Common to both literatures is that of trying to supply water to citizens with previously tenuous 
access. The first, ' the Durban experiment,' sought to provide to recently urbanised residents living in 
informal settlements a basic supply of water; the second recognised that poor rural citizens could not 
afford to pay the ' user fees' which accompanied newly implemented water infrastructures. I will show 
how ' the Durban experiment' moved from apparently benevolent origins to the realm of calculated intent, 
in this; it influenced the second recognition; primarily because it offered ' proof' that such a policy to 
provide free volumes of water could actually work. Contestations around the origins of free bas ic water 
are significant precisely because they offer clues as to where the pendulum was swinging at the time. 
Within government there are different views of the origins of free basic water. Macleod (Durban ' s water 
manager) has argued that free basic water was invented in Durban by his Water Service Department. 
Prior to 1997 the Durban Metropolitan Council, under his leadership, was tasked with investigating the 
water access options of citizens residing in the burgeoning informal settlements springing up around 
Durban (Macleod, 2007: 3). Macleod (2007) noted that the chief means of water access for these citizens 
was via the purchase of water at local trading stores: 
... at great cost. This manner of obtaining water was unsustainable and created significant social 
and financial problems in the area. This lead to destruction of water infrastructure and fire 
hydrants as illegal methods of connection were sought (Macleod, 2007: 4). 
This, according to Macleod (2007), required more thorough research which culminated in the provision of 
200 litres per day instituted via the daily filling of a 200-litre household water drum at a minimal charge. 
During 1998 the eThekwini Municipal Council, as part of strategising around ways to ensure that poor 
households had permanent access to a water supply, assessed the bailiff-operated system implemented in 
Durban·s informal settlements, and found that "the amount of money that was collected by the Council 
for the water supply was in fact equivalent to or less than the costs of administering the collection of the 
amounts from the relevant communities" (Macleod, 2007: 4). The outcome was the decision to 
1
" See Niccol6 Machiavelli"s (1967) The Prince. 
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implement the drum water supply system, providing 200 litres per day or 6kt per month, at zero charge 
(Bailey, 2003: Macleod, 2007). Macleod (2007: 3) states that during 1997 and 1998, "eThekwini 
Municipality was instrumental in introducing free basic water to South Africa and in coming up with a 
measure for the amount of water that should be given free to indigent communities." 
Macleod with the former Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry conceptualised water access in the same 
vein stressing those without formal access as well as problems of affordability once infrastructure is 
provided. Indeed, Kasrils's epiphany at a dried-out river bed has gained much publicity: 
At a dried out river bed in the remote Eastern Cape village ofLutsheko, I came across a young 
woman with a 3-week-old baby on her back. She was on her knees scooping muddy water out of a 
shallow hole to fill her container. I asked why she did not use the village water scheme. The 
scheme provides each family with 6 000 litres of fresh water a month for only Rl 0. She told me 
she could not afford it (Kasrils, 2000b; his article in the Cape Times, 19 July 2000). 
Mike Muller, who was the Director-General of the Department of Water Affairs during the period when 
"the Free Basic Water (DW AF) policy was conceptualised and implemented" (Muller, 2006: 2) holds the 
same view of previous in-access: 
... it gradually became obvious that there were problems of access, as many people were too poor 
to take advantage of the new services. Thus a new policy determined that all South Africans 
should receive a basic water supply free of charge (Muller, 2008: 67). 
In 2000, with ANC discussions regarding the provision of free basic water, the eThekwini Municipality 
experience became instructive: 
In my view the experiences in eThekwini Municipality influenced government policy when it 
came in 2000 to determine the amount of free water that should be provided by all municipalities. 
I was involved in that decision and I personally engaged with Minister Ronnie Kasrils. the then 
Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry, during this time (Macleod, 2007: 5). 
Kasrils and others c lose to government (Sussens and Vermeulen, 2001 ) have affirmed the influence ofthe 
Durban case on the conceptualisation of the Free Basic Water Policy on numerous occasions. For 
example: 
The City of Durban has demonstrated the possibility of providing .free water to the poor by 
providing the first 6 000 litres per month free. Thereafter, the more customers use on a rising 
tariff scale, the more they pay. Revenue from ratepayers consuming greater amounts of water 
helps to cross-subsidise the poor. Whether you are rich or poor, if consumption is under 6 000 
litres, you are not biJled. A total of93% of bills are paid, which shows that non-payment is often a 
problem ofaffordability and that a system can work without the insistence on cost recovery from 
all consumers .. . The challenge is to find ways of funding the rural areas where the cost-cutting 
advantages of the cities and towns don ' t exist. If the Durban model can be replicated in all urban 
centres, then the Government can concentrate on providing water service grants for rural councils 
(Kasrils, writing in The Cape Times: 19 July 2000b. my emphasis). 
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However, in 2007, with the Mazibuko vs City of Johannesburg ruling, it appeared that DWAF was trying 
to distance itself from the 'all roads lead to Durban' thesis: 
The Durban example contributed to the policy on free basic water but was not the only factor 
relied upon in finalising the policy. It is incorrect that then Minister Kasrils based the free basic 
water policy solely on the Durban case (Schreiner, 2007: 73, my emphasis). 
Why then does Schreiner (2007) sow doubt? The answer lies not in a yellow attempt by National 
Government to usurp the glory of the inventor but rather because Durban was seen by leftist critics to 
sabotage the free basic water policy. lt was thus a legal strategy to remove the free basic water project 
(and all of its accompanying critique) from its locus. For example: Bond (2007) showed the bureaucratic 
trickiness underpinning Durban's free basic water offering. which according to him sabotaged the 
primary agenda (progressive) by reversing the humane, redistributive and gendered promises through 
neol iberal mechanisms such as, adopting convex tariff structures, allocating water per household and not 
per capita, retracting from original RDP mid and long-term goals, and allowing too much leeway for 
municipal bureaucrats to ' interpret' or rather manipulate the policy for parochial ends. The refutations 
came too late however; Durban's free basic water architect had positioned himself and the City ofDurban 
at the centre of the free basic water story. The national expansion of a policy based on the contested 
'Durban experiment,' therefore cast doubt on the entire national free basic water project. The apparent 
murkiness underpinning free basic water's conceptualisation is given further traction as we now consider 
the strange rationale underlying the final volume of free basic water offered. 
7.1 How much is enough -the debates 
Once free basic water was declared a new imperative for local government the debate on exactly how 
much was enough and why 6k~ was chosen opened up. The offering of 6kf was criticised by the left for 
not being enough (see, for example: McDonald, 2002c; Harvey, 2003; Smith, 2003; Bond, 2004b; 
Deedat, 2006). Moreover, some argued the volumes offered had more to do with what was convenient 
for the state 's cost recovery goals (Desai, 200 l; Pape, 2002; McDonald, 2002a; Bond, 2004b; Ruiters, 
2005; Smith & Green, 2005). As a response, two major threads run through the debates on water 
requirements: the first is that of the influence of international domestic water quantity 
'recommendations' and the second (linked to the first) is that of the issue of scarcity. The former 
introduced scientific contestation within international and national discourse; the latter was even more 
vexed, with international scholars interrogating prevailing ' population-resources· ideological 
assumptions; which actually turned the notion of needs and scarcity on its head. 
Over the years recommendations on water requirements of between 20 and 40 litres per capita per day 
were posted by a number of international agencies (Gleick, 1998). For example: by the United States 
Agency for International Development, the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees. the World 
Bank, the United Nations Development Programme and the World Health Organisation (see later). Much 
of the literature that is available frames basic water requirements in rights-based or physiological and 
biological terms, that is, the volumes of water to meet absolute/emergency needs: prevent dehydration, 
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cook a basic staple meal and ensure basic hygiene (Gleick, 1996 & 1998). Moreover, very little 
justification, if any is provided in how the water requirements were calculated. For example: the United 
Nations Development Programme, via its Human Development Report (2006: 65) has advocated that 
"every person has a human right to a minimum of about 20 litres each day•· in terms of "establishing 
social minimum provision levels" (my emphasis). No justification is given for how this volume was 
arrived at: the "20 litres" is simply repeated in various guises th irteen times throughout the text. Gleick 
(1996: 90) himself, with notable omissions, (yet) roundly lauded by a section of leftist South African 
scholars (see Mazibuko vs City of Johannesburg), had recommended a basic water requirement as a 
"fundamental human right" of 50 litres per capita per day: allowing 15 litres for bathing, I 0 litres for 
cooking, 5 litres drinking water and 20 litres for sanitation and hygiene. 
Consistent with most of the international agencies indicated above, DW AF did not provide explanations 
for how it had calculated that 25 litres was required in relation to ' basic' needs. Instead, the key 
justification for DWAF's quantification of free basic water offered is the World Health Organisation's 
(WHO) 'recommendations· of 25 litres per capita per day. For example: DW AF's guidelines on "Free 
Basic Water Provision: Key Issues for Local Authorities" (March, 2001 ), states: 
What is implied by a ' basic' supply of water? 
The South African standard on a 'basic' level of water supply sufficient to promote healthy living 
draws on the World Health Organization standard of25 litres per person per day. This amounts to 
about 6 000 litres per household per month for a household of eight people. This volume has been 
set as the basic target for all households in South Africa and will be regulated as part of the 
national strategy in terms of Sections 9 and 10 of the Water Services Act of 1997 (DW AF, 
2001: 2). 
This reference to 25 litres per capita per day is pervasive in the South African Free Basic Water Policy 
literature. Yet, the original source of the WHO ·recommendations,' is shrouded in mystique. 17 
Moreover, the validity of the WHO ' recommendations' had not been challenged by South African 
scholars. Around 2003 however, DW AF distanced itself from the WHO ' recommendations' : "The 
amount of 25 litres of water per person is not based on a World Health Organisation standard, but is a 
widely accepted and internationally applied norm" (Kasrils, writing in The Witness: 20 November 2003). 
Kasrils gave no justification for the source of such a "widely accepted ... norm" (Ibid, 2003). 
Significantly, however this refutation coincided with a contestation from within the WHO itself. Howard 
and Bartram (2003) refuted the claim that the WHO had issued recommendations on domestic water 
requirement standards and further suggested that the document referred to might be the Global Water 
Supply and Sanitation Assessment 2000 Report (WHO and UNICEF, 2000), which may have been 
mis interpreted by the conflation of actual water requirements with proximity of water source and water 
service level. 
Despite common claims of WHO standards relating to water quantity, WHO has not previously 
published specific guidance on the quantities of water as targets for health protection and 
promotion (Howard & Bartram, 2003: 2, my emphasis). 
17 DWAF cites that the recommendation comes from the WHO: it does not cite a specific document. 
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The WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme, which produces the Global Assessment of 
Water Supply and San itation data, describes reasonable access as being ' the availability of at least 
20 litres per person per day from a source w ithin one kilometre of the user's dwelling' (WHO and 
UNICEF, 2000). However, it should be noted that th is definition relates to [sic] primarily to 
access and should not necessarily be taken as evidence that 20 litres per capita per day is a 
recommended quantity of water for domestic use (Howard & Bartram, 2003: I ). 
In 2007, in response to Mazibuko vs City of Johannesburg and continuing the denial of the original c laim 
of a link to the 'WHO recommendations,' and moreover Kasrils' s (2003) own claim of "some" "widely 
accepted and internationally applied norm[s];" Schreiner (2007: 47) stated, "At the time that South 
Africa' s water policy was being established. the relevant international agencies had not taken a formal 
position on quantitative minimum standards." This position was reaffirmed by Macleod (2007: 5), who 
said: 
At the time we were making our investigations in eThekwini Municipality, there was very little 
research either in South Africa or internationally on the amounts people actually use and need and 
the research that we had done in eThekwini Municipality was amongst the only actual research 
re levant to South Africa and the South African experience ... at that time there was little other 
international research to guide us. 
Moreover, those involved in the conceptualisation of the volumes of free basic water, in response to the 
seminal Howard and Bartram (2003) study which posited a positive correlation between improved service 
levels and higher volumes of use. as an attempt to exonerate themselves, cited a decreased household size 
(4.48 in 1996 to 3.8 in 200 1) and "welfare policy of general application" 18 (Schreiner, 2007: 4 1) and 
unabashedly c laimed that the WHO had 'come around' to the South African standard. 
The position finally taken by the WHO (Taken from: Domestic water quant ity, service level and 
health by Guy Howard, Water Engineering and Development Centre, Loughborough University, 
UK and Jamie Bartram, World Health Organization ... Geneva, 2003) reflected closely that taken 
ten years previously by the drafters ofthe RDP (Schreiner, 2007: 47-48). 
The definition of a basic water supply as 25 led was supported by recent recommendations of the 
World Health Organization (WHO), which had for decades sought to avoid pronouncing on the 
matter. WHO' s position reflected that taken 10 years previously by the drafters of South Africa's 
RDP (Muller, 2008 : 82). 
The Howard and Bartram study (2003) actual ly did not resound with the South African standards; what it 
did was to show that water volumes consumed actually have more to do with proximity of water source 
and service level. For example: if the distance between the user and the water source moves from I 00-
1 000 metres to an on-site source then consumption would increase from 20 litres per capita per day to 50 
litres, with subsequently lowered health concerns (Howard and Bartram, 2003: 22). That is. it highlighted 
'" In her argument for maintaining the free basic offering at 6k! a month. 200 litres per day or 25 litres per member of an &-member 
household per day: Schreiner (2007: 41) indicates that 93.96% of all South African households have 8 or fewer members (200 I 
Census-StatS SA). Hence. only the balance has more than 8 members and therefore the reach of free basic water is in line with the 
rule of general application: 
In the design of any welfare policy of general application. there is a need to balance the proportion of potential 
beneficiaries who receive less benefitS than intended with the proportion who receive more. This case. where without any 
adjustment, the policy of providing 200lcd would target effectively 94% of South African households, compares well with 
the targeting efficiency of many other welfare interventions (Schreiner, 2007 : 41 ). 
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the paradox of the South African case: improving service level and bringing infrastructure closer to the 
user whilst simultaneously limiting the water at the source, in other words, the construction of a system of 
access which at its final point, instead of the realisation of ('natural') increased consumption; provides 
('unnatural ') restriction. 
All of the above points to the possibility that the free 6kt was based on an illusory, even flawed 
document, and with the Durban experience setting a precedent, itself based on the conceptualisation of 
water on previous in-access (informal trading store or rural provision), shaped by technocratic 
methodologies and framed within a narrow affordability milieu implored a more rigorous debate. Yet, 
South African scholars did not sufficiently interrogate government volumetric concessions. Ignoring the 
implications of the Howard and Bartram (2003) study; national government defended its policy by 
arguing that it had to first ensure that all households were connected to service systems before 
augmenting volumetric allocations to those already connected. This was dubbed the "some for all rather 
than all for some" principle (Schreiner, 2007: 61). Lured into conceptualising basic water requirements 
within similar frameworks of 'scarcity,' and in an amenable format that government ' will understand', the 
South African left (unions, social-justice advocacy groups and leftist-academics) attempted to calculate 
how much poor households ' really' need in contrast to the 25 Iitres per capita per day offered. 
For example: in South Africa, post-Free Basic Water, Cosatu and Samwu (2003) and Samwu (2007), 
have, over the years, attempted to calculate the minimum water requirements for persons (not defined) 
living in an 8-member household with an optimal water supply. Methodologies employed are 'common-
sense' based considering water use activities, frequencies and volumes per activity and in the case of the 
latter study, based on 'expert' opinion, information garnered from the City of Cape Town and 'own 
measurements.' Hence, researchers employed largely desktop research and dialogue on 
practical/technical matters. The first study (Cosatu and Samwu, 2003), calculated the daily minimum 
requirements of between 63. 105 or 120 litres per capita per day- excluding water for productive use 
(figures jump by way of substituting 2 baths/3 showers a week for a daily wash in a basin bath). The 
second study (Samwu, 2007) calculated 'water sufficiency,' and too was based on dai ly water use 
requirements for a member residing within an 8-member household. The total daily minimum proposed 
is 90 litres per capita per day and excludes water for sanitation as this activity is covered via a 4.2kC 
additional volume granted per household (17.5 litres per capita per day) by the City of Cape Town. This 
volume of90 litres per capita per day is, as Samwu (2007) has indicated, conservative. 
In sharp contrast to the 'scientific' and ideologically 'neutral ' discourse above, international scholars 
(Harvey, 1977 & 1996; Illich, 1993) on the 'radical' left interrogated the assumptions underlying 
·scarcity' . 'resources' and 'needs. ' In th is, they drew on Marxist critiques that 'resources' must be 
understood as "relational rather than absolute•· (Harvey, 1996: 226 citing Oilman, 1971). That is, to 
declare resources as "absolute" means that society has no control over them when in fact resources are 
given value, transformed into utility by society and defined in relation to a particular t ime (Harvey, 1996). 
Core to this thesis then, is that, consistent with Marxist interpretation, needs are not purely biological, but 
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also socially and culturally constructed (Harvey, 1977; Illich, 1993). Moreover, Harvey ( 1977: 236) 
conceives that scarcity is not inherent in nature but socially and culturally determined; scarcity is 
produced via human activity and managed via social organisation. Returning to the relational aspect of 
resources; Harvey (1977: 236, citing Harvey, 1973) like Marx, in the context of a society dominated by 
elites (capital interests) posits its relationship to the ·mode of production' and notes, "Scarcity is in fact 
necessary for the survival of the capitalist mode of production. and it has to be carefully managed, 
otherwise the self-regulating aspect to the price mechanism will break down." Central to such an 
interpretation is that the prevailing views about the population-resources relationship as neutral. absolute 
and outside of ' our' control are in fact "political in origin and have political effects" (Harvey, 1977: 237). 
To declare a state of ecoscarcity is in effect to say that we have not the will, wit, or capacity to 
change our state of knowledge, our social goals, cultural modes, and technological mixes, or our 
form of economy, and that we are powerless to modifY either our material practices or ' nature' 
according to human requirements. To say that scarcity resides in nature and that natural limits 
exist is to ignore how scarcity is socially produced and how ' limits' are a social relation within 
nature (including human society) rather than some externally imposed necessity (Harvey, 
1996: 147). 
However, it is not Harvey's voice or even Marx's that imbues the local and international population-
resources discourse, but Thomas Malthus' s: there are simply too many people and not enough resources. 
Under the Malthusian assumption of 'overpopulation'. someone or some people must be made redundant 
(Harvey, 1977). ln a milieu of a society dominated by an elite or other powerful interests the question of 
who actually must bear the cost is quite simply ' them' - those people that have less power and "less 
relevance for the economy'' (IIlich, 1993: 95); that is "the non-elite invariably experience some form of 
political, economic, and social repression" (Harvey, 1977: 237). 
Indeed, as the Malthusian argument goes: misery must fall somewhere, why not onto those already 
miserable? (Harvey, 1977: 217). 'Helping· ' them' wi ll simply make them lazy, stop working and 
encourage reproduction; this will help neither capital nor scarcity- 'we· will all become miserable. 
The labouring poor, to use a vulgar expression, seem always to live from hand to mouth. Their 
present wants employ their whole attention, and they seldom think of the future. Even when they 
have an opportunity of saving, they seldom exercise it. but all that is beyond their present 
necessities goes, generally speaking. to the ale-house. The poor laws of England may therefore be 
said to diminish both the power and the will to save among the common people, and thus to 
weaken one of the strongest incentives to sobriety and industry, and consequently to happiness 
(Malthus, 1970: 98). 
Let us now return to the free volume of 6kt contrived for the settlement of 'basic needs' or ' basic 
requirements. ' Illich (1993) and Gronemeyer (1993) argue that the concept of 'basic needs ' is a 
derivative of development which sought to split humanity above and below a measurable standard of 
decency and normality. Core to this was that ' basic needs' could be expressed, via technical 
measurements, in monetary terms which called in a '·new kind of bureaucracy to establish [scientific] 
criteria for what was acceptable - and what was not" (lllich, 1993: 92, my emphasis). 
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Welfare is not a cultural hammock. It is an unprecedented mediation of scare resources through 
agents who not only define what need is, and certify where it exists, but also c losely supervise its 
remedy - with or without the needy's approval (Illich, 1993: 96). 
The needy person ... is not the master of his or her neediness. [But] ... the result of a comparison 
with a foreign normality, which is effectively declared to be obligatory. One becomes needy on 
account of a diagnosis -1 decide when you are needy. Help allotted to a needy person is a 
transformative intervention (Gronemeyer, 1993: 66, her emphasis). 
The important point, to bring out in this discourse above is that 'basic needs ' or ' requirements ' are 
determined by the other, more powerful or economically relevant elements of governance. 'Needs,' 
divorced from the peculiar social, cultural and place/time context. are re-determined ·scientifically,' by 
"experts" (Rose, 2006: 155), for the needy. In attempting to measure free basic water, the determinations 
and framing of basic water requirements appear consistent with such an approach. In this regard, Taylor-
Gooby (2000: II ) offers a caveat: "The inte llectual dominance of market ideas - one of the few areas in 
which an approach whose rationale is based on professional expertise goes relatively unchallenged - may 
lead to policies which are damaging to human interests in tackling the uncertainties that citizens face.'' 
8 WATER TARIFF DESIGNS: AN OVERVIEW 
The adoption of the Dublin principles in 1992 at the International Conference on Water and the 
Environment meant that water would be treated as an 'economic good' (Savenije & van der Zaag, 2002; 
Rogers, de Silva & Bhatia, 2002). A few months later the United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development (Earth Summit) in Rio de Janeiro pronounced water a 'social good' too; the initial 
economic principles stuck. ln line with this discourse, the full cost pricing of water services became 
important. International scholars have argued that the final price to consumers should then include not 
just the operation, maintenance and capital costs (costs of supply) but also the opportunity costs. 
economic and environmental externality costs (Rogers, Bhatia & Huber, 1998). Such pricing (in this 
view) implicated that not only would the resource then be put to its most valuable uses. send the ·correct' 
messages to users that "water is an economic good in scarce supply ... and must be treated as a valuable 
commodity" (Whittington, 2003: 61 & 70) but also ensure equity, fairness, efficiency, sufficiency of 
revenue and environmental sustainability (Boland & Whittington, 1998; Rogers, et al. , 2002). 
Tariff structures entail a mix of competing objectives. which are typically articulated as the following: 
revenue sufficiency. economic efficiency, equity and fairness, income redistribution and resource 
conservation; secondary considerations include: public acceptability, political acceptability, simplicity 
and transparency, net revenue stability and ease of implementation (Boland & Whittington, 1998: 4-5; 
Rogers, et a!.. 2002). Additional mechanisms to achieve such objectives are broadly housed within the 
'demand management' rubric: which include. among others, metered water usage, education and training, 
user charges. subsidies and penalties (Savenije & van der Zaag, 2002). However. there is contestation 
within the dominant school of 'economic' thought as to the best tariff design to achieve these above 
objectives. Historically, uti lities employed ' uniform ' charges; but there has been a substantial move 
towards increasing block tariffs (Savenije & van der Zaag, 2002), and more recently a combination of 
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increasing block tariffs [IBT] with a fixed charge has been mooted (Boland & Whittington, 1998; Rogers, 
et al. , 2002; Whittington, 2003). 
The use of IBTs has been acclaimed as an instrument for improving access and ensuring equity (Rogers, 
el a/ .. 2002: 7; Savenije & van der Zaag, 2002; UNDP: Human Development Report, 2006). IBT"s 
provide a lifeline or minimum supply to poor users below cost which is subsidised by users consuming 
beyond the minimum supply and charged at higher rates (Rogers, el a/. , 2002). This has resulted, 
accord ing to Boland and Whittington (1998: 1), in the situation in which, " Increasing block tariffs have 
become the tariff s tructure of choice in developing countries" (my emphasis). Their use of "choice"; 
however, is curious because they go on to say: 
Multilateral donors, international financial and engineering consultants, and water sector 
professionals working in developing countries all commonly presume that IBT structures are the 
most appropriate way to determine water users' monthly bills (Boland & Whittington, 1998: I). 
Nevertheless, the debate on the use of IBTs is primarily located around the determination of the size of 
the first block parameter and price. In th is regard, critics argue that the first block is generally too big and 
underpriced (Boland & Whittington, 1998). This, they argue, sends the wrong message to consumers and 
can undermine financial revenue and the sustainability of the service (Whittington, 2003). This situation, 
they suggest is caused by undue political interference in the tariff design process by actors w ho do not 
appreciate the complexity of balancing the competing objectives and indeed that tariff setting should be 
done with a long-term view (Boland & Whittington, 1998; Whittington. 2003). According to Boland and 
Whittington ( 1998: 6) an ' ideal· IBT should ensure that "relatively few users terminate their consumption 
in this [first] block." That is, the first block parameter should be " not more than 5kt per month;" which 
would ensure that o nly those for whom the subsidy is targeted consume within this block and all others 
fa ll into the second tariff block, thereby permitting the utility to recover the marginal cost of supply 
(Boland & Whittington, 1998: 7). The suggestion of an additional fixed charge is as an attempt to remedy 
the s ituation where the above ' ideal ' is not politically possible, thereby as an effort to secure and stabilise 
revenue suffic iency as well as to prevent zero or negative bi lls (Boland & Whittington, 1998; Rogers, et 
a/., 2002). 
South African policy directives reflect this prevailing international orthodoxy. South African tariff 
regulations require that municipal tariff structures are designed on a rising block tariff (same as increasing 
block tariff), with three or more tariff blocks and further allow for a fixed charge for households 
exceeding the 6kt free basic supply (DW AF, 2002c). Regulations reflect "the more you use. the more 
you pay" principle (DWAF. 2002c: 72), with the first tariff block comprising a maximum of 6kt "set at 
the lowest amount, including a zero amounf' (DW AF. 2002c: 72). In this regard, It is useful to return to 
Boland and Whittington' s (1998) critique ofiBTs as including too large a volume in the first block and 
bemoaning political interference. The introduction of free basic water within the prevailing IBT 
framework, may have actually met a ll the 'requirements· of Boland and Whittington's (1998) ' ideal' 
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design - the first block appears small enough to ensure that terminat ion (for the majority) is achieved in 
the second marginal cost block. 
In this regard, South Africa's Free Basic Water Policy, despite the naysayers (Boland & Whittington, 
1998; Bate & Tren, 2002; Whittington, 2003 ; Savenije & van der Zaag, 2002; Rogers. et a!.. 2002) 
appears consistent with full cost pricing philosophies. Ironically, it is the political ' interference' that may 
have delivered the ' best practice' principles which have regulated the size of the first block tariff; thereby 
allowing this full cost pricing to take shape. 
In South Africa, we treat water as both a social and an economic good. Once social needs have 
been met, we manage water as an economic good, as is appropriate for a scarce resource (Minister 
Kasri ls quoted in DWAF, 2003: 27). 
The volume of water offered via the Free Basic Water Policy apparently meets Kasrils's ·social good· 
requirements. The National Water Services Regulation Strategy explicitly stipulates affordability criteria 
to a 'basic· supply and not supply per se (OW AF, 2008a: 57). Tariff structures, after the first 6kf block 
must be ' cost-reflexive' and therefore may increase sharply (RSA, 1997: 18; DWAF, 2003: 27). Indeed, 
this might in part explain why South Africa' s Free Basic Water Policy, initially having been severely 
cr iticised by international agencies is now being promoted as a strategy to meet the Millennium 
Development Goals, following the South African example by ensuring free or lifel ine tariffs to the 
world 's poor (UNDP: Human Development Report, 2006: 22, 66). 
In such a dominant milieu local scholars have contested the apparent equity of increasing block tariffs, 
which appear to be far more concerned with cost recovery. For example: as Pape (writing in Business 
Day: 2 November 2000) asserts: " [IBTs] ... will fail because they are set in a policy that is far more 
determined to recover costs and cut budgets than it is to deliver water to people:· Core to such critiques 
is that the first block or 'l ifeline' is too narrow, subsequent blocks too expensive and not sufficiently 
concave to promote affordability or environmental sustainability (McDonald, 2002d; Bond. 2004b: Smith 
& Green, 2005). Poor households falling into steep subsequent blocks, out of necessity not over-
consumption, accrue very little, or no financial relief or, in many cases, face higher water charges 
(McDonald, 2002b; Ruiters, 2005; Bond, 2007). The attainment of a full, healthy and productive life is 
therefore dependent on the ability of households to mobil ise their assets and claims, to pay for water 
charges above the 6kf (Deed at, 2006). 
Part of the problem of ensuring affordable and equitable tariff structures, critics argue (Centre for Applied 
Legal Studies, 2008), is that municipal ities are given far too much autonomy in tariff design 
determination. Although tariff structures are regulated, with the first block set at a maximum volume of 
6kf (or as much as the municipality can afford); the subsequent blocks (parameters and prices) are not 
d ictated. In this regard, DWAF has shied away from prescribing monetary block attachments, instead 
instructing via the following broad principles: "equity, proportion to use, affordability, reflecting costs 
(costs associated with rendering the service), different iation (differentiation between different categories 
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of users, debtors, service providers, services, service standards and geographical areas) and transparency" 
(DWAF, 2002b: 37). This has meant that municipal tariff designs differ across municipal j urisdictions; 
with the subsequent implication that "Service costs vary dramatically across the country" (McDonald, 
2002b: 164 and see DWAF Local Municipality tariff survey, 2006/7). For example: The 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Review [IGFR] (2003) charts the monthly municipal consolidated service bills 
for a variety of South African local municipalities and metropolitans. The IGFR tables consider monthly 
service bills for 'small households, ' defined as, residing on a "300m2 plot, 48m2 improvements, 498 units 
of electricity and 25k~ water" (IGFR, 2003). The IGFR table includes rates, electricity (basic), electricity 
(consumption), water (basic), water (consumption), sanitation, refuse removal, other and VAT. The total 
bills and water component of the bill for 2002/3 are the following in descending order: Msunduzi 
Municipality (R510.14, Rl23.85); eThekwini (R455.70, R122.50); Buffalo City (R428.93, R81.78); City 
of Tshwane (R409.60, R87.20); Ekurhuleni Metro (R399.73, R86.40); Nelson Mandela (R396.96, 
R9 1.36); Mangaung (R344.96, R87.59); and City ofJohannesburg (R3 13.24, R86.41) [IGFR, 2003]. 
9 THE LOCAL STATE 
The local state is the implementing agency for many of the state' s most important development goals that 
have an acute bearing on South Africa' s poor citizens. The term local state is used here to denote more 
than the elected local government or municipal bureaucracy or ensemble of ' stakeholders.' The term was 
used by Cockburn (1977) to describe the local state as that part of the state concerned with the 
reproduction of labour power (focusing on issues such as housing, education, health and water) to ensure 
that the local labour force was housed, fed, fit and disciplined for capital. While broadly drawing on this 
view, elements of Weberian theory are added to explore the local state as a relatively coherent set of 
practices and institutions geared towards supporting the reproduction of capitalist social relations 
(Harvey, 1989: 126). Relative coherence implies that even local states are not substantively coherent or 
internally unified (Jessop, 1990; Painter, 2006). As Painter (1995: 63-65) writes, the state is a site where 
strategies of rule over territorially defined populations are elaborated, and where populations are more or 
less pacified, routinely observed and regulated, but these strategies are not self-evident and depend on 
previous ones chosen. These local strategies according to Harvey (I 989) are also decided in a context 
where cities and regions compete with one another for capital (lower wages. lower costs of reproducing 
labour, improved technologies, lower transport costs, less crime, effective urban social control and so on). 
Local states in a country have similarities but also vary from place to place. That is, as argued by Gupta 
(2006: 229) notions ofthe reification of the state as unitary are problematic; instead conceptualisations of 
state operation should be decentralised and disaggregated. For example Painter (1995: 83) states that "the 
delivery of public services to geographically scattered populations leads to the formation of localised 
systems of administration and service delivery." The variation in local state strategies (financial, 
administrative, cultural, moral order and legitimation) is particularly important for this dissertation. 
In South Africa, municipal interpretation is not confined to tariff design nor other ' pro-poor' policies (e.g. 
indigent policies) but extends to credit control and debt collection policies among others. In this regard 
the South African literatures have accorded local administrators (or street-level bureaucrats) a deceptively 
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passive role (Lipsky, 1993). Yet the architecture of a weak and porous state, as argued by Painter (1995) 
and Bond (2000) provides much space for local interpretation and manipulation. Scholars of the local 
state have noted that "neoliberally-orientated municipal officials" (Bond, 2006: 4) have sabotaged the 
state's redistribution and developmental goals, with cost recovery imperatives profoundly affecting how 
municipal bureaucracies work (Ruiters. 2005). Alongside the privatisation of services, citizens have been 
repackaged as ·customers,' with the poor learning to take responsibility for their poverty and learning 
how to live with the small packages of services delivered to sustain life (Ruiters, 2005), with 
contemporary state service delivery being far removed from notions of traditional public service delivery. 
Local refashioning of traditional service delivery along commercial lines has cascaded down with 
implications for traditional citizen-state relations: the access to rights and services means concurrent 
obligation/responsibility to not only pay for services but also to use them well (Ruiters, 2005). Moreover, 
Pithouse (2005) has suggested that citizens appear to be uncomfortable with the manner in which they are 
being treated by the state. Yet, the nature of this new state is difficult to understand. ln this, Abrams 
(2006) reminds us that the state is an illusory consensus - its real intentions are masked and it purposively 
constructs itself in a haze. Camus (1950) offers a more depressing analysis; for him, the state is simply 
absurd, its constructed bureaucracy offering citizens only excruciating frustration. Taylor-Gooby (1998) 
and Fjeldstad (2004) articulate the tensions between the state and citizens as a breakdown of public trust. 
What this means and how this is played out in the homes, streets and communities of poor citizens and 
indeed in the offices and buildings of official power opens up very different types of power, response 
strategies and implications for service delivery and notions of citizenship. 
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Chapter 3 
METHODOLOGY 
The study's methodology uses different data collection techniques to optimise the quality of data and the 
engagement of the respondent. This chapter lays out the epistemological and methodological theories as 
applied in the study. lt further outlines the sampling frame and procedure, study design, data collection 
techniques and data analysis undertaken. 
1 SAMPLING FRAME, DESIGN AND PROCEDURE 
This section presents the study area, study design, survey sampling framework and sampling procedures 
employed in the study. 
1.1 Study area 
The study was located in Ward 34, Eastwood. Eastwood is situated in Pietermaritzburg, in the province 
of KwaZulu-Natal, in South Africa (see Figure 3.1). Pietermaritzburg's municipal authority is called 
Msunduzi Municipality (KZ225), a category B municipality, 19 which is located under the 
uMgungundlovu District Municipality (DC22), South Africa. The study covered the period January 
2005-June 2007, with fieldwork over the period January 2005-July 2006. All municipal service tariffs 
referred to in this study are limited to the 2005/6 year. 
Only one area has been selected: Eastwood, for the purposes of an in-depth, exhaustive case study. 
Households in the community of Eastwood, a historically working class community within 
Pietermaritzburg, will form the core field area of the case study. Eastwood has ' formal housing,' with 
each household having access to an inside and yard water connection and grid electricity. All households 
receive a monthly service bill. Plots typically house one formal structure, with very few additional 
housing structures on properties e.g. additional back-yard shacks/outbuildings on properties. Although 
many different types of housing exist in Pietermaritzburg (formal and informal). 1 selected Eastwood 
rather than informally housed communities (in shacks) because this study is particularly concerned with 
formal water and electricity connections; hence this is essential for full-service billing. The community 
of Eastwood's demographic and socio-economic characteristics are similar to other poor and working 
class communities within Pietermaritzburg having ' formal housing. ' Additional Pietermaritzburg 
communities participated and engaged with the results of the Eastwood study for triangulation and 
typicality purposes. 
1
'
1 A ·category B municipality ' applies to non-Metropolitan municipalities. At the end of2007. Msunduzi Municipality became a 
Metropolitan and therefore then became a ·category A municipality.· 
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Kw...Zulu-Natal 
Figure 3.1 : Location of field area. 
Source: Demarcation Board website: www.demarcation.org.za, accessed 1 October 2008 and SA-
Venues website: www.sa-venues.com, accessed 1 October 2008. 
Pietermaritzburg communities have demonstrated sparks of opposition to free basic water implementation 
modes, water service affordability and delivery problems; and have demonstrated a willingness to 
advocate for water policy and implementation changes. Noting my application of a praxis epistemology, 
it was important that the study area selected presented a fertile environment for engagement and 
discussion. Eastwood provided the strongest case of a functioning Community Forum, within 
Pietermaritzburg's low-income communities and, of prime significance for this study, it showed the 
capacity to bring other Pietermaritzburg communities on board. The Eastwood Community Forum (ECF) 
has displayed leadership capacity, has a participatory and democratic organisational ideology, is well 
respected within the Eastwood community and other Pietermaritzburg community groupings and 
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significantly has municipal services and eviction issues as its core frame of concern. Furthermore, it 
provided a strong vehicle for engagement and advocacy. 
1.2 Study design 
The study design incorporated a number of different paradigms and perspectives, consistent with a praxis 
epistemology. Primarily this study is a contextual one, using the case study approach. The scope for 
generalising to the whole of South Africa is limited, however the thesis provides insights into what 
happens in municipalities pursuing aggressive cost recovery. The study employed a number of 
ethnographic techniques which all aimed to ensure optimum engagement with various respondents and 
importantly to triangulate data. In this regard the prime quantitative method was the survey approach to 
provide a framework of data which was then enriched by qualitative methods of focused semi-structured 
interviews, informal interviews, participatory observation, workshops (focus groups) and house visits, 
which involved conversations with residents wherever they were (and accompanying residents when they 
negotiated with the local state). ln addition, consistent with the epistemological approach taken (see 
later), much t ime was spent debating with respondents. 
Attempts were made to talk with respondents across the municipal spectrum. Furthermore, once the 
' picture' was clear, attempts were made to hear different voices to ensure that the entire experience was 
grounded in the many different realities and perspectives held by respondents. The study design was 
based on two particular paradigms- an amended ' action research' model and naturalistic inquiry - which 
seemed to work well together in the case study approach (consistent with Erlandson, Harris, Skipper & 
Allen, 1993). The design was grounded in cyclical reflection and learning, which adhered to all the 
naturalistic techniques employed to establish methodological adequacy and data trustworthiness: 
prolonged engagement, persistent observation, triangulation, referential adequacy, peer debriefing, 
member checks, reflexive journal, purposive sampling and audit trail (Erlandson, eta!., 1993: 131 - 161 ). 
Efforts were made to ensure that what was being researched and how it was researched was meaningful to 
and accessible to the households included in the study. In this regard, the study was reasonably 
pragmatic, exploratory and flexible in regard to new information and respondent leads. Ultimately, I 
sought to locate the research in the contextual experience of real citizens, with real voices and needs. 
Moreover, I was ever conscious of my role as researcher and tried to ensure that my intentions were clear 
to and open to scrutiny by respondents participating in the study (see Desai, 2006). Data techniques and 
study design will be expanded upon where particular reference is made further along in this chapter. 
This study is primarily located in the experience of Eastwood citizens, particularly women. In this regard 
the female gender is prioritised; not necessarily from a specific feminist perspective but because women 
were the primary care givers in the home, typically performed most of the primary and secondary water 
activities, physically paid the municipal bills, negotiated with municipal authorities and faced the greatest 
burden when municipal services were restricted or disconnected. In this regard female Community 
Researchers (CRs) were purposely selected to conduct the surveys. Furthermore, where possible, all 
surveys and lifestories were conducted with women as chief respondents. 
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1.3 Survey sampling framework 
The sampling framework on which the surveys were based was founded on a municipal database created 
specifically for my study purposes by Promis Income, Credit Control department. Msunduzi Municipality 
(June 2005). The database20 included all billed domestic Eastwood households (average water 
consumption per household per month from the date of implementation of the Promis system, 
approximately 3 years to June 2005) and land and property valuation data per erf (from the last valuation 
date of 1997).21 I perused the data and systematically eliminated a cluster of streets that were incorrectly 
included owing to inadequate ward jurisdiction mapping. Thereafter l checked all the Eastwood 
addresses against the Msunduzi 1997 Valuation Roll (2004/5 electronic version) to identify missing 
households on the Promis Income database and land-usage characteristics. Missing households were 
reverted to Promis Income and the omitted data retrieved. All non-residential homesteads were 
eliminated from the Eastwood database. Non-residential homesteads were identified by land use 
characteristics, as per Msunduzi 1997 Valuation Roll, e.g. vacant land, schools, parks, businesses etc. 
Other non-residential homesteads, not indicated as such, per the Msunduzi Valuation Roll, were identified 
via household visits and community researcher information. In addition, 1 conducted site visits to ensure 
that the information on the Valuation Roll and Promis Income database was consistent (via observation, 
speaking with Eastwood residents and checking data against individual household municipal service 
bills). Water consumption data, as provided by Promis Income, was checked randomly against 15 
household bills and found to be relatively consistent; although in some cases consumption was vastly 
divergent - this was due to a '3-year' mean with implications for demographic and consumption change. 
Land and property valuation, as provided by Promis Income, was checked against the Msunduzi 1997 
Valuation Roll (2004/5 electronic version), and found to be relatively consistent. Through this systematic 
process, I arrived at a sampling frame of I 090 residential Eastwood households, each with an average 
monthly water consumption and latest available land and property valuation. To this Promis Income data 
of 1 090 residential households, I added data per household on ' indigency status' (accessed via the 
indigency registry, Local Government Consultant, 2005a) and ' restriction status' (accessed and 
consolidated via restriction lists compiled from Msunduzi Consolidated Billing, 2005). 
1.4 Sampling procedures 
A combination of cluster, random and purposive sampling was used in the study. Prior to identifying the 
sampling clusters to be included in the sampling, two different consumption types were identified for pre-
analysis: households consuming 50.1 kf+ a month and user-specific restricted households. The former 
implicated household visits and the latter the employment of a short survey. The outcome of these 
preliminary inquiries resulted in the inclusion of the 50.1 kf category and restricted households as a 
separate user-specific category (see below for justification). ' Indigent' households were not included as a 
separate category; as the Indigent Policy had recently been implemented (July 2004) and, as per the 
information gained from the Local Government Consultant (2005a: personal communication [pc]), more 
20 I had asked for individual household payment data as well. This data was considered confidential and declined. 
21 (Land and property valuations were conducted in 1997. Valuations are conducted every 5 years. hence this data was valid till 
2002. Msunduzi Municipality last updated its valuations in 2008. 
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households would probably register during the study and households were only just starting to be 
restricted. ' Indigent" households were therefore included within ·normal ' consumption clusters during 
the survey but identified post-survey in the analysis phase. 
As per Prom is Income data, 22 households were indicated as consuming 50.1 kH per month. Noting that 
50.1 k!+ a month is well beyond the norm (mean consumption pre-survey); 10 such households were 
randomly selected via a random numbers table and visited (from 20-25 July 2005) to ascertain the causes 
and significantly, for the study, to j ustify inclusion or exclusion and to establish the most appropriate 
method. The results were split: in some cases consumption per household bills was indeed consistent 
with Promis Income data (very large household size, leakages, billing anomalies) but in others, 
contemporary consumption was inconsistent with Promis Income data (small household size, new 
residents and 'normal' consumption patterns). Owing to the variance in results and high potential for 
billing irregularities, failing infrastructure and household movement, it was decided to include the twenty-
two 50.1 k!+ households in the study, but as a separate category to facilitate better monitoring. 
One-hundred-and-fifty-nine22 (159) households were designated as ' restricted· water users and were on a 
'bad' debtor list consolidated up to August 2004 (data accessed through Credit Control department, 2004) 
and month-by-month up until June 2005 (data accessed through Credit Control department, 2005). Closer 
analysis was necessary to determine whether restricted households should be included as a separate 
cluster or included as per ' normal" consumption clusters. To facilitate this analysis a brief survey was 
conducted with all 159 restricted households. Restriction survey data was collected from 20-29 July 
2005, by five CRs. Five questions were asked per restricted household: ( 1) Is your water restricted now 
- in the eyes of the Municipality? (2) When was your water restricted? (3) Why was your water 
restricted? (4) Describe the flow of water. (5) Why are you no longer restricted? 
Statistical Program for the Social Sciences (version 15.0) was used for data entry and analysis. Perusing 
the results, 121 households were currently restricted 'in the eyes of the municipality,' 8 households 'had 
never been restricted,' and 30 had once been restricted (with 27 paying outstanding arrears, 2 new tenants 
and I 'don't know'). Of the 121 households restricted ' in the eyes ofthe municipality ': 28 had tampered 
with their restriction washers and 93 had not tampered. Having visited some of the restricted households 
and after discussions with CRs, it was evident that restriction washers had significant implications for 
water consumption, household dignity and well-being. In addition, although all 93 households were 
restricted with the same device; flow rates differed: slow, trickle or no flow at all. This was due to 
variance in water pressure, gradient, dirt particles within the water system and number of water points 
within the home (see Chapter 4, s4.5.1 ). This variable flow rate was also evident within households that 
had tampered, but variance, similarly with the above, further depended on type of tampering. For 
example: some households removed the device completely (returning to full pressure) and others just 
22 Note: from August 2005 until July 2006 (fieldwork period). restrictions continued (implemented as a debt control strategy via 
identifying 'bad · debtors or ' indigent" households), hence some households not initially restricted pre-June 2005. were restricted as 
per the duration of the survey data collection. Post-June 2005, Municipality-compiled monthly restriction lists were declined. 
40 
made the ' hole' bigger (implicating an improved yet still relatively slow flow) . In addition, if tampering 
was not done, households employed a variety of strategies to cope with a restricted flow: some restricted 
their water activities and consumption; others utilised water via other sources or moved to alternative 
accommodation. Significantly, preliminary analysis found that restricted households (121 restricted 
households in 'eyes of municipality') could not be included as part of the ' normal ' consumption clusters 
because restricted and tampered flow rates had major implications for water consumption. 
Having decided that so-called excessive consumption of 50.lkH households was to be included in the 
sampling clusters and restricted households, included as a separate user-specific cluster, Promis Income 
data was re-configured and Microsoft Office Excel was used for data entry and analysis. 1 used 
consumption as the independent variable instead of property and land valuations (a useful indicator of 
socio-economic status) because I was particularly interested in factors affecting consumption; with 
property valuations just one factor of many (also: household demographics, water activity frequencies 
and volumes, service packages, infrastructural quality, restrictions etc). Hence, I purposively put 
consumption at the centre of my analysis. 
The Promis Income database of 1 090 residential Eastwood households was statistically analysed to 
identify consumption clusters. At lower and mean volumes, 3kC increases provided a good differentiation 
to be better able to analyse the 6kC free basic water offering and mean consumption of ± 15kt The 
analysis added 9 more consumption clusters, which together with the 50.1 kC+ cluster and the user-
specific restriction cluster moved the total number of clusters to 11: (1) Restricted households; (2) 0-6ki; 
(3) 6.1-9kC; (4) 9.1-12kC; (5) 12.1-lSkC; (6) 15.1-l&kC: (7) 18.1-2lkC; (8) 2l.l-25kC; (9) 25.1-30kC; (10) 
30.1-SOkC; and (1 1) 50.1kC+. 
Having identified the consumption clusters; Stats version 1.1 (google stats version 1 .1) and decision 
analyst (www.decisionanalyst.com) was used to determine the number of households within each 
consumption category (see Table 3.1 ). l was assisted in this regard by Mr S. Ramroop, School of 
Mathematics, Statistics and Information Technology, University of KwaZulu-Natal (Ramroop, 2005 & 
2006). Sampling was conducted according to the following equation: 
n :.... N {1 + (N - 1)/PQ (d/Za)2 r• 
Where: 
P = those having the characteristic of interest 
Q = 1-P 
N = Population sample size 
d = Tolerance level (4%) 
Z a = 1.96 (from normal distribution tables; 95% confidence). 
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Table 3.1 : Survey sampling categories. 
Consumption category Number of households Sample(4%) #Surveyed 
1 Restricted 121 39 39 
2 0-6k! 75 33 33 
3 6.1-9kf 121 39 39 
4 9.1-12kt 145 42 42 
5 12.1-15kf 130 40 40 
6 15.1-18kt 124 39 39 
7 18.1-21kt 91 35 35 
8 21.1-25kf 105 37 37 
9 25.1-30kt 77 33 33 
10 30.1-50kt 79 33 32'J 
11 50.1 kf+ 22 16 8" 
Total 1 090 386 377 
Households within each cluster were selected using a random numbers table (www.random.org). 
I employed purposive sampling consistent with naturalistic inquiry in the selection of households to be 
included in the ' lifestories.' ln the initial sampling stages, households were identified on the basis of five 
broad categories which warranted further substantive inquiry: (1) restricted households ('bad' debtors) -
tampered and not-tampered; (2) restricted households via Indigent Policy - tampered, not-tampered and 
not-yet-restricted; (3) households with members living with HIV/AIDS or other disabilities; (4) 
' conventional' households struggling to pay their bills and self-restricting; and (5) households living on 
6k( or less ('conventional,' ·restricted' and ' indigent'). Thereafter, thirty households were identified 
using four different methods: household surveys; selection by CRs; direct approaches; and via 
' snowballing' or ·serially'. These thirty households were then approached as potential ' information rich ' 
cases - this is a very important step in naturalistic inquiry (Erlandson, et a!. , 1 993). In this regard, a 
respondent who satisfies such criteria is able to critically reflect, explain and share her/ his perspective on 
the phenomenon under analysis, and as the process progressed, 'cases' were sought that elucidated upon 
the ' stories ' that had already been collected (Erlandson, et at. , 1993). Finally I identified twenty 
households for their lifestories but also left space for additional households to be considered further along 
the process; if identified by other ' lifestory' households and on my own judgement as contributing a 
different perspective to the study or elaborating on already acquired knowledge (as consistent with 
Erlandson, et al. , 1993). 
U ltimately seventeen households were included in the lifestories proper, with an additional eight 
households being sought out for elucidating on specific phenomena (see Appendix A). Again, and 
consistent with naturalistic inquiry, the figure included in the lifestories is not problematic; it is the 
quality of the information gathered and not the quantity which is important (Erlandson, et at.. 1993: 84). 
I 'stopped' the interviews at 25 as 1 was confident that I had grasped the context, li fe-experiences, reality, 
2
' Clusters I 0 and II were under sampled by I and 8 respectively. ·n1is arose because in the Eastwood consumption contexL such 
high consumption is unusual. ln these clusters there were more billing and meter reading irregularities and although this group was 
vigorously sought out to try and meet the sampled number: the exercise became fruitless as commonly such households as per 
Prom is data had changed over the three years and were not typicall} reflective of such categorisation. Nevertheless. because I 
sampled fewer than the targeted sample: it is acknowledged as a limitation of the study. 
2
• Ibid. 
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perspectives and nuances of the phenomenon. That is, there was no new information forthcoming (refer 
to section 2.2). 
2 DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUES 
A number of data collection techniques were employed during the fieldwork period from January 2005-
July 2006. These are indicated briefly below; and presented in full in the following sections. Techniques 
were either quantitatively or qualitatively based, as appropriate, to maximise information gathered and 
provide the most comfortable format within the space and for the respondents involved. All data was 
triangulated using a variety of techniques and across stakeholders?5 Household surveys were the prime 
method of quantitative data extraction. These were supported by chiefly qualitative techniques, which 
typically contain a quantitative component. The techniques used were: focus groups; household 
lifestories; interviews - fonnal and informal (with municipal actors, citizens, academics, broader 
Pietermaritzburg community groupings, civil society organisations and The Department of Water Affairs 
and Forestry); interactive engagement, personal observation and citizen dialogue, community meetings 
and workshops; all on the prerequisite foundations of primary and secondary data. 
2.1 Surveys 
The main quantitative data collection instrument was a survey conducted between August 2005 and 
December 2005 (the details of which follow below). Surveys were conducted with 377 households. The 
survey had two components, (I) dealing with demographics and water activities, frequencies and 
volumes; and (2) service package ('conventional,' ·applied indigent' and 'lifeline'), consumption. billing 
and economic data. Ten female community members, active in the ECF, were elected by the Forum to be 
involved in the study fieldwork as CRs. The criteria for selection was the following: multi-lingual 
(isiZulu, English and Afrikaans); literate; residing in Eastwood; committed to and active in the ECF. 
Members of the ECF were selected as I hoped that the skills they would acquire by way of the study 
would build the capacity of the ECF, and that the knowledge gained would be directly accessible to the 
ECF for advocacy work. In addition it was an attempt to achieve meaningful data collection and 
community ownership. All the CRs involved in the study faced similar concerns regarding paying bills, 
restrictions, disconnections, housing evictions, tampering etc. lt was this experience that located water 
issues within a shared conceptualisation and consciousness so valuable for the study. 
Two focus groups were conducted with the CRs, not as a direct contribution to the study but as a way of 
establishing rapport; for me to get a feel of the field area context as well as to build a joint consciousness 
within the group regarding the Eastwood experience. The first focus group considered ' Life in Eastwood, 
Pietennaritzburg and South Africa: perspectives and issues, in general' and the second focus group 
considered 'Eastwood, water issues in particular. ' Following this, I conducted a two-day research 
25 A note on Ward Councillors: It is considered common courtesy to inform the ward councillor of any research study or other 
intervention that is to take place within his/her ward. I did not comply with such courtesy. My reasons were justified on the basis of 
previous engagement - which had been neither amenable nor positive. Furthem1ore. the community perception of the ANC 
councillor of the time: followed by a ·new· councillor elect. was congruent with that of my own - that of mistrust and suspicion. I 
did not want to be perceived as aligned with the councillor as it would havejeopardised my engagements with community members 
and indeed blocked free and open dialogue. 
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methods and procedures workshop. This was intentional as I wanted the CRs to conceptualise data 
collection as just one part of the research process; as well as to provide CRs w ith the basic skills for 
themselves to conduct their own community-based research, if they so wished; particularly with their 
advocacy forum in mind. The second and third workshops were facilitated with particular concern for the 
themes, input, shaping and procedures of data collection with regard to the surveys. With regard to the 
questions to be included in the survey; we discussed the main water issues; domestic water activities: 
modes, frequencies and measuring devices, how to ask questions of income, expenditure and billing, how 
to gently tackle issues of tampering and financial struggles. Much time was spent on municipal tariffs, 
how to read munic ipal consolidated bi lls, how meters worked and the mechanisms involved in free basic 
water, indigent and debt collection policies. (At this stage I reduced the number of CRs from ten to six;26 
this was both a practical intervention as an attempt to ensure quality data collection and a response to the 
real issues faced by four women who indicated that they could no longer commit to the process due to 
personal constraints). The survey instrument took all of these inputs into account. The first draft 
instrument was then taken back to the CRs for addition, amendment and readjustment. The second draft 
instrument was used for the pilot studies. Each CR and I undertook 5 surveys for piloting, with 
households selected via way of random numbers table. Thereafter we went through the surveys as a 
group; discussing difficulties, question appropriateness/reworking or eliminations, quality of responses, 
additions, new information or themes to explore and basic survey procedures. In addition to the group 
discussions, I spent time with each individual CR, going through their specific pilot surveys- hence here 
looking more closely at coding. quality of responses and exploring understanding of concepts. Following 
the pilot study, the final survey instrument was adopted. Each CR conducted 60 surveys, with myself 
picking up the balance. Two further meetings were conducted at the end of the data collection period. 
These meetings provided the space to discuss, debate and triangulate preliminary study results. 
2.2 Lifestories 
Lifestories in the naturalistic inquiry sense "take on the form of a dialogue" as opposed to a question and 
answer session (Erlandson, et a/. , 1993: &5). Lifestories further depart from a typical ' issue-based-
interview' in that they explore the past in relation to the present and the future. In this way context is 
embedded in responses and ass ists the interviewer in understanding the wholeness of the phenomenon. 
Hence, lifestories extend beyond the narrow confines of a typical interview to include a far more nuanced 
conversation regarding social, personal, cultural and economic context and how the respondent sits within 
such a milieu. Such " interviews allow the researcher and respondent to move back and forth in time; to 
reconstruct the past, interpret the present and predict the future'' (Lincoln & Guba, 19&5; cited by 
Erlandson, et a/., 1993: &5). The basic construct of such an interview is therefore open-ended and 
informal. Yet, and this is important, the planning of the interview is given much time: themes/issues are 
c learly thought through prior to the interview. Questions are not limited to stale language on a sheet of 
paper but illuminated via themes and put to the respondent in a '·common vocabulary," not sequentially 
but at the most appropriate time, almost serendipitously, to ensure maximum space and comfort but also 
26 These four women however were not excluded from informal engagement and meetings. and were given space to input and 
participate whenever and if they wanted to. 
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to follow naturally on from where the discussion is moving (Erlandson, et a/., 1993: 87). This method 
serves to give ownership to the respondent as well as optimal space for the interviewer to truly listen to 
what is being said. Hence, where a thought thread is clearly close to or of concern to the respondent; 
space is given for her/him to expatiate, with the interviewer subtly exploring and challenging the 
respondent to question the feelings and ontology underlying such perspectives and opinions. Here too, 
the interviewer moves beyond 'safe' questions: opinions, feelings, perspectives, comments and 
interpretations are sought from the respondent and suggestions of anger, rage, embarrassment or shame 
etc. are carefully unpacked. The techniques involved in lifestories are delicate and intricate yet the 
dialogue and information shared immensely satisfying and rich. 
Lifestory themes were the following: household demographics, socio-economic status, employment and 
location histories, illness status, social security, water service delivery and municipal service history, 
service packages (indigent policies and free basic water), payment and affordability and arrears, water 
consumption and activities, billing procedures, restrictions and disconnections (responses and 
perceptions), municipal engagement, conceptions of local state power, governance and community 
relationships, notions of citizenship and future prospects, and everyday life. 
I met with the ' lifestories households ' at least three times prior to the interview, building rapport prior to 
the interview and to confirm their selection as "good respondents" (Erlandson, et a!., 1993: 91 ). 
Moreover, I remained in close contact with these households post-interview proper: to continue the 
dialogue as well as to monitor changes within the broader theme of service access, payment and response. 
In this way I had a much better grasp of everyday life, struggles faced and responses, and hence could 
contextualise meaning and experience better. As the dialogue continued, the relationships built provided 
a sounding board for study theories, a triangulation mechanism and a wider optic into the broader 
Eastwood context. 'Lifestory· households would introduce me to neighbours, friends and families facing 
particular service-related issues and the dialogue would be extended. 
This facilitated a mutual knowledge sharing and gain. I would share my knowledge regarding how 
policies were implemented and intricate technical details therein and households would share their real-
lived experiences and responses to such policy. 'Proof' of an event, action or experience was perceived 
to be important and where more information was deemed necessary, a group of us would promptly 
engage the particular household in dialogue, to ' hear it first from the horse's mouth.' This facilitated a 
richness of engagement as together we were all learning. Households would test their own theories on me 
and vice versa, and investigation became a mutual endeavour. Thus began a joint consciousness of 
experience and many an excited dialogue commenced. Importantly, the prolonged engagement and 
visibility of my person facilitated an immense volume of contemporary data. Anything new. strange or 
suspicious was quickly explored: a rash of disconnections, water restrictions, a call to sign onto a policy 
or letter. an arrears leaflet or water conservation pamphlet, 'something the councillor said,' or a 
community rumour, an official soliciting a bribe, the removal of persons with ' temporary· disabilities 
from the social security roll; an arrears 'write-off,' a repossession or eviction, a bad experience at the 
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municipal offices (etc.). 'Explore' here means broadly triangulating to 'build the bigger picture' -
recording the experience or action, accessing appropriate documents, testing and enquiry with other 
households to determine typicality or divergence, engaging directly with middle management and front-
line staffs, checking consistency with municipal policy and against National law, policy and regulations). 
Importantly, not only the action but the experience was also 'fresh ' and households were able to recount, 
in great detail, what had happened, how it had happened, who was involved, the process, how they felt, 
how they responded, emotions, opinions and questions of ' what next?' These engagements were so rich 
and generous and importantly were relayed not only to me but others so that we were all part of the 
experience. In short, these engagements, facilitated initially by way of the lifestory interview not only 
provided contextual substance of 'the Eastwood experience' but shaped a mutual knowledge sharing and 
consciousness. The lifestories facilitated rich rapport, which opened the door to the wider Eastwood 
community; and together were of great import for the study. 
A further data collection technique employed was of an "interactive nature" (Erlandson, eta/. , 1993: 113-
123). In this regard, naturalistic inquiry departs from the 'traditional' study, which separates data 
collection from data analysis. Instead, a study in the naturalistic inquiry tradition sees data collection and 
data analysis as " inseparable" (Ibid, 1993: 114). Consistent with such methodology, my study entailed a 
mix of analytical revisions, that is data was fluid; moving through different triangulation processes. For 
example: survey data was checked against personal observation which then extended into the actual 
experience of respondents 'accessed' via my accompanying respondents during their experiences. Hence, 
creating a shared or joint experience and therefore a platform for dialogue. This was actioned by my 
accompanying households to various municipal departments. Here the process was documented in its 
entirety: the responses of officials as well as feelings, frustrations and thoughts of the households. 
Moreover, I was provided the space to 'see' how households operated with reduced amperage and 
restricted water supplies as well as how households tampered with electricity and/or restriction washers. 
Such a method also allowed me to engage with household thought and decision-making processes. The 
culmination of this "interactive" process ensured that the 'final ' analysis was grounded in numerous 
processes, both theoretical and real. 
Lifestories27 were conducted between January-July 2006. This time period was purposive. consistent 
with naturalistic inquiry, as I wanted to have the benefit of hindsight via preliminary survey analysis for 
the optimal grasp and exploration of 'themes' and 'survey trends' as well as time to ensure my 'visibility' 
within Eastwood to facilitate rapport. Interviews were conducted in English, and infrequently isiZulu and 
Afrikaans were employed. Lifestories typically took two hours. All lifestories were digitally recorded 
and transcribed, and translated (where necessary). Transcribing was undertaken by myself and as soon 
after the interview as possible to ensure that gestures etc. were captured. The transcribed interview, 
together with household bills and any additional data (e.g. letters of demand, indigent applications, 
27 I am grateful to Hameda Deedat who encouraged me to conduct lifestories as a tool to capture substantial quality and meaningful 
information. as well as a method to truly listen and dialogue with citizens. 
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restriction leaflets, arrears payments etc.) were compiled as a ·case file ' for easy reference and new data 
additions. 
2.3 Municipal Data 
I interviewed middle management (Municipal Consolidated Billing, Promis Income, City Engineers and 
outsourced municipal debt collectors: Venn Nemeth & Hart Call Centre). However my most fruitful and 
free engagements, albeit of a more informal nature, occurred with lower level municipal staff (Municipal 
Consolidated Billing, Customer Services, Credit Control [data capturers- indigent applications, water 
restrictions and electricity disconnections], City Engineers [water desk - restrictions, leaks and meter 
errors], Water department [restrictions and tariffs]. Meter Reading department, Account Enquiries, 
outsourced municipal debt collectors [Venn Nemeth & Hart and Natal Debt Corporation - customer 
services), Umgeni Water [tariff department], Electricity department [disconnections/reconnections, new 
connections and meter errors]). 
I included municipal bureaucracy in my study as an attempt at balance, triangulation of data and enabling 
the assessment of the whole picture of service delivery in Pietermaritzburg. Middle management were 
selected as they lie at the citizen-state interface and act as street-level bureaucrats in a position to 
interpret, apply and implement municipal service-related policy. Municipal staff (customer services 
representatives [CSRs]) are located at this interface, and engagements were made so as to assess the 
operation of the municipal apparatus at its c losest proximity to citizens. I was refused interviews with top 
level management and initially denied access to municipal data (see Abrams, 2006: 112-114, on the 
secrecy of the state). Interviews with middle management and lower level staff, the successful outcome 
of my Promotion of Access to Information Act [PAIA)28 (Act No. 2 of 2000 [RSA, 2000a]) request, and 
the extrapolation of other sources of data all served to reduce the severity of such sanction. Moreover, 
many hours were spent engaging and observing municipal bureaucrats, particularly in the Municipal Hall. 
This time proved very fortuitous as l was able to observe the quality of interaction between CSR or 
Municipal debt collector and citizen; the number of citizens entering the Municipal Hall and times of 
greatest use. I was further able to put fairly innocuous questions to the CSRs - information mostly of a 
practical nature but off-limits to me from higher up. 
Most of the municipal interactions were conducted via ' face-to-face ' personal communication; with fewer 
telephonically and a smattering via email. J employed semi-structured interviews with middle 
management. All such interviews were recorded via shorthand or full text (where possible) and in some 
cases, via digital recorder. In the case of the former; I made a point to write up immediately after the 
interv iew was completed. Middle management typically got nervous when l put pen to paper so all 
efforts to document had to be discrete. Telephonic communications were also immediately written up. 
Email discussions were particularly useful as it enabled a clear record; yet officials were generally 
reluctant to engage via such a medium. All meetings, events and observations were meticulous ly 
2~ Thanks to Ebrahim Harvey and Jacky Dugard for advice in this regard. The Open Democracy and Advice Centre (ODAC). Cape 
Town. through Mukelani Dimba and Parvathi Pather, assisted with the successful PAIA application. 
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documented in study fieldwork notes. Engagements with municipal lower level (front-line staff or call-
centre) staff were typically questions of clarity and procedure and framed so as not to unsettle or alarm. 
Here documentation was performed via shorthand, full text or via digital recorder. Personal observation 
was also critical. 
2.4 Primary data 
Primary data utilised in the study included: all water-related Acts, policies (Free Basic Water, Indigent, 
Credit control and debt collection, municipal budgets etc), databases (Promis Income, Restriction and 
Indigent lists, Msunduzi 1997 Valuation Roll [2004/5], DWAF Local Municipality tariff survey (2006/7] 
and DW AF Free basic service monitor system), municipal service bills. letters of demand, PAIA 
information request, community leaflets and flyers issued by Msunduzi Municipality. Secondary data 
utilised in the study included: journals, theses, research reports, internet searches, books, printed media, 
general audio and visual media (radio, television, DVDs etc.), submissions (in the High Court of South 
Africa, Witwatersrand Local Division, Case No 06/13865) and Amicus Curiae. 
In addition to the engagements with municipal actors, I met with two well-respected academics from the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal; both of whom have a firm grasp of Pietermaritzburg's economic and 
political context. Clive Coetzee (School of Economics and Finance), tasked with compiling the Quarterly 
Economic and Business Report for Pietermaritzburg, shared with me his perspective of the economic and 
financial status of the city. Professor Laurence Piper (Department of Politics). unpacked the complex 
political currents at play. Both allowed for dialogue and challenged each others' optic of the state of 
affairs. 
As indicated previously, the study area is Eastwood. The study however is enriched by visits to different 
areas within the same Municipal jurisdiction. Urban areas, with housing type indicated in brackets, 
included: Cinderella Park (RDP Housing); Thembalihle and Tamboville (site and service); Panorama 
Gardens, Sobantu, lmbali and Ashdown (formal housing, similar to Eastwood); Acacia Park (lower to 
middle income government housing in the form of 'cluster housing'); and Ashroad (shack dwelling 
settlement). Rural areas included Mafakatini and Vulindlela (KwaMpande and Umsunduzi). 
Engagements with the above communities typically took the form of site visits and community meetings. 
All engagements were post-survey. Interactions were purposive to contextualise and frame the 
'Eastwood phenomena' within the larger Msunduzi Municipal setting. Here commonalities and 
divergence were sought and a dialogue initiated to start conceptualising the Pietermaritzburg water 
context. 
Further to this process elucidated above and in direct relation to the study a number of meetings took 
place in Eastwood proper: before, during and after the survey. Pre-survey meetings were attended by 
myself as an introduction to the Eastwood political dynamics and emergent service delivery issues. Here 
I was principally an observer. As the study progressed, meetings were convened via way of the ECF, 
with water as the principle issue. Over time, other communities and Pietermaritzburg Civil Society actors 
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were included in these meetings and workshops. A task team was convened for the purposes of bringing 
different communities and organisations on board. The task team was constituted of six individuals, 
including myself, who met weekly (in different communities) to discuss the Pietermaritzburg political and 
service delivery environment. progress in capacitating identified communities and tracking municipal 
procedures (council izimbizo, budgetary inputs, mayoral meetings, municipal initiatives/policy and 
general media). Over time, this task team evolved into what became known as the 'Maritzburg Water 
Caucus.' This was a more formalised structure whose role it was to advocate for change within the 
Msunduzi Municipal service delivery paradigm. This local structure then became the principle vehicle 
for engagement between Pietermaritzburg communities and the Department of Water Affairs and 
Forestry, Msunduzi Municipality and the South African Water Caucus. In the latter processes, my role 
changed to become a faci litator and resource person. 
2. 5 Quality control 
I was assisted by six CRs. They conducted surveys across consumption clusters to counter any 
subjectivities isolated to a single cluster. Furthermore, CRs were assigned a survey minimum of six 
households within c lusters to facilitate discussions regarding trends within a particular consumption 
cluster. The number of surveys conducted per CR was limited to three a day. This was decided so as to 
minimise CR fatigue and ensure optimal quality. In the event of particular household unavailability, CRs 
would return to the household three times (on different days ofthe week and at different times) and if still 
unable to secure an appointment; the next randomly selected household would be included in the survey 
roll (I was particularly fastid ious in this regard). Surveys were conducted in the vernacular of the 
responding household and coded in English. lf there were any translation misunderstandings, these 
would be picked up immediately and clarified (I have a good grasp of isiZulu and Afrikaans; hence 
language was not an impediment). Throughout the data collection phase I would further conduct spot 
checks (random re-checking of data) and visit households that had a lready been surveyed. Every day, for 
the duration of the data collection period; I would meet with each individual CR. Together we would 
peruse the three completed surveys. This, to check whether all questions were answered, to discuss the 
three surveys (get clarity on specific responses, or more information), to identify if a particular household 
warranted further engagement and check whether the data was consistent, that is, to ensure that the 
'picture' was congruent. Furthermore, th is process facilitated for prompt CR return to a particular 
household if data was omitted or incongruent. If, after returning to the household, the survey sti ll 'did not 
make sense,' l would make a house visit. These daily meetings were also valuable in that the experience 
was sti ll 'fresh ' in the mind of the CR and facilitated optimal information sharing. My role here was 
important because I wanted to give maximum support to the CRs; and because I was in the field, I could-
that day - make follow ups with households, where necessary. In addition to the daily meetings with 
individual CRs: our ' research team' met twice a week on Mondays and Fridays. These meetings were 
convened to give all team members support, a space to share experiences and perspectives, to engage with 
the data, to discuss and debate responses within a broader framework and crucially, to triangulate 
responses. That is, if a CR noticed a particular trend in responses then this would be discussed in the 
group for consensus and divergence. It also facilitated a useful sounding board for my own insight. 
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3 DATA ANALYSIS 
The type of data analysis applied was dependent on the nature of the data. In this regard the study data 
included a mix of quantitative and qualitative derivatives. Equal emphasis was given to both. 
Importantly, analysis endeavoured to use both quantitative and qualitative data to describe a particular 
phenomenon. That is, data was triangulated for validity and defensibility and typically presented using a 
variety of appropriate techniques. Underlying all analysis was the essential component of common sense 
and query. This section considers qualitative analysis and statistical analysis. 
3.1 Qualitative analysis 
Qualitative data derived from focus groups, lifestories, interviews, informal community engagement, 
community meetings, workshops and observation was digitally or manually recorded and transcribed. 
All data was systematically organised into either individual cases or groups for ease of reference and for 
the purposes of audit. Where comparisons and contrasts were possible, all data was organised into 
selected study themes. Middle management and other municipal staff interviews and engagements were, 
via difficult circumstances of secrecy and closure, not necessarily systematic or consistent so as to run 
qualitative correlations. The data gathered was analysed via issue responses and married with the 
selected study themes referred to above. I decided not to run the lifestories through a qualitative 
statistical package as I wanted to retain the real voices of households (especially evident in Chapter 8 and 
9: drawing on the styles of Hellman [1999] ; Hochschild [1994]; Wikan [1980]). Community respondents 
did not typically request my anonymous documentation of their persons; however I intentionally decided 
to protect identities. On the contrary, Msunduzi officials indicated very clearly that they preferred not to 
be named. Although unfortunate, I have complied with this request. 
3.2 Statistical analysis 
Statistical sampling assistance was provided by Mr Shaun Ramroop, School of Mathematics, Statistics 
and Information Technology, University of KwaZulu-Natal (2005 & 2006). Quantitative data was 
derived from the household surveys [n=377]. Statistical Program for the Social Sciences (SPSS), 
Microsoft Office Access and Microsoft Office Excel were used for data entry. Analysis was done in 
SPSS (version 15.0). Statistical ana(vsis assistance was provided by Professor Sarah Radloff, Head of 
Department - Statistics, Rhodes University (2007). 
Descriptive and inferential analysis of statistics was undertaken. Descriptive analysis included 
frequencies, percentages, means and standard deviation. Inferential analysis utilised correlation and 
multiple regression procedures to determine relationships between variables to obtain fitted models. 
Analysis of variance (ANOV A) t-tests for independent and dependent samples were used to determine 
significant differences in mean values between groups. Chi-square tests of independence via observed 
frequencies were used to determine whether or not there was a statistically significant association 
between variables. Significance was set at the 0.05 level. Values were considered as outliers if they 
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exceeded the third quartile (75%) plus 1.5 (interquartile range) [q3 +1.5iqr]. Where necessary figures 
were rounded off to one decimal point e.g. 34.3689 became 34.4. 
4 EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF STUDY 
The research design is based on a praxis epistemology. Knowledge is therefore viewed through the 
methodological imperative of the dialectic: the process of reconciling one's personal experience to the 
particular social context in which one exists. Reality is given meaning through social relationships, and 
social change is therefore a product of individuals sharing this reality and together struggling for change. 
Knowledge is an active and continual process of creation, testing, re-defining and re-testing. Our 
knowledge is neither static nor complete. Knowledge, as dynamic, is significant; we are creative and 
changing human beings, our potential realities change as we have the capacity for critical self-reflection 
and the privilege of building on past knowledge (Cole, 2004: pc). Knowledge is therefore part of the 
knower, it is socially constructed through language and dialogue (with oneself and others) and built on a 
foundation of current/past knowledge, which is contextually linked (historically, culturally, socially and 
politically) and reflects personal experiences (Raskin, 2002; Pollock, 2002; Spicer & Fleming, 2001; 
Marcel, 2001). 
The study aims not only to explore and describe the water service delivery paradigm in its contextual 
social, racial, historical, political and cultural environment; but also aims to "radically criticise and 
qualitatively transform social reality" (Roderick, 1986: 7). The study draws on Habermas's interpretation 
of critical theory, which he locates, "between philosophy and science" (Habermas, 1973: 212). As 
Habermas sees it, the task is to develop a social theory which retains "the rigour of scientific knowledge 
without relinquishing the 'practical intentions' of classical politics" (Roderick, 1986: 49). This study 
reflects a scientific rigour alongside a critical discourse.29 I will employ a balanced rigour in my 
criticisms of the founding ontologies and knowledge systems of all groups as well as pluralist data 
collection techniques (quantitative and qualitative), congruent with the many ways of interpreting the 
creation and justification of knowledge. Hence, although I do not claim to represent a certain viewpoint, I 
will challenge the individual or group to criticise, communicate and interpret her/their own positions 
(through the technique of naturalistic inquiry). 
Critical constructivism has the implications that convictions, assumptions and ontologies are consistently 
challenged. To achieve this, I will not only have to be aware of my own ontology, and the ontology of 
others and compensate for the differences, but will also have to consciously criticise my own ontology, 
and the ontology of others as well as facilitate for the said individuals and groups, participating in the 
research, to do the same (Cole, 2004: pc). To facilitate this process, I will have to make available the 
different interpretations of the phenomenon and the relevant research-collected information to all groups 
29 Discourse, as defined here and consistent with Habennas. "explicitly thematises and criticises the background consensus 
concerning belief systems, nonns. values and ideologies taken for granted in everyday life" (Roderick. 1986: 82). 
involved in the study. In so doing, individuals or groups may be able to re-create, modify or re-state their 
original positions; engage directly with one another's interpretations and ontologies; and identify points 
of departure and/or consensus. 
A participatory research design, founded on action research, will be applied in the study. Action research 
provides for a joint learning framework (drawing on pedagogy: creative thinking versus passive learning) 
that encourages critical reflection and discourse, optimises participation and provides the scope for 
action/advocacy based on research outcomes. It is also important therefore that my study gives due 
relevance to analysing not only the effects of change but also the process of change (Cole, 2004: pc). The 
objectives of the study are not just to interpret the phenomenon and facilitate joint consensus, but extend 
to being able to convince other groups of the value of a specific interpretation. Hence, challenging 
interpretations should emerge from a common horizon of meaning, which is valued and understood by the 
particular group advocating a certain position (Marcel, 200 I; Bodner, Klobuchar & Geelan, 200 I ; Raskin, 
2001 ). Subsequently, one group's capacity to convince another, "depends on both the content and form 
of the discourse" i.e. dependent on the quality of the communication and interpretation (does it make 
sense to the other group) as well as the authority of the political actor ' doing' the convincing (Marcel, 
200 I: 17). To meet these requirements, it is critical to ensure three things: (1) that data is collected in a 
way that is best suited to the different groups and presented in a format that meets the engagement terms 
of each group; (2) that the advocating group (in this case communities) have a sufficient political platform 
on which to engage and a large polit ical base through which their voices can find solidarity and; (3) that 
research processes be negotiated with and owned by the groups involved in the study and all parties take 
responsibility for the research outcomes/results, once sufficient space has been provided for comments, 
queries and criticisms. 
Each chapter that follows will specify from where data is sourced, but in totality all data is grounded in a 
broader matrix of mixed methods and techniques, as indicated in this chapter. The next chapter (4) 
considers Pietermaritzburg's institutional and policy architecture and serves as an institutional and policy 
reference point for the thesis: a foundation on which future analysis, study results and connections can be 
established. 
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Chapter4 
INSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY ARCHITECTURE FOR WATER IN MSUNDUZI 
MUNICIPALITY 
This chapter presents the institutional and policy architecture of municipal services m greater 
Pietermaritzburg (hereafter Msunduzi). This chapter has a dual purpose: as an institutional and policy 
reference point for the thesis; and as the foundation on which the analysis of the case study results can be 
established. The policies described apply to Eastwood. 
The first part ofthis chapter looks at Msunduzi Municipality's (Msunduzi ' s) institutional architecture, the 
relevant socio-demographics, financial and service delivery context. I outline the water delivery system 
and further outline the status of water infrastructure, and water backlogs in Msunduzi. The second part of 
this chapter looks at municipal service policies and procedures. Particular attention is given to the free 
basic water and indigent policies as interpreted and applied by Msunduzi. Water tariff structures for 
households charged at standard tariffs and households registered as 'indigent ' are described, and in the 
latter case uptake procedures are outlined. Credit control and debt collection policies and procedures are 
presented with specific reference to payment, water restrictions and electricity disconnections. Data for 
this chapter was sourced via Msunduzi policies and data, broader municipal and governance related 
literature, Msunduzi official interviews and primary interviews with other community actors. 
1 POPULATION, FINANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
Pietermaritzburg is KwaZulu-Natal' s capital city. Pietermaritzburg's municipal authority is called 
Msunduzi Municipality (KZ225), formerly a category B municipality/ 0 located under the 
uMgungundlovu District Municipality (DC22). Prior to 1994, Msunduzi Municipality was called 
Pietermaritzburg Corporation (Msunduzi IDP, 2007); many citizens still refer to it as "the Corporation." 
Msunduzi serves a population of 553 224 citizens, with a growth rate of 1.2% per annum on the 1996 
population figure of 523 4 70 (Statistics South Africa-Census, 2001 ). The household growth rate for the 
same period (1996-2001) was far more pronounced, with a 12% recorded increase from 11 5 933 
households in 1996 to 130 405 households in 200 I (Statistics South Africa-Census, 200 1). More recent 
(2005) household estimates put Msunduzi's total household figure at 139 650 (South African Cities 
Network [SACN], 31 2006: 49). Msunduzi ' s estimated mean 2005 household size is 4.05 members per 
household (SACN, 2006: 49). This figure is notably higher than any other SACN participating city (see 
Table 4.1) and far exceeds the average city mean of 3.3 1 members per household (SACN, 2006:49). 
Msunduzi 's population trajectory is however consistent with national trends towards smaller household 
sizes with concurrent increases in the total number of households within major urban locales (SACN, 
30 Msunduzi Municipality became a Metropolitan Municipality at the end of2007. 
31 SACN is a survey collaboration of major metropolitans and selected larger local municipalities (members: Buffalo City. Cape 
Town. Ekurhuleni, eThel..-wini. Johannesburg. Mangaung, Msunduzi, Nelson Mandela. and Tshwane). SACN issues a biannual 
report registering city demographic. economic. social and political data comparisons. SACN used the Human Science Research 
Council estimated 2005 city average household size figures and number of households. based on an extrapolation of the 1996-200 1 
Census (SACN, 2006: 49). 
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2006: 49). There is a clear urban slant to Msunduzi ' s population; with an urban-rural ratio of 
approximately 4:1 (Draft Water Services Development Plan [WSDP], 2004: 13). 
Table 4.1: City average household size and numbers of households. 
Indicator Buffalc, Cape Ekurhulen eThekwini Johannes- Mangaung l.isuoouz:, Ne!SC'l -shwane ~.verage 
CitY Town burg Mande!a or total 
Average 3E 3.7~ 3.02 3.67 2.90 3.16 4.05 3.53 3.25 3.31 
household size 
!';·Jmbercf 235 351 801 836 C.04 861 540 1 135 097 223118 139 65C 311 934 628 786 5 182 701 
i·:::Jseldds 3C3 
Source: SACN (2006: 49). 
Most local commentary suggests that financially Msunduzi is in fairly good shape and in a much better 
position now than it has been in, in many years (Coetzee, 2006; The Witness: 29 May 2006). Coetzee 
(2006), a respected local economist, argues that this is a result of an ongoing 2Y2-year economic boom, 
with the result that Msunduzi was running a small surplus of Rl30 million (The Witness: 29 May 2006). 
The roots of this financial standing started in 2003 with a serendipitous permutation of factors (low 
interest rates, the opening of the Liberty Midlands Mall and the confirmation of Pietermaritzburg as the 
capital city of KwaZulu-Natal) which culmina1 d in a knock-on effect of massive consumption and 
investment (Coetzee, 2007: personal communication [pc]). Good governance indexes reflect Msunduzi's 
encouraging economic trends: Msunduzi has a favourable credit rating (short-term A- and long-term A), 
acid test (1.7:1) and liquidity ratio (SACN, 2006: 95-98; Coetzee, 2007: pc; The Witness: 29 May 2006). 
The Auditor-General 's report indicated fewer qualifications for the year 2004/5: from twelve items to 
one (SACN, 2006: 95 ; The Witness: 29 May 2006). Despite indications that Msunduzi ' s finances have 
not only improved but are relatively stable, there are still major questions to be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
The African National Congress (ANC) is the majority party in KwaZulu-Natal and the ANC continues to 
dominate in Msunduzi (Mottiar, 2006: 24). The Mbeki/Zuma intra-party conflicts plague the ANC at the 
local level (Piper, 2006: pc). Party loyalties have splintered around prominent local politicos: with 
preferred allegiances represented by current Mayor Zanele Hlatshwayo and past Mayor, now District 
Speaker, Hloni Zondi (Piper, 2006: pc; The Witness: 31 January 2007). Such divisions have been notably 
regressive for service delivery in Msunduzi, " . .. as personalities spent more time facing off, squaring up 
and drawing battle lines as opposed to pacing up service delivery" (The Witness: 31 January 2007). The 
announcement of a new mayor in March 2006 - Mayor Hlatshwayo, together with allegations of recent 
financial irregularities and corruption, signalled the start of a senior management exodus from City Hall 
(The Witness: 31 January 2007). In this regard, persons in the following positions have resigned since 
early 2006: Municipal Manager, Chief Financial Officer, Credit Control Process Manager, Electricity 
Process Manager, Human Resources Process Manager, and Internal Audit Executive Manager. Of further 
significance and of particular relevance for this study is that a weakened political leadership has provided 
the space and legitimacy for privatisation options as an attempt to bypass political wrangling. 
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Msunduzi 's institutional architecture is increasingly commercial in structure. Departmental units have 
been financial and managerial ring-fenced (Account Enquiries, 2005: pc). Consultants occupy influential 
positions within municipal departments and hold shorter contracts as Msunduzi struggles to meet its 
complicated statutory requirements (Local Government Consultant, 2005b: pc). The full extent of 
municipal service outsourcing by Msunduzi is not known as service agreements are not readily accessible. 
However, we do know that the following municipal services (directly relevant to this study) are 
outsourced: electricity disconnections, municipal debt collection and municipal security services. In 
addition, meter reading is next in line (The Witness: 28 February 2006). Outsourcing appears to be a 
strategy to keep certain services beyond the reach of council political interference (Local Government 
Consultant, 2005b: pc). 
The influence of smaller oppositional 'right of ANC' parties (see the Democratic Alliance [DA] and 
lnkatha Freedom Party [IFP]) on council outsourcing must also be acknowledged. The IFP is strongly in 
favour of privatising services (IFP website: www.ifp.org.za/Policies/polwater.htm, accessed 19 February 
2007). The DA 's mantra " ... cutting delivery costs by outsourcing services," is well known (Democratic 
Alliance, 2006). In Msunduzi, a delivery challenge rarely goes by without the DA (with strong backing 
from the IFP) citing privatisation as 'the solution' to delivery woes. In this regard, the robust emergence 
of the DA in the 2006 municipal elections. winning 12 seats and gaining the support of the IFP ( 11 seats) 
must represent a strong privatisation lobby in the city (Mottiar, 2006: 24). 
Organised labour is parochial. largely reactive and far removed from community struggles (Wagner, 
2006: pc). Broader Pietermaritzburg civil society is highly fragmented with weak linkages to actual 
community struggles on the ground. A broad network of community groups, frustrated with local 
governance and suspicious of the lack of civil society organisational and academic institutional support, is 
emerging (Wagner, 2006: pc). 
2 WATER SERVICE DELIVERY IN MSUNDUZI 
Msunduzi purchases all its bulk water from the Umgeni Water Board (WSDP, 2004: 41). The Umgeni 
Water Board (UW) acts as a water service provider in rural areas and within the Msunduzi Municipal 
jurisdiction primarily connects, supplies and retails potable water to rural water schemes32 (Msunduzi IDP 
Review, 2006: 185). Msunduzi reticulates water to the urban parts of the municipality (Msunduzi IDP 
Review, 2006: 185). Umgeni Water (UW) sells treated bulk water primarily to eThekwini Metro, the 
Ilembe, Sisonke, uMgungundlovu and Ugu district municipalities and the Msunduzi and Mgeni local 
municipalities (UW website: www.umgeni.co.za/Current%20Customersl71.aspx, accessed 25 January 
2007 [UW, 2007c]). Msunduzi after eThekwini Metro, is UW's second largest customer and accounted 
for 14% ofUW's annual treated water sales for 2005/6 (UW, 2006a: 30). 
32 There are negotiations between UW and Msunduzi to either formalise a ·service level agreement' or to hand over the U\\'-
managed rural schemes to Msunduzi via a sales agreement (Msunduzi lOP Review. 2006: 185). 
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2.1 U mgeni Water 
"Umgeni Water is the largest bulk water supplier in KwaZulu-Natal and the second-largest water utility in 
South Africa" (UW, 2006b: 4). UW describes itself as a "state-owned enterprise": part public service 
entity and part corporation (UW, 2006a: 4). But UW is aggressively corporate; structured as both 
"commercial business" and "regulated business" (UW, 2006a: 67). UW's operations are financed 
primarily through the supply of bulk treated water to municipalities (UW, 2006b: 4). Treated water sales 
constitute 89% of UW's organisational revenue (UW, 2006b: 4). Non-core activities include sanitation 
services, waste water treatment and "other specialised commercial services" (UW, 2006b: 4). The profits 
from the "other specialised commercial services," may not be especially significant but the architecture of 
UW's non-regulated commercial subsidiary (availed by the Water Services Act, 1997): Umgeni Water 
Services (Pty) Limited may have a more central function. Contrary to the ring-fenced nature of the 
subsidiary, revenues/shortfalls from public service activities (non-commercial) and commercial activities 
can be used to augment the other by making maximum use of differing applicable legislative loopholes 
(Loftus, 2005: 86). Here, UW states that despite its status as a state enterprise: "it generates all its own 
revenue and receives no government funding" (UW website: 
www.umgeni.co.za/Corporate%20Profile54.aspx, accessed 25 January 2007 [UW, 2007a]). The UG65 
bond (trading on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange) together with Development Bank of South 
Africa (DBSA) loans constitute 94.8% of the total UW funding structure (UW, 2006a: 64). In recent 
years UW has looked to extend its reach beyond its historic areas of operation into Africa, where it 
intends to create "a footprint on the African continent" and perhaps seek further competitive advantage 
(UW website: www.umgeni.co.za/Operationai%20Area242.aspx, accessed 25 January 2007 [UW, 
2007b]). 
Historically however, UW has been frustrated by significant bad corporate decision-making, debt, 
treasury mismanagement challenges, the lack of profitable outlets to invest money borrowed and revenue 
raised, and lower-than-expected profits from the rural water services sector (Loftus, 2005: 91 ). UW's 
financial woes can be said to have begun at its birth in 1974, when it purchased Durban's bulk water 
supply operations for well above the real value (Loftus, 2005: 82). Fast-tracking to 2001: as an attempt 
to recover monies lost via poor investment choices, UW sought to increase bulk water tariffs by 22.3% 
from the previous term (Loftus, 2005: 98). This caused outrage amongst UW's two largest municipal 
customers: Pietermaritzburg and Durban (Loftus, 2005: 98). Together Pietermaritzburg and Durban, 
with support from a strong lobby of local capital, launched an effective campaign which saw the 
reduction ofthe 2001 /2 tariff increase to 19.53% (Loftus, 2005: 98; UW, 2006b). The brouhaha did not 
escape the notice of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) and in July 2001. DWAF 
instructed the Trans Caledon Tunnel Authority to undertake the treasury management of UW (UW, 
2006a: 65; Kasrils, 2001c). It appears that UW' s albatross has been slain: finances are stabilising 
(Intergovernmental Fiscal Review [IGFR], 2008) and as at January 2005, UW resumed full responsibility 
for its treasury function (UW, 2006a: 65). None so powerful an example of uw·s changing fortunes is 
perhaps UW's latest 2005/6 financial figures, where UW sold 361 million kilolitres of treated bulk water 
to its customers, amounting to revenue of R1.1 billion and a profit of R154.1 million for the parent 
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company for the term 2005/6 (UW, 2006a: 6, 25). UW bettered that for the term 2007/8 with profits up 
155% to R393 million (The Witness: 22 October 2008). 
Impressive revenue results have not however diluted the bad blood which still exists between UW and its 
major municipal customers. A powerful indication of such tension is the initiation of a Municipal 
Systems Act section 78 assessment to explore the possibility of forming a joint entity including Msunduzi 
Municipality, Durban Metro, Umgungundlovu District Municipality, UW and other (Msunduzi IDP 
Review, 2006: 167). If successful, such an entity should provide UW's major municipal customers with a 
greater degree of leverage and control. 
2.2 Water volumes, sales, grants, revenues and expenditure 
Official data on Msunduzi 's total bulk water volume purchases for 2005/6 were incomplete. The 
information and analysis that follows is based on various data sources (Msunduzi, 2006; UW Debtors 
Supervisor, 2006: pc; Msunduzi, 2007; PAIA, 2007a). Msunduzi ' s retail water sales revenue for the 
2005/6 term amounted to Rl63 944 937 (Msunduzi, 2007: 55); its bulk water purchases from UW were 
Rl77 579 136 (Msunduzi, 2007: 59). Msunduzi ran the water service at a ±RI4million loss for the 
2005/6 term (Msunduzi, 2006: 77-79).33 The cost recovery structure behind this under-recovery deserves 
much greater scrutiny. 
The 2005/6 UW bulk water tariff was R2.698019 per kilo litre, excluding VAT (UW Debtors Supervisor, 
2006: pc). This suggests that Msunduzi bought around ±65MC (mega-litres) from UW.34 The PAIA 
(2007a) indicated that billed domestic households consumed ±l3MC, not-billed/non-metered domestic 
households ±19MC, non-domestic consumers (business, industry, institutional etc) ± IML Totalled this 
accounts for ±33MC, which when added to Auditor-General ' s projections ofunaccounted-for-water losses 
(UA W) of 49% (The Witness: 30 May 2006) or ±32MC (see later) is equal to ±65MC. Immediately 
noticeable in this breakdown is the small amount of municipal water consumed by non-domestic 
consumers and the massive UA W. Regarding the former, non-domestic consumers, who together 
accounted for a R3 billion turnover in 2004 and include 6 856 commercial consumers and 602 
manufacturing entities even before accounting for agricultural, construction, business, government and 
other (Coetzee, 2008: 43); such water consumption figures are incorrect. Yet, of importance from this 
extrapolation above is the figures relating to not-billed/non-metered households and billed domestic 
households; they serve to show how the recovery of water expenses is structured in Msunduzi. 
Unaccounted-for water losses (UA W) and water to not-billed/non-metered households, of which there are 
60 163 households, accounts for ±5 I M C of annual water purchased from UW for ±R139 million (UWA 
accounts for ±R88 million and not-billed/non-metered for ±R51 million). Of the remaining ±14M C, non-
domestic consumers account for ±R2.6 million at the UW tariff and billed domestic consumers account 
J' Msunduzi ran the water service at a ±R2 million loss for the term 2003/4: a ± RS million profit for the term 2004/5 (· actual': 
Msunduzi, 2006: 77-79) and operating budgets indicate a profit (not ·actual') for the tem1s 200617 (±R30 million), 2007/8 (±R18 
million) and 2008/9 (±R23 million) respectively ('proposed': Msunduzi. 2007: 55-59). 
3
' All figures, unless specified rounded off in text for ease of reading: all calculations employed complete figures. 
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for ±R36 million of which there are 61 443 households (PAIA, 2007a). Out of this billed domestic group 
of 61 443 households: 28 750 households are not charged anything for the first 6k C consumed [21 780 
are automatic 'indigents,' 3 241 are applied 'indigents,'35 and 3 729 households are charged standard 
tariff rates but are able to self limit to :::;6kC per month and thereby pay nothing towards water] (PAIA, 
2007a). This group's free water consumption accounts for ±2MC (±R5.5 million at UW tariff). This 
leaves 32 693 billed domestic households or 27% of the total number of domestic consumers m 
Pietermaritzburg (as per PAl A, 2007a), consuming ±II M C or ±R30 million at the UW tariff 
The revenue to cover the water department's operating expenses is sourced through user fees, 
interdepartmental contributions, the Equitable Share (ES) and the Municipal infrastructure Grant (MIG). 
The largest revenue source is user fees, rates cross-contribution and an infrastructure grant. The ES is the 
prime mechanism promoted and funded by National Treasury to finance free basic services. The MIG 
subsidy (±R16 million) is used primari ly for capital investment, infrastructure upgrades and a small 
amount for maintenance and extension of water and sanitation services (Msunduzi, 2006:79; Centre for 
Applied Legal Studies, 2008: 41). 
The ES in Msunduzi, of which R33.8 million is directly allocated to water services in general , not free 
basic water in particular, accounts for 33% of the total RI01.8 million granted for the 2005/6 term 
(Msunduzi, 2006: 13). The income forgone for free basic water concessions reflected in the operating 
budget (actual) to the following groups of households comprised the following for the 2005/6 term: water 
rebates for ' indigent' households (automatic [R8 020 133] and applied [Rl 084 533]), water rebates for 
households charged at standard tariffs able to self-limit to ~6kC per month [R714 782], and water 
concessions to unbilled low-cost housing and unbilled community standpipes [R27 579 715] (Msunduzi, 
2007: 59). 
The income forgone on free basic water rebates for ' indigent' households and ·conventional' households 
able to self-l imit is charged at nearly double the UW tariff (±R5.5 million as per the ±R I 0 million 
forgone). On the other hand, the income forgone on water service concessions for not-billed/non-metered 
households covers just half of the UW tariff (±R51 million as per the ±R28 million forgone). Added to 
this rather awkward funding/loss arrangement, the free basic water rebates added to the water concessions 
to unbilled low-cost housing and unbilled community standpipes (±R38 million) exceeds the ES (±R34 
million) by ±R4 million. Moreover, there appears to be no further national grants to account for this ES 
deficit, nor indeed the additional funding required to cover the remaining not-billed/non-metered shortfall 
of ±R23 million. Further to this, the bulk of the ES is used not to finance free basic water rebates but to 
extend RDP-type water services to not-billed/non-metered domestic households. That is, additional 
grants should be used to fund this type of access, not the ES. This financing picture gets more 
complicated however because Msunduzi has stated that, "[the ES] is not sufficient to reduce the 
" Automatic ' indigents· arc automatically restricted just to 6kL applied ·indigents· potentially are able to access more than6k[ but 
in practice are also restricted to 6k ( unless they tamper. 
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municipality's reliance on rates to provide subsidised services to the poor," (cited by Centre for A pplied 
Legal Studies, 2008: 42). 
Indeed. if we relook at the fact that Msunduzi has charged its free basic water rebates at nearly double the 
UW tariff rate and that there are no additional grants to fund free basic water or water services to not-
billed/non-metered households; it appears that the shortfall must come from the user fees of non-domestic 
consumers, other metered and billed domestic households and indeed the targets of free basic services-
the poor themselves. 
In this regard non-domestic consumers are largely absolved from such responsibility36 due to Msunduzi's 
goal of enhancing investment in the city via 'business incentives,' by way of reasonable commercial 
water tariffs (R8.74/kC [including VAT]) and generous water concessions and discounts, in the order of 
±R92 million (Msunduzi, 2007: 59). It is common that municipalities do not overburden commercial or 
industrial entities with major water cross-subsidisation burdens, for example: 2005/6 commercial tariffs 
for Durban were charged at R6.65, Cape Town R6.99, and Johannesburg R9.15 (all accessed from city 
websites). 
Msunduzi 's water revenue is chiefly based on the ± 11 MC consumed by the 32 693 billed domestic 
households unable to self-limit to _;6k C per month. At Msunduzi's retail tariff (R22.30 for 6kt and 
R7.34/kt thereafter) , this group of billed domestic households, solely on billed water charges, potentially 
contributes a total of ±R74 million (±R9 million of 6kt and ±R65 million for water used in excess of 6k~) 
toward the water purchased from UW (±11M C at UW tariff is ±R30 million). That is 27% of the total 
number of domestic consumers, using ± 17% of the total water purchased from UW account for 53% of 
the UW water expense account. Sanitation charges (fixed charge ofR66.70) add a further ±R26 million 
to Msunduzi 's water revenue, bringing the total monies from this billed group of domestic consumers to 
61 % of Msunduzi 's total retail water sales revenue (±R164 million). ln reality however, this group 
contributes far more to the overall water operating budget because rates are used as a cross-contribut ion, 
as are debt-related instruments of interest and penalties. That the bulk of Msunduzi water revenue must 
be recovered from a small pool of billed domestic households culminates in an immense payment burden 
with serious social and financial ramifications for households unable to pay in full. 
This section shows how Msunduzi's municipal cost recovery is structured around a small core of b illed 
domestic consumers and that Msunduzi's finances are far more tenuous than suggested by official 
indicators. Moreover, I have highlighted the insufficiency of intergovernmental transfers of funds from 
national to local government. In this regard, the ES does not absorb the DW AF-defined water needs of 
;, Commercial water tariffs are charged at R8.74/kr (including VAT). Moreover. commerce receives major water and discharge 
concessions in line with Msunduzi's strategy to encourage investment (Msunduzi website: www.msunduzi.gov.za/site/investwithus. 
accessed 4 February 2008a). Commercial sewage tariffs are charged on a sliding tariff scale of 4. 13/kf [0-400k(): 3.85/kf [40 1-
1 OOOk £]: and 3.18/kf [IOOI+k[] subject to a maximum charge ofR I6 593 (all including VAT) [Msunduzi Tariff Policy. 2005/6]. 
Commercial water tariffs are marginally more than domestic water tariffs but not significantly high enough to act as a cross-
subsidisation mechanism. Consumption-based sewage tariffs are more equitable than the uniform tariffs applied for domestic 
households (R76.04) and moreover the sl iding scale and indeed maximum charge appears not to penalise over-consumption, 
wastage. future supplies nor account for the ·polluter pays· principle. 
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not-billed/non-metered households, domestic households registered as ' indigent' and a small number of 
·conventional' households able to self-limit. The way Msunduzi has structured its b illing and cost 
recovery regime has major implications for delivering municipal service requirements, meeting social 
equity goals and how the municipal accountancy regime is framed. These will be expanded upon later in 
the thesis. 
2.3 Service levels and backlogs 
Municipal demarcations and urbanisation resulted in the dramatic increase of Msunduzi's jurisdiction 
from 150 km2 (up to 1994) to 649 km2 (since 2000) and population size from 176 590 (up to 1994) to 
523 470 (since 2000) [Msunduzi IDP, 2006: 19]. Consequently Msunduzi inherited a number of different 
levels of water and sanitation services (Msunduzi IDP Review, 2006: 165). 
The 2001 data relating to the number of Msunduzi households with access to water in certain water 
service level categories is the following (read with Table 4.2): inside dwelling = 48 628; inside yard = 
42 680; community standpipe (distance less than 200m from dwelling) = 13 280; community standpipe 
(distance greater than 200m from dwelling) = 17 653; and other = 8 146 (Msunduzi IDP Review, 
2006: 23 and Statistics South Africa-Census, 2001 - note that data from sources are slightly variable). 
Totalled, this entails water access for 130 387 households. 
Table 4.2: Number of Msunduzi households with access to water by service level. 
I Main Water Supply Number of Households 
I *Piped Water to the D.velllng 48627 
*Ptped Water 1nside yard 42681 
*Plped Water to Commumty Stand < 200m 13281 
Piped Water to Community Stand > 200m 17 653 
Borehole 1 226 
Spring 2 302 
Rain-water Tank 370 
Dam/pool/stagnant water 301 
River/stream 1194 
Water vendor 231 
Other 2 521 
Total 130 387 
Source: adapted from Stat1st1cs South Afr1ca-Census, 2001. 
*Only service level unconditionally compliant with Water Services Act (RSA, 1997). 
The Water Services Act (RSA, 1997) promulgates regulations of minimum standards for basic water 
supply service, defining this as access to a potable water supply within 200 metres from dwelling (see 
regulations in DWAF, 2002c: 26). "Access to water" and backlogs must therefore be defined as meeting 
these minimum standards for basic supply services. The corollary is clearly that all other service levels 
not ascribing to this standard must be considered a backlog: standpipes more than 200 metres from 
dwelling, access via spring, river, etc. The IDP Review (2006: 23) reported the estimated 2005/6 backlog 
as 14 063 individual water connections in the Edendale and Vulindlela37 areas (this is approximately 10% 
~7 Vu1indlela, a fom1er presidcntia11ead project. is typical of such statistical inaccuracy and UW profiteering. The consequences of 
which find Vu1indle1a roundly acknowledged as the area of greatest water and sanitation backlogs within the Msunduzi Municipal 
jurisdiction (Msunduzi lOP Review, 2006: 165). 
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of the total 139 650 Msunduzi households). Yet a more accurate method in calculating access figures 
(compliant with RSA, 1997) would then be to add the numbers of households with piped water to 
dwelling; piped water inside yard and piped water to community stand less than 200 metres: hence, 
splitting Table 4.2. In this regard 80.2% (104 589) households comply with the Water Services Act and 
19.8% (25 798) households do not (with implications for free basic water access). These figures are 
relatively consistent with recent DW AF statistics which show 82.8% of Msunduzi population have 
"access to water" (DW AF website, Free basic service monitor system implementation status: 
www.dwaf.gov.za!FreeBasicWater/, accessed 24 January 2007 [DWAF, 2007a]) but inconsistent with 
disaggregated statistics which indicate 95.8% of the poor population served by Msunduzi have "access to 
water'' (DWAF, 2007a). 
Msunduzi has acknowledged that its backlog figures "may be underestimated" (Centre for Applied Legal 
Studies, 2008: 42). Such figures must be seen in the context whereby water access statistics are 
" ... virtually impossible to assess" (Bernson, 2000: 39; and recently admitted to by Government, see 
Rudin, 2008: 18). Bernson (2000: 39) and Greenberg (2005: 207) note a lack of systematic monitoring 
and evaluation of South Africa' s water access programmes and infrastructure breakdowns. Finally, the 
failure of many rural water schemes plus enforced disconnections due to inability to pay or non-payment 
has further contributed to inaccurate and dated access data (Hemson, 2000: 41 ). 
Msunduzi has had mixed success in reducing the water access backlog. Historically the independent 
entities amalgamated into Msunduzi have been the site of high apartheid-related water access backlogs. 
Backlog progress must therefore take into account this sizeable historical backlog. Using a different 
measure of access and backlog (on-site access) and comparing with other large cities is instructive. In 
this regard, Msunduzi appears to be losing ground (see Figure 4.1 ). 
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Figure 4.1: Percentage of households without access to water on site. 
Source: SACN (2006: 80). 
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The SACN (2006:79) does not have specific backlog data but it does consider access in terms of 
"households without access to water on site" and "households with access to water in dwelling:• In this 
regard, the SACN indicates that the percentage of Msunduzi households without access to water on site 
(in yard or in dwelling) has decreased on the whole between 1996 and 2004 but increased slightly 
between 200 I and 2004 (SACN. 2006: 79 and see Figure 4 . I). Progress with regards to the percentage of 
households with access to water in dwelling has decreased sl ightly between I 996 and 2004. At the same 
time the number of households with access to water in dwelling has increased slightly. Such a trajectory 
is relatively consistent with Mangaung, Nelson Mandela, Tshwane, Johannesburg City, eThekwini and 
Ekurhuleni (SACN, 2006: 78). Interpreted, the trajectory could be due to an increase in the number of 
households within municipal jurisdictions (a national trend), an increased population caused by extended 
municipal demarcation boundaries, and service levels deemed appropriate and affordable to a large rural 
and poor population (hence a shift of focus from in-yard/dwelling connections to community standpipes 
etc.) [SACN, 2006: 138]. 
Rapid expansion of municipal jurisdiction, significant service backlog and differential service levels have 
the implication that substantial resources are necessary to equalise the situation. Msunduzi's capital 
expenditure (capex) however, is inadequate to meet the needs of substantial backlogs, maintenance and 
service delivery, with a deficit of almost half the capital budget required (Msunduzi website: 
www.msunduzi.gov.za/site/municipalmanagerscolum, accessed 4 February 2008b). 
3 CONDITIONAL FREE BASIC WATER 
The Free Basic Water Policy was implemented by Msunduzi on 1 December 2001 (Msunduzi, 2001). 
Municipalities have three options when deciding how to implement the Free Basic Water Policy (OW AF, 
2002a: 32): 
I. Provide a free allocation ofwater just to the poor free of charge (i.e. targeted) 
2. Provide a free allocation of water to everyone free of charge or 
3. Provide a free allocation of water to everyone free of charge but if domestic users consume more 
than the free allocation than they must pav (or the free allocation o(water and anv additional 
ki/olitres consumed. i.e. the subsidised cost of the full free allocation plus any additional 
kilolitres used over the free allocation (at the standard tariff rate). 
In 2001 Msunduzi adopted the third delivery option: a universal application of free water for all domestic 
consumers provided they remain within the free volume allocation(!> 200 litres per day per billing period: 
(i.e.) 30 days x 200 litres = 6kC). If a domestic consumer uses S 200 litres per day per billing period then 
water is free; if a domestic consumer uses more than the free volume allocation(: 200 litres per day per 
billing period) then free water is waived: such consumers pay for their 'free water' and any additional 
kilolitres consumed (Msunduzi, 2001). 
The free basic water volume offered to individual households each month is not uniform. It is dependent 
on the period between each monthly meter reading date. lt is calculated as follows: number of days 
between meter reading dates x 200 litres = Total free water volume for that particular month. 
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Number of days x 200 litres =Total free water volume 
Hence the free water volume allocation may be more or less than 6k( per month (e.g.) 29 days x 200 litres 
= 5 800 litres free water or 35 days x 200 litres = 7 000 litres free water. 
If households use 6 000 litres over 29 days (200 litres more than the free allocation) then free basic water 
will be withdrawn: the 5 800 litres will be charged for at R4.24/kt, and 200 litres at R8.37/kt (see 
Appendix B). Now is perhaps an opportune moment to consider how typical the municipal practice of 
charging for the first 6k( is if consumption exceeds this basic volume? To answer this question I have to 
disregard official DWAF's Free basic service monitor system (DWAF-FBSMS) statistics (DWAF 
website: www.dwaf.gov.za/FreeBasicWater/, accessed 13 May 2008 [DW AF, 2008b] because their 
numbers of households accessing free basic water do not correlate with their official definition, which 
defines "served by free basic water" as "Population or Household that receives a basic water supply at no 
charge/for free" (DWAF website: www.dwaf.gov.za/dir_ ws/fbw/subscr/Datadefs.asp, accessed 16 
September 2008 [DW AF. 2008c]; text in italics is DWAF's emphasis). For example: their figures 
include households as "served by free basic water" whose access does not comply with the regulated 
service level ("below" or "at RDP level" which implicate the carrying of water from a communal 
standpipe or other, the distance of200 metres or more) and further their statistics conflate access to free 
basic water for entire populations served by Water Service Authorities (WSAs) when in fact only parts of 
those populaces are actually accessing free basic water. 
The question therefore is better answered by using The DWAF Local Municipality Tariff Survey database 
[DWAF-LMTS] (2006/7) which provides free basic water access and other tariff-related data and which 
is based on 239 municipalities. It is not however, strictly comparable to the DWAF-FBSMS statistics as 
it deals with municipalities and not WSAs and further carries other errors and omissions. However, in the 
absence of any alternative database comparison, the DW AF-LMTS does provide some clues. For 
example: applying descriptive statistics to the database; out of239 municipalities 139 (58.9%) charge a 
zero amount for the first block of 6kC and 97 (41.1 %) institute charges for the first block. Analysing the 
data further for municipalities with a Free Basic Water Policy (58.9%): it was found that 4 out of 139 
charge a flat rate, 62 out of 139 levy a basic municipal service charge, and 2 out of 139 levy both a flat 
rate and basic municipal service charge - that is, these municipalities cannot be considered as legitimately 
having a Free Basic Water Policy because they recover monies for the water service provided. This 
leaves 71 out of 139 which can be legitimately classified as having a Free Basic Water Policy yet tell us 
nothing about cases such as Msunduzi (which would be included in the 71) that remove access if 6kC is 
exceeded. Nevertheless, a truer indication of municipalities, as disaggregated from the DWAF-LMTS 
database, which actually deliver free basic water ("no charge/for free") may be closer to 29.7% (71 out of 
239) - although even this figure may be too high. 
In summary, the practice of charging consumers for all their water if 6kC is exceeded is fairly common. 
However, the determination of how the recovery is actually enacted is typically concealed through a 
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variation of opaque methods. For example: municipalities may give the illusion that certain volumes are 
free, only to have fixed , service or flat rate charges eliminate the free part of free basic water. Msunduzi 
appears contrary to this and offers the analyst transparency: households either access free water or they 
do not. 
In July 2004 Msunduzi introduced the Indigent Policy. Msunduzi's Free Basic Water Policy was 
amended to incorporate option one and three (Local Government Consultant, 2005a: pc). I will return to 
the Free Basic Water Policy and amendment implications in section 3.2; for now more detail is given on 
the Indigent Policy and tariff frameworks. 
3.1 Indigent Policy 
The emergence of the Indigent Policy as an instrument in targeting basic services and subsidies for 
vulnerable groups is of great consequence. The Indigent Policy applied in Msunduzi has markedly 
shaped the interpretation and application of free basic services38 in Msunduzi. There is no blueprint 
Indigent Policy, like the Free Basic Water Policy: municipalities can interpret ' indigency' and apply 
policy as they see fit. In 2007 DWAF justified Msunduzi's poorly equilibrated tariff structure (blocks and 
parameters), its excessive standard tariff charges, and its 'targeting' of free basic water on the premise 
that "all poor households" were absorbed within the Indigent Policy subsidy conditions (Acting Regional 
Director DWAF, Angela Masefield, Fax to Fred Wagner, Eastwood Community Forum, 20 April 2007 
[DWAF, 2007b]). 
The means-tested Indigent Policy was first approved in 2003 and implemented by Msunduzi in July 2004 
(Local Government Consultant, 200Sa: pc). Qualification conditions include total monthly household 
income, house and land values. Total monthly household income may not exceed Rl 957 for 2005/6 
(Municipal Consolidated Billing [MCB], 2005: pc). Three different categories of indigent households 
have been devised: (I) automatic indigents: house and land valued under R30 000; (2) applied indigents: 
house and land valued between R30 001-R40 000; and (3) applied indigents: house and land valued over 
R40 001 (see table 4.3). The different procedures for 'automatic' and 'applied' indigent uptake are 
important. The former is governed by administrative procedure, the latter by personal application and 
registration (via Ward Councillor and Municipal Administration). 
There is no application process for 'automatic indigents.' This category is automatically identified via 
computer systems and charged accordingly. Restriction devices are installed in the homes of 'automatic 
indigents· (MCB, 2005: pc). Households falling into this category have no choice in accepting/not-
accepting the 'benevolence of government. ' It is further notable that new RDP housing infrastructure 
comes with automatic installation of water limiting devices and prepaid electricity meters (MCE, 2005: 
pc). 
~·Free basic services offered through the lndigent Policy form part of the social wage. 
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Households wanting to register as "applied' indigents must meet qualification conditions: household 
income S RI 957 (2005/6) and house and land valuation R30 00 1-R40 000 or household income 
~ Rl 957 (2005/6) and house and land valuation above R40 001. This first step is administered by the 
Ward Councillor, whose responsibility it is to ask the household a series of income-related questions, 
explain criteria and conditions, and advise on what further steps are needed prior to submission of 
completed forms. Households must submit the following information: details of account holder; proof of 
income; proof of residence; certified copies of identification documents; and numbers and names of 
dependants (Msunduzi Indigent Policy, 2006). Moreover, households must agree (and sign for) the 
following: a reduction of amperage (20 amperes or less); a water restriction device ( limiting water 
consumption to 12kC per month); and sign an acknowledgement of debt (Application for Indigent Status, 
2005). There are legal and ethical questions surrounding the latter two conditions. The first, regarding 
the restriction of water to 12kC will automatically bring the municipality into breach of contract; as the 
technical restriction devices applied only allow the maximum access to 6kC water per household per 
month. The second condition, requiring a customer to sign an acknowledgement of debt prior to granting 
a loan, is regarded by the Credit Bureau Ombudsman as "unethical practice" (Experian Bureau. 2007: pc). 
This is because signing an acknowledgement of debt allows the municipality to immediately start a 
judgement process to bring a garnishee order to attach a salary portion; or further along to attach 
household possessions or auction off the home - this, even before the applicant has defaulted (Experian 
Bureau, 2007: pc). 
'Applied' indigent households, once registered. must further abide by certain payment conditions. That 
is: they must pay their current accounts (total monthly municipal service bill) every month. in full and on 
time. If the household complies with these conditions then all outstanding arrears and all the monthly 
interest on the outstanding arrears will be 'frozen' until such t ime as Council 'writes it off.' However, if a 
household defaults by making a late or partial payment or failing to pay, then all the historical arrears 
return to the account and interest will be charged. In such a case, the household must make payment 
arrangements with the municipality and pay off all the interest charges and defaulted amounts from the 
period of first default to the current date (Msunduzi Customer Services department [CS), 2006a: pc). If 
these arrears are settled in full, then the interest will no longer be charged and the household will proceed 
as normal (CS, 2006a: pc). If arrangements are not made then every month the interest on the 
outstanding arrears must be paid together with the current account and the household is liable to be 
handed over to Municipal lawyers for breach of contract (CS, 2006a: pc; MCB. 2006b: pc). Furthermore, 
once a household has registered as an ' applied indigent' they are only able to deregister after a year has 
passed; hence if a household is unhappy with water flow or amperage they are not allowed to get out of 
the contract. 'Applied indigents' are required to confirm their income status details annually; if this is not 
done the contract automatically terminates (CS, 2006a: pc; CS, 2006b: pc). 
It is evident that the entire indigent registration process and conditions of uptake are exceptionally 
arduous and humiliating. They are onerous, bureaucratic, invasive and stigmatising - as much of the 
literature on welfare argues (Dean, I991; Piven & Cloward, 1993; Walker, 1993; Brown, 1995; Lund, 
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200 I; see Chapter 2). Indeed, the onerousness of procedures and low uptake of indigency status is not 
limited to Msunduzi; with the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (2008 : 18) noting that problems with 
municipal indigent policies include: 
... the exhaustive requirements and documentation needed to apply for indigency status; the narrow 
definition of indigent within municipalities; the burden of responsibility placed on indigents to 
reapply annually; the stigma and criminalisation attached to indigent status; the restrictive 
conditions attached to accessing free basic services via the indigency policy. 
The procedures and requirements of application and indeed the conditions attached to concessions might 
explain why so few people register as indigents. From July 2004 to June 2005, 16 420 households in total 
( 12% of all Msunduzi households) were entered as indigents: 13 619 households were ' automatic 
indigents ' and 2 801 households were ' applied indigents ' (Promis Income Manager, 2005: pc). Twenty-
two months later, in April 2007, 25 012 households in total (18% of all Msunduzi households) were 
entered as indigents: 8 161 'automatic' and 440 'applied indigents' had been added to the list totalling 
21 780 'automatic' and 3 241 'applied indigents' (PAIA, 2007a). The fact that only 440 new ' applied ' 
applications registered in 22 months (June 2005-April 2007), just less than 2 years, could suggest several 
explanations (I) households are in a good financial condition; (2) arduousness of procedures and 
conditions accompanying subsidies act as a disincentive to uptake; and people are rejecting state ' pro-
poor' policies (a conundrum that will be explored later); (3) all poor qualifYing households are already 
captured in the register; or (4) Msunduzi, with its massive number of not-billed/non-metered households 
and limited external grants does not want to absorb any further costs. Suggestions 1 and 3 are rejected 
and 2 and 4 provide a closer proximity to the truth. ln 2007/8 Msunduzi reported that the number of 
households on the indigent register is ''only 20% of the total number who would qualify" (cited by Centre 
for Applied Legal Studies, 2008: 44). 
Clearly Msunduzi overstated the figure (implying that all Msunduzi households should be on the register 
[total number of households in Msunduzi is 139 650]); this admission is nevertheless significant, is 
contrary to DWAF's assertion that ''all poor households" have been absorbed by the Indigent Policy, and 
implies that many more households should actually be on the register. Importantly, it suggests the 
following immediate issues: (a) the Indigent Policy; as an instrument to deliver free basic services may 
be inadequate; and (b) the administrative options of free basic water delivery (1: targeted) and (3: free but 
if use more; pay for all) may not have been the most appropriate choice. Indeed, universal coverage as 
provided by option 2 (free for all) may have been a better (and easier) administrative option. Moreover, 
the admission further hints at the large gap between the numbers of billed households receiving standard 
service packages, and those that should actually receive indigent packages. All other poor Msunduzi 
households (not registered as 'indigent') only receive free basic water if less than 6k( is consumed per 
month and no further subsidies are given if 6kC is exceeded. This means that the majority of poor 
households may not be guaranteed free basic water and wi ll therefore be expected to pay for their water at 
standard tariffs. Table 4.3 below shows the total indigent package offered by Msunduzi. 
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Table 4.3: Indigent services at 2005/6 tariffs (inclusive of VAT). 
Services Automatic Application Application 
House & Land Value Under R30 000 Between R30 OOO-R40 000 OverR40 001 
Electricity Free 50 kWh FreeSOkWh Free SOkWh 
Balance @ nonnal Balance @ nonnal 
Ampere Free 20Amp 20 Amp reduced 20 Amp reduced 
Water Free 6kt Balance @ nonnal tariff Free 6kt 7 -12kf @ R3.41/kf'. Free 6kt 7-12kl@ R3.41/kf*. 
R8.37/kl* Balance@ nonnal tariff R8.37/kl* Balance@ nonnal tariff 8.37/kl* 
[Restriction device to be installed] [Restriction device to be installed} [Restriction device to be installed/ 
Sewage Free Reduced tariff Reduced tariff 
Refuse Free Reduced tariff Reduced tariff 
Rates Free Free Rebate on approval 
Source: Msunduz1 lnd1gent Polley GUidelmes (2006). 
3.2 Water tariff structures with free basic water and the Indigent Policy 
Tar iffs are the chief source of revenue for water services in South Africa, over 80% is derived from the 
sale of water, the remaining 20% is derived from taxes and subsidies (DW AF, 2002b). Municipalities 
have relative autonomy over municipal tariff structures and prices, the interpretation of free basic 
services, indigent policies, credit control and debt collection policies; all of which differ markedly 
between municipal jurisdictions. Although South African municipalities have ultimate discretionary 
powers regarding the setting of municipal water tari ffs; they are expected to adhere to legislative 
injunctions, regulations and national tariff principles. In this regard, DWAF has suggested the following 
broad principles: 
... equity, proportion to use (amount users pay should be in proportion to use of service), 
affordabil ity, reflecting costs (costs associated with rendering the service), differentiation 
(differentiation between different categories of users, debtors. service providers, services, service 
standards and geographical areas) and transparency (DWAF, 2002b: 37). 
DWAF's regulation standards for water services tariffs under section I 0 of the Water Services Act apply 
to all water service institutions and " ... no water service institution may use a tariff which is substantially 
different from any prescribed norms and standards" (DW AF, 2002c: 61 ). The regulation standard for 
water services tariffs under section 10 of the Water Services Act (RSA, 1997) states the following: 
The rising block system should include at least three tariffblocks but may include more. The 
tariff for the first block, i.e. consumption between 0 and 6kC per household per month should be 
set as low as affordable by the water services institution and should be provided for free if a 'free 
basic water· policy is being implemented. The second block in a three-block tariff structure is for 
'normal consumption' meaning that the upper consumption limit ofthis block should be set such 
that a household that uses water sparingly should be accommodated within this block. The tariff 
charged for consumption in this block should ideally reflect the actual or average cost of water. 
The third or top block is for ' luxury consumption.' A household that uses water for luxury 
purposes, such as filling a swimming pool or a household that does not use water sparingly should 
be requi red to pay a higher than average price for water that reflects the economic cost of this 
scarce resource (DW AF, 2002c: 72-74, my emphasis). 
The requirements of sub regulation (I) are deemed to have been met where the tariff is set as a 
volume based charge that provides for a rising block tariff structure which includes: three or more 
tariff blocks with the tariff increasing for higher consumption blocks; a first tariff block with a 
maximum consumption volume of six kilolitres and which is set at the lowest amount, including a 
zero amount, required to ensure the viability and sustainability of water supply services; and a 
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tarifffor the last block or highest consumption block set at an amount that would discourage high 
water use and that reflects the incremental cost that would be incurred to increase the capacity of 
the water supply infrastructure to meet an incremental growth in demand (DWAF, 2002c: 72-73). 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the difference between DWAF's rising block tariff regulations and the 2-block tariff 
structure employed in Msunduzi for standard tariffs. 
Rising block tariff regulations (OWAF example) 
II\ R8.37 
Msunduzi Municipality block tariff (proper) 
" 
R5.50 I 
R2.50 Bloc!. I ~·lei.._ 
o-okf 7- .so ... t 
Free 
Okt 6kf 
I 
.... 
I , R4.42 
\ Block 3 Rlud. I 3lkt+ 0-6H 
.... Free IR2;44-I , 
30kt 00 Okt 6kt 
Household consumption per 30 day period 
nl""i. 2 
.;~ t~..a:. 
Figure 4.2: Regulation example of rising block tariffs (adapted from DWAF, 2002c: 72) compared 
to Msunduzi 2005/6 tariffs. 
Source: adapted from DW AF (2002c: 72) and Msunduzi Tariff Policy (2005/6). 
Msunduzi 's standard tariff structure (non-'indigent') for the majority of Msunduzi citizens is substantially 
different from, and contravenes the prescribed norms and regulation standards issued under section 10 of 
the Water Services Act. This is because Msunduzi employs a 2-block tariff structure: the first block 
parameters include 0-6kC (free basic water) and the second block includes 6kC+ to infinity. Msunduzi 
water tariffs contravene DW AF tariff regulations, guidelines and principles: the number of tariff blocks, 
widths of block parameters and pricing of each block serves to penalise poor low-volume consumers via 
the imposition of expensive and inequitable tariffs for limited consumption. Msunduzi charges a ' full 
cost tariff as far down the volume chain as possible. Msunduzi over-recovers low-volume consumption 
and under-recovers excessive and wasteful high-volume consumption. 
Msunduzi deviates from standard policy regulations further by removing access to free basic water if 
incrementally more is used. Such a practice is in contravention of the Strategic Framework for Water 
Services (DW AF, 2003: 34-35), which states: 
Where domestic consumers consume just more than a defined basic amount, water service 
authorities shall not be entitled to recoup the fu ll financial cost of providing the basic amount in 
the marginal tariff for the next small increment consumed. In other words, if the free basic water 
allocation is 6kC per month. then a water service authority may not require a consumer who uses 
7kC per month to pay for the full fi nancial costs for the supply of7k[ per month. 
1 showed in Chapter 2 that Msunduzi tariffs and bi lls lie at the upper end of municipal comparisons (to be 
further discussed in Chapter 5). As such, poor households, restricted via lack of finance or technical 
limitations. may struggle to pay for sufficient water volumes to meet required water needs. 
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.... 
Before free basic water, Msunduzi also had a 2-block tariff structure: 0-5kC and 6kC+. The 
implementation of free basic water saw the tariff structure largely unchanged: the monetary value 
attributed to the tariff structure remained the same; it was only the parameters that changed to incorporate 
an additional kilolitre (Msunduzi Water Department, 2003: pc). Significantly, instead of incorporating 
the 6th kilo litre at the same tariff rate as the first l -5kC block (R2.29/kC); Msunduzi incorporated the 6th 
kilolitre at the tariff rate for the old 2nd block (R5 . ll/kC). With the annual tariff increase of 10%, the 
tariff rate for the 2nd block changed to R5.62 per kilolitre and the charge for the first 6kC (now first 
block) amounted to Rl7.07 (2002/3 tariffs). This had the implication that households consuming more 
than 6kC a month received no financial benefit from the introduction of free basic water (see Table 4.4). 
Table 4.4: 200112 Msunduzi Municipal derivation of free basic water tariffs. 
Tariff before free basic water (2001/2) 
1" block 0-5kf@ R2.29 per kl = R11.45 
2nd block 611 kt +@ R5.11 per kf - R 5.11 
Total for 6kl 5kt + 1kt = R16.56 
Tariff after free basic water (2002/3) 
1•' block 0-6kf@ R2.29 x 5kf + R5.62 (R5.11 + 10%) x1kl = R17.07 
2"" block 7kf +@ R5.62 per kl = R 5.62 
Total for 6 kt 6kf (free basic water) = R17.07 
Source: Msunduzi Water Department, 2003: pc. 
Tariffs appl ied in this study cover the period 2005/6. Current standard tariffs (2005/6) dictate that the 
first block of6kC is charged at R25.44 and the second block of6kH is charged at the standard tariffrate 
of R8.37 kC (all figures include VAT). In 2004 with the introduction of the Indigent Policy, the tariff 
structure and tariffs for standard users (defined in study as 'conventional') remained unchanged. 
However, the tariff structure and tariffs for ' appl ied' indigents changed; the tariff structure for 'automatic 
indigents· remained unchanged but the prices changed (see Table 4.5). The tariff structure for 'applied 
indigents' included 3 blocks: 0-6k C (free regardless of whether more water was consumed); 7-12kC at 
subsidised rate of R3.41 /kC; and 12kC+ balance at standard tariff of R8.37/kC (including VAT: 2005/6). 
Note that the 'applied ' indigent rates for 7-l2kC are cheaper than standard free basic water (0-6kC) rates 
per kilolitre [R3.41/kC versus R4.24/kC]. It is important to note that 'applied indigents' received such 
concessions on condition that they submit to installation of a restriction device (such households were 
being 'helped' to consume less). The tariff structure for ' automatic indigents' 39 remained unchanged (2 
blocks); however the first block (0-6kC) was guaranteed free (regardless of whether more water was 
consumed) and all kilolitres consumed thereafter were charged at the standard tariff of R8.37/kC. 
Indigent households (both ' applied ' and ·automatic') were the only category of users guaranteed their free 
water regardless of volumes consumed. 
''J This group is relatively poorer than ·applied indigents·. This rather strange ·automatic· indigent tariff structure. whereby the 
second block of 6kf + is charged at the standard tariff rate of R8.3 7 k ( - more than the ·applied' indigent rate - is clearly contrary to 
equity and poverty alleviation goals. However. in practice. it did not matter because ·automatic' indigents were automatically 
restricted to just 6kt (unless they tampered). 
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Table 4.5: Msunduzi water tariffs for standard versus 'indigents': 2005/6 (inclusive of VAT). 
User category Consumption 1•• Tariff 2nd block Tariff Jrd Tariff FBW utility? block block 
Consuming 0-6kt Free 6kt+ Not applicable None ~ s 6ktlmonlh (conditional) -Standard 
tariffs40 Consuming 0-6kt R25.44@ 6kt+ @ R8.37/kt None X > 6ktlmonth R4.24/kt -
0-6kt Free 6kt+ @ R8.37/kt None ~ Automatic (unconditional) -
'lndigenr tariffs 
Free Applied 0-6kt (unconditional) 7-12kt @ R3.41kt 13kt+ @ R8.37/kt ~ 
Source: adapted from Msunduz1 TanffPohcy (2005/6). 
3.3 Unaccounted-for-water and water availability 
Considerations of water delivery and free basic water in particular invariably result in contestations of 
resource sufficiency. In this regard the question of scarcity in absolute or socially constructed terms is 
moot. It is not my intention to explore such debates (beyond that already presented in Chapter 2); rather I 
present an inquiry into Msunduzi 's water avai lability via the optic of unaccounted-for-water. 
Unaccounted-for-water (UA W) is a term used to describe non-revenue water, which consists of 
unbilled/unmetered authorised consumption and water losses: apparent losses (illegal connections and 
metering inaccuracies) and real losses (mains leaks, reservoir overflows and service connection leaks) 
[International Water Association, 2000: 5]. The Msunduzi IDP Review (2006: 167) indicated that UA W 
losses had been reduced, " ... from approximately 43% to 33.6% as at 30 June 2003." These figures were 
reasonably comparable to those quoted in the WSDP (2004: 42) of unaccounted-for water losses of 31%. 
ln contrast, the Auditor-General indicated that total water losses had increased from, " ... 43% in 2004 to 
49% for the year ended June 2005" (The Witness: 30 May 2006). Reconciling such statistical 
inconsistency is difficult (particularly if there may be some gerrymandering with non-domestic consumer 
concessions); however, of greater importance is that UA W presents Msunduzi with a tough challenge. In 
this regard, Msunduzi registered a constant annual purchasing water projection of 40 250 OOOk C for 2004-
2009 (WSDP, 2004: 41 ). Recognising that actual kilolitres purchased is higher than that indicated in 
Municipal plans; a constant trajectory suggests that there is enough volume capacity to provide water to 
Msunduzi ' s citizens without buying significantly more water in the future. 
Returning to the structure of UAW: specifically the ratio of 'water losses-to-non-revenue water;' any 
considerable reduction in water losses would free up existing volume capacity to be used to augment 
current supplies. This, without having to either increase the volumes purchased from UW or substantially 
accommodate water resource and infrastructure replacement costs within service tariffs. All of which 
meant that, if Msunduzi prioritised the fixing of leaks, even marginally (expensive in the short-term but 
cheaper and more sustainable long-term); the convoluted ways in which households are either granted or 
•o Note that households charged at standard tariffs are not necessarily better of f in a socio-economic sense than ' indigent· 
households: it simply means that these households are not registered as 'indigent. · 
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declined their water service requirements could simply recede to the granting of all households, 
particularly the poor, appropriate and affordable volumes of water. 
4 CREDIT CONTROL AND DEBT COLLECTION 
Credit control refers to policies and practices (e.g. incentives for prompt payment or limiting 
consumption) which help prevent households from accumulating municipal service debts or inversely 
help municipalities avoid permitting such accumulation. Debt collection is typically the ongoing 
collection of debts, not necessarily defaulting debts, which in the latter case signals a failure of credit 
control; it is initiated when households fall into arrears and ensures that these monies due to council are 
collected. Official definitions of credit control and debt collection typically conflate the two, for 
example: Msunduzi defines credit control as, "all functions relating to the collection of monies owed by 
customers and users of municipal services" (Msunduzi Municipality Credit Control and Debt Collection 
Policy [CC&DC], 2006: 7). It is legislated that municipalities have to collect all monies due and payable 
to it (Local Government Municipal Systems Act, 32 of2000 [RSA, 2000b); Local Government Municipal 
Finance Management Act, 56 of 2003 [RSA, 2003)). However, the Local Government Municipal 
Systems Act (RSA, 2000b) does allow for differentiation on an equitable basis for different categories of 
users: 
A credit control and debt collection policy may differentiate between different categories of 
ratepayers, users of services, debtors, taxes, services, service standards and other matters as long as 
the differentiation does not amount to discrimination (RSA, 2000b: 90 s97, 2). 
Msunduzi has indicated that its '·credit control and debt collection policies are very effective" (MCB, 
2006a: pc). Punitive measures are strictly enforced for service and rates defaulting. Defaulting 
households are immediately yoked with interest on outstanding payments and the limitation or 
disconnection of certain services. Serial defaulters are handed over to Municipal debt collectors, where 
the defaulting on large monthly payments may result in litigation resulting in the dispossession of 
furniture or the auctioning-off of homes. The procedures followed to rein in the defaulting household are 
of great consequence; as such, these are presented comprehensively and consider in turn: payment 
procedures, payment rates. debt collection procedures, municipal debt collection consortia, water 
restrictions and electricity disconnections. 
4.1 Msunduzi municipal consolidated bills and payment procedures 
Msunduzi municipal tariffs for services, across all service groupings (defined in this study as: 
'conventional,' ' indigent,' ' lifeline,' ' tampered ' and 'restricted' households), are fixed or volumetrically 
based or part-fixed and part-volumetric. Refuse removal and sanitation are fixed, that is, it does not 
matter how much refuse or water a household discharges; all households within a particular service 
grouping are charged the same monthly amount (see Appendix C). Property rates are fixed but not 
uniform: rates are calculated on land and property value. Electricity tariffs include both a fixed monthly 
amperage charge (variable depending on the size of the amperage: 5-80 amps) and a volumetric 
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consumption tariff. Water tariffs are volumetrically linked if the free basic water allocation is exceeded, 
and fixed to zero if not. 
Tariffs, for all services, increase annually in July of each year. Water increased I 0% year on year from 
2002 to 2005 and by 8% for the year 2005/6. All other services, for the 2005/6 year increased by the 
following percentages: rates 6%, electricity 4%, sewage and refuse by 7% (Msunduzi, 2005: 18). 
On I July 2004 the City Council implemented a new billing system. This system saw the incorporation of 
rates as a monthly instead of an annual charge as well as the consolidation of all municipal services into 
one monthly account (Msunduzi household correspondence, 2004). Msunduzi has indicated that it has 
61 443 billed domestic connections in Msunduzi (PAIA, 2007a). Bills are posted to consumers. Payment 
can be made at various pay points and other facilities, however the A.S. Chetty Building, located at 333 
Church Street is the main municipal payment and query point (Msunduzi website: 
www.msunduzi.gov.za, accessed 15 September). Interest is charged from 30 days of bill issue. Interest 
of 1.5% is charged on arrears per month, this works out to 18% per annum (Account Enquiries, 2005: pc). 
The allocation of payments and part-payments, as per Msunduzi policy is as fo llows: " .. . receipt of the 
total outstanding monies will be allocated to the credit ofthe account in full" (CC&DC, 2006: s20.J , 32). 
However, where a debtor pays only part of the total amount due, for services, " ... a customer is not 
entitled to allocate any payment made to any portion of the total debt due" (i.e.) a customer may not 
prioritise the allocation of a partial payment to electricity or water before other services (CC&DC, 2006: 
s20.2, 32). Allocation to the account is performed according to the sequence below: 
1. to any unpaid interest raised on the account 
2. to any other sundry debtors (miscellaneous) 
3. to housing rents and instalments 
4. to any unpaid refuse collection charges 
5. to any unpaid sewage charges 
6. to any unpaid water charges 
7. to any unpaid electricity charges and 
8. lastly, to any unpaid property rates (CC&DC, 2006: s20.1, 32). 
The hierarchy of allocation is inverted so that the interests ofthe state are prioritised. The significance of 
sequence on the allocation of part-payments is two-fold: a household, only able to make a partial 
payment, cannot secure their electricity or water services because the total bill must be paid in sequential 
order; and total outstanding payments are disproportionately levied on services which are relatively more 
expensive e.g. property rates, which accrue a I 0% annual collection charge penalty, effected in October 
annually (CC&DC, 2006: sl 8.3, 29). 
4.2 Recovery rates 
"The percentage of revenue collected compared to that of revenue billed provides a valuable indicator of 
the overall efficiency of municipalities in collecting funds due to them" (SACN. 2006: 54). Msunduzi ' s 
long-term payment target is a debtor turnover ratio of 30 days (i.e.) the payment of services on average 
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within one month of receiving an account (CC&DC, 2006: 19). Msunduzi 's Mayor (H latshwayo) 
indicated that in the last financial year (2005/6), "the municipality recorded an average 96% collection 
rate of the monthly bills issued" (Hlatshwayo, 2006). The Msunduzi Credit Control and Debt Collection 
Unit "aimed at ensuring an annual average of at least 95%" (CC&DC, 2006: 19). Moreover the SACN 
(2006: 96) saw a "dramatic improvemenf' in Msunduzi 's debt collection between 2002/3 and 2005, from 
88.09% to 98.89% (SACN, 2006: 98). This represented the highest debt collection rate for all nine cities 
included in the SACN survey (SACN. 2006: 98 and refer to Table 4.6). 
Table 4.6: Revenue collection versus revenue billed. 
lnd cator Oat;, Suff<'liO Cape Ekurl1uler eTnel<w n .k1hRnnes Ma:1gaur19 MsundJzi 
C1ty Tow"' burg 
Perce;;tage revenue 2006 97.2-1> - - - -
co.·erted vs revenue 20<J5 - 8i.4"' - - 93 .2~' 98.897, 
b' cd 2002.3 83.0~' 93.c/c. 89.09:. es.v:. 92.0~ ' 8309~ 
Source: SACN (2006: 98) usmg Local Government database (percentage revenue collected -
municipalities) from Treasury. 
Tshwa~e 
-
-
!l7.0'i· 
The Witness (20 July 2007), citing The Municipal Finance Third Quarter Review, reported that Msunduzi 
was owed R443 million.41 Municipal debt is not limited to Msunduzi, with "South Africa's 21 high-
capacity municipalities owed more than R35 billion" (The SA Local Government Briefing. July 
2008: 19). In descending order, consistent with SACN cities, municipal debt is the following: 
Ekurhuleni R6.3 billion, Cape Town R3.5 billion, eThekwini R3.2 billion, Tshwane R2.7 billion, Nelson 
Mandela Bay Rt.l billion, Mangaung R657 million, Buffalo City R427 million (The SA Local 
Government Briefing, July 2008: 19). It is entirely plausible that Msunduzi's revenue collection rate has 
improved owing to the very strict credit control and debt collection procedures enforced against 
defaulting households. Yet, the sheer extent of ' recovery' appears unlikely. There are many factors that 
appear to contradict these ' official ' figures and pronouncements. For example: by 30 June 2006, 35% 
(2 1 55 1) of all bi lled domestic households had been handed over to the municipal debt collectors 
consortia for rates and service arrears (PAIA, 2007b) . In 2003 approximately 7 500 rates and service 
defaulters were put on a municipal list for the auction of their properties (Wagner, 2006: pc). The context 
ofthis ' recovery' and its social costs is therefore crucial. 
4.3 Debt collection procedures 
The social and political implications of the severity of Msunduzi 's debt collection enforcement will be 
exp lored in detail in this thesis. By way of introduction it may be worthwhile to stress: debt collection 
procedures are typically enacted against households which have defaulted on the payment of basic, life-
sustaining services. Policies are framed with large numbers of people in mind - a bureaucratic, 'one size 
fits air approach. A prime objective of a debt collection policy seems to penalise poor non-payers: not 
ensure that they have continuous services, differentiate between those households that can pay but don't 
want to and those households that truly struggle to pay yet nevertheless try to do so. 
<I The SA Local Government Briefing (July 2008: 19) reponed that Msunduzi is owed R442 million. 
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Msunduzi enforces the following debt collection procedures, where consumer accounts are in arrears, 
with the intention of proceeding until the debt is collected or written off: 
• Immediately after due date (due date is 30 days from date billed), disconnect and/or restrict all 
water and/or electricity services for all overdue amounts relating to rates, service charges or any 
charges for services rendered by the municipality. 
• Thirty days after the due date: 
• Tracing action may be authorised and instituted if the whereabouts of the debtor is 
unknown. 
• Sixty days (or any earlier period if the ChiefFinancial Officer deems that it is in the best interest 
of the Council) after the due date, and where the account rendered to a customer remains 
outstanding, the following action may be taken: 
• All arrear amounts shall be handed over to the Council's debt collection agents. 
• The collection agents will then make use of normal debt collection procedures including 
a call centre approach and legal processes to collect the amounts owed to Council. 
• If necessary, the sale in execution of such property to recover arrear property rates and 
service charges will be instituted (if the accountholder is also the owner ofthe 
property). 
• All legal expenses incurred by the municipality shall be for the account of the 
defaulting customer (CC&DC, 2006: s27.1-27 .3, 38-39). 
Msunduzi's arrangements with customers in arrears and the debt collection procedures have tightened 
over the last few years reducing the ability of households to meet such arrangements. To illustrate this 
point: in February 2005, I was handed the Msunduzi Municipal Credit Control Policy (by a Credit 
Control employee). The document was not dated, however; it can be assumed that it was Msunduzi's 
Credit Control policy prior to 2005 because the arrangements for defaulting customers for 2005 and 2006 
were already in line with those issued in the CC&DC of 2006. This undated document issued the 
following: in respect of domestic consumers, " I 0% of the total overdue balance or the current account, 
whichever is the greatest. as an initial payment, shall be paid, and the balance of the account in equal 
instalments over a maximum period equal to the number of months that the outstanding amount has 
accumulated'' (Msunduzi Credit Control Policy, not dated: s6.3, 9, my emphasis). Then, in 2006, the 
CC&DC (2006: sl9.3, 30, my emphasis) issued an amendment on the previous arrangements: in respect 
of domestic consumers, "I 0% of the total overdue balance or the current account, whichever is greatest, 
as an initial payment, shall be paid, and the balance of the account shall be paid in equal instalments over 
a maximum ofl2 months." Hence, prior to the Msunduzi Municipal Credit and Debt Collection Policy of 
2006, households after paying an initial I 0% of total arrears, were able to pay the remaining arrears off in 
equal instalments over as long as it had taken to accumulate the arrears (hence this could be over many 
years); but the amendments of 2006 mean that after the 10% of total arrears is paid, the remaining arrears 
must be paid off over 12 months. J confirmed these arrangements with the municipal debt collection 
consortia and numerous households handed over to these consortia and found this to be true. 
4.4 Municipal debt collection consortia 
Before June 2004 municipal debt collection was outsourced to numerous law and debt collection firms42 
(verified by lifestories, interviews and Venn, Nemeth & Hart [VNH] Call Centre Manager, 2006: pc). In 
~2 Many households having paid outsourced lawyers for years were then handed over to the Msunduzi selected consortia (Lifestory 
interviews. 2006). 
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2003 Council decided to consolidate municipal debt collection43 (VNH Call Centre Manager, 2006: pc). 
In June 2004 municipal debt collection contracts were awarded to two consortia: 
• MV Credit Management Consortium - a joint venture between Venn, Nemeth & Hart Inc., 
Venn, Nemeth & Hart Credit Management and Kenlink Investments (Pty) Ltd trading as Mkonto 
Asset Management 
• Bambanani Joint Venture - made up of Cajee, Setsubi, Chetty Incorporated, Natal Debt 
Corporation and Jika Trading (Pty) Ltd (The Witness: 13 September 2006). 
The second PAIA instalment, sourced from Msunduzi's department of Strategic Analysis and Research 
(PA!A, 2007b) indicated that Msunduzi had " ... no data prior to 2004" on the number of domestic 
households handed over to debt collectors and lawyers. Nevertheless, the figures granted to me were the 
following: as at 30 June 2004, I 9 931 households had been handed over; 30 June 2005. 20 643 and 30 
June 2006, 21 551 (PAIA, 2007b; MCB, 2006a: pc). The Msunduzi lDP Review (2006: 115) indicated 
that by July 2006, debts totalling Rl27 million had been handed over to the consortia for recovery. The 
contract started in November 2004 (VNH Call Centre Manager, 2006: pc). Representatives from VNH 
and Natal Debt Corporation are housed permanently in the A.S. Chetty Building (the main municipal 
building); their service windows are the equivalent of and flank those of Customer Services. The 
municipal debt collection consortia receive a commission of 17% of all monies collected (The Witness: 13 
September 2006). The consortia only deal with original debt, hence interest raised for defaulting or 
paying late on current debt goes onto the household account and is payable directly to the municipality 
(VNH Call Centre Manager, 2006: pc). If a household defaults on the signed arrears payment 
instalments, the consortia will allow a short period of grace, and the household is allowed to re-negotiate 
the arrangements (VNH Call Centre Manager, 2006: pc; VNH Consultant, 2005: pc). However, these 
arrangements must be met, and to this end instalments are often paid via a garnishee order (direct from 
salary) or other (depending on employment status). If however, the household still does not 'honour' the 
arrangements, then they will be handed over to the consortia·s legal partners and legal proceedings will be 
initiated [see Appendix D] (VNH Call Centre Manager, 2006: pc; VNH Consultant, 2005: pc). 
On 13 September 2006 The Witness, (drawing on my initial findings) uncovered that ANC luminaries 
held positions as directors within the two municipal debt collection consortia. This was in addition to a 
search warrant, granted to the National Prosecuting Authority on 31 August 2006 to " ... collect all 
documents pertaining to the advertisement, application, awarding of the subsequent execution of the 
tenders awarded for all municipal debt collection allocated between the period of June 2004 and June 
2006" (The Witness: 13 September 2006). 
4.5 Restricted water services 
Restricting household water supplies and disconnecting electricity are primary credit control and debt 
collection strategies. The number of households restricted per month is disputed. The PAIA (2007a) 
suggested GOO households per month restricted (no time period or reconnection figure was given). MCB 
~, VNH and Natal Debt Corporation are the debt collection arms of the consortia. 
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(2005: pc) indicated that 30 water restriction devices are installed per day, or 400-500 per month. 
However the City Engineers Department (who carry out the restrictions) indicated that they install 60 
restriction devices a day and remove 5-10 a day (MCE, 2005: pc). The daily figures provided by the City 
Engineers Department work out to 1 200 installations and between 1 00-200 restriction device removals a 
month. In ascertaining which figures are ' more accurate,' the City Engineers Department, who carry out 
the directives of the Consolidated Billing Department/Treasury, must be in a more favourable position to 
provide accurate data. The number of restriction devices installed per day is limited by physical 
resources, many more households should technically be restricted but the City Engineers Department 
does not have enough staff to carry out the required restrictions (MCB, 2005: pc). If, for example: 5-6 
households in one street are due for restriction, "the worst offenders" are therefore selected on an 
"unlucky lottery" basis with the hope that the other defaulting households will be coerced into making 
payment (Local Government Consultant, 2005b: pc). 
There appears to be some confusion regarding when a household is liable for restriction. MCB (2005: pc) 
indicated that" ... there is no real rule but the Credit Control staff downstairs know that if total service 
arrears is Rl 0 000 or more then these households get restricted." A customer services employee echoed 
this 'rule' and said," ... I am not really sure when a household's water gets restricted but I think it is if 
they have very high arrears" (CS, 2006d: pc). However, when this same question was put to the CS 
Manager (2006: pc), he said, " ... your lights get disconnected after 30 days and 90 days for water 
restriction." I checked the ' rule' against several recently restricted households and saw that their arrears 
were not in excess of Rl 0 000 but the households had been in arrears for more than 90 days. Hence, it 
might be concluded that where households are in arrears for longer than 90 days and where arrears are 
perceived (by Credit Control) to be high; then a household is liable for restriction (albeit there is no clear-
cut tenet). 
Msunduzi charges ' bad' debtors a penalty fee for installing restriction devices: this was R159.60 in 
2005/6. The Water Department stated that the process of restricting households includes that "someone is 
sent to the household to negotiate payment options" (Centre for Applied Legal Studies, 2008: 44). This 
process, according to households, does not happen consistently (verified via lifestories). No additional 
restriction warning is provided prior to restriction of water supply apart from a warning message on the 
service bill, which states: "pay by due date to avoid disconnection/restriction." The warning message is 
written in English. in small print at the base of the bill and in the case of serial defaulting is always shown 
on the bill (see Appendix B). Because the message always appears on the bill, and sometimes does not 
result in restriction, it is disregarded (Lifestories, 2006). On being restricted, a household will receive a 
letter in their post box stating that they have been restricted for defaulting. Moreover, the water flow rate 
is not checked by the council employee post-restriction installation. nor is there an attempt to formally 
communicate with the household (this has implications for flow rate. explored in section 4.5.1 below). 
Such procedures do not appear to comply with the Water Services Act (RSA, 1997) nor the National 
Water Act (RSA, 1998) with regards to the observance of" . . . reasonable notice of intention to limit water 
services" nor adequate" ... opportunity to make representation." 
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Households found to have tampered with restriction devices are charged for the re-installation of another 
device, at their own cost. Subsequent tampering results in the water supply being disconnected, the 
service connection removed, the service agreement cancelled and the matter being reported to the South 
African Police Service (CC&DC, 2006: 41). 
4.5.1 Flow rate through restriction washers 
Different types of restriction devices are being installed by the Municipal City Engineers (MCE): 
restriction washers (copper and plastic) and electronic flow devices (three types: black/blue, white and 
silver) [MCE, 2005: pc]. The type of restriction device installed is dependent on the type of meter, the 
purpose of restriction and cost (MCE, 2005: pc). The restriction washer (copper) is the cheapest device, 
most frequently used, easiest to tamper with and is the one used most prevalently in Eastwood (MCE, 
2005: pc). The copper restriction washer is coin-l ike with a small round hole in the centre. It is fitted 
before the meter, in the connecting pipe, and is used in conjunction with the older type of meter (see 
Appendix E). The diameter of the hole in the centre of the restriction washer was indicated as being 1 mm 
in 2005 (MCE, 2005: pc). The MCE (2005: pc) indicated that the diameter was supposed to be 0.5mm in 
diameter but "the drill bit used to make the hole kept on breaking." The flow rate through the I mm hole 
was indicated as "8 .33 litres per hour" (MCE, 2005: pc). MCE (2005: pc) stated that the copper 
restriction washers theoretically restrict the water to 6kC per month because water just trickles out. 
However, they conceded that the flow rate is actually not known as it varies for gradient, water pressure 
and dirt particles within the system (MCE, 2005: pc). In 2006 however, I noticed that the diameter of the 
hole in the restriction washers was much smaller than those that I had seen in 2005 and therefore 
conclude that the MCE had reverted back to the 0.5 mm diameter hole thereby further reducing flow rate. 
Such a flow rate is in contravention of the prescribed regulations promulgated under section 9 (1) of the 
Water Services Act; which defines a basic minimum standard of water as: "six kilolitres per household 
per month or 25 litres per person per day within 200 metres of the household, at a flow rate of not less 
than 10 litres per minute" (DWAF. 2002c: 26; DWAF, 2003: 45). 
4.6 Electricity disconnections 
Msunduzi's electricity disconnection and reconnection unit is outsourced to three companies (Private 
electricity contractor, 2005: pc). Official electricity disconnection figures (PAIA, 2007a) indicated a 
disconnection rate of 600 domestic households per month. Yet, these figures appeared far too low. Two 
private electricity contractors indicated that the companies receive a daily list implicating 250-400 
electricity disconnections and 25 reconnections (Private electricity contractor, 2005: pc). Monthly, up to 
5 000-8 000 disconnections and 500 reconnections are made. The private electricity contractors indicated 
that their company has five teams each with its own van. Their company alone disconnects 
approximately 250 households a day and endeavours to reconnect those households on the list who have 
made payment. The contractors work on commission: every disconnection yields R23 and reconnection 
R25 for their company (Private electricity contractor, 2005: pc). Half the commission goes to the 
employees and half to the boss, consequently: " We work like a well-oiled machine" (Private electricity 
contractor, 2005: pc). To disconnect or reconnect takes approximately 3-5 minutes (Lifestory interviews, 
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2006). Noting that there are three companies involved in disconnecting/reconnecting electricity; one 
company reportedly disconnected/reconnected in excess of 250 households a day. With such lucrative 
profits involved; it is plausible that daily disconnections for all companies exceed the "400 a day'' quoted. 
Importantly, disconnections are reported as revenue (±R6.5 million) in Msunduzi's Operating Budget 
2007/8 and amount to approximately I% of the electricity operating budget (Msunduzi 2007 & 2008). 
Revenue generated by disconnections will be much higher if fines and other penalty fees are added, 
(±RSO million) but difficult to provide exact figures on electricity, as totals are unqualified (Msunduzi 
2007 & 2008). Suffice to indicate that disconnections/reconnections represent a sizeable revenue base. 
Although it is indicated in the CC&DC (2006: s27.1 -27.3, 38) that households will be disconnected 
immediately after due date for payment, if no payment or only a partial payment has been received; 
households are given a grace period of approximately 6 days to make payment (MCB, 2006a: pc; CS, 
2006b: pc). Electricity supply is always disconnected as a first option before the restriction of water 
supplies (CS, 2006d: pc; Msunduzi Customer Services department manager, 2006: pc; MCB, 2006a: pc). 
Disconnections and reconnections are carried out from the 7th to the 15th of each month (Fieldwork notes, 
2006). Disconnected households (excluding 'indigent' households) must pay a penalty fee in addition to 
their outstanding current account: R234.95 (2005/6). Disconnected households are still charged the flat 
rate amperage charge despite the fact that they have no electricity (CS, 2005: pc). Only if a household ' s 
electricity meter box is removed do the amperage charges fall away. If the household ' s electricity supply 
is to be reconnected; the household must settle their current account and penalty fee in full; this is strictly 
enforced. For example: a woman related to me that her electricity had been disconnected because she had 
not paid her current account (now in arrears); she was R4 short in settling her current account plus penalty 
fee; the municipality would not reconnect her lights - she still owed R4 (Lifestory 9, 21 April2006). 
If the household has been found to be tampering on more than one occasion then the entire electricity 
meter box will be completely removed. The cost of getting the electricity meter box re-installed (after 
being removed for tampering) is R I 134.69 for the first offence and increases substantially thereafter (CS, 
2006b: pc). As for the water service, no additional disconnection warning is provided prior to 
disconnection of electricity supply, apart from a warning message on the service bill. Subsequent 
tampering may result in the electricity supply to the property being discontinued by the removal of the 
meter and the cable and the water supply may also be restricted. Similarly, punitive measures are invoked 
and threats of police action are made (see water above). Prior to mid-2006, electricity was disconnected 
at the electricity box (at the home); electricity is now disconnected at the mains in the street; and the box 
is locked (CS, 2006c: pc; Lifestory interviews, 2006). This new policy has been implemented as an 
attempt to make it more difficult to tamper (the lock must be cut and the mains are more visible to the 
public). In the same regard. electricity meters which operate on a clock dial system are being replaced by 
electronic dia ls (CS, 2006c: pc; Lifestory interviews, 2006). 
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5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I outlined the city's services and its institutional and bureaucratic architecture. I noted the 
disconnect between the glow of Msunduzi 's official economic and financial position and somewhat 
extraordinary, albeit inexplicable, debt-collection ' successes' in direct contrast with that indicated in 
financial statements and by study-observed household debt and citizen struggle. 1 located this apparent 
paradox within the structure of Msunduzi's billing and cost recovery regime which, in the context of a 
major intergovernmental transfer deficit, and endeavouring to provide commercial entities with 
favourable investment concessions, sought to recover the bulk of monies for all services delivered in 
Msunduzi from a small core of billed domestic consumers. This, in part explains the shift towards the 
corporatisation of delivery and management units. 
The glowing picture Msunduzi paints is incongruent with the accounts and reality of its citizens and 
indeed its own balance sheets. Yet, although Msunduzi ' s financial and governance position is tenuous, 
this is not immediately evident as municipal indicators are not sufficient and social implications are 
neither reflected nor are they prioritised. 
I noted the uncomfortable relationship, overall irrationality and systemic conflicts between Msunduzi and 
its corporatised bulk water supplier UW. To this end, I questioned the role of UW in the large water 
access backlog in the Msunduzi jurisdiction and noted that basic supply standards were not defined, 
thereby positing that water service progress may be overstated. UW's part in transferring high water 
tariffs to Msunduzi citizens is palpable. lt is no secret that both Msunduzi and eThekwini Municipalities, 
which purchase water from UW, account for some of the highest water tariffs in the country (MCE, 
2005: pc; Intergovernmental Fiscal Review, 2003; DWAF Local Municipality Tariff Survey 2006/7). 
Although this does not absolve Msunduzi from contravening DW AF water service tariff regulations, it 
does point to the possibility that Msunduzi ' s contraventions may be an attempt to cope with escalating 
bulk water costs. The clearest validation of this supposition is that UW's own clients are moving to 
amalgamate to better contest the hegemony ofUW. 
The chapter unpacked in detail the conditions and procedures of municipal social benefits and service 
delivery mechanisms in free basic water, Indigent Policy, service tariffs, credit control and debt 
collection. Here I noted a distinct locally interpreted policy, which revealed a broader municipal 
disregard for national promulgated regulation. Indeed, the power of local bureaucrats to refashion poorly 
formulated national directives and policies, in the context of fund ing deficiencies, is particularly evident. 
The ways in which policies were constructed appeared to seriously vitiate the goal of helping the poor. 
The myriad of invented categories to classify and segment citizens - highly significant in itself -
appeared to be more about managing an emerging social fall-out with rising levels of distrust and indeed 
a situation whereby citizens rejected state policies (explored in Chapter 8 and 9). A thread that will be 
woven throughout the thesis is that of a vicious cycle of decline in public trust which sees the local state 
scrambling to grasp its citizens via increasingly insidious means and byzantine sanction. 
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The next chapter (5) explores the billing and charges appl ied in Msunduzi. That is, how and how much 
citizens are charged for their municipal services. The analysis is located in Eastwood, Msunduzi. 
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Chapter 5 
EASTWOOD HOUSEHOLDS: BILLING AND CHARGES 
This chapter describes the billing and charges applied in Eastwood by the Msunduzi Municipality. This 
chapter analyses the bills of 336 Eastwood households (selected from the 377 households, by the 
elimination of outliers). The 336 households have been put into specific ' tariff or user groups' for 
substantive analysis: these are 'conventional,' ' indigent' (short for ·applied indigent'), ' lifeline,'44 
'tampered,' ' restricted' and ' all ' (aggregated). To be clear, categories are qualified briefly: 
'conventional' households are households not registered as 'indigent,' not restricted or receiving lifeline 
tariffs and charged standard Msunduzi tariffs, 'indigent' households are those registered as ' indigent' 
thereby receiving water, electricity, sanitation and refuse subsidies, ' lifeline' households are those with 
automatic subsidy on refuse and sanitation only, ' tampered ' households are 'bad' debtors charged 
standard Msunduzi tariffs and ' indigent' that had tampered with restriction washers, ' restricted ' 
households are 'bad' debtors charged standard Msunduzi tariffs and 'indigent' that had not tampered with 
restriction washers. 
This chapter considers the water bill but also the aggregated municipal bill with a detailed analysis of all 
service items (water, electricity, sanitation, refuse and rates). I also analyse the interest charges on late 
payments and penalties arising from water restrictions and electricity disconnections. Finally I detail 
historical debts and value added tax (VAT) which is levied on all services excluding rates. Data included 
in this chapter was sourced via 336 individual household bills, averaged over three consecutive months 
for the period August 2005 to December 2005 for the tariff period 2005/6. 
The number of households within each category and presented in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 requires a brief 
explanation: ' conventional' households [N=252J; ' indigent' households [N=35J (include: sixteen 
households which had tampered with their restriction washers; eight restricted (not-tampered) and the 
remaining eleven which had not been restricted yet); 'l ifeline' households [N=34); ' tampered' households 
[N=28) (include: ' bad' debtors [N=l2) and ' indigent' [N=l6)); and ·restricted' households [N=ll) 
(include: ' bad' debtors [N=3] and 'indigent' [N=8)). The sum total, for 'all' households [N=336) 
included all surveyed households, although the ' indigent' households were not duplicated in the sum 
total. The reason ' bad' debtors and ' indigent' households were aggregated in the 'tampered' and 
· restricted' groupings was that these households exhibited characteristics atypical of the aggregated 
'indigent' or 'conventional' group segmentation. Further it should be noted that ' bad' debtors simply 
means that the 15 households were restricted/tampered as per the survey; this does not mean the other 252 
•• In the recent past, ' lifeline· tariffs were universally applied to ·poor households' (qualification unknown). Households receiving 
' lifeline' tariffs are automatically subsidised for refuse and sanitation (not water. rates or electricity). At the time of the study. the 
municipality \\as still using this categorisation but with the introduction of the Indigent Policy. many of these households were 
assumed to have registered as ·applied· indigents. Where households have not registered as ·applied' indigents, such ' lifeline· 
tariffs still appear on total bills. Msunduzi Credit Control indicated that they ·are still getting around to removing ' lifeline· 
subsidies·: such households would then receive ·conventional' tariffs if they do not register as ' indigent' (MCB. 2005b: pc). I have 
included ' lifeline· tariffs as a separate category as their characteristics are not clearly similar to households falling into the 
·conventional· category. Howe\er, noting that such tariffs are now obsolete: an in-depth analysis will only be made where relevant. 
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households from the 'conventional" group were not in debt - just that these households had not yet been 
restricted and classed by the municipality as 'bad.' 
1 MSUNDUZI TOTAL BILLS 
The total bill for a household refers to all municipal service charges as reflected on the monthly municipal 
bill. Msunduzi total bills are comparably higher than those of other municipalities (as shown in Chapter 
2). The mean total bill for 'all' surveyed Eastwood households is R563.52 (see Table 5.1). The mean 
total bill charged for each 'tariff and user" grouping, is indicated in descending order: ' conventional' 
R621.34, 'tampered' R535.19, ' lifeline' R353.54, ' indigent' R328.35, and ' restricted ' R265.76. 
Table 5.1: Msunduzi MuniciQalitv total bili Qer grouQing. 
'Tariff or user' % % % % % Total non-N Total bill interest & non-service group interest penalties penalties VAT items service items 
'Conventional' 252 R 621.34 2% 5% 7% 11 o/o 18% R115.64 
'Indigent' 35 R 328.35 23% 0% 23% 8% 31 % R 102.84 
'Lifeline' 34 R 353.54 6% 4% 10% 10% 20% R 71 .88 
'Tampered' 28 R 535.19 21 o/o 4% 25% 9% 34% R 181.21 
'Restricted' 11 R 265.76 24% 8% 32% 8% 40% R 107.48 
All households 336 R 563.52 4% 5% 9% 11 o/o 20% R 114.71 
The mean total bill differs markedly between 'tariff or user groups.' Significantly, the total bills for all 
households, regardless of grouping, are all relatively high. Households paying 'conventional ' tariffs 
formed the bulk consumer group in the study; they secured no subsidies or concessions, and were charged 
the highest total biJI (R621.34). 'Tampered' households, charged 'conventional ' tariffs, incurred the 
second highest mean total bill of R535.19. 'Lifeline' households were charged R353.54 (lower total bills 
attributed to subsidised sanitation and refuse). 'Indigent' households were charged R328.35 (lower total 
due to subsidised water, electricity, sanitation, refuse and potentially rates via rebate). ' Restricted ' 
households were charged the lowest mean total bill of R265.76. This is attributed to very low (or no) 
water or electricity consumption levels due to restriction and/or electricity disconnection. Importantly, 
non-service charges added disproportionately to total bills. The implications of non-service items will be 
discussed later in this chapter. For now, Msunduzi water charges will be analysed. 
2 MSUNDUZI WATER CHARGES 
The mean water component of the total bill for ' all ' surveyed Eastwood households (336) is Rl08.91 or 
19% (inclusive of interest and VAT) of total bill. In the study area. mean consumption was ±15kC/month. 
The water component as a percentage of total bill for each ' tariff and user' grouping is indicated in 
descending order (see Table 5.2): ' lifeline' 22% (R77.22); ' conventional ' 20% (Rl22.61); 'tampered ' 
18% (R95.95); ' indigent' 11% (R37.35) and 'restricted' 3% (R8.16). This ordering is similarly reflected 
in total bills and volumetric usage in general (see Table 5.1 ), and in particular, if the grouping is able to 
access free basic water and/or additional subs idies linked to volumetric usage. 
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Table 5.2: Water as a percentage of the total bill bv group. 
Mean water component of Mean Interest on water % water component of total Consumption group N bill (including interest & 
component bill bill (including interest & VAT) VAT) 
'Conventional' 252 R122.61 R2.16 
'Indigent' 35 R37.35 R2.51 
'Lifeline' 34 R77.22 R1 .77 
'Tampered' 28 R95.95 R11 .39 
'Restricted' 11 R8.16 R5.87 
All households 336 R108.91 R2.97 
Each 'tariff or user' group is analysed in turn (as per descending order above). ' Lifeline' households 
receive refuse and sanitation subsidies; not water subsidies. Hence their access to free basic water is 
premised on consumption of 6kC or less per meter reading period. However, like households charged 
'conventional' tariffs, if free basic water is exceeded, it must be paid for (R25.44) and any additional 
consumption over 6kC must be paid for at the standard tariff rate of R8.37/kC (all figures include VAT, 
2005/6). As mentioned before, ' lifeline' subsidies are being phased out, but were historically conceived 
for poorer households. In this regard, the water component ofthe 'lifeline' households' bill is a reflection 
of lower socio-economic status culminating in reduced consumption (mean 12.6kC per household per 
month) which is nevertheless charged at 'conventional ' tariffs. Moreover, the refuse and sanitation 
subsidies render the total bil l relatively lower and cause the water component as a percentage of the total 
bill to appear higher. Importantly, 'l ifeline' households, securing no water subsidy yet consuming just 
marginally more than ' indigent' households (12.6kC versus 10.4kC/month respectively) - incur a 
significantly higher water charge -thereby showing how water subsidisation can potentially reduce total 
bills for different categories at similar consumption levels. Notwithstanding the problems with indigency 
application, many households currently receiving ' li feline' tariffs should be eligible for ' indigency' tariffs 
thereby ensuring a reduction in water charges. 
' Conventional ' households registered the highest relative monetary water charges (RI22.61). This is 
directly related to higher relative consumption which resulted in just 6% (15/252) of this grouping 
' regularly' consuming within the 0-6kC parameter. This meant that the majority of 'conventional' 
households had to pay for their 'free' 6kC (R25.44) and all additional water at 8.37/kC. The mean 
consumption for all ' conventional' households not accessing free basic water was ± 17kC/month. In this 
case, for example: households would be charged 6kC at R25.44 and the remaining 11 kC at R8.37/kC. In 
sum, the high water charge for ' conventional ' households is related to higher relative consumption levels, 
which disqualified their access to free basic water as well as the service package, which offered no further 
subsidy once 6k[ was exceeded. 
The water charges levied on the total bills of the 'tampering· group (R95.95) are explained by way of a 
mix of 'bad' debtors and ' indigent ' households. The former are charged at 'conventional' tariff rates and 
the latter at ' indigent ' tariff rates. The act of tampering had allowed this group to consume around 16.6kC 
(N=28). In this regard, 'bad' debtors were charged for both free basic water and any additional water at 
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20% 
11% 
22% 
18% 
3% 
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the standard tariff rate of 8.37/kC; and 'indigent' households were able to access their first 6kC free of 
charge as well as to access the 6-l2kC subsidy, at a relatively lower R3.41/kC. 
' Indigent' households, guaranteed access to free basic water at zero charge regardless of consumption 
level, further received ' indigent' water subsidies from 7-12kC (R3.4l/kC compared to R8.37/kC). These 
subsidies, together with lower relative consumption levels (1 J .39kC/month [N=35]) meant lesser water 
charges. Moreover, 57% (20/35) of all ' indigent' households consumed below the l2kC subsidy 
threshold; thereby accessing the maximum water subsidy. This is reflected in a greatly reduced water 
charge (R37.35 or 11% of total bill). Nevertheless, the financial gain came at a social cost for the 
'indigent' households (23%) which abided by the indigent conditions of restricted supply (mean 
consumption 4.3kC/month). ln most cases, applicants voiced that financial benefits were not equivalent to 
the limitation on services received (Lifestory interviews, 2006). 
We would rather have a tap to run than a drip. I pay, I don ' t mind paying water, I don't mind, but 
then give me water! Let our taps run! I don't mind paying even R200 a month for water. But the 
fact remains is that we can' t live like this (Lifestory 15, 31 May 2006). 
'Tampered' and not-yet-restricted ' indigent' households, although able to access a normal flow, found 
their attempts at securing normal consumption under threat from eventual or renewed restriction, financial 
penalties, removal of systems and the constant fear of being under the gaze of a punitive state (Lifestory 
interviews, 2006). 
'Restricted· households were charged the lowest at R8.16 per month (3% of their total bill). Very low 
levels of consumption around 4 . I k C/month were consumed by 82% of the sample group and therefore 
registered at zero charge. The remaining 18% were both 'indigent' households and therefore still 
accessed the fi rst 6kC at zero charge and the additional marginal water was charged at the subs idised 
indigent tariff (R3 .41 /k C). The interest charged on the water component of the bill is actually higher than 
the water charges levied. This is explained by the fact that although the majority of the group are not 
charged anything for their water; failure to comply with indigency conditions has meant that interest is 
again being levied on historical debt. Moreover, if payment is erratic, this water-related interest will 
continue to rise and in future may erode the free basic water gain altogether. The majority of restricted 
households have tampered, in their efforts to secure normative water volumes (Lifestory interviews, 
2006). 
It appears that Msunduzi ' s tariff parameters are not sufficiently wide to absorb normal consumption at 
affordable prices. Core to a tariff strategy of ensuring equity is the number of tariff blocks, width of tariff 
parameters and pricing of each block. ln this regard the number of blocks should be sufficient to ensure 
that all users are accommodated; parameters should be wide enough to accommodate ' normative 
consumption.' and the price at each block should be equilibrated to ensure affordability (whilst 
simultaneously ensuring cross-subsidisation and sustainabi lity). Normative consumption levels are 
defined as those volumes required by households to meet everyday water use activities necessary for 
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perceived dignity and health requirements. The Johannesburg and Cape Town case of achieving equity 
may be instructive. Increasing the number of tariff blocks, and pricing lower blocks affordably and 
higher blocks at successively higher rates achieves a more equitable equilibration than the limited two-
block tariff structure of Msunduzi. For example: in Eastwood it was found that the majority of 
households' consumption needs would be met within a range of 15-18kC/month (see Chapter 7). In this 
regard tariff parameters, to accommodate this ' normative consumption,' may be better achieved by 
instituting (in the ' conventional' tariff structure) a second 'affordable' tariff block (e.g. 7-18kE) and third 
tariffblock (e.g. 19kt+). That is, the segmentation of the 6k C to infinity block. As it stands however, and 
as this study has shown; Msunduzi contravenes DWAF regulation injunctions and principles against 
expensive and unaffordable water charges as well as secondary debt charges, which will now be 
discussed below. 
3 MSUNDUZI INTEREST CHARGES 
With only 56% of all surveyed Eastwood households (excluding ' lifeline') consistently paying in full and 
on time (see Table 6.2) and around 61% being in arrears; the interest rate and payment procedures 
become important. Interest, as a result of payment default (arrears), is levied on all services [electricity 
(amperage and consumption), water (free water if exceeded, and additional consumption), sanitation, 
refuse and rates] and service penalties (electricity disconnections, water restrictions and annual arrear 
rates penalty). Interest is charged from 30 days of bill issue. ln this regard, Msunduzi stands to gain 
substantial revenues from usury finance: interest rates are very high; charged at 1.5% per month, or 18% 
per annum (Account Enquiries, 2005). Moreover, Msunduzi prioritises payment allocations, which 
implicates higher relative interest when households make only part-payment because services with higher 
relative charges are found at the end of priority lists. Households are therefore severely penalised if they 
do not pay consistently in fu ll and on time. Payment rates and scope of payment [in full, partially or no 
payment] are therefore a significant factor in determining the contribution of interest as a percentage of 
total bills. 
The 'conventional ' group, with the highest full-pay and lowest no-pay percentages incurs a relatively low 
mean interest of 2% of the total bill (see Table 5.1 ). In stark contrast, ' restricted· households, with the 
lowest full-pay and highest no-pay percentages respectively incur the highest interest percentage of the 
total bill at 24% (R65 .05). The same pattern is evidenced with 'indigent' households 23% (R74.19) and; 
'tampered ' households 21% (Rll3.90). 
A further factor contributing to the high total interest value incurred by poor households is that (I) a very 
high proportion of households was in arrears and (2) interest was charged on a very high baseline of 
arrears: high baseline arrears was directly related to high relative monthly interest and number of years in 
debt. Indeed, of the 336 surveyed Eastwood households, 61% are in arrears (mean arrears ±R4 500). 
Mean arrears and proportion in arrears differ between groups. For example: 53% of all ·conventional' 
households were in arrears, with a mean baseline arrears of ±R2 700 compared with the I 00% arrears of 
' restricted· households and ·tampered· households with mean arrears of ±R9 500 and ±R I 0 500 
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respectively; and 91% of all 'indigent' households with a mean arrears of ±R9 300 (dealt with further in 
Chapter 6). At 1.5% per month or 18% per annum, interest weighs heavily on the shoulders of poor 
households, with major affordability and general socio-psycho and economic implications. For example: 
the monthly 1.5% interest on average historical debt alone (Rl 0 000), is R150 - this amount is added to 
the current bill and must be settled, each month, in full. High interest rates tell us much about 
fundamentally unaffordable and iniquitous tariff structures, and probably reveal even more about the 
intentions of the municipality. 
The cycles of poverty and municipal debt swing together in close, frenetic, fierce circles. Payments are 
skipped or part-paid as monies are directed to emergency crises so common amongst the poor. Interest is 
levied on arrears and services are disconnected, with penalties rendering the next bill even more 
unaffordable, which in tum makes it even harder to pay in full next time. All the while households 
struggle against electricity disconnections and water restrictions; and struggle to find money to pay off 
credit control or municipal debt collectors or lawyers, to delay complete service removal , dispossessions 
and evictions. In this context, soon the largest proportion of household total bill payments is directed 
towards staving off the debt collectors, reducing interest raised on accounts and other non-service items. 
A household can' t bath or keep itself warm by paying interest. 
4 MSUNDUZI SERVICE PENALTIES 
Service penalties impose negative financial, domestic and social implications for all households but are 
particularly acute for poor households. This section deals primarily with the financial implications 
(service penalties), the social penalties will be dealt with in Chapter 8 and 9. Service penalties are 
enacted for non-payment or tampering with the electricity or water service. 
Electricity disconnection, the first step in the credit control process, is the most common and most 
frequent punitive action enforced. Survey results showed that 33% (111) of 336 households had been 
disconnected at least once for the year 2005. Furthermore, the indications are that the majority of such 
households experienced more than one disconnection penalty for the year 2005 and for substantial 
periods. These power disconnections have become a social phenomenon for a large segment of Eastwood 
society. 
Service penalties, in the first case, are enacted if full payment of the total current bill is not received 
within 30 days (usually by the end of every month). Outsourced companies disconnect electricity and a 
fine ofR234.95 (2005/6) is levied on the bill. The service penalty must be paid in full and in addition to 
the current amount due if the electricity service is to be resumed. 
If households do not respond to the electricity disconnection by making payment, then the second step in 
the credit control process is enacted: water is restricted to 6kC (the free basic water amount) and a 
financial penalty of R159.60 (2005/6) is imposed. Water restrictions are not imposed as frequently as 
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electricity disconnections (they are more time-consuming and therefore costly and harder to monitor) and, 
unless tampering occurs, the penalty fee is a once-off charge. 
Eleven per cent ( 121 ) of all residential Eastwood households (I 090) were restricted to 6kC in June 
2005.45 Resumption of full water service once a household's water has been restricted is difficult; this is 
typically due to larger amounts of debt being permitted to accumulate before restriction is imposed, 
making it harder for households to settle in full. This has the implication that unlike electricity 
disconnections, water restrictions are typically around for a long time. 
The third type of service penalty is related to total outstanding arrears in general and rates arrears in 
particular. In this regard, every payment made is allocated in accordance with the Msunduzi Credit 
Control and Debt Collection Policy (2006: s20.l, 32). This has the effect that unpaid property rates are 
the last to be allocated a part of any partial payment. A rates service penalty is imposed annually on any 
household liable to pay rates and in arrears as at September (exemption can be sought via the annual 
completion of a rates-exemption form - very few households know about this [Personal observation and 
lifestory interviews, 2006]). The percentage of all households included in the study (N=336) in rates 
arrears is 47.9% or 161 households (note that the figures differ for general arrears and rates in particular 
due to the rates-exemption status of some households). This service penalty is a once-off annual fine, 
levied in October and is calculated at 10% of the household ' s total annual rates bill. 
The second category of penalties arises with water and electricity tampering. Households found 
tampering with water restriction washers are fined R159.60, with steeper fines and more punitive actions 
being imposed for subsequent tampering. Persistent tampering can result in the complete removal of the 
meter and water connection, with a new connection fee ranging from R600-R3 550, depending on pipe 
diameter. The municipality may even refuse to reconnect households based on ' risk' . 
The fine for electricity tampering is R234.95, while persistent electricity tampering may result in the 
removal of the electricity meter box, reinstalled at a cost of Rl 134.69 (CS, 2006b: pc). Once again. the 
total bill (including all arrears) must be settled in the case of a first tampering offence. There is a 
substantial increase for further offences. Interestingly, there appears to be no set rule with regards to how 
often a household is found tampering before harsher punitive measures are taken. Some households 
continue being fined at the initial rates whilst others are quickly faced with the removal of water and 
electricity systems (Personal observation from bill perusal and Lifestory interviews, 2006). It is worth 
noting that the initial penalty fines for defaulting are the same as those for tampering (in both water and 
e lectricity). Perhaps defaulting and tampering are similarly criminal? 
All 'tariff and user ' groups, with the apparent exception of ' indigent' households, incur service penalties 
on total bills. Although not reflected in monetary penalties, 'indigenf households are still restricted and 
4~ Sec chapter 3. based on pre-main survey of consolidated restriction lists. 
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disconnected: 51 % of all surveyed 'indigent' households registered at least one disconnection for the 
year 2005. The figure for 'restricted ' households is relatively higher than for other groupings, due to an 
e lectricity penalty levied on a ' bad' debtor household and an additional three undisclosed penalties on 
three other households in the group. 
In general service penalties provide an optic into the nature and scope of affordabi lity struggles between 
residents and the local state. Indeed, along with interest charges, service penalties suggest that many 
households across all groups are struggling to pay their bills in full and on time. At the centre of the 
service penalty question is the paradox of being further financially penalised for inability to pay, as 
illustrated by the Lifestory excerpt below: 
You have to pay your lights account [total bill], for it to stay on. If you haven' t got the money and 
you pay three days later, your lights are gone. Where do you get connection fee? Connection fee 
is R250. Where do you get R250 when you can't pay R300 [the original bill total]? (Lifestory 3, I 
February 2006). 
This excerpt lucidly describes the structural problem of disconnection penalty fees for poor households: 
if one cannot afford the total bill; how does one then pay the penalty fee and the total bill? Here the 
purpose and targeting of such a fine should be considered: as a slap on the wrist of a consumer who can 
ordinarily pay but drags her feet, it works and is possibly justified; but for a struggling household of a 
financially unpredictable nature, the penalty fee serves to push it closer to the edge of social 
disintegration. Here there is a clear difference: the first household can pay and is stalling; the second 
household cannot pay. The fine as ' a behavioural modification lesson' will achieve its objective in the 
first case - payment will be secured thereafter; but for the second case: the fine is misplaced; non-
payment, part-payment or late-payment, in this case is not a behavioural but an economic response. A 
penalty on an electricity disconnection, a restriction washer or the annual arrear rates penalty is of great 
future consequence (see Appendix F). If it cannot be paid in full , the amount due carries over to the next 
month which if not paid; will imp licate another disconnection and additional interest and VAT. 
Importantly, all municipal departments operate independently, so that even if a representation is made at 
the Customer Services or Credit Control department; Treasury has the ultimate say. 
Indeed, it may be worth considering the monetary value of the disconnection penalty. Typically 
households experiencing service penalties are poor. Households are disconnected because they struggled 
to pay their bills in full and on time. For the very poor, R234.95 is not typically going to be found, and if 
it is, major compromises (with their own consequences) will be made. In most cases however; electricity 
will not be reconnected permanently, households will tamper or other inefficient, uncomfortable, 
expensive and hazardous sources wil l be sought. For the relatively less poor or lower-middle classes 
however, the amount of R234.95 may be potentially accessible via way of borrowing. loans or taking 
money from elsewhere in the household purse. Indeed, of the 93 'non-indigent' households which 
experienced a disconnection - 80% (74) paid up. 
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I include an excerpt from my fieldwork notes, which illustrates the experiences of one household included 
in the 80% of those who regularly get disconnected and make arrangements to settle: 
[My notes] Freda (name changed) pays her account every month. This month she paid late. She 
paid on the 5th of May instead of the 31st April. Today is the 1 I th of May, disconnection week. 
Freda knew it was disconnection week and knew that she had paid late so she left her payment 
receipt with her mother, who is also her neighbour. The disconnectors came and Freda's mother 
showed the disconnectors Freda's receipt as proof of payment. The men disconnected Freda, 
despite her mother's pleas that she had paid. Freda returned home to a dark and cold house. She 
was furious because she had paid. She called me and asked me to explain to her what was going 
on. I told her that, as she had paid late and explained the process of the disconnection list. I told 
her that I had asked the municipality whether if a receipt of payment is shown to the disconnectors, 
if they were still allowed to disconnect. The municipality assured me that no, they could not 
proceed with disconnection. Freda thrust the R234 disconnection slip in my hands. She said that 
she had missed work on Monday because she had gone to collect her child's grant money. She 
had missed work on Tuesday because she had to go to hospital. She said that she couldn't take off 
another day's work to go and sort out the electricity. We spoke in the cold lounge, with a candle 
for me to see her bill, receipts and the disconnection statement. [Freda's voice] "I have had a 
really shit day at work and now I come home to this: a very cold house and no electricity. I can't 
keep taking days of/work to go and shout and swear at the municipality. I paid my bill, it is 
difficult, but I paid it. I am really tired of shouting and swearing at the municipality. What the 
hell are they doing? I am going to have to go and sort it out as we can 't live without electricity. " 
[My notes] She is going to have to fight to get the R234 dropped and I don 't know if she will win 
because, after all, she did pay late and that is municipal policy. Of course she should never have 
been disconnected because her mother had produced proof of payment. But she will have to take 
time off work, to get them to reconnect promptly and to try and negotiate for the R234 to be 
removed from her account. I really get the feeling that people have reached breaking point. Are 
people expected to go and 'swear and shout ' every month"'r.? Frequent disconnections appear to be 
an immense problem (Fieldwork notes, II May 2006). 
Indeed, it is unremarkable that Freda was disconnected, even though there was proof of payment. The 
business of disconnecting and reconnecting households is very profitable (see Chapter 4, s4.6). Yet, it is 
clear that the value of the service penalty, for Msunduzi, extends beyond profit - it has a symbolic and 
pedagogic value. The real threat of the service penalty and the visibility of disconnections often makes 
people comply: its effect is to secure the majority of monthly payments. In this regard, poor households 
bear the cost of majority compliance with monies diverted from other essential requirements, pushing the 
poor into debt and ill-health and insecurity. Indeed, this simply reinforces the compliance mechanism. 
Public disconnections then, in the tradition of Foucault (1991: 48-49) take on a "juridico-political" 
function, for example: "The public execution did not re-establish justice; it reactivated power." 
Households can avoid all of this misery 'simply' by paying their bills. And indeed, this is where 
Msunduzi ' s strategy might have gone too far. The 'symbolic' threat affected far too many households; 
the implications were too severe. Some households simply could not pay the charges expected of them -
for them; penalties were no longer symbolic, but real and devastating. 
5 MSUNDUZI VALUE ADDED TAX (VAT) 
The South African government introduced value added tax [VAT] in 1991. VAT revenue is paid directly 
to the South African Revenue Service (not local authorities) and distributed as per Treasury procedures. 
'"Some households are disconnected every month or just about (Fieldwork notes. 7 June 2006). A woman showed me her 
statements for five consecutive months: ever month she had been disconnected for late or part-payment (Lifestory 8. II April 2006). 
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It is broadly accepted that VAT, as a consumption tax, is regressive for the poor, as the proportion of 
income paid in VAT is relatively higher for the poor than the rich (Cosatu, 1999). VAT stands at 14% 
and is levied on all goods and services; with the exception of a few zero-rated basic staples (Alderman 
and del Ninno, 1999). The logic of zero-rating, shown to reduce the regressivity of VAT (Cosatu, 1999), 
is based on equity," ... revenue raised from the poor has different social costs than an equal amount raised 
from the less poor. Conversely, subsidies or tax exemptions which favour the poor are viewed as more 
socially desirable than those for the less poor" (Alderman and del Ninno, 1999: 1 ). Yet, municipal 
services - water, electricity, sanitation and refuse removal - all essential services, all used by the poor, all 
consuming a large proportion of household expenditure - are not VAT -exempt. 
VAT is levied across all 'user and tariff' groups and on all services (excluding rates and free basic water -
only if ~ 6kt is used), fixed charges and service penalties. VAT on water and electricity is consumption-
based. That is, the more a household uses; the greater proportion of VAT a household pays. In the case 
of households charged at 'conventional" tariffs; if the free basic water allocation is exceeded, VAT is 
levied on both the ' free basic water' [R22.30 + 14% = R25.44 (2005/6)) and on every kilolitre thereafter. 
Indeed, even subsidised water tariffs for ' applied indigent' households, households which are known to 
be poor, are inclusive of VAT (second block [7-l2kC]: R2.99 + 14% =R3.41). VAT on electricity is 
levied on flat-rate amperage charges and on the total kilowatts consumed. VAT on sanitation and refuse 
is determined by service package. This is problematic as not all households within the same service 
package are socio-economically homogeneous. The starkest example of this is within the 'conventional' 
group. Here, a wealthy household (living in a mansion) will pay the same flat rate for the sanitation and 
refuse service (regardless whether a household discharges 60kC or 3kC into the sewage system or if 20 
black bags of rubbish or just a few 'Checkers' packets are put out for collection) and therefore is charged 
the same amount ofVAT as a poor household (not registered as ' indigent' or receiving other subsidies). 
In this regard, VAT linked to a flat-rate charge, which itself is inequitable, is inadequately targeted and 
nefarious. VAT is further charged on service penalties: electricity disconnection penalties [R206.1 0 + 
14% = R234.95 (2005/6)) and insertion of restriction washers [R140 + 14% = Rl59.60 (2005/6)). The 
inclusion of VAT on service penalties (for inability to pay) appears shocking: a penalty is not a ' taxable 
supply' - it is a punishment. It acts to take more money from the poor. Levying VAT on property rates 
which certainly have more positive and discretionary attributes (beautifying residential areas and 
maintaining public services e.g. clinics, community halls, sports grounds, libraries etc) could potentially 
act as a redistributive measure. 
No 'tariff and user' g roups register the full 14% on total bills because VAT is not levied on rates and 
interest charges. 'Indigent,' ·tampered' and 'restricted' groupings register a lower relative VAT total on 
bills (8-9%). The ·conventional ' and ' lifeline' groups (I 0-11 %) exhibit patterns closer to full VAT on all 
services. In the case of ' conventional ' households, this is because of relatively higher vatable 
consumption compared to non-vatable rates and interest. In the case of ' lifeline' households, this is 
because of the higher relative water-to-bill ratio. The mean VAT payable on total bills for ·all ' surveyed 
Eastwood households is 11% (R61.19). Importantly however, if bills are not paid in full and on time 
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every month, as arrears carry over; the compound interest accrues on total arrears, including the VAT 
component. The proportion of VAT on the total bill is therefore important; with 61% of all surveyed 
Eastwood households (N=336) in arrears; VAT on municipal service bills has profound affordability 
implications not just on current bills but for interest on total arrears. 
The logic of zero-rating VAT on basic foodstuffs is not inconsistent with municipal services in general; 
and free basic services in particular. A case can be made that municipal services are indeed a basic need 
and at the very minimum 'basic' or lower levels of consumption should be exempted from VAT because 
of their proximity to poor consumers. In the interest of equity and poverty relief, VAT exemption should 
be targeted as a subsidisation and redistributive measure instead of a universal application. Cosatu ( 1999) 
argues that zero-rating VAT should be informed by equity considerations which include the prioritisation 
of goods and services that have a positive and improved social welfare impact on the poor. They further 
cite that consideration should be given to the zero-rating of municipal services, up to a certain level: 
" ... zero-rating of a certain amount of electricity and taxing subsequent consumption at a higher rate 
would be an effective way of targeting the poor. A similar rationale could be applied to water, sewerage, 
and refuse removal" (Cosatu, 1999). Importantly, Cosatu's proposal can be easily implemented and 
would immediately and directly lighten the total bill. 
6 MSUNDUZI AND EASTWOOD: CONSIDERING 'ALL' NON-SERVICE 
ITEMS 
Considering all non-service charges, it became evident that the proportion of non-service charges was 
exceedingly large while tariffs were exceptionally high. The inclusion of non-service charges further 
worsened the households' ability to pay. Indeed, struggling households had little space to manoeuvre; 
they were as the isiZulu saying goes "being boiled in a small pot" (ukupheka ngebhodwe e/incane). It 
appeared however, that Msunduzi does not take household difficulties into account, nor does it appreciate 
the lengths and immense sacrifices made to effect payment; it simply compounds household anguish by 
issuing extra financial burdens and handing over households to its ubiquitous debt collectors. Indeed, 
removing all interest, VAT and penalties from the bill would leave it considerably reduced; albeit still an 
unreasonably high mean total bill. Yet, Msunduzi appears unconcerned about the immense strain total 
bills are putting on poorer households, or the enormous levels of household debt. ln any other milieu the 
handing over of 35% of all billed households to municipal debt collectors (see Chapter 4) would surely 
constitute a crisis. 
The benefit of service subsidies and free basic services is eroded by charges for non-service items; 
typically omitted from calculations of the real costs of municipal services to domestic households. These 
charges47 bear substantially on total bills and hide (or in the Eastwood case, reveal) the real state of 
n Total bills in this study do not include debt repayments to the municipal debt collection consortia. These figures are not listed on 
total bills: instead households make payments directly to the consortia. The implications of additional consortia debt repayments is 
that monies paid each month to Msunduzi must be seen as just one payment. with another to its partner debt collectors. That is. 
Eastwood households may spend more monies on servicing debt than the figures presented in the ·total bills· . Exact numbers of 
handed-over Eastwood households in general or surveyed Eastwood households in particular are unknown (official data is restricted 
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domestic crisis and municipal gerrymandering. The mean contribution of non-service items for 'all' 
surveyed Eastwood households is 20% (Rll4.71) of the total bill. Mean non-service charges make up 
18% (Ril5.64) of total bills for 'conventional' households; and impact more brutally on 'restricted' 
households at 40% (Rl07.48), 'tampered' households at 34% (Rl81.21), and 'indigent' households' at 
31% (R102.84). Each group will be discussed in turn (starting with the highest proportional charges). 
If you don 't pay that RlOO from arrangements [debt collectors] they come and cut. If you don't 
pay that current account then they come and cut. So you are not winning in any way. You can't 
say I will pay Paul this month; I won't pay Peter. You have to pay Peter and Paul (Lifestory 7, 
II April 2006). 
'Restricted' households, at the centre of the nastiest effects of the cost recovery apparatus, are charged the 
highest proportional non-service charges, yet receive, undoubtedly, the worst levels of service (or none at 
all). It bears repeating that these households have adhered to all state demands: but because they failed 
on one front - they are poor and cannot pay - they receive no clemency. The grubby household purse 
continues to be pilfered; it appears that the local state is not content to just limit households to survival 
consumption. If exempted from non-service charges, 'restricted' households would see mean total bills 
come down from R265.76 to Rl58.28 - a significant reduction, not low enough but more equitable 
considering the scope of services accessed. 
The substantial non-service charges on ' indigent' total bills (31 %) take on an altogether different hue. 
Firstly they suggest that households are not paying in full and on time; with implications for the revoking 
of the indigency contract and therefore the return of interest on historical debt. This means, for example, 
that a household having defaulted is now liable to pay interest on historical debt (see Appendix F). 
Secondly, non-service charges (Rl 02.84) serve to obliterate social wage gains (explored in Chapter 6). 
The non-service charge reduces/eliminates the service subsidies, which means that the household now, 
with restricted water or disconnected or reduced amperage, may be expected to pay a relatively 
comparable total bill to that received prior to application to the Indigent Policy. But, now the total bill 
comes without the benefit of unconditional and full supply: households are paying similar charges for 
greatly reduced services. In short, instead of a gain, theirs is a major loss; not necessarily financial but 
social. ' Indigent' households are angry, as indicated by the following narrative: 
It [the Indigent Policy] made a difference from the start, but then again, we failed to pay, we have 
to have a monthly income, you have to pay each month. so it becomes a problem again ... They 
sending accounts every month, they restricted me from this and that: water and the lights. Now 
when I receive the account, my account is more than the original account they sending to me. I got 
no lights and no water but they sending me the account every month with interest. That' s R600 
sometimes, R400, R500 to R600. R700. The difference is that I am without lights here. and I am 
getting a R600 account which I have to pay, according to their account there. 1 have to pay that 
money. Does that make sense? Alright, if they cut my lights and they don't send me an account. 
Why send me a big account, of interest and this and that with no lights and no water? Thafs just 
unfair man! Because I am paying even more than having lights. I would rather have lights! 
[personal communication VNH Consultant. 2005: pc)). However. if I were to estimate the percentage of households within the 
study that have been handed over to the consortia. I would put the figure at 30-50% of all households in arrears (based on 
community engagement, surveys. and interviews). 
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Because I am paying less than this R700. You see my account [showing me old account], I get 
R200, R300 a month. But now when my lights and water are getting cut, I' m getting, RSOO, R600 
or R700 account. That doesn ' t make sense? They are wrong. Because my lights are off but my 
account is more than when I have lights. I am still paying every month! It' s like I am actually 
having lights ' cause I am getting a R600-R700 account every month. Now, I have to pay them this 
money! (Lifestory 4, 15 February 2006). 
In other cases, the levying of historical debt on the total bills of ' indigent' households is not as explicit as 
in the case above. Some households have found their debt immediately transferred to municipal debt 
collectors. This means that although total bills ' look' substantially reduced, additional charges are paid 
directly to debt collectors and not reflected on total bills. For example: when I asked households if the 
Indigent Policy had made a difference to their total bills, this was the response: 
I used to pay R300 to R400 before and now I pay around R200 but I also pay the lawyers Rl 00 for 
arrears on services and another R50 for my handed-over rates, so it is still around that amount 
(Lifestory 11, 17 May 2006). 
I don't know. But we still can' t pay our bill and in June we were told to go pay the lawyers R50 a 
month. So, we still worry about our house because they can still take it fi·om us even with this 
policy that is supposed to protect us, to help us (Korhoender Road, 20 December 2005). 
These two cases differ from the first in that they appear to be an illusion of total bill reduction, yet are 
simply a restructuring of debt. Perhaps more importantly however, is that they indicate that the signing 
up for ' indigency' has not protected households against prosecution by debt collectors and their lawyers 
(together with the return of electricity; escaping prosecution was a strong incentive). Hence, although the 
indigency contract (also) gave the assurance that historical debt would be frozen; defaulting however has 
dissipated this concession and ironically with the conditional signing of acknowledgement of debt; has 
implicated even faster prosecution. 
'Tampered' households incur the highest mean monetary non-service item charges of all groups: 
Rl81.21 (34%). This is due to high interest on service defaulting and relatively high VAT due to 
attempts by such households to secure normative consumption levels. If such charges were omitted from 
the bills of 'tampered' households; such households may be (1) in a better position to meet payments of 
approximately R350 per month (a reduction of ±Rl80); and (2) more amenable to meeting payments, if 
service and municipal disaffection were a factor. 'Conventional ' households too, are not exempt, with 
18% (R115.64) of total bills made up of non-service charges. Although the major contributor to this 
figure is VAT; and household monies moved to national and not direct local coffers, such charges add 
considerable strain on total bills. 
6.1 The municipal financialisation mechanism 
The Msunduzi case, through the case study of Eastwood, suggests that what we are seeing is akin to 
monopoly financialisation (Bellamy Foster, 2007). The move to financialisation is part of the so-called 
·new capital,' (Bellamy Foster, 2007) whereby capitalists in the face of declining consumption (and 
inadequate revenue streams) move to augment revenue losses via the imposition of debt-related financial 
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services. In this regard, the 'product' (municipal services) being sold becomes less important and the 
financialisation around the product becomes more significant. In short, the municipality itself and with 
outsourced debt collectors becomes a 'virtual bank,' actively locking consumers into the debt peonage. In 
this regard, mechanisms exist to reinforce a debt cycle. First, unaffordable and inequitable tariffs serve to 
promote default; without which non-service items could not be levied on total bills. Financial penalties 
ensure prolonged indebtedness and provide additional revenue for the municipality. Lastly, debt and 
disconnection outsourcing ensures that politically uncomfortable actions are removed from the confines 
of the state (Local Government Consultant, 2005b); simultaneously allowing for much higher interest 
rates on debt and more extensive service cuts. The financialisation mechanisms whereby debt products 
are sold alongside the provision of services provide valuable additional revenue. Non-service charges 
moderate under-recovery from not-billed/non-metered households, concessions given to non-domestic 
consumers, and unaccounted-for-water losses, and they fund operation and maintenance costs, finance 
new infrastructure and the extension of services to other poor households in the city. 
Moreover, with key ANC luminaries holding directorship positions within Msunduzi ' s two municipal 
debt collection consortia (The Witness: 13 September 2006), a further insidious element is at play. 
Revenue gains from debt may well serve not public re-investment but private pockets. This, together 
with the limited pool of billed households, may in part explain the direct administrational and political 
pressure thwarting tariff structure change, thereby maintaining tariffs beyond the affordability thresholds 
of the majority of poor citizens. 
7 CONCLUSION 
The chapter outlined the day-to-day financial complexities and realities of municipal billing systems and 
procedures in Eastwood. Msunduzi chose a ruthless credit control and debt collection regime. It was 
clear that high bills have promoted default and prolonged indebtedness. Tariffs were poorly equilibrated 
(only two blocks), overpriced at low volumes, and thus inequitable and expensive (particularly evident for 
households accessing 'conventional ' tariffs). Once pushed into default, a myriad of financialisation 
mechanisms, spring-loaded and set off by the smallest misdemeanour, to extract maximum revenue from 
households, were activated. Households once defaulted, found it very difficult to (I) return to the black 
and/or (2) even keep arrears levels down. All served to keep households keen: aware of their 
vulnerability and at the mercy ofMsunduzi's ·grace' (explored in Chapter 9). 
Msunduzi did not accommodate the financial situation of poor or struggling households by writing off 
historical debt and reducing penalties. If it did, total bills would not be made up of 30-40% non-service 
items; and urgent strategies would be implemented to disentangle households from the harsh cycle of 
municipal debt. The logic of financially penalising households because they could not afford to pay 
original charges could only be conceptualised within a particular framework of accumulation and cost 
recovery. Restricting water and disconnecting electricity services have become palpable and semi-
permanent aspects of dispossession. Msunduzi used symbolic penalties and inflated non-service items to 
play a potentially dangerous strategy: it used the misery inflicted on poor households to reinforce 
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compliance in the majority; yet the social cost of this strategy, for poor households was devastatingly real 
(as the next chapters show). 
It was apparent that poor households had little space to manoeuvre and even less for obtaining relief. The 
Indigent Policy brought some reprieve in water charges, but Msunduzi squashed this by re-introducing 
historical debt and the restriction of water supplies. Restricted households cut down on their water and 
electricity usage, but Msunduzi levied interest on outstanding arrears which countered the effects of their 
restraint. The continued spiral of tariffs and non-service items means that many households currently 
within the ·conventional' package may be forced into downgraded ' bad' debtor categories. 
Having presented the billing paradigm; the next chapter (6) will explore how households responded to the 
billing charges and thereby better provide an insight into service affordability. That is: are households 
paying; how are they paying (in full, part-pay or no-pay); and frequency of payment (every month, skip a 
month, etc). The chapter will then consider affordability thresholds, that is, are households able to pay or 
not, in relation to total household income. Lastly, a more thorough analysis of the services component of 
the social wage will be conducted in the effort to determine the value of the Indigent Policy instrument in 
the face of escalating payment pressures and harsh credit control mechanisms. 
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Chapter 6 
EASTWOOD HOUSEHOLDS: PAYMENT RATES, AFFORDABILITY AND THE 
SOCIAL WAGE 
Whereas Chapter 5 looked at the structure of bills, various kinds of charges and what Msunduzi 's IDP 
(2007: 132) termed its "aggressive approach to streamline our credit control policy," the first part of this 
chapter looks at how surveyed Eastwood residents responded to such charges in terms of payment 
behaviour. lt then considers payment in relation to affordability thresholds. Lastly, the value of the 
social wage for ' indigent' households is analysed. 
The data herein is sourced from the total bills of 302 selected Eastwood households (34 households 
accessing ' lifeline' tariffs were excluded from the analysis) as well as from lifestories. 
1 PAYMENT RATES FORALLMUNICIPALSERVICES 
The previous chapter presented total bill charges. This section considers the payment responses of 
households. Are households paying total bills? What enables this payment? How are they paying? 
What strategies are employed? Are the same payment responses enacted regularly or is there movement 
between strategies? Are there differences between and within ' tariff and user' groups? The purpose of 
this inquiry is ultimately to determine the appropriateness of service package tariffs and subsidy 
sufficiency in relation to household affordability constraints. Payment rates therefore serve an important 
partial prox/ 8 in this regard. 
Noting the restriction of official municipal consumer payment data and the arduous process of acquiring 
individual household's bills (see Chapter 3); payment rates included in this section are confined to two 
bills. This is a limit for any analysis which seeks to explore payment trends; however the two bills are 
contextualised within a broader individual payment framework which shows total arrears owing. Hence, 
although the data herein serve only as an absolute within the timeframe of inquiry; it is nevertheless an 
instructive gauge. 
Msunduzi Municipal payment procedures disallow payments to specific services, for example: the water 
component of the municipal bill (CC&DC, 2006: s20.2, 32). Therefore I could not isolate payment into 
separate service components but only show payment rates in relation to total bills. Payment data was read 
directly off household bills; this was an exact method, precise to the last cent. I used three consecutive 
bills in this regard: 'current' bill; ' last month's' bill and 'two months ago' bill (August 2005 through 
'" I qualify the term as other factors may influence payment, for example: the efficiency of punitive credit control mechanisms. 
service satisfaction levels, attitudes towards governance and other behavioural indices. ln this regard, qualitative interviews with 
households and individual community members (see Chapters 8 and 9) appear to suggest that punitive credit control mechanisms 
enact a strong influence. That is. payment is made out of fear of default consequences and indeed aspirations of securing notions of 
·good' citizenry. Due to this. the payment rates and trends reflected may be higher than the true absorption of costs. In this case, 
households may consume at levels deemed less than appropriate and further compromise the securing of other essential services in 
effons to keep up with monthly total bill payments. 
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December 2005: tariff period 2005/6). However to verify payment (read off subsequent bill e.g. if a 
payment is made towards ' last month's ' bill the amount paid will be reflected on the ' current' bill) and 
for the purposes of this analysis, I used payments made on ' last month ' s' bill and ·two months ago' bill 
(checked against 'currenf and ' last month's' bill respectively). To assist reading, 'last month's' bill will 
be referred to as bill '1' and 'two months ago' bi ll as bill '2' . Moreover, 'full-payment' means the exact 
amount due was paid; 'partial-payment' means some but not all due was paid, and ' no payment' means 
that no payment was made towards the amount due. 
1.1 'All' households' payment rates 
The average full-payment rate (bill ' 1' & bill '2') for ' all ' surveyed Eastwood households (302) is 68% 
(see Table 6.1 ).49 It is important to note that only households paying in full and on time escape the 
imposition of non-service charges; hence 32% of'all' households would be liable to additional penalties. 
Table 6.1: Payment rates: 'all' surveyed households CN=302). 
Response vanable [N=302] Bill '1' Bill '2' Average for bills '1' & '2' 
No-pay 24% 7% 16% 
Full-pay 60% 77% 68% 
Partial-pay 16% 16% 16% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Noting the difference in payment rates between bill ' I ' and bill '2'; it is evident that there is a fair amount 
of movement between full-pay and no-pay (partial-pay appears to remain constant). For example: more 
households are in arrears at bill '1' (40%) than at bill ' 2 ' (23%). This suggests that some households 
employ different payment strategies. Table 6.1 indicates average payment rates and particular responses 
for 'all' households; it does not reveal anything about each ' tariff and user' category nor particular 
individual household responses within categories. To determine the extent of movement within and 
between each ' tariff and user' group; we need to look at: (I) each group in isolation; (2) ' regular· 
responses across bills ' 1' and '2 ' (e.g.) full-pay bill ' 1' and full-pay bill '2'; and (3) movement between 
payment responses (e.g.) full-pay bill ' 1' and part-pay bill '2'. 
Table 6.2: 'Regular' payment responses across both bills ' 1' and '2' {N=302). 
Groupmg 'Regular' no-pay 'Regular' full-pay 'Regular' part-pay 'Regular' all responses % % % % 
'Conventional' 2% 62% 9% 73% 
'Indigent' 23% 34% 17% 74% 
'Tampered' 32% 36% 11% 79% 
'Restricted' 27% 18% 18% 63% 
All [302] 6% 56% 10% 73% [219/302) 
•• This figure is higher than the official payment rate (65.6%). for all billed domestic connections within the Msunduzi j urisdiction 
(PAIA, 2007a). 
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The percentage of households across all groups that employed the same strategy for both bills is within a 
range of 63-79%. The margin of difference in the ' conventional' group suggests greater leeway to 
manoeuvre between payment responses; however in the ' restricted ' group such movement is consistent 
with financial vulnerability. It is clear however that the type of response strategy employed differs 
between groups. For example: apart from ' restricted ' households all other groups registered full-
payment as the most common response. Importantly, some households within all groups (21 -37%) 
moved between different payment responses. That this oscillation is exhibited across all groupings, in 
addition to the data that shows that proportions within all groups are not making regular full payments 
deserves closer scrutiny. To explore this nuanced phenomenon more meaningfully, it is necessary to 
disaggregate 'all ' households into their particular 'tariff and user' categories. In this regard, use is made 
of particular category tables for bill ' I ' and bill '2 ' payment rates in conjunction with Table 6.2. This 
analysis will indicate the appropriateness of service package tariffs and sufficiency of subsidies to absorb 
household affordability thresholds. Moreover, it will show compliance levels and explore justifications 
for particular responses. 
1.2 'Conventional' households' payment rates 
Table 6.3 shows that the 'conventional ' group registered the highest average full-pay rate (74%). 
However, fewer ' regularly' paid their bills in full (62%) [see Table 6.2]. The 65% full-pay rate for bill 
'I' [see Table 6.3) resonates with those households making ' regular' full-payment (62%). In this regard; 
95% of the households in this group consistently paid in full (for both bills); with only 4% making a 
partial payment and I% making no payment. Although this indicates that ' regular' full-pay is accurately 
reflected around the 62% level, study statistics considering total arrears rates (beyond the two bills) 
indicate that 53% of all ' conventional ' households were in arrears (mean arrears were R2 784.57). Hence 
more households probably fail to make regular full-payments. Nevertheless the scenario above suggests 
that some households (38%) within the 'conventional ' group are struggling to meet monthly payments: 
2% are ' regularly' not making a payment; 9% are 'regularly' making part-payments and 27% move 
between strategies [see Table 6.2]. Importantly, rarely is no payment made at all. That is, where a 
household has not paid in full for a particular month, full-payment or partial-payment has been made 
either the preceding or the subsequent month, thereby indicating the existence of a ' culture of payment'. 
Table 6.3: Payment rates: ' conventional' households (N=252). 
Response variable [N=252] Bill '1' 'Bi ll '2' Average for bills '1 ' & '2' 
No-pay 20% 2% 11% 
Full-pay 65% 83% 74% 
Partial-pay 15% 15% 15% 
%in arrears 35% 17% 26% 
By far, the most likely strategy employed by the osci llating 27% is to pay one month and skip another. 
For example: of the 52 households that did not pay bill ' I ' : 75% paid bill '2' in full. This is evident in 
the higher full-pay rate, up from 65% (bill 'I') to 83% (bill '2 '). This group may be attempting to 
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outsmart the municipality; delaying payment for as long as possible before being disconnected. As a 
strategy it is always going to be precarious, there is only a fine margin of time, as disconnections are 
rigorously enforced. Of the remaining households that did not pay bill 'I' [25%]: 15% paid partially and 
I 0% did not pay (this I 0% is the same '2%' that ' regularly' did not pay). lndeed, the payment rates of 
' conventional' households show that the majority are making regular full payments, fewer are making 
part payments and the remainder oscillating between paying in full or delaying payment. Very few 
households (2%) are ' making a habit of not paying' ('culture of non-payment'); thereby indicating that 
the group of 'conventional ' households, as a whole, are compliant and exhibiting a ' culture of payment'. 
The 'regular' non-paying group (2%) presents an unusual case. All households within this group 
explained non-payment in terms of a refusal to pay (in contrast to all other ' regular' non-paying ' user and 
tariff groups; who explicitly cited inability to pay). Total bills for this group exceeded Rl J 00 per 
month, of which interest contributed 20% (±R220) and total outstanding arrears ±R22 000. All of these 
households indicated that they tampered with their water and electricity. The perception was that making 
payment is fut ile, but more importantly they didn ' t believe that they should pay - "we are being ripped 
off' (Fieldwork notes, 2006). This case is significant in showing that these households that consistently 
did not pay; were not desperately 'poor' but also perceived a sense of injustice. They were able to 
' protect' themselves from prosecution by using locks and aggressive dogs to keep municipal officials at 
bay. They were unlike other struggling poor households who had no gates or fences, little security and no 
money in the bank to pay bribes. ln this regard, households frequently referred to examples of how the 
state actively pursued the poor for minuscule misdemeanours yet let brazen non-payers off the hook. 
A large proportion of households within the 'conventional ' group - 38%- struggle to make regular full-
payments (see Table 6.2). Yet only 4% of all 'conventional' households satisfy the income conditions 
(2005/6) which would qualify them for 'indigent' status. This signals an emerging municipal service 
affordability crisis for a large proportion of households within the 'conventional' group. 
1.3 'Indigent' households' payment rates 
The average full-payment rate registered by 'indigent ' households is 43% (see Table 6.4), with ' regular' 
full-payment at a lower 34% (see Table 6.2). This 34% figure, reflecting ' regular' responses for the two 
months is underestimated: an arrears analysis (beyond the two bills) found that 91 % of all surveyed 
' indigent' households were in arrears averaging around R9 300, and were therefore charged interest on 
historical debt. 
T able 6.4: Payment rates: 'indigent' households (N=35). 
Response variable [N=35] 
No-pay 
Full-pay 
Partial-pay 
%in arrears 
8111'1 ' 
40% 
37% 
23% 
63% 
Bill '2' Average for bills '1' & '2' 
26% 33% 
48% 43% 
26% 24% 
~% ~% 
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Strategies informing payment responses in this group are more nuanced. Attempts at making full-
payments are motivated by preventing service disconnections/removals and keeping debt down (Lifestory 
interviews, 2006). Indeed, the common thread running through strategies to make full or part-payments is 
fear: fear of complete removal of water and electricity boxes;50 fear of debt collectors and lawyers; fear 
of dispossession and eviction; and fear of the police (Lifestory interviews, 2006). Higher relative 
' regular' partial payment responses (I 7%) are conspicuous (see Table 6.2). Households (unable to pay in 
full) believe that attempts to make at least a small contribution will show the municipality that they are 
trying to pay, thereby staving off punitive measures (Lifestory interviews, 2006). Such a strategy is 
pointless in the context ofMsunduzi's rigid debt collection enforcement. Partial payments do not prevent 
the enacting of punitive measures, attempts to pay are not enough; the municipality only responds to "full 
payment, on time, every month" (Lifestory interviews, 2006). 
The 23% of 'indigent' households that registered a ' regular' no-pay had fallen so far behind that none of 
the indigent conditions were worth meeting. Even though subsidies were still reflected on bills; the return 
of historical debt, water restrictions and disconnected electricity meant that even if households had money 
(50% registered a zero household income) there was nothing worth paying for. Although households 
were still scared of the municipality; they were already in deep trouble. Indeed, it was hard to see, apart 
from removing services altogether, how much further services could be reduced (Lifestory interviews, 
2006). 
If you don 't pay; you don't get nothing. What they going to do next? Put a washer on top of a 
washer, it will be thirty times worse; already it is so slow (Lifestory 12, 18 May 2006). 
You tell me, from that 10 amp where do you think they are going to take us to? (Lifestory 7, 11 
April 2006). 
1.4 'Restricted' households ' payment rates 
A relatively high 37% of ' restricted' households oscillate between payment responses (see Table 6.2). 
Lifestory interviews (2006) suggest that households base payment decisions on shifting circumstances 
(financial and in response to municipal threats). ' Restricted ' households registered the lowest average 
full pay (32%) and 'regular' full pay (18%) of all ' tariff and user' groups. This is due to major financial 
constraints (see below). 
'Restricted' households made the highest average part payments (32%) and ' regular ' part payments 
( 18%) of all ' tariff and user ' groups. This is primarily an indication of affordability constraints, hence 
households ' pay what they can. ' But this further suggests that partial payment is made out of fear, amid 
worry that water and electricity systems may be completely removed, seeing that indigent conditions have 
50 Many households mentioned that one of the main reasons for their signing onto the Indigent Policy was to ·get their electricity 
box back· (Lifestory interviews. 2006). Memories ofparaffm. candles and collecting wood are still fresh in peoples· minds. 
Households make serious efforts to keep up with payments. 
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been breached or in the 'bad' debtor's case, because such households are being actively pursued for debt 
recovery (Lifestory interviews, 2006). 
Table 6.5: Pavment rates: 'restricted' households (N=ll). 
Response variable [N=11] Bill '1' Bill '2' Average for bills '1 ' & '2' 
No-pay 36% 36% 36% 
Full-pay 18% 46% 32% 
Partial-pay 46% 18% 32% 
%in arrears 82% 54% 68% 
'Restricted' households registered the second highest average and 'regular' non-payment rate (36% and 
27%) [see Table 6.5 and Table 6.2]. The high ' regular ' non-payment rate suggests non-payment is not a 
behavioural but an economic response: total bills made up 10% of total household income R2 629.09 (the 
lowest income registered by all groups) and 24% of the total bill was made up of interest charges (1 00% 
of households were in arrears of approximately R9 500). 
We did not pay not because we didn't feel like paying, we didn't pay because we didn ' t have the 
money; that is why we did not pay (Lifestory 9, 21 April2006). 
Similarly with decisions not to tamper; the non-payment of bills may indicate that households have 
resigned themselves to their containment and deem payment pointless. Other reasons might be that the 
cost of bills is not equivalent to the limited or no services received. Importantly, even if feelings of 
injustice are perceived; no apparent action is taken (these households have not tampered) - in this regard 
such households are probably too exhausted to resist or worst, feel responsible for their wretchedness 
(Lifestory interviews, 2006; Personal observation, 2006). 
1.5 'Tampered' households' payment rates 
More households within the ' tampered' group (46%) made full-payment than part or no-payment over the 
two months of analysis (see Table 6.6). These payment rates might appear peculiar if one were to 
conflate tampering with a 'culture of non-payment. ' Of course, as this study shows; tampering is not 
equivalent to 'deviance' but rather occurs as an attempt to secure nom1ative volumes and there are not 
' cultures of non-payment' at play, only "economics of non-payment" (Desai, 2002: 17). 
Table 6.6: Pavment rates: 'tampered' households (N=28). 
Response variable [N=28] Bill '1' Bill '2' Average for bills '1' & '2' 
No-pay 43% 36% 39.5% 
Full-pay 39% 53% 46% 
Partial-pay 18% 11% 14.5% 
%in arrears 61% 47% 54% 
Nevertheless, high relative full and part payments may be explained in the following ways: although 
'tampered' households have similar arrears characteristics as 'restricted' households (100% in arrears 
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with mean above R1 0 500, interest charges account for 21% of total bill and total bills account for 11% of 
total household income), ' tampered' households earn almost twice as much (R4 854.93) as their 
' restricted ' counterparts. Hence, although 'tampered' households' total bills are more than twice as much 
as the ' restricted ' household total bills (R563.52 to R265.76); they appear to be in a better financial 
position to be able to pay. An additional possibility underlying full or partial payments (linked above); 
may be due to the enacting of payment as a decoy against prosecution (the act of tampering may induce 
greater fear of prosecution countered by more regular payment responses to mimic 'responsible 
citizenship') [Lifestory interviews, 2006]. Noting the general admonishment by the community at large 
regarding perceived tampering (more on this in Chapter 9), payment is offered to counter judgement ("we 
may be tampering because we need more water but we still try to pay when we can"). 
2 AFFORDABILITY THRESHOLDS 
The National Water Services Regulation Strategy explicitly stipulates affordability criteria to a 'basic' 
supply and not supply per se (DW AF, 2008a: 57). At the heart of the affordability question is the 
definition of basic supply. Tariff structures, after the first 6kl block, do not have to reflect 'affordability'. 
Tariff structures, after the first 6kl block must be 'cost-reflexive ' and therefore may increase sharply 
(RSA, 1997: 18; DWAF, 2003: 27). This is in line with DWAF-regulated punitive tariffs at higher 
consumption levels (DW AF, 2002c: 72-74). Importantly, whilst cost recovery is legislated; affordability 
studies are not (Centre for Applied Legal Studies, 2008). 
It is commonly held that poor South Africans face a severe municipal service affordability crisis (Bond, 
2001; Fiil-Flynn, 2001 ; McDonald, 2002b). This is echoed by The World Health Organisation, " ... South 
Africans are paying too much for their water" and The Department of Provincial and Local Government, 
which states that municipalities are "charging unaffordable and unreasonably high service rates" (cited by 
Pauw, 2003: 5); and Msunduzi's own City Engineer, who stated that the municipality has "the most 
expensiYe water in the country" (MCE, 2005: pc). 
The World Bank's senior water and sanitation engineer in Latin America stated that water and sanitation 
charges should not exceed payment thresholds of 3 to 4% of household income, otherwise people will 
simply be unable to pay (cited by Pauw, 2003). The United Nations Development Programme, as a target 
for the Millennium Development Goal to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, proposed a "target 
ceiling of 3% for the share of household income spent on water" (UNDP: Human Development Report, 
2006: 22). Camdessus and Winpenny (2003) and The World Health Organisation put the affordability 
threshold at 5% and 7% of total household incomes, respectively. These benchmarks refer only to water 
and sanitation services and are international directives; hence they may not be appropriate to the South 
African situation, which has numerous non-service items and hidden costs. They are however, a useful 
guide. 
Before I present the water and sanitation charges as a percentage of total household income, it is 
important to note that households (in Msunduzi) cannot allocate payments to particular services. Hence if 
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water is to be secured; the total bill must be paid in full. Hence total bills as a proportion of total 
household income gain significance. Unlike for water and sanitation; there are no international guidelines 
in this regard; the total bill percentages merely indicate that water and sanitation affordability thresholds 
must be seen in the context of total bills. 
Table 6. 7: Total bill, water and sanitation charges as a proportion of total household income. 
Total household monthly 
income 
Zero-R1 000 
R1 001-R2 000 
R2 001-R3 000 
R3 001-RS 000 
RS 001+ 
% total bill 
39% 
21% 
17% 
13% 
7% 
% of households making 
% water & sanitation 'regular' full-payment for 
specified income range 
9% 46% 
6% 50% 
5% 56% 
4% 56% 
2% 57% 
It is evident (from Table 6.7) that households with lower total household incomes are charged 
proportionally more of their incomes on total bills and the water and sanitation services. For example: 
households registering a total monthly income within the range zero-R 1000 per month; are expected to 
spend 39% of total income on the total bill and 9% of total income on the water and sanitation services; 
whereas households registering a total monthly income within the range R2 001-R3 000; are expected to 
spend 17% of total income on the total bill and 5% on the water and sanitation component. This raises 
serious questions for equity, as issued by DW AF (2002b: 37) across different socio-economic users. 
It is clear that there is a disjuncture between the benchmarks suggested above and the charges levied for 
Eastwood households. There is variance however: the fault line is more acute at lower total household 
income levels, with higher relative income levels suggesting an affordability caution. Moreover, testing 
regular full -payment rates against total household income showed that 46% of households within the 
income bracket [zero-Rl 000] paid both bill '1' and '2' in full ; 50% at [Rl 001-Rl 000], 56% at [R 2001-
R3 000], 56% at [R3 001-R5 000], and 57% at [R5 001+] (see Table 6.7). McDonald (2002b), in a 
similar service affordability study, yet including far more respondents, found that the income range 
[R3 001-R5 000] typically absorbed all municipal service affordability constraints, with only 3% of all 
households unable to pay for municipal services at this level. This study however found that only 56% of 
a ll surveyed Eastwood households within this same income bracket regularly paid total bills in full. This 
may suggest that the 'international' benchmarks are too high but probably has more to do with the fact 
that services cannot be separated in the consolidated municipal bill; that is, the total bill in relation to 
household income appears to be high. in general up to the R3 001 -RS 000 bracket [at 13%] but 
particularly at lower income brackets [zero-Rl 000 at 39%]. Such a scenario suggests an overall high bill 
across incomes but importantly also reveals increased affordability pressures for the marginally better off, 
albeit still 'lower-middle' income, households. 
The implications of affordability constraints with regards to basic municipal sen·ices is that households 
have to make critical decisions regarding which needs to pay for, which needs to restrict and which needs 
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to compromise or forfeit (McDonald, 2002b). However, because water is an essential life source any 
decision taken will typically have major implications for household livelihoods (see The Coalition 
Against Water Privatisation, the Anti-Privatisation Forum and Public Citizen's Nothing for Mahala, 
2004). If money is mobilised to pay water charges (in Msunduzi's case the total bill) then less money is 
available for other necessities, such as food, education, transport and medical expenses. The lifestories 
and other community interviews (2006) all told of such compromises made to meet monthly bills: pulling 
kids out of school; walking to work instead of taking public transport [kombis]; forfeiting quality and 
pressing medical attention; asking neighbours or family for food, and relying on church or other feeding 
schemes. There was a general surrendering of all the infinitesimal necessities necessary for dignity: 
households gave up attending social functions and gave up buying personal and household products such 
as deodorants, sanitary materials and cleaning products: 
There was a time that we had to give everything that we had to our bills and lawyers and I had to 
go around asking for food, so I just go to a few ladies and ask them to give us a few potatoes, few 
of this, a few rice. Yes, actually that is exactly what I have been doing. Going around to the 
women, the ladies. If we can be free from bills ... that would really help. The account . .. maybe, 
it mustn't be too high. It's not that we don' t want to pay; we want to pay and also try and buy 
clothing for our children, and shoes and food. If the lights account can come down, a little low, 
just a little bit, you know maybe like RlOO a month then at least I can even buy single beds for my 
children. I can even buy food, I can even buy them shoes and clothing, at least this little money 
that we are getting too can just not be finished there on the lights and rates (Lifestory 8, 11 April 
2006). 
And all these years we have been sukkeling [struggling] because why, my mother used to make 
sure that at least there is electricity. Sometimes you even go so far as cutting down on your 
groceries in order to make sure that you are under a roof and electricity (Lifestory 7, 11 April 
2006). 
I don't like arrears; I'd rather not eat (Rooiborsie Road, 17 January 2006). 
With affordability of municipal services presenting a real economic burden to poor households the 
concessions and subsidies offered by the social wage gains greater significance. The next section will 
consider the scope of welfare-type municipal benefits and analyse their impact on poverty relief and 
transformation. 
3 THE SOCIAL WAGE 
In an exceptional study which sought to quantify the contribution of the social wage in the alleviation of 
poverty; Meth and Dias (2004: 20, 25) found that the social wage even if easing poverty, "has not been 
sufficient to bring households anywhere near to an acceptable standard of living" and further has had 
"little impact on the spending power of the poor." This finding resonates with welfare: poor households 
are generally better off when receiving welfare than not receiYing it, yet concessions are not enough to be 
transformative (Gough, 1979; Alcock, 1987; Walker, 1993). Acknowledging the significance of Meth 
and Dias's study (2004), there are nevertheless three gaps: (1) general and therefore arbitrary estimates 
are used to value water concessions (municipal tariffs and policy applications differ across jurisdictions, 
see Chapter 2), and refuse and sanitation concessions are omitted; (2) their study, like many others, is 
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framed in a largely quantitative framework and (3) heeding Roberts's (2005) concern that a time lag 
exists between policy implementation and measurable change, Meth and Dias's study was based on 
survey data from 1999-2002, and may not have allowed sufficient time to pass to do justice to measurable 
change. 
The social wage has come to the fore in the calculation and consolidation of all poverty relief efforts to 
poor households, in the words ofMbeki (President's speech, 2006) " ... [the] social wage plays a vital role 
in our continuing efforts to address the challenge of poverty." Yet, how much of a role does the social 
wage actually play in the reduction of poverty, easing affordability constraints, equalising and 
transforming society? This section attempts to partly answer this question by analysing the municipal 
service component of the social wage, which in South Africa, at the local government level, is delivered 
via the instmment of the Indigent Policy. 
As indicated in Chapter 2, previous attempts at calculating the services component of the social wage 
have been diminished by attempts to put a general and national face on benefits within a context of vast 
municipal tariff, subsidy and service disparity. In this regard, noting the gaps in knowledge and 
methodological critique of Meth and Dias's (2004) nevertheless important study, this section addresses 
the first gap and aims to present a more comprehensive and reliable computation of the services 
component of the social wage in Msunduzi (the methodological and time-lag gaps are addressed in 
Chapter 8 and 9). That is, concessions, subsidies and service charges are only a reflection of 'applied 
indigent' and 'conventional ' tariffs as instituted in Msunduzi. Note that this section deals with the 
monetary components of the social wage; qualitative implications will be discussed in Chapter 8. 
3.1 Value of services component of social wage in Msunduzi 
The services component of the social wage considered in the study included water (free basic water and 
indigent subsidy), sanitation (indigent subsidy), refuse (indigent subsidy) and electricity (free basic 
electricity). Municipal rates were excluded for three reasons: (1) the services secured by the payment of 
rates could not be quantified; (2) the service nature of rates was inconsistent with the other four services 
and; (3) 'indigent' households had to apply separately for rates rebates, hence not all 'indigent' 
households received a rebate. The social wage benefit for sanitation, refuse and electricity was constant, 
and was calculated by subtracting the 'indigent' tariff from the 'conventional ' tariff. The social wage 
benefit for water was based on consumption and calculated by subtracting the 'indigent' tariff from the 
'conventional' tariff at each tariff step over the indicated metered period (less than or greater than 30 
days). Table 6.8 below indicates the potential social wage benefit for the four considered services for all 
'applied indigent' Msunduzi households. Two figures are provided: (1) indigent gain at consumption 
levels of0-6kl [R100.29] and (2) indigent gain at consumption levels of 12kl [Rl 30.06). 
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Table 6.8: Potential social wage benefit (2005/6). 
Services 'Conventional' tariff 'Indigent' tariff Potential social wage benefit (incl VAT) 
Water 0-6kl 1 FREE if <6kl 
Water 7-12kl 2 R8.37/kl 
Water 13kl +3 R8.37/kl 
Sanitation R76.04 
Refuse R49.19 
Electricity 50kWh R10.39 
Indigent gain 1 
Indigent gain 2&3 
(incl VAT) 
FREE 
R3.41/kl 
R8.37/kl 
R32.05 
R28.70 
FREE 
{R4.24/kl} R25.44 (max for 30 days) 
{R4.96/kl} R29.77 (max for 30 days) 
ZERO GAIN 
R43.99 (constant) 
R20.49 (constant) 
R10.39 (constant) 
R100.29 (max for 30 days) 
R1 30.06 (max for 30 days) 
Table 6.9 below indicates the actual social wage benefit for surveyed Eastwood 'indigent' households. 
Three scenarios are presented, based on mean consumption. Namely, (I) what 'indigent' households 
would be paying if no social benefit was received ('conventional ' tariffs); (IT) actual total bill charged to 
'indigent' households for the four identified services (excluding interest and service penalties); and (III) 
actual social wage benefit gained by ' indigent' households. 
Table 6.9: Comparison of service scenarios: at ' conventional' tariffs; 'actual bill,' and actual social 
wage benefit. 
Scenarios Scenario I Scenario n Scenano Ill 
'Indigent' bi ll if charged at Actual 'indigent' bill at Actual social wage 
Serv1ces 'conventional' tariffs. 'indigent' tariffs benefit 
[4 items -mean] [4 items- mean] [4 items- mean) 
Water R64.00 R25.63 R38.37 
Sanitation R76.04 R32.05 R43.99 
Refuse R49.19 R28.70 R20.49 
Electricity R110.24 R99.85 R1 0.39 
Total [4 services items] R299.47 R186.24 R113.24 
The actual social wage benefits gained by 'indigent' households for each service, and indicated in Table 
6.9, are the following: water R38.37, sanitation R43.99, refuse R20.49, electrici ty R10.39. The actual 
mean social wage benefit gained is Rl13.24. That is, the difference between a mean bill of Rl86.24 
(with social wage) and R299.47 (without social wage). The social wage benefit gained is diminished by 
the servicing of debt (see later). 
It is clear from Table 6.9 that the greatest social wage benefit is accrued via sanitation subsidies. Here, a 
little insight is useful. Sanitation charges, for 'conventional ' households are levied as a fixed, non-
volumetric charge. Indeed, there are numerous problems with such a format. Low-volume water 
consumers are at a distinct disadvantage in such a calculation and the 'relief acquired should in fact be 
extended to all low-volume consumers and not just 'indigent' households. Moreover, households have to 
pay twice: once for the water that comes into the home, and once to discharge it back into the system. It 
is also common for a household to use less than 6kl , thereby getting free water; but to subsequently be 
charged for this ' free' water to be discharged. Even free water is not free, because sanitation charges of 
R76.04 are levied (see Appendix G). The second-highest benefit, in descending order, is water. Again, 
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such profit must be tempered: financial relief is bound up with restricted water supply and as such, the 
majority of 'indigent' households have indicated that they would rather have full service at the deemed 
cost (Lifestory interviews, 2006). The refuse benefit is welcomed by 'indigent' households (Lifestory 
interviews, 2006) but comes with a rider that excessive wastage is not a characteristic of poor households. 
The municipal refuse service also has been voiced, by poor households, as being inadequate and 
discriminatory (Lifestory interviews, 2006). The last on the social wage list is electricity; a relief of 
Rl0.39 for 50kWh. The Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) states that 50kWh is only sufficient 
for "basic lighting, small black and white TV, small radio, basic ironing and basic water boiling through 
an electric kettle" (DME website: www.dme.gov.za/energy/elect_fbe.stm, accessed 24 November 2008). 
' Indigent' households must also reduce their amperage to 20 amps; hence must manage their usage lest 
the lights trip. Apart from this frustration, the ramifications of a low amperage mean that 'indigent' 
households are unable to optimally use or perhaps invest in higher-end infrastructure (fridges, geysers, 
stoves etc) and therefore must submit to an automatically downgraded lifestyle; a lifestyle that appears 
constructed to reinforce domestic burden and inequality. It would be hard to imagine that a 'saving' of 
Rl 0.39 coupled with low amperage delivers not only real relief but actually helps the poor. Rather, it is 
not far-fetched to imagine that such concessions and structural restrictions simply operate to keep the 
poor in their place (Ruiters, 2005). However, the apparent subtlety of the above may not even matter, 
many 'indigent' households face continual disconnections for late or partial payment so don't actually 
have lights at all (51% of surveyed ' indigent households' were disconnected at the time of study). And 
finally, regardless if disconnected or not, ' indigent' households must still pay for their fixed monthly 
amperage charges (R53.12 for 20 amps, 2005/6); which eats up the 'free' electricity. 
It is clear that mechanisms have been put in place to systematically erode any real social wage relief. 
Moreover, the value of the social wage is linked to the trumped up and poorly equilibrated 'conventional ' 
tariffs. In this respect the more expensive or iniquitous the 'conventional ' service tariff; the greater the 
potential social wage gain, without in actuality effecting an eased economic burden. Indeed, would it 
matter if the social wage benefit were doubled or even quadrupled, if the ' indigent' total bill were to 
remain the same or thereabouts - and the service to be restricted or disconnected? We must again return 
to the total bill charged to ' indigent' households (see Chapter 5, Table 5.1). The substantial difference 
between the 'indigent' total bill levied (R328.35) and the ' actual indigent bill' (Rl86.24) is attributed to 
the items that fell outside of the ambit of calculation: rates (rebated/charged), interest and service 
penalties. Here it is significant to note the mean interest charges levied on 'indigent' total bills: R74.19. 
These charges reduced the social wage benefit from Rll3.24 to R39.05. The social wage benefit is 
diminished by the servicing of debt. 
IR113.24 (social wage benefit) - R 74.19 (debt) = R39.05 (social wage benefit after debt)l 
In the broader context of 'indigent' conditions: restricted water, reduced amperage, increased 
surveillance, stigmatisation and criminalisation, administrative burden and humiliation - and households, 
in reality, only gained R39.05. Moreover, this analysis shows that any social wage benefit must be 
107 
considered in the context of total bills levied. In isolation the social wage is merely hypothetical and not 
reflective of the wider reality of systematic elimination of potential gains. Importantly, the social wage 
benefit in the Eastwood context has not realised any substantial economic relief, has not eased 
affordability constraints, and it is almost preposterous to imagine that it acts as a transfonnative measure. 
As such the study findings resonate with Meth and Dias's (2004: 20, 25) conclusions which indicated that 
the social wage has had a limited impact on poverty alleviation and transformation. Yet, my study adds a 
different dimension: that the social wage has acted retrogressively and has actually reduced the quality of 
life of poor households. 
This section suggests that municipal 'debt relief or 'pro-poor' initiatives may not, after all , be about 
helping poor people. 'Pro-poor' policies in Msunduzi are not responsive to the needs and vulnerability 
circumstances of poor households. The few benefits that are offered are miserly, with careful deliberation 
given to the numerous conditions for accessing benefit. The conditions of course, are of significant value 
to street-level bureaucrats: to garner household information cheaply and efficiently, to segment, target 
and externalise 'bad' debtors. For example: " ... the indigent approach has had a very positive impact on 
municipal debt management. The approach has contributed to improvements in collection rates by 
removing from the pool those who cannot afford to pay" (SACN, 2006: 139). Moreover, the social wage 
serves to reduce and restrict consumption, to secure payment, to reduce municipal debt, and to 'educate' 
and control. The broader intentions of the state, in conceding welfare-type benefits will be further 
explored in Chapter 9. 
4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter showed that at the time of the research 94% of households in Eastwood (regardless of 
income) were paying monthly bills, despite Msunduzi ' s poorly equilibrated tariff framework - relatively 
expensive bills with high proportions of non-service items and despite the extraordinary burden that these 
imposed. Households oscillated between skipping payment, partially paying, and paying in full. Fifty-six 
per cent of 'all ' households ' regularly' paid bills in full, 10% of 'all ' households 'regularly' made part-
payments and 27% oscillated between payment responses. Non-payment was rare: only 6% of 'all ' 
households 'regularly' made no payment at all, thereby indicating a 'culture' of payment and compliance. 
Households regarded debt very seriously and made real efforts to settle outstanding debt. 
'Regular' payment responses showed that only 56% of 'all ' households paid both bills in full during the 
period of inquiry. That is, 44% of 'all' households either 'regularly' made part or no-payments or 
oscillated between payment strategies. This means that 44% of 'all' households were liable for additional 
non-service charges. These figures were more nuanced across service packages: although some 
households within all service packages struggled to make 'regular' full payment; compared to 
'conventional' households making full-payment (62%) - about half as many 'tampered' and ' indigent' 
households (36% and 34% respectively) and only a quarter of 'restricted ' households (18%) - paid bills 
in full. This showed that a very high proportion of households within all service packages but more 
acutely evident in 'downgraded ' packages were struggling to pay bills in full. Poor households were 
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found to be spending significantly more of their incomes on water and sanitation services than laid down 
in international affordability benchmarks. It indicated that the affordability constraints of poor 
households were not absorbed within the many invented ways of delivery and non-delivery. Improved 
affordability would then come, not from better equilibrated tariff structures, but from service cutbacks. 
The social wage de livered via the instrument of the Indigent Policy provided a mean fmancial gain of 
Rll3.24. Yet this relief is systematically eroded by interest, service penalty charges and fix ed service 
charges, which reduces the net gain to a mere R39.05. The linkage of social wage gains to the poorly 
equilibrated 'conventional ' tariff charges provides an exaggerated and largely illusory gain. There was 
little financial relief and that which was 'getting through' acted to subjugate the poor by reducing services 
and locking households into the debt apparatus: instead of attempting transfonnation: it offered 
retrogression. 
Ironically, however, even this chance at spurious poor relief offered by the Indigent Policy excluded 
many struggling households. Only 4% of 'conventional ' households would qualify; the rest (34%) were 
disqualified from ' indigent' status due to total income higher than the application threshold. This meant 
that in time, they might well join the ' bad' debtor grouping. This exclusion appeared intentional because 
as shown in Chapter 4 there did not actually appear to be sufficient intergovernmental funding to back up 
the social wage mandate. Msunduzi, instead of meeting this largely unfunded mandate by reorganising its 
tariff and billing structure; used the embedded limitation clauses to contain poor households to minimum 
service provisions and legitimise the exclusion of anything more than the basic offering. In this respect, 
social policy was twisted to limit the demand on Msunduzi's cash outflow. In th is context the definition 
of a 'basic' supply, whereby poorly equilibrated tariffs excluded households from accessing an adequate 
level of service, became very significant. This will be further explored through the optic of free basic 
water in Chapter 7, which follows. 
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Chapter 7 
EASTWOOD HOUSEHOLDS: WATER USE AND FREE BASIC WATER ACCESS 
Whereas Chapter 5 looked at what residents were charged for water and Chapter 6 looked at how 
residents responded to such charges, this Chapter (7) focuses purely on notions and conceptions of water 
usage, the metered volumes of water used, comparisons across and within groups, and problems around 
the adequacy of free basic water. I further look at the influence of restriction, tampering and payment 
scope on consumption levels; and analyse the conditions of households' access to free basic water. Lastly 
I contextualise limited water volumes within an argument about the state's containment of poor 
households and futther propose a consumption range based on Eastwood metered volumes which may be 
more appropriate in accommodating the water requirements of the majority of surveyed Eastwood 
households. 
The information for this chapter comes from 336 selected Eastwood households (billed water 
consumption component over average of three consecutive months), survey questions related to service 
package, free basic water, consumption activities, restriction and demographics. I also used data from 
Msunduzi, DW AF and P AlA sources. 
1 NOTIONS AND CONCEPTIONS OF WATER USE ACROSS SPACE AND 
TIME 
Throughout history purity and cleanliness have been used to categorise and distinguish different groups of 
people (see Douglas, 1966: 1-28); and by default the access to resources, particularly water, needed to 
facilitate this differentiation. The 'unclean' are dangerous, uncivilised, disordered, immoral and sexually 
deviant (see Douglas, 1966: 1-28). An analysis of cleanliness and dirt is closely related to notions of fear, 
race and class. The passage below is redolent with such notions: 
[Mistress Alya in conversation with Saartjie Baartman]- Cleanliness is godliness, she would 
whisper over and over, wringing her just-washed hands. As I understood it, to be clean was an 
affirmation of independence. What was cleansed was the dirt of the world: pollution and 
injustice. Dirt disguised violence and torture. It prevented self-knowledge. Cleaning made 
everything distinct and clear like the African dawn. To keep oneself clean was to set oneself apart 
in a world of confusion and foreigners. Dirt was vagabond. Dirt was the appetite of the flesh. 
Dirt was folly, disorder and sex. The Hottentots, she would say, were not only dirty, they were 
filthy. They smeared their bodies with butter and dung. They wore entrails around their necks. 
They painted their faces. They spat and urinated on brides and grooms. And when there was 
nothing to eat, they ate dirt rather than starve. I began to bathe myself twice a day, rising at dawn 
to wade in the river that ran through the farm or filling a wooden trough with hot water from the 
kitchen and letting the waters close over my head (Chase-Riboud, 2003: 48-49). 
Different standards of water consumption and notions of water needs across space and time are reflective 
of the context of use. In the South African context the use of water for hygienic purposes is peculiarly 
racialised. For centuries Whites exerted their supremacy and civilisation via cleanliness. This of course 
was not perceived by Whites to be facilitated by the access to improved water infrastructure, hygiene 
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products and services, time and Black labour - but choice. In the same way it was the ' choice,' (ethical 
and moral) of Black South Africans not to be clean, powdered and fresh. Whites went further however to 
entrench this domination of cleanliness (and distinction of their superiority) by being very clean - even if, 
for the most part, this was facilitated by the labour of Black servants, the exploitation of Black labour and 
the theft of Black land and property. Notions of water need were particularly racialised in colonial Africa 
and under apartheid, on the assumption that Africans in general, and black South Africans in particular 
were merely labourers, mine workers, factory workers, farm workers or domestic workers - they did not 
need to be as clean as Whites. 
This was reflected in the apartheid-era urban water architecture which constructed different conceptions 
of need and standards (see Mathewson, 1957). Water infrastructure in white suburbs, under apartheid, 
was built for full pressure, hot water, in-house multiple taps; diameters of pipe were large and plumbing 
was constructed in the front of streets. Black townships were built for low pressure, cold water, in-yard 
single taps; diameters of pipe were narrowed and plumbing was installed using backyard methods. 
Different municipal planning books existed (red and green books) which differentiated between racialised 
residential groups: one excellent standard for white suburbs and another inferior standard for black 
townships. Contemporary post-apartheid South Africa has seen the ANC government reproducing similar 
implicit racist notions of need through a type of discriminatory notion of basic needs and cost-cutting 
mechanisms. 
In Msunduzi, water in poor areas is constructed on low pressure water systems and delivered by way of 
roof or ground tanks. Water flow is thus automatically pre-restricted, and then further restricted by way 
of manipulation of meters/implementation of restriction devices (MCE, 2005: pc). Household water 
infrastructure is rudimentary, limited to kennel-like ' bathrooms,' outdoor basins or water saving showers, 
low-flush toilets or pit latrines. There are no baths or kitchen sinks. Water drips out of taps, which are no 
longer made from sturdy shiny metals but cheap pink plastics; small, difficult to tum, and they break 
easily. Electricity is provided by way of prepaid electricity meters. Roofs are made of cheap, thin tin -
blisteringly hot in summer and freezing cold in winter. There are no gutters or effective drainage. 
Shallow sanitation systems ensure that systems are frequently blocked and such places smell. When it 
rains, there is a lot of mud (Personal observation: Cinderella Park, Thembalihle and France and 
Lifestories, 2006). 
But look at how they are building these new houses, so small. One door and kitchen ... Ja, but you 
can' t do nothing, even if they build you a shed, you go in (Lifestory 15. 31 May 2006). 
Not that small little house ... There is no air vent, first of all, you have to put your own sink in, the 
toilets they put in are poor toilets, they've only got one door, so if there's a fire, you can only go 
through one entrance; the roofing. it 's zinc roofs, there's no ceilings, they don 't plaster the houses 
inside and out, that when it rains, the water goes inside. I don't know what were they trying? I 
mean they are giving, they are saying it's for the poor people. So, it means you are living, like you 
are living in a shack. That is not houses (Lifestory 3, 1 February 2006). 
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1.1 Basic water requirement 
As indicated in Chapter 2, due to the framing of ' basic' requirements within a rights-based and/or 
humanitarian crisis approach, notions of basic water requirements have been framed in physiological 
terms to meet absolute needs. Such an approach invokes a 'scientific ' response; measurements are based 
on absolute minimums to ensure basic health and prevent death. Indeed, the full scope of water activities 
is largely unmet: no water for washing hands and face, brushing teeth; no water for flushing toilets; for 
washing dishes, utensils, pots and table tops; no water for washing clothes, linen, blankets, floors, 
furniture, baths and sinks; no water for small home enterprises or food gardens; no water for cultural uses, 
burial ceremonies or fire and other emergencies. In addition, no differentiation is made for demographic 
factors, all of which have implications for water requirements (e.g.) an ill child, a pregnant woman, a 
menstruating girl, a diabetic man, an infant, a woman feeding her child breast milk substitutes or a 
bedridden old woman. Ultimately, such physiological water requirements are impoverished from value or 
context. All ' users' are standardised; all contexts are equal. This orthodox discourse ignores Harvey's 
(1977 and 1996) thesis of the relational nature of ' resources' or ' basic needs' and thereby contains 
numerous gaps in grasping how households use and value water. 
The calculation of basic water requirements is highly subjective. In this regard the framing and purpose 
of basic water requirements becomes significant. A water volume calculated to maintain health and 
prevent death, and accessed via water vendor or emergency tanker is going to be vastly different from one 
based on convenience, dignity, gender equity, transformation and accessed via in-house tap. In the same 
vein, if such basic water requirements are framed in the language of rights, with major legal and financial 
implications, the volumes arrived at will be dissimilar from those framed in the form of water as a public 
good to optimise citizenship. 
Past attempts to measure water requirements via crude calculations of activities and frequencies have 
defied the fluidness and intimacy of use. How much and how and when a household uses water is 
subjective, contextual and often particular to the individual household doing the using. That is, when to 
flush, to share bath water or not and who shares, how hands are washed and when, to bath twice a day or 
once only and how much water to use; when and how often to clean homes and wash clothes etc. Values 
around water usage are not universal. The preference to run hands under a tap, wash in a bowl or wipe 
with a wet cloth are all important. Each inclination is drenched in meaning and implicates total volumes 
consumed. Moreover, the washing of bodies, clothes and homes in the South African milieu sometimes 
takes on a historical quest for false equity by the proving of humanity through cleanliness. The use of 
water in such a racialised hygiene context cannot be equated with international water volume research 
advocating volumes to meet basic physiological water needs precisely because of its closeness to 
recapturing dignity. 
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2 VARIATIONS IN WATER CONSUMPTION BETWEEN GROUPS IN 
EASTWOOD 
Household consumption levels were garnered via municipal consolidated bills, although it is held that 
water meters are notoriously inaccurate (Baumann & Boland, 1998). Noting this as well as the financial 
impossibility of actually installing new meters at every household surveyed; I nevertheless put a number 
of controls in place to at least minimise ' visible' or 'obvious' irregularities. For example: in the data 
collection phase errors were reduced via the physical checking of meters, scrutiny of more than the study-
limited three consecutive bills and engagement with households. In the data entry phase consumption 
was checked for consistency over the three bills and where questions were raised, households were re-
visited or surveys rejected. In the preliminary data cleaning and analysis phase values were considered as 
outliers if they exceeded the third quartile (75%) plus 1.5 (interquartile range) [q3 +1.5iqr] and surveys 
registering meter reading errors (coded in SPSS) were removed. The large sample size further tempered 
against meter inaccuracies. What is important is that the consumption patterns presented are consistent 
against other vatiables. They suggest strong correlations and significances. 
The next sub-sections will consider metered household consumption patterns within and across 'tariff and 
user' groups for the surveyed Eastwood households. The 'conventional' group will be presented first, 
where the prime focus will be on the relationship between household size and consumption levels. 
Thereafter volumes used by ' indigent' households will be presented and discussed, followed by a 
comparison between ' restricted', 'tampered,' and ' not-yet-restricted ' water users, including consumption 
in relation to water access packages (specifically free basic water), technical limitations and household 
responses to restriction. 
2.1 'Conventional' group: metered water consumption 
This consumption analysis is based on the 252 households included in the ' conventional' tariff grouping 
where consumption is not limited by any technical or administrative means. The analysis excludes a 
minority of households with more than 6 members per household (23) since the sample numbers were too 
few to render a meaningful average; and excludes a further 35 households which incurred bills that 
indicated meter reading disputes and errors or major consumption inconsistencies over three total bills. 
Unlike bill totals, which households are expected to pay regardless of error, consumption inaccuracies 
distort average household consumption volumes. The final household tally in this analys is is therefore 
194. 
Testing a number of relevant demographic variables (age, gender, illness status, socio-economic status, 
employment status. social security status, time at home etc.) and keeping the housing types constant (old 
apartheid council housing: tenement blocks, semi-detached houses and small single houses) against 
consumption patterns (see Baumann & Boland 1998: 22-26) it was found that the variable of household 
size had the strongest correlation with water consumption [1.000, sig. (1-tailed) p<O.OOO I]. In light of 
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this it was clear that merely calculating an average for this group was going to miss much of the 
consumption dynamics. Consumption patterns were therefore calculated within household size groups. 
There are significant consumption differences between small and larger households (see Table 7. 1 ). For 
example: households with 2 members use half the amount of households with 6 members. That is, there 
is a positive correlation between household size and monthly/daily household consumption; as household 
size increases so too does monthly/daily household consumption. There is however, an inverse 
correlation between household size and per capita consumption. The data showed that as household size 
increases, household monthly consumption also increases, but each member within the larger household 
uses less per capita per day (and month) than smaller households (also see Baumann & Boland 1998: 22-
26). 
Table 7.1: 'Conventional' group: mean household and per capita consumption bv household size 
= 6 (N=194). 
Consumption per Household (HH) Consumption per capita 
Household N per month(kl ) per day(l) per month(kl ) per day( I) 
size (HHs) 
1 8 4.4 147 4.4 147 
2 17 8.8 283 4.4 148 
3 63 12.5 417 4.2 139 
4 59 15.3 512 3.8 128 
5 35 17.9 596 3.6 119 
6 12 18.5 617 3.1 103 
Total 194 14.1 467 3.9 131 
There are significant differences in variation for per capita consumption between household stzes. 
Households with 3-6 members benefit from economies of scale; with increasing benefit derived with each 
additional member. For example: sharing baths, washing clothes, cooking, cleaning home etc. It is 
important to note however, that sometimes, even with larger households, economies of scale do not cover 
all water activities for all age, gender or illness demographics. For example: baby's bath water is not 
shared and baby's clothing is washed separately; boys and girls up to their teens may share water but after 
this age boys typically don't share bath water but girls continue to share water with sisters, aunts or 
mothers; men typically do not share bath water; if a member is very ill, bath water and washing is 
typically not shared, after urination toilets are immediately flushed, special food in separate pots may 
need to be prepared; menstruating women have to flush immediately and bath separately (or after 
someone); young women (older teenage girls) tend to flush fastidiously; toilets have to be flushed after 
defecation, for most people at least once a day (Fieldwork notes, lifestory interviews and survey data, 
2006). In this regard many different factors affect how water is used in the home (not just household 
size); typically usage is fluid and consistent with particular household demographics, cultures, dignity 
values, time and the broader socio-economic environment (Ibid, 2006). 
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Although noting the problems around quantifying water consumption, average consumption for the 
Eastwood households (14.lkl /month) is far below the average (18kl) for Msunduzi Municipality as a 
whole [PAIA, 2007a]. 
2.2 'Indigent' households: metered water consumption 
This consumption analysis is based on the 35 households included in the 'indigent' tariff grouping where 
consumption is meant to be limited by technical means. I excluded one ' indigent' tampering household 
from this analysis as it had a major leak and drastically skewed mean data. The final 'indigent' household 
sample size used in this analysis is 34. However, as noted, households have responded to such limitations 
in different ways. Eleven 'indigent' households are ' not-yet-restricted'. Interviews with several such 
households suggested that they had "chased the municipal employees away when they came to restrict us" 
(Lifestory interviews, 2006). Such a situation of unlimited access could however also be due to delayed 
administration procedures and hence ' not-yet-restricted' households will in all probability be restricted in 
future. The other responses include tampering with restriction washers. 
The mean consumption for the ' indigent' group was 10.4kl per household per month. There were 
however acute differences within this ' indigent group' (household size as a factor in determining 
tampering will be explored later in this chapter). 'Restricted' households consumed ±8kl (65%) less than 
' tampered' and 'not-yet-restricted' households (mean for 26: 12.3kl) and their 'conventional ' group 
counterparts respectively. 
Water restrictions to less than 6kl take on a special type of significance for ' indigent' households. The 
Msunduzi Indigent Policy contract stipulates that water be restricted to 12kl. The problem is that 
calculated flow rate of the restriction washer used for 'indigents' is 6kl (if a tap is left on 24 hours a day) 
(MCE, 2005: pc; DW AF, 2007b). 'Restricted ' ' indigent' households consumed 4.3kl per month; this is 
l.7kl less than the 6kl free water allowance. 'Restricted' indigent households noted that the savings of 
±Rl8 (if there were no Free Basic Water or Indigent Policy at all in Msunduzi) were not perceived to 
adequately compensate for the negative social consequences of a reduced supply (Lifestory interviews, 
2006). 
Table 7.2: 'Indigent group' : mean household and per capita consumption per restriction status 
(N=34). 
'Indigent' households [34] N Household slze Consumption Consumption per HH per month (kl ) per capita per day (I ) 
'Restricted' 8 2.9 4.3 53 
'Tampering' 15 4.8 13.4 101 
'Not-yet-restricted' 11 4.2 10.9 99 
Mean for all 34 4.1 10.4 89 
The 'not-yet-restricted' ' indigent' group consumed less than the 12kl subsidy cap so they did stand to 
benefit from a net saving of ±R25 in the 2nd indigent block. 'Tampering' households also, despite 
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marginally exceeding the 12kl cap, saved ±R30 in the 2nd indigent block although they paid the full 
'conventional ' tariff of R8.37 in the 3rd tariff block (13kl + used). That this benefit in the latter case is 
derived from tampering may itself be a paradox: one has to cheat the policy to benefit. However, both 
groups tend to limit consumption voluntarily and consumed less (±25-29%) than their 'conventional' 
group counterparts. 
2.3 Restricted and tampered: metered water consumption comparison 
This consumption analysis is based on the 28 ' tampered' and 11 ' restricted' water supply to households. 
I excluded 3 'tampered' households from this analysis for major leaks, bringing the total for the group to 
25. The ' restricted' household numbers remain the same (11). 
There are significant consumption differences between ' restricted' and 'tampered' households. 
'Restricted' households consumed ± lOki (72%) less than their tampering counterparts. Yet, this 
difference tells us more about the modest consumption levels of 'restricted' households than the 
excessiveness of 'tampered' households (see later). 'Restricted' households should be consuming around 
the ±12kl mark consistent with 'conventional' households of equivalent household size. Yet they were 
not even able to access the minimum 6kl since ' restricted' households consume 32% less than their free 
basic water allowance. 
Table 7.3: 'Restricted' and 'tampered' group: mean household and per capita consumption per 
restriction status (N=36). 
'Restricted' group [36] N 
'Restricted' 11 
'Tampered' 25 
Household 
SIZe 
2.9 
4.5 
Consumption 
per HH per month (kl ) 
4.1 
14.4 
Consumption 
per capita per day (I) 
49 
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'Tampering' households consumed 14.4 kl per month. For all groups of tampering households, across 
service packages or punitive measures, tampering is conducted out of the need to secure normal water 
volumes. This suggests the existence of a consumption threshold beneath which it is very difficult to 
function adequately. Moreover, that 'tampering' households are not over-consuming but actually 
consume ±2kl less than their 'conventional' household size equivalents means that the value of water 
does not appear to be less simply because it is accessed via tampering. Indeed, the myth of reckless water 
usage or deviant behaviour in relation to tampering does not appear to hold sway among these Eastwood 
households (explored further in Chapter 9). This study has shown clearly that households typically do not 
waste water. Water is valued and the more it is held up as a public good, with popular pressures to value 
it as such, the more volumes will be kept within appropriate levels. The implementation of technical 
limitations is therefore unnecessary and, as the comparison between 'not-yet-restricted' and 'tampered' 
'indigent' households showed, counterproductive. 
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2.4 Consumption and payment correlations 
There is a general perception (particularly at the municipal and national level) that households that do not 
pay or partially pay their total bills are feckless and use more water than their paying counterparts. 
Testing the independent variables of payment (full, partial, no-pay) against the dependent variable of 
monthly household consumption (for bill ' 1' and then bill '2') and per capita per day consumption; no 
significant differences (across all 'tariff and user' groups) were found in variances between households 
that paid in full , in part, or did not pay bill '1' and bill ' 2'. See Table 7.4 by way of example. 
Table 7.4: 'Tampered' households: consumption and pavment correlations (N=25). 
'Tampered' [N=25] Response N Consumption per HH (kl) Consumption per capita per Mean household 
variable per month [bill '1'] da}: (I ) (bill '1'] size 
No-pay 12 14.6 105 4.1 
Paid bill '1' Full-pay 8 14.2 118 4.8 
Partial-pay 5 18.5 145 5 
'Tampered' [N=25] Response N Consumption per HH (kl) Consumption per capita per Mean household 
variable eer month [bill '2'J da~ (I ) (bill '2'J size 
No-pay 9 12.9 115 
Paid bill '2' Full-pay 13 15.3 131 
Partial-pay 3 15.1 77 
This is a powerful indicator: payment rates, in Eastwood, do not reflect volumes consumed. That is, 
normal volumes are consumed regardless of payment. This again reaffirms the thesis of a consumption 
threshold below which households cannot function adequately - regardless of ability to pay in full for 
such volumes. Indeed, inability to pay in full does not equate with reckless or excessive water usage -
water consumption remains moderate. These results indicate that myths of 'cultures of non-payment' and 
'irresponsible behaviour' are unfounded. 
It appears that dignity and needs, and not economics, are the major determinants of water value. The 
assumption that poor households will suffice themselves with wretched volumes of water just because 
payment is a problem is somewhat naive; nor is the ability to pay for water a fair instrument in 
determining how much water is needed. This assumption is also particularly racialised and classist. 
While poor households with fewer water-using appliances, fewer taps and toilets and bathrooms, typically 
limited gardens (more vegetable than flower) and certainly no sparkling cool pools; will use less water 
than wealthier equivalents - they place a high value on hygiene. My study found that such dignity is 
fiercely guarded and households have clearly rejected notions of water as commodity (Lifestory 
interviews, 2006). 
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3 ACCESS TO FREE BASIC WATER: EASTWOOD AND MSUNDUZ/ 
ln Msunduzi, free basic water is only guaranteed to ' conventionar households that consume equal to or 
less than 6kl per month (voluntarily) or households registered as 'indigent.' If 'conventional' households 
do not pay, their water may be restricted to 6kl , while, in the case of 'indigent' households restriction is a 
condition of access. This condition implies that the 'access to ' free basic water may not necessarily entail 
a 'benefit' since restrictions may carry social and health sacrifices and burdens. 51 
Data for 'who is getting free basic water' is determined by consumption levels of equal to or less than 6kl 
per 30-day period (or 2001 per day over billing period) for all 'conventional' and ' bad' debtor groups 
(registered as zero charge) and for the 'indigent' group, if the 6kl part of total consumption is levied as 
free (zero charge). I excluded one ' indigent' tampering household due to a massive leak. In this regard, 
all other households excluded from previous consumption analyses due to meter reading errors, 
inconsistencies, leaks and household size were included as I wanted to explore the free basic access 
phenomenon as it presents itself in reality. This free basic water analysis is based on the 335 Eastwood 
surveyed households. 
As shown in the diagram below (Figure 7.1), of my sample of335: 
• 264 (79%) households never accessed free basic water; 
• 14 (4%) households sometimes accessed free basic water; 
• 57 (17%) households always accessed free basic water. 
Ofthe 57 households which always accessed free basic water, 40% (23) were found to be non-'indigent' 
and 60% (34) were found to be 'indigent.' The non- 'indigent' were households with an average of2.2 
members. Four non-' indigent' households (from 'bad' debtor group) were found to have been restricted 
due to high levels of debt (mean debt R11 000) and therefore, by virtue of pain, were able to access free 
basic water. This left 19 non-'indigent' households (6% of total sample), which always accessed free 
basic water voluntari ly (this group will be further explored below in section 3.1 ). All 34 ' indigent' 
households accessed free basic water. 'Indigent' households comprised on average 4.1 members. Of the 
'indigent' households which had been restricted at one or other time, 65% had tampered with their 
restriction washers. Free basic water access nuances for the ' indigent' grouping will be further explored 
in section 3.2. 
~ 1 The tenn ·access to· is intentionally employed. It is not to be confused with 'benefit from· or even 'beneficiaries.' The tcnns 
carry different connotations: the fonner ·access to· is qualitatively ncutrnl and. in this context. simply means that the household is 
receiving the free volume of 6kl at zero charge. whereas the latter distinctly implies a qualitative attribute: positive or pleasant. 
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Figure 7.1: Surveved Eastwood households with access to free basic water (N=335). 
3.1 The size ofthe non-'indigent' household and free basic water: Eastwood 
It is evident that the access to free basic water by 19 'conventional ' households is closely correlated to 
living in a small household (p<O.OOOI). The mean household size for the group is 2.1 , yet the range 
differs between 1 and 4 members. This suggests that the relationship between household size and free 
basic water is slightly more nuanced then suggested by the group mean. 
Of the 19 households getting free basic water; 47% live alone; 16% live in households with 2 members; 
another 16% with 3 members; and the remaining 21% live in a household of 4 members. Single-member 
households did not appear to be self-limiting and consumed at optimal levels. In contrast, the 10 
remaining households, comprising two, three or four members used less water per capita per day than 
their 'conventional ' household equivalents (see Table 7.1). Households comprising 2 members used 41% 
less per capita per day than their • conventional' group counterparts (mean 871 compared to 1481 ); with 3-
member households using 68% less per capita per day (441 compared to 1391) and 4-member households 
using 70% less per capita per day (381 compared to 1281) when compared with their equivalent 
counterparts. It is evident that as household size increased; daily water consumption per capita dropped. 
Yet the reduction is not consistent with the incremental economies of scale indicated in Table 7.1; these 
decreases are far more pronounced and indicate, especially in the 3-4 member households, that major self-
limitations are occurring in order to secure a free water supply. Moreover, economic factors suggest 
reasons for limitation with 5 out of 10 of households registering that they use monies derived from social 
grants to pay bills. 
It is further useful to consider the above consumption patterns in relation to the free basic water offering 
based on 8 members per household using 251 per capita per day. In this regard, even the largest 
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household group of 4 members always accessing free basic water exceeded the 251 per capita daily 
allowance. This hints at the incongruity between free volumes offered and the difficulty of actually 
consuming within volume parameters even if households substantially reduce consumption. Such a 
finding has import not only for administration options (free only if use =6kl per month) but also delivery 
options which privilege small households whilst simultaneously discriminating against larger ones. These 
findings suggest (1) the limited scope of access via non-'indigent' delivery and; (2) the inadequacy of the 
free 6kl volumetric cap. 
Noting the distinction made between 'access' and 'benefit,' I now return to the term 'beneficiaries'. 
Clearly, single-member households and small households able to self-limit but still maintain appropriate 
volumes have benefitted from free basic water. That is, only 6% (19) of all non- ' indigent ' surveyed 
Eastwood households benefit from free basic water. 
3.2 'Indigent' household access to free basic water: Eastwood 
Free basic water, delivered via the instrument of the Indigent Policy, appears more able to widen the 
scope of access by accommodating more households and importantly larger households - not by offering 
higher volumes of free water but simply by not removing it if 6kl is exceeded. This enables more 
households and larger households in particular, consuming volumes in proportion to size, to sti ll access 
the financial benefits of free basic water despite using more than 6kl . 'Indigent' households had 
approximately twice as many members as non-'indigent' households similarly accessing free basic water 
(4.1 versus 2.2). Moreover while indigency is still skewed, with 60% of all 'indigents' living in 'small' 
households (1-4 members); the ratio of beneficiaries is better spread compared to non-' indigent' 
households. Nevertheless, a uniform free 6kl volume is always going to discriminate against larger 
households, so although a small financial benefit is gained, the volumetric equivalent is not equitable to 
household size. This means that while the Indigent Policy is better able to deliver free basic water than 
the 'conventional' package, the scope is still too small. Larger households are treated unequally. 
Arduousness of uptake and administration procedures (etc.) further limits ability to deliver free basic 
water (see Chapter 4). Moreover, conditional restriction actively subverts potential monetary and poverty 
alleviation gains by substantially reducing consumption. 
Where household size does appear to have an impact is on the decision to tamper. Larger 'indigent' 
households (5-8 members) tampered more than smaller households. For example: of the 10 large 
households with restricted access, 9 tampered. In contrast, less than 50% of small households tampered. 
Significantly, tampering seems the most likely response to ' indigent' restriction across all households. 
That a rise in household size makes this action more likely is most typically attributed to substantial 
deprivation caused by restricted water supplies (see Chapter 8). 
Indeed, where 'indigent' access to free basic water comes unstuck, consistent with non-'indigent' access, 
is at the point of restriction. 'Restricted' households [8] consumed 531 per capita per day compared to 
'not-yet-restricted' and 'tampered' households, who together [26] consumed a mean 1011 per capita per 
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day. In the case of ' restricted ' households; the access to free basic water comes with acute deprivation. 
For example: the sole ' restricted' household in the larger household group, comprised 6 members - each 
member consumed 201 per capita per day. It is therefore unsurprising that the majority of ' indigent' 
households (small and large) have rejected the imposition of restriction washers. 
Ironically, tampering might just be the Indigent Policy's salvation. Tampering facilitates, in most cases, 
improved access to normative volumes (not optimal but closer). Moreover, tampering ensures that the 
'legitimate' contract to enable the access to 12kl is righted. The removal of the technical limitation 
together with a guaranteed free 6kl supply with further subsidisation from 7-12kl all ensure that not only 
are greater volumes of water accessible, but also that water is more affordable. In sum, households in the 
best position to truly benefit from free basic water and indigent subsidies are those that tampered. Yet 
households should guard against complacency as municipalities have shown their ingenuity in developing 
a myriad of restriction variants which may, in the future, thwart the tampering option. 
Nevertheless, regardless of restriction status, ' indigent' households still consume less water than their 
'conventional' household equivalents. That is, the Indigent Policy has instead of ensuring augmented 
consumption actually implicated decreased consumption. If this was the underlying intention of the 
Indigent Policy then it has succeeded; but, (on paper at least) the philosophy of the Indigent Policy is 
actually the contrary, as with free basic services. Both aim to improve the quality of life of poor 
households. A reduction in consumption, particularly to levels of acute deprivation, is incongruent with 
broader goals of transformation, equity and alleviating the fundamental constraints characterising 
wretchedness. 
3.3 Free basic water access in Msunduzi 
The PAIA request (2007a) indicated that there were 60 163 non-metered households and 61 443 metered 
and therefore billed domestic households in Msunduzi. Non-metered households do have access to water 
in some form but it may be a stretch to qualify this access in terms of ' free water access,' because the 
majority of such households source water through community standpipes (volumes limited by distance 
and ability to carry) or through automatically restricted sources such as ground/roof tanks etc. The 
introduction of free water for this group of households has simply allowed Msunduzi to continue the 
practice of providing minimum volumes and containing further consumption beyond that which has been 
offered. 
With the 61 443 billed domestic households, the focus of this inquiry: 25 012 were registered as 
automatic or applied ' indigents' and thereby officially accessed free basic water through a restriction 
mechanism (as per P AlA, 2007a). This left 36 431 households, both metered and billed, who potentially 
could access free water via standard (conventional or non-' indigent') tariffs. In this regard, the PAIA 
request (2007a) indicated that only 3 729 Msunduzi households or ± 10% consumed less than or equal to 
6kl per month thereby accessing free basic water (no qualification e.g. household size or restriction status 
unknown). That is they do not pay a cent for water. Hence ±90% of Msunduzi households billed at 
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standard tariffs did not get free basic water since, by using more than 6kl , they have disqualified 
themselves. 
4 STATE CONCESSIONS VERSUS WATER REQUIREMENTS 
The government concession of 6kl free basic water falls far short of the current water requirements 
sought by poor households. There are dangers of reducing relative water requirements to absolute water 
requirements via teclmical or affordability limitations. The volume of water offered via the Free Basic 
Water Policy was never conceived originally as being sufficient to meet the appropriate water 
requirements of households, but rather a short-term measure (DW AF, 2003 :27). Msunduzi deemed that 
not only is 6kl sufficient as a basic minimum but stretched this to 6kl being sufficient to satisfy water 
requirements in general (Msunduzi, 2001). Such a narrow interpretation has served municipal cost 
recovery well because it has allowed for the justification of a cap on consumption exceeding 6kl (via 
restriction mechanisms) and the maintenance of a high 2nd block tariff. This has the implications that 
poor households must (1) struggle with an inadequate volume of water and slow flow rate; (2) tamper 
with restriction devices with diffidence regarding being 'found out' or (3) pay for additional water 
volumes consumed at high tariffs with severe consequences for the household purse. 
This case study has shown that the Free Basic Water Policy has failed on four major aspects: (1) account 
for the significance of household size on consumption levels and therefore, by default equitable access to 
free basic water; (2) adequately take into account the usage and value of water by poor households 
(perhaps discrirrunatory: class and race); (3) encourage broader tariff transformation to facilitate 
affordability after the first free 6kl ; and ( 4) issue stronger and more rigorous injunctions on how 
municipalities interpreted Free Basic Water Policy implementation in line with the broad goals of free 
basic water. 
The gap between the free water volumes offered by government and metered household consumption 
patterns is significant. Indeed, sufficiency has many interpretations. Let us now look at sufficiency 
through the optic of the Eastwood water requirement context. 
4.1 Water requirements of Eastwood residents 
Some may say that sufficiency just means enough water to maintain life or prevent death. Others may 
interpret 'sufficiency' within South Africa 's developmental and historical context and insist that 
'sufficiency' means enough for a productive, dignified and progressive life. There has been a general 
retreat in just how universal and progressive free basic services are meant to be. The objectives of service 
delivery were always located in the broader context of humanity and transformation: that is, delivering 
not just on physiological needs but dignity and equity; implicating positively on poverty alleviation, 
affordable access, public health and gender equity. 
Although, in general, it is cautioned that metered consumption levels as per total bills should not be 
contlated with appropriate water requirements, this study has shown that payment rates and tampering 
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have little impact on the access of sufficient water supply. In this regard, the metered consumption levels 
of the 'conventional' group (see Table 7.1), which exclude technical limitations for 'bad' debt or as a 
condition of subsidy, provides an instructive guide in the determination of the range of volumes which 
may accommodate the water requirements of most Eastwood households. Note the deliberate use of the 
term ' range' as opposed to a minimum or uniform standard - a range does not limit but accommodates 
the subjective water requirements and size of households. Moreover, I intentionally break the linkage 
between how much water households require and the free 6kl offering. Quite clearly there is no 
relationship between the two. A range based on the original 6kl would simply reproduce the same 
unsubstantiated and untested notions of the poor household water requirement thereby continuing to omit 
the fundamental aspects of how households use and value water. The closeness of water to dignity and 
notions of humanity mean that the range should be wide enough to allow the user to have sufficient 
choice in how water activities are performed. 
Attempts by the state to help the poor but at the same time instruct on how and how much water is used 
by poor households are very problematic. Capping water volumes will always be discriminatory and 
unresponsive to water requirements of households. Employing Schreiner's (2007: 118) interpretation of 
the welfare principle of general application (see Chapter 2); water requirements for the majority of 
surveyed Eastwood households (mean household size 4.3 for N=377), may be accommodated within the 
range of 15-18kl per month or 120-1251 per capita per day. An augmented water supply would have to 
reflect this range above (where households do not have the money to pay for their full appropriate water 
requirements) and ensure this range is affordable, facilitated by direct tariff reductions and appropriate 
tariff restructuring (where households have some money to pay for their full appropriate water 
requirements). Further to this, noting the significant impact of household size on consumption level; 
where household size is significantly different from the mean shown here, avenues to make 
representations would be critical with regards to equity. This range is not proposed as an attempt at 
closure. Indeed this approach rejects any attempts to provide absolute figures because, as already stated, 
water requirements cannot be uniform. Determining water requirements for residents within specific 
contexts has to be done by people themselves. The range suggested is simply an indication of where such 
water requirements may fall if poor households in Eastwood are to be accommodated. The final volumes 
chosen should always reside with the people themselves. 
The problem of meeting water requirements therefore is far more nuanced than delivering defined free 
volumes of water. Quite clearly, if the objectives of free basic water are to be realised, then a substantial 
re-thinking of its framework is essential. That is, the broad goal in recapturing the potential of free basic 
water to truly act transfonnatively, alleviate poverty and contribute positively to gender equity, health and 
productivity. Part of this review would be in returning the humanity of poor households to the centre of 
the water access discourse. It is recognised that securing the water requirements of poor households 
would have to be accompanied by a substantial paradigm shift which would re-locate water and indeed, 
the decisions around water, in public hands. If all are to have enough water to meet their water 
requirements, then perhaps there is no place for ' hedonistic' users (private swimming pools, exotic 
123 
gardens and golf courses etc.). In the same vein, there is no place for the commodification of the water 
required by poor households if it comes at the cost of public health, dignity, an erosion of the household 
purse, gender equity, community solidarity and undermines the broad goals of racial and socio-economic 
transformation in South Africa. 
5 CONCLUSION 
With the implementation of free basic water, where payment was not forthcoming or was sporadic, 
households formerly with unlimited water supplies were restricted just to the free basic water offering and 
could not access water beyond the 6kl cap (the state now being active in implementing punitive measures 
where conditions of access have been contravened). Free basic water in Eastwood, instead of advancing 
the access beyond what was previously available to appropriate volumes of water and making water more 
affordable for poor households, actually achieved the contrary - it eroded formerly unlimited water 
supplies via the imposition of restriction devices, exacerbating and contributing to the emerging 
affordability crisis. Indeed, the offering of free basic water and indigent subsidies cannot be seen outside 
the framework of social containment, cost recovery and corporatisation. That is, whether it was the local 
state's intention to use concessions as containment or not; where affordability or technical measures 
prevented households from accessing as much water as they perceived appropriate to meet their water 
requirements, any limitation was always going to be seen as containing the poor. Free basic water, in 
Msunduzi, has been used as a pseudo-moral justification to limit the water volumes of households 
struggling to meet full and timely total bill payments. It is bitterly ironic, then, that the most vulnerable, 
for whom free basic water might actually have implicated great benefits for transformation, equity, 
dignity and improvement in quality of life, are the ones for whom free basic water has acted 
retrogressi\ely. 
Free basic water was not accompanied by tariff reforms to increase affordability above 6kl . Free basic 
water in short provided a resource and financial control for municipalities to limit water service volumes 
to poor households whilst concurrently preserving a poorly equilibrated tariff structure via the erroneous 
justification that "all poor households" had been catered for. Indeed, and in contrast to the principles of 
welfare, very few households had access to and even fewer were benefiting from free basic water. 
Msunduzi 's interpretation of free water via option 1 and 3 (see Chapter 4, s3), whereby a household could 
only access a guaranteed free basic water allocation if consumption was equal to or less than 200 litres 
per 30-day period (or equivalent) or if a household qualified as 'indigent,' severely strangled the scope of 
free basic water. 
Only 6% of all Eastwood and 10% of all Msunduzi non-' indigent' , non-restricted households were able to 
access free basic water. Small households in general and households with one to two members in 
particular were better able to access the benefits of free basic water. This finding implicated service 
delivery modes in relation to a standard offering of free basic water capped at 6kJ per month. 
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The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry and local municipalities in general have not been able to 
regulate tariff systems and enlarge the numbers of free basic water beneficiaries. Quite clearly, as 
elucidated by the Msunduzi case, the Free Basic Water Policy, in Eastwood - an established urban 
setting, has failed: the volumes and delivery mechanisms enacted were not sufficient, nor appropriate, 
nor consistent with the broad goals of free basic water. This was due to the initial conceptualisation and 
framework governing the national Free Basic Water Policy in conjunction with Msunduzi's peculiar 
interpretation of free basic water within a rigorous credit control apparatus. DW AF's role in free basic 
water's failure is palpable. A much stronger and more visionary leadership was required. The autonomy 
of local authorities should not have extended to a policy with such scope to actively improve the lives of 
poor households (Dugard, 2008). The Msunduzi case laid bare the implications of loose implementation 
injunctions and Jack of regulatory oversight. The Free Basic Water policy, failed by its own lack of 
imagination and temerity in acting within the South African miracle; has been reduced in the hands of 
blinkered technocrats to a miserly volume of water making no impact on affordability or transformation 
and acting retrogressively on original household water access with implications for quality of life, dignity, 
equity, productivity and citizenship (see Chapter 8). 
Water volumes in the 1994 RDP and 1997 Water Services Act were conceived in a framework of access 
addressing apartheid backlogs and basic human rights. At the time of the conception of the Free Basic 
Water Policy, there appeared little international and local research to go on. International research at the 
time was framed within a limited 'rights-based' and 'physiological needs' approach to access. The 
Durban Metropolitan Municipality experience therefore set a precedent. The 'Durban experiment,' 
however carried fundamental flaws: (l) it misunderstood the link between improved water access and 
increased volumes; (2) its context of delivering water to households without previous access failed to 
account for households previously with optimal access; and (3) it was framed within a narrow cost-
accountancy framework. The volume arrived at glossed over the significance of household size on 
household water consumption; had no relation to actual household water requirements; had no concept of 
the use of water within a real-life, fluid domestic environment; and had no conception of its intrinsic 
value for dignity, health, productivity, gender equity and citizenship. The 'Durban experiment,' located 
in informal settlements, formerly with non-permanent access should not have transcended beyond this 
context to areas of historical, full-pressure and grid access. The Eastwood case reflected the inappropriate 
national application of a policy practically conceptualised within a narrow local context and to meet 
particular objectives and needs. 
This chapter has proposed that a water supply of between the range 15-18kl in Eastwood based on 
metered consumption and taking account of household size may be more appropriate for meeting the 
water requirements of the majority of poor households and end the cycle of debt. However, in line with 
Harvey's (1977 and 1996) thesis of the relational nature of 'resources' and 'basic needs,' and the social 
and cultural construction of needs; any final decision as to basic supply has to be located in the contexts 
and preferences of the people themselves. That is, the people themselves are to be the 'experts' and 
managers of their own perceptions of what they need. Importantly. Harvey (2006: pc) notes: unless there 
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is an ideological reclaiming of the popular ownership and control of water, technocrats will always find a 
way to limit water in ways not originally considered. In this regard all the required water does not have to 
be offered free. Of greater import however; is that an augmented water supply be accompanied by a 
substantial restructuring of tariff structures (prices, block numbers and block parameters) which prioritise 
affordability to facilitate appropriate access (especially where water systems are already in place) and 
absorb affordability constraints. In determining a more equitable tariff structure, Msunduzi through its 
Indigent Policy already has a mechanism which subsidises water volumes between 6kl and 12kl . 
Perhaps by widening the block parameters from 12kl to 18kl and applying the Indigent Policy tariffs as 
the water access policy for all poor households, minus restrictions and onerous uptake procedures; the 
quest for equity and financial relief may be decisively realised. However, this option may not be 
supported within the existing framework. If true equity is to be achieved however; the system which 
prioritises cost recovery via commodification and commercialisation above the needs of people will have 
to be dismantled. 
It appears that the racialised notions of cleanliness employed in apartheid (and for centuries in other parts 
of colonial Africa) to distinguish black from white are being reproduced in contemporary water 
architecture. That race has been usurped by class - the poor are the new unclean - is merely a more 
subtle way to prevent poor mostly black households from accessing the volumes of water perceived to 
deliver dignity and equality. Yet, it appears that poor citizens rejected this overt classification and 
segmentation. In this, the state misjudged that the security of adequate volumes of water is intrinsic to 
reclaimed humanity. Indeed, despite porous state success to contain and deny households the access to 
their appropriate water requirements; ultimately, where households are limited to volumes below that 
which is deemed appropriate, the local state cannot win: households will 'find a way' to secure 
normative supplies. 
The next chapter (8) will move beyond volumetric considerations and consider the micro-implications of 
restricted welfare in the domestic realm of the poor and working poor. The real life experiences of 
households pushed into 'indigent' service packages or simply restricted due to ' bad' debt will be 
explored. In addition, Chapter 8 will explore the political attitudes of households to welfare and the state. 
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Chapter 8 
MICRO-IMPLICATIONS OF RESTRICTED WELFARE AND HOUSEHOLD 
PERCEPTIONS THEREOF 
Chapter 8 explores the micro-socio-political implications of restricted welfare for the homes and 
communities of the poor and working poor and their attitudes to welfare and the state. This chapter 
considers the social, practical and perceived micro-implications of water restrictions for poor households. 
The whole spectrum of water activities is considered. Thereafter the household perceptions of free basic 
services and indigent subsidies and conditions are explored, as are household perceptions of the local 
state. I close the chapter with a consideration of municipal perceptions of the poor and the services and 
subsidies given. 
The qualitative information referred to herein adheres to all the naturalistic techniques employed to 
establish methodological adequacy and data trustworthiness (Erlandson, et a!. , 1993: 131-161 ). 
Typically, household accounts of living with a restricted water supply read like a "tragicomic story" 
(Ginzburg, 1975: 78). I have tried to capture the feelings, perceptions and realities of poor households via 
excerpts from my field notes, lifestory interviews, Msunduzi management and debt collector interviews 
and informal engagements on Eastwood streets, in municipal offices and in broader community meetings. 
This section takes its data from the 35 'indigent' households, the 3 ' restricted' and 12 'tampe1ing' 'bad 
debtor' households (from major survey), the 159 restricted households included in the first exploratory 
restriction mini-survey, lifestory interviews, field notes, informal community engagement, primary 
municipal data and interviews with municipal officials; and much time spent on personal observation in 
homes and in the municipal payment hall. 
1 MICRO-IMPLICATIONS OF RESTRICTIONS: SOCIAL, PRACTICAL 
AND PERCEWED 
If the restriction system works as it should, the restriction washer with a hole diameter of 0.5mm and at 
the standard pressure, provides 8.33· litres per hour, or 6kl a month (8.331 x 24hr x 30 days = 
5999.99997kllmonth). This is in apparent contravention of DWAF-issued regulations which state that 
flow rate should not be less than 10 litres per minute [section 9 (1) of the Water Services Act, (DW AF, 
2002c: 26; DW AF, 2003: 45)]. However, when Pietermaritzburg communities challenged Msunduzi and 
DW AF on this, they retorted, " . .. the flow rate of 8.3333 litres per hour does indeed amount to 6 000 
litres per month and therefore conforms to national norms and standards" (DWAF, 2007b). Perhaps 
DW AF was unaware that households do not run their taps for 24 hours, 7 days a week and that hole 
diameters and pressures differ. Together, all of these factors meant that households could not even access 
the 'basic' 6kl. 
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The inadequacy of the free basic water volume coupled with the mode of low pressure delivery via 
restriction washers implied a deluge of negative consequences for major water activities (bathing, 
washing, flushing toilet) and minor activities (cleaning home; drinking water; washing hands and face and 
brushing teeth; washing and rinsing kitchen utensils, counters and foods; and running home enterprises). 
These negative consequences extended to time, gender-based burden, dignity, hygiene, stress, intra-
household conflict and children's development. 
This section will show that the flow rate coupled with a reduced supply had profound implications on 
household time, quality of activity and relative burden of activity. All household members were affected 
by restriction washers but the primary homemaker (typically a woman) was disproportionally burdened. 
That restriction washers were introduced into an already iniquitous milieu whereby domestic burden is 
located in both the public realm (at work: feminisation of labour whereby women follow the broom into 
the workplace [Samson, 2007], paid less than men and perform degrading ' service-type' work [Brown, 
2006]) and private realm (in the home: sexual division of labour created by capitalism which saw a 
distinctly gendered domestic environment of unpaid reproductive work and familial caring) [Brown, 
2006; Cock, 2008]; implied a third burden by making 'private' work more onerous. 
It is the 'third burden' which is given space in this chapter and revealed through what is termed the 
'etatisation' of time (Verdery, 1996) - the 'state control' or ' nationalisation' (Painter, 2006: 755) or 
'theft' of the private time of citizens in its many guises. The 'etatisation' of time, in this study context, is 
enacted via restriction washers. Water access, within a home environment, was necessary to fulfil all 
activities of reproduction and caring. This meant that any limitation, containment or restriction, 
immediately and acutely affected the functioning of a household in general; and the person performing 
the task in particular. Unlike administrative time-stealing (explored later); restriction washers stole time 
directly within the home and more specifically from those responsible for conducting domestic activities 
- typically women. 
1.1 Waiting ... time and households 
Restriction washers severely reduced the water pressure in household water systems. Only one tap was 
operational at a time and the flow rate through this singular water source was very slow. The major 
consequence of such a reduced pressure was that households spent a vast amount of time waiting for 
water to perform an activity. For example: a flow rate of 8.33 litres per hour implicated that filling a 20-
litre bucket of water meant ±2 hours spent waiting. A direct result of this was that a restricted household 
typically had a scattering of containers of all shapes and sizes around the house: used either to save dirty 
water for re-use elsewhere or to store clean water to be used to bath, wash clothes or drink. Water was 
recycled until the smell could no longer be tolerated. Water could not be used freely. That is, at the time 
it was needed, in sufficient volumes required and in the mode preferred. Every water activity was 
consciously thought about, calculated, planned and timed. The use of water was approached with 
excessive vigilance and was constantly on the mind of the homemaker. 
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... waiting for the water, doing this. waiting to put on water for tea, waiting to bath your chjld, 
waiting to wash your clothes (Lifestory 3, 1 February 2006). 
If you use the bathroom; the kitchen doesn't get water. If you use the kitchen; the bathroom 
doesn't get water ... Ja, the water, Man! The procession of putting, thinking, you know putting the 
pot, how long is it going to take ... (Lifestory 10, 2 May 2006). 
When she had to wait and wait and wait for water, when she could only use one tap at a time; a woman 
could no longer multitask. Instead of performing a myriad of water activities simultaneously; for 
example: running her children's bath, rinsing the potatoes for supper, wiping the table, filling the kettle, 
soaking her children' s school shirts and flushing the toilet; when her water is restricted - she can only do 
one thing at a time. She cannot run her children's bathwater and rinse the potatoes and soak her 
children's school shirts etcetera. Only once her children's bathwater had been run could she only then 
rinse the potatoes, once the potatoes had been rinsed, only then could she draw the water to soak her 
children's school shirts. Restriction meant that activities could only be performed sequentially, with 
major time implications. 
1.2 Waiting ... to bath 
Restriction washers severely limit water use activities which require relatively large volumes of water 
(such as bathing and washing) due to the longer waiting period required to reach a sufficient water 
volume and the planning involved. Subsequently, households had to severely limit the volumes used, 
which simultaneously changed the nature of 'bathing culture.' Having a bath was no longer "a delicious 
little thrill" as Ross (1996: 93) put it. Typically, the restricted household members would bath in a basin 
(plastic/enamel) instead of a bath. A bath simply took too long to fill. The prospect of running a long hot 
bath, to relax and soak away the day's stress and sweat, which was technically possible pre-restriction; 
was no longer possible: you bathed in a basin and you just washed and wiped to get clean. Moreover, 
households expressed that they could no longer rely on geysers for hot water. The low flow rate, they 
said, damaged their geysers. 
The irony is that they make these washers out of the copper in old or broken geysers. The more 
washers; the more broken geysers. The more broken geysers; the more washers (Patrys Road, 3 
December 2006). 
Households, with electricity/gas, added a kettle/pot or two of hot water to a small basin of cold water. 
'Bath' water was shared and reused (for other activities) wherever possible. 
I bath my kids first and send them to school, then take their water and bath myself, then take that 
water and fill the toilet cistern (Korhoender Road, 2 March 2005). 
We don't actually have a bath where we fill in the bath and relax in it. We are just basically 
putting it in a dish and we are washing in the dish. We don' t actually put a bath of water; you are 
bathing in a dish (Lifestory 3, 1 February 2006). 
We don't really bath, we just rub ourselves. You just rub yourself with the soap. We sit in the 
bath, rub ourselves and then pour the water over us (Lifestory 11 , 17 May 2006). 
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We have to bath out of a dish. You can't bath. You have to wait too long. You have to bath out 
of a dish; you have like a shower when you are washing (Lifestory 4, 15 February 2006). 
You've got to bath, you've got to wait one person ... the bathing, I would bath and then I would 
jump out and my daughter would jump in and use my water. And it's like you are having a splash. 
That is all you could do; there was no bath. And it' s not hygienic, how can you live like that? 
(Lifestory 9, 21 April2006). 
Households expressed that sometimes they deferred or abandoned bathing altogether due to the 
preparation time required. 
The thing is sometimes you want to go and bath and you think of the water and it sort of turns you 
off! You know! Ayii! (Lifestory 6, 15 March 2006). 
You know like on a Sunday, I will be rushing for church and I think, Ayii I must still have a bath, 
and I watch the time and I see, oh, it is 8 o'clock, I can still . .. and I think no, I can still have a 
bath and I think, no leave it never mind, by the time that water is full it will be half-past eight and 
so time has run out (Lifestory 10,2 May 2006). 
1.3 Waiting ... to wash 
The procedures for washing clothes and linen became complicated. Waiting times were long and again 
volumes were cut. Only one tap was operable at a time. Water for washing implied the opening of a tap 
several hours before washing could start. Here too, households would have to have enough containers to 
hold water for washing and rinsing. Households indicated that frequently water was set aside after 
bathing to be re-used for washing clothes but that rinsing had to be performed with clean water. 
Moreover the volumes of water required for rinsing were greater than those for washing. Indeed, water 
required for rinsing clothes appeared to be very problematic. In this regard households complained that it 
took so long to get such water that less water than required was used. This meant that clothes and linen 
not sufficiently washed due to the overuse of soapy water were also not completely rinsed with the 
implication that clothes smelled and had that hardened feel of washing powder that was not completely 
rinsed out. 
You've got to fill buckets in the evening, if you know you are doing washing the next day. Make 
sure all the buckets are filled. Then you've got to wash with the one bucket. Throw all your 
clothing in one bucket. There is no such luck as if you' ve got a machine you can separate the 
whites from the coloured clothes. You are just washing in one bucket. You don't separate 
anything; you are just washing in one bucket. There is not enough water. So, from there you' ve 
got to be rinsing in the next water. The rinsing you use two buckets, so like you are not even 
rinsing the clothes out perfectly. But just to rinse them so they are smelling okay. We soak the 
clothes before we wash them and then wash in the same water (Lifestory 3, 1 February 2006). 
When we did the washing and things, we had to wait quite a while; we had to start early, to open 
the water, to go to the toilet. If you wanted to do the washing you had to tum on the water by 8am 
and then about 1 Oam you could only do the washing. And even to rinse too, it was a problem, 
because when you wash, afterwards you have to rinse. You still have to wait, you know about 
another two hours waiting (Lifestory 4, 15 February 2006). 
You saw how it drips. It takes a very long time; it does. When you wash, you fill the water and 
then when you rinse we must wait again for the rinsing. It takes long. When we start washing, we 
turn the water on at about 8 o'clock in the morning; and then can start washing at 10 o'clock, 
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about two hours. And then we still have to rinse the clothes. Wait again, it's terrible. We wash, 
in just a little bit of water, we have to wait till there is enough for washing. You let the water run 
till you think it is enough and then you put your powdered soap and all that, soak and all that. 
Then you start your washing, open again for washing. Then you open again for rinsing (Lifestory 
6, 15 March 2006) . 
. . . this is how I do it: I have to wait. If I do my washing, it takes half a day. Because you see I 
have to rinse, takes time, full the bucket up again. I have to rinse, then wash and then rinse again 
(Lifestory 1, 24 January 2006). 
But not always do we soak it 'cause the water comes out very slow, we can't afford to soak, we 
just wash. You think of the time and the water that's available and you really wait long for that 
water. You really wait long. Washing takes very long because you have to open the water at 3am 
in the morning, and by the time you wake up at 6am it's not even half way in the bath. You see. 
'cause once you open the bathroom tap you can't open any other tap. Like you want to wash the 
dishes in the kitchen, but the water must first be finished in the bathroom (Lifestory 17, 21 
December 2005). 
I wash, you can check my washing. I have my white washing, coloured and running washing. 
Because of this water, you can see the colour of our clothes. Because you got to use a limited 
amount of water. And try and rinse and when that bit of water, rinses the white things first, then I 
got to take the coloured things, then I rinse them in the same water and then I got to put Staysoft 
in again, you rinse it and squeeze it and wring it out. But you know the water is not sufficient. 
Before, I won't bluff you, we used to use about half the tub, so that I could rinse my washing 
clean. And when you wring your washing, you can see your washing's clean. We don't have that 
now, so you got to use stasoft. And if you can't afford stasoft, what happens? Your clothes smell 
(Lifestory 2, 26 January 2006). 
Households in possession of washing machines indicated concern that the flow rate via the restriction 
washers damaged their machines (specifically with washing machines that did not allow a manual input 
of water). In this regard households could no longer use them and reverted to washing clothes by hand. 
Households with machines allowing a manual water input, indicated that the restriction washers 
implicated that, like households that washed by hand, white clothes and dark clothes were washed and 
rinsed in the same water. 
I've got a washing machine, but it took forever. In the end I started doing washing every third 
day, by hand. Because the machine would take forever and it wouldn't get full anyway. Ja, 
because it uses water to rinse and then wash and then new water to rinse. And there was not 
enough water and it almost damaged my machine. My machine was almost damaged. Because I 
was wondering ... because it was making a noise, like it's washing but the water is not even 
covering the clothing, because I mean it fills up and then it automatically switches off on its own, 
the machine. Now it doesn't know that it can't take more (water), so it switches off with hardly 
any water (inside) and starts operating on its own. So with the result that the drum, the thing that 
turns, almost broke. So, I stopped using my machine (Lifestory 9, 21 April 2006). 
I don't even use my washing machine because I don't know what it will bugger, because now it 
doesn't fill. There must be so much water for it to wash. So I have to wash by hand. I only use 
the washing machine to spin. I just put it on spin (Lifestory 10, 2 May 2006). 
Households further indicated that they did not wash their linen and clothes as often as they would like. 
Indeed, it is clear that all restricted households cut down on all activities, both the volumes used and the 
frequency of activity. 
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You see the washing now; I do it on a Friday. 'Cause I used to do it on a Monday and Fridays, 
now just once. So, I cut down because maybe we were using too much water. So we cut down the 
water, we actually close the taps in the day time, we don't use the taps in the kitchen. We use the 
bathroom, maybe after you have used the toilet, you wash your hands. And then we only use the 
kitchen taps when we are cooking and after that there, we close. Bathing, we only bath once. And 
the children just have a wash. It's just boys so we put a little water in the bath and the boys all 
share (Lifestory 7, 11 April 2006) . 
... it takes a whole day; we wash about once a month (Lifestory l , 24 January 2006). 
Before having a washer, we used to wash linen every week. But now with a restrictor on, you 
can't do it once a week. This is also unhygienic too cause you know body odour, you sleeping, 
you sweating, there is nothing you can do (Lifestory 3, 1 February 2006). 
1.4 Waiting ... to flush 
A restricted water supply played havoc with sanitation and even the simple act of flushing the toilet was 
problematic. Cisterns took a long time to fill up and whilst the cistern was filling up no other taps were 
operable. To counter this, toilets were only flushed when absolutely necessary or were flushed physically 
by pouring water into the toilet bowl. Households indicated that pouring water into the toilet bowl was 
not an efficient way to keep the bowl clean. This was due to reduced flush efficiency but probably more 
so because the water invariably used to pour into the bowl came from soapy water from washed clothes, 
the same soapy water that was used to wash bodies tired and sweaty from work, school, play or just 
another exhausting day. 
The difficulty in acquiring water for flushing implicated that toilets were frequently left unflushed until 
the smell became unbearable and toilets simply had to be flushed. Demographics, physiological 
requirements, ventilation and household hygiene norms all impacted on frequency of flush (both want and 
need). For example: number and age of members; gender (pregnancy, menstruation and young female 
dignity); illness status (bladder problems and infections, diarrhoea, diabetes, high blood pressure/sugar 
and persons living with HIV/AIDS); size and location of bath/toilet room; excretion requirements and 
perceptions of hygiene. Households indicated that toilets were not flushed enough. 
It was too bad. It was too bad because you could only open one tap at a time. And the toilet, to 
flush it, how long did it take to fill up there. So you going, a person is urinating, the next one 
comes, you flush, the next one comes; you can' t flush. Somebody goes and needs to make number 
two; you can't flush because there is no water. So you've got to sit and wait now, till it fills up for 
you to do that (Lifestory 9, 21 April 2006) . 
. .. the toilet is more worse. That's more worse, the toilet is more worse! You flush the toilet, then 
you can't flush the toilet, then you have to wait. You have to wait quite a while too, I think about 
an hour before you can flush (Lifestory 4, 15 February 2006). 
I feel it is very unhealthy, even an inspector will tell you that. Because the toilet now, we have to 
wait until it fills. Say you have a running stomach and you have to wait now till it fills so you can 
flush it down. It takes hours and hours and hours, hours and hours to fill. Because now it is just 
dripping (Lifestory 10, 2 May 2006) . 
.. . do you know what it is like for all of us to need to shit in the morning? Sometimes we can't 
even flush before the other one goes. We also need to brush our teeth and have coffee and get 
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ready for work. We can't wait for the water for the cistern to fill. We must get out and go to work 
(Korhoender Road, 21 April2006). 
With a toilet that did not flush when needed and requiring physical cleaning; households were unhappy 
with the hygiene situation and felt that it was unhealthy. Not being able to flush the toilet on demand was 
perceived, by households, to create indignity, embarrassment, inconvenience and health problems. Not 
being able to flush the toilet meant that homes smelt (worse with poor ventilation, small homes and 
exacerbated by heat). Some households used all manner of air fresheners, candles etcetera but regardless 
of how aggressively such products were used, homes still smelled. 
You know when a house is restricted. You know as soon as you walk through the door. You 
know the house is not flushing at all or just sometimes. You can smell it. You can smell the urine. 
You can see the people. You can feel the dirt (DuifRoad, 7 December 2005). 
Some households voiced that they got used to such indignity and privation; however, when visited by a 
neighbour, friend or relative the reality of their situations became all the more inescapable and acute. 
There was often an awkward rush to the toilet to flush it when such persons entered the home. To prevent 
embarrassment households often discouraged visitors from their homes and made alternative social 
arrangements. Such a situation limited socialisation in terms of holding church, women's groups or other 
gatherings in the home. Households became extremely embarrassed if visitors, friends etc. asked to use 
their toilet and the procedure of flushing then had to be confessed. The visitor too, became anxious and 
thought twice before asking to use the toilet: not wanting to embarrass the host and won·ying that they 
would be using the household' s scarce water (Lifestory interviews, 2006). 
Alternatively household embarrassment was replaced by frustration, whereby households, vigilantly 
monitoring the use of their toilets, felt uncomfortable with the perception that flushing was literally 
money down the drain and actively asked relatives and friends to use alternative faci lities. 
I have to shout at people to stop using the toilet, hey you, stop using the to ilet! Whoever comes 
here, the grandchildren, I have to shout at them to stop using the toilet, I tell them to go home. 
The toilet is broken, but we flush it from inside [the cistern]. I fight if it gets flushed a lot. We 
don't flush every time. It has to be flushed but I am frightened because so many litres go down. I 
have to tell them. They know, they know. They must be careful, they must just be careful, that 's 
all. We mustn ' t go overboard (Lifestory II, 17 May 2006). 
Where income generation activities were run from homes (e.g. hair plaiting etc.) , households expressed a 
desperate exasperation that the implications of not being able to efficiently flush the toilet and the 
subsequent smell and tangible insufficient hygiene was hampering their business. 
I used to get a lot of customers, a lot of customers, maybe 4 or 5 people a day, all right. And I do 
their hair at home, you know because knowing that, I can't go to people's houses because someone 
else will come and they want me to do their hair and I'm not at home. So it did make a difference 
because the toilet would be smelling terrible and I would be doing somebody's hair and I would 
even feel so embarrassed and I can feel that the person is ... You know we don ' t have things like 
air fresheners, and you can spray the entire house, and so you can close the door, but at the end of 
the day that smell, that smell just seeps under the door and all of that. And you can't do anything. 
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The house has to be clean, first of all. It has to be clean and the toilet can't be smelling like that. 
And the person can' t sit the entire day, plaiting braids and when they ask, "can I please use your 
toilet?" People are uncomfortable, using a place that is unhygienic. And a place that you can't 
flush the toilet, they are going to feel dirty. So, the toilet not being able to flush might not be a 
problem to the municipality but the water not being there is a big problem because the person is 
going to feel it. Maybe, they want to urinate or do sometlllng else and then they have to wait ... 
wait for water in the bucket and then the time ... they are going to say, "Hawu! I'm not going to 
go back to that girl, she plaits nice but the problem is, there is no toilet, we can't use the toi let. We 
must go and sit there for 5 or 6 hours, doing my hair, with no toilet. Can't drink water, things like 
that. So, it is a waste; I am losing out a Jot (Lifestory 17, 21 December 2005). 
1.5 Waiting ... for dignity 
Many of the complications that have been presented deal with the major water activities; yet it is often the 
myriad of prosaic activities that together form a matrix of privation and indignity. For example: washing 
dishes, rinsing vegetables, cleaning counter tops, mopping up spills, drinking water, washing hands and 
face, brushing teeth and cleaning the home. Indeed, all the infinitesimal activities that households 
normally performed without thinking; suddenly with restriction, had to be consciously worked. 
Restricted households washed dishes and utensils in a small container (such as an ice-cream container or 
small bowl); not the sink. A container was quicker to fill. Typically, dishes and utensils were not rinsed; 
just washed and put in the cupboard. Some households said that they did not even rinse their vegetables 
properly before they cooked them. They were wiped when needed. Water was collected in containers for 
drinking. Water for drinking was not accessed directly from the tap; a container was filled and then 
poured from when needed. Hands were not run under the tap but cleaned using water from a bowl or 
wiped with a wet cloth. Water for brushing teeth was put in a cup. Bath water was re-used for wiping 
floors and washing mats/carpets etc. Households voiced that the only water that was not re-used was the 
greasy, dirty and soapy water which had been used for washing dishes, pots and utensils. 
If! have bath water that is still okay, I have a twin tub so I can wash the carpets in there (the bath 
water). No waste .. . I rinse the carpets and things in there. I pour the water in the washing 
machine. Also, the water that comes from the spin-dry, I catch that water and I put it back into the 
machine to rinse the next load. So that water does not just evaporate and get finished. The rinsing 
water, I wash the carpets, so what ever water gets thrown out, it is dirty water. I make sure that it 
is really dirty water. So as I am saying, I make sure that the water is very dirty, and I even take 
some of that and I wipe the floors (Lifestory 11, 17 May 2006). 
Because even minor water use activities were planned and or controlled, parental guidance was often 
needed in the case of children. Moreover, assistance from children with household chores had to be 
monitored or discouraged so as not to 'waste ' water. This meant that women typically found it "easier 
just to do the work themselves" (Lifestory interviews, 2006). This meant that the burden on the primary 
homemaker increased. 
It was clear that restrictions had negative implications for all household members; however the burden 
was more piercingly felt by the principal homemakers: typically women. In cases where the home 
included members who were mentally or physically challenged, ill or headed by a child; restrictions 
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further burdened the already struggling household. Restrictions had a clear impact on time (both the time 
needed to perform the specific activity and the opportunity cost of such activity on other non-water 
related activities), usability of infrastructure/appliances, efficiency of performance, perceptions of health 
and dignity. 
It was the role of the homemaker to ensure that the home functioned efficiently. Restriction frustrated 
such duties and placed impossible odds against the homemaker. If a home was not clean and smelled, 
who was responsible? If clothes were not washed, who was responsible? Yes, the particular household 
might be restricted but activities still had to be carried out, regardless of the burden involved. This had 
the implication that women faced indignity, humiliation and frustration - both within the home and from 
outsiders (who might or might not have known that the household was restricted and, even if they did, 
might not have fully recognised the intensity of burden). Indeed, an overwhelming distress, voiced by 
restricted households, was the perception that ' other people' thought that they were both dirty and worse: 
dirty out of volition. With this came a great sense of shame and humiliation. 
'Bathi siyanuka!' [They say we stink!] (Lifestory 17, 21 December 2005). 
1.6 Waiting ... to die 
It was clear that restricted water had health ramifications; and not isolated to the realm of aesthetics, as 
suggested by some scholars (Eales, 2006; Palmer, 2007). I met many households that were caring for 
members living with HIV/AIDS. Service deprivations were perceived as a direct threat on their own and 
their ill family members' lives. These excerpts below were conversations with a registered nurse and a 
woman who, as part of her church work, prayed for, and offered help and bereavement counselling to 
clergy members and their families. 
Now you tell me ... do they realise that, does the government realise that we are dying out here? 
We are getting infected. Huh? We are infecting one another with AIDS, HIV. If they keep on 
coming here to put these things in here (restriction washers), cutting off our lights, are they after 
killing the whole of Eastwood? Because that is what they are after doing next; they are going to 
kill us. Its easy, it is easy. Firstly they are sick hey, dehydration, right, and plus food. You are 
going to assist, that person is not going to tell you they are HIY, they are not going to tell you they 
are IllY, you coming in there, you are entering the house, you can see the circumstances, hawu 
what happened, lights off, there is no water, no gloves. And the people, the mothers there are 
helping, assisting their children. No gloves, they've got nowhere to wash, and from there, from 
helping out the child, into the pots. Already, how many people am I infecting in one house? How 
many people are getting infected in one house? And then afterwards you are going to find 
children, I mean shingles, children of today don't know what is shingles, it is very, very 
contagious, and that is how most of the people are contracting HIV, through shingles. Small 
children are playing around the house ... with shingles in the home ... the sores open up. The 
sores open up. And if you are not cleaning the bedding ... things like that, you need to clean, you 
need hygiene. And you tell me, by these people cutting off water, not giving them light, huh, how 
is the sanitary there? You can't flush the toilet, wash hands, clothes. Illness, sickness, contracting 
HIY. Get people to come and check in the homes, how people are living, how many children; I 
am quite sure most of the people are full of shingles already but they wouldn' t know its shingles, 
they will think oh, it is scabies, even with the scabies, you will find them with a lot of sores and all 
that, then we are eating, then you are coming to console and saying oh I am so sorry, oh what 
happened and you are also contracting. Huh, from there you are passing it onto your place. Who 
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are you going to meet along the road, maybe two or three people? You shaking, you holding, you 
kissing, you carrying on. What's happening? It is spreading. Spreading and maybe you are 
coming to that house and sometimes it don't show but I tell you that germ of AIDS inside is still 
alive, the first person it wakes up to contracts it. No man, they are playing with our lives, they are 
killing us. They are killing us. You can't tell me with all this here ... they need to do something 
(Lifestory 7, 11 April2006). 
No. It's terrible really, you know when you really sit and think ... we are living in a society with 
an epidemic ... and I mean they are taking away people's water, they are taking away people's 
electricity and there are sick people in the house. And how is the hygiene? You go into those 
people's homes and you think no wonder that person died in this house. Because I mean we go to 
a lot of homes. Because I belong to the prayer group, St Francis Assisi. So whenever there are 
deaths in the community, let's say, because I am a Roman Catholic, if someone requests a prayer 
meeting in their home, then we go there and we will pray. But you go and you look at the 
conditions in the home and you know, you think ... but they had to ... go. I mean look at the way 
they lived ... how did they expect to survive (Lifestory 9, 21 April 2006). 
2 HOUSEHOLD PERCEPTIONS OF RESTRICTION AND RELIEF 
The widespread perception of the Indigent and Free Basic Services policies is that household lives have 
been made more difficult. Hence, although our data indicated that financial burden was reduced if 
households paid in full and on time, only 9% of 'indigent' households in the study actually did (see 
Chapter 6 sl.3). Yet it appeared that even for those households able to extract maximum monetary 
savings (coupled with the 91% able to access some subsidies), the heightened domestic burden exceeded 
the monies saved. 
In this regard, a ' saving' on the total bill was displaced as more work for women in the already unpaid 
realm of household reproduction and caring. Indeed, as shown in Chapter 6 s3.1, the social wage benefit, 
diminished by the servicing of debt (for the 91% of 'indigent' households), resulted in a net benefit of a 
mere R39.05. Unsurprisingly women in ' indigent' households perceived this 'gain' as wholly inadequate 
when compared to what it meant in terms of time, dignity and the ability to be free citizens and access a 
decent and productive quality of life. Indeed, households perceived indigent subsidies as retrogressive 
and injurious and voiced that they would rather revert to normal service levels at original tariffs 
(consistent with Lund's [2001] theory of the poor having to concede so much more than they receive). In 
this regard, it is useful to consider the push factors, which compelled poor households to sign up in the 
first place. 
2.1 The tyranny of 'choice' 
Poor households unable to keep up with their monthly service payments are left with limited choices if 
they are to remain within the municipal system and access municipal services. They must (1) continue 
making payments by compromising other essential needs, struggle with regular electricity disconnections; 
ward off municipal debt collectors and lawyers; and face emotional, financial and physical insecw-ity; or 
(2) apply for indigency status. In this regard, Gronemeyer (1993: 53) asserts that "these days help can 
usually only be accepted if accompanied with threats." With either ' choice' the household's water and 
electricity will be restricted, the difference however is that with 'choice' (2) the household may escape 
immediate financial persecution, secure regular water and electricity services (albeit restricted) and access 
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service subsidies. Yet, this ' choice' is not an easy one to make: although the ability of households to 
decipher indigent forms and their knowledge of the onerousness of conditions typically influences uptake; 
it appears that the desperation status of a household plays a significant role. Hence, what may appear to 
be a voluntary decision is really a pseudo-choice - households that cannot pay for their services are most 
likely to succumb to the Indigent Policy regardless of the arduousness of policy conditions. 
The Indigent Policy is embedded within the 'self-help' discourse. Here, as articulated by Dean (1991: 58-
59), citizens enter into a "legal, quasi-contractual relationship with the state," which entitles citizens to 
certain benefits, subject to certain behavioural rules. Welfare benefits and their conditions are offered 
under the "guise of being voluntary," even if in truth they are not: " ... benefits are presented as the right 
of a free citizen and ... the rules to which the citizen is subject appear more as a correlative duty to that 
right and less as an authoritative imposition" (Dean, 1991: 59). Indeed, the Msunduzi Indigent Policy 
requires households to sign a contract agreeing to Indigent Policy conditions of uptake, acknowledgement 
of debt, conditions of default and acknowledgement of understanding the legalese of the contract. Only 
once households have submitted to this "burden of proof' (Dean, 1991: 59) to the municipality's 
satisfaction and the conditions of contract are they able to benefit from indigent concessions. 
The role of the 'Ward Councillor' in the administration of the Indigent Policy is important. The 
Councillor is responsible for explaining the conditions and implications of the Indigent Policy to 
households. He/she is further responsible for assisting the household in the completion of the Indigent 
Policy application forms. Because the Indigent Policy conditions are so onerous and because the forms 
are full of legalese, this step is crucial if households are to understand possible implications of the quasi-
contract (see Appendix H). In the Eastwood case, it was found that the Councillor did not actually 
explain the Indigent Policy to households at all, nor did he assist with the completion of forms. In 
Eastwood, the Councillor simply signed the appropriate space on the Indigent Policy application form and 
left it with his secretary to distribute on demand (Lifestory interviews, 2006). 
No, he (the councillor) wasn't there and his secretary neYer explained to me nothing. She never 
explained to me nothing. She just gave me the fom1 and I took it to the corporation. She never 
explained to me nothing (Lifestory 16, 25 July 2006). 
It was therefore up to the household to interpret the policy. In this regard, there was also an element of 
"Torchlusspanik" (door-shut-panic52), whereby households rushed to sign on without the necessary 
knowledge of the implications of such consensus. Typically households unaware of what they had signed 
were angry and upset at having their water restricted, amperage reduced and, in some cases, their arrear 
debts handed over to municipal debt collectors. 
I dido 't know that they were going to restrict us. The Indigent Policy is supposed to help poor old 
people but look now we haYe to use a bowl and wait very long for water. My wife and I have 
52 A German term ·'describing the frenzy as people fight to rush through a door before it is slammed in their face:· see Francis 
Wheen's (2004: 239) Idiot Proof Deluded Celebrities. irrational Power Brokers. Media Morons. and the Erosion of Common 
Sense. 
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diabetes, we pee a lot, what do we do when our toilet doesn't flush? The government is making us 
smell in our own homes; it is taking us back to apartheid (DuifRoad, 12 September 2005) . 
. . . this [indigent) policy is supposed to help people but it makes people's lives a living hell 
(Lifestory 9, 21 April2006). 
We go to them for help. They don't help us. We tell them we cannot pay. Instead of helping us 
they make our lives a desperate, a desperate, terrible struggle (Tarentaal Road, 27 August 2005). 
Then I didn't know what the woman was doing, she made my husband sign [the acknowledgement 
of debt] because the house is on his name. I came home and I opened up the papers and I saw 
Hawu! She actually made my husband sign to say that if this Rl50 is not paid on a certain date, 
every month, then a summons would be sent to him. I said Hawu! Now you see, it's because they 
don't make you read first and they don't tell you first what is this thing for or what are you signing 
for. It is only when I came home that I realised this man is in trouble; if I don't pay this (Lifestory 
11, 17 May 2006). 
Frans is on a pension and struggles to walk, his wife Bettie is sickly, has severe diabetes and is on a 
disability grant. They Jive with their daughter and grandchild. They signed up for the Indigent Policy as, 
although they consistently paid their bill in full and on time; it was a major struggle. The municipality 
immediately installed a restriction washer. Water dripped out of their tap and made it very difficult for 
them to cope with their health problems. They were bitter because they had paid their bills and did not 
understand why they were restricted. 
Because we paying! We pay; it's a different thing ifl wasn't paying every month. Every month. I 
pay full , I don't pay half now and half the next month, I pay full. Always! (Lifestory 15, 31 May 
2006). 
The municipality could not remedy their situation apart from explaining that these were the conditions of 
indigency. Frans and Bettie had not expected to be restricted; they had expected relief. Frans and 
Bettie's story is not unique. 
Apart from the obvious difficulty in comprehending the legalese, as well as manoeuvring through the 
misleading claims and illegalities; the most significant issue regarding informed take-up was the capacity 
of households to anticipate the implications of living with a restriction washer and reduced amperage; and 
coupled with this understanding was a fair degree of financial desperation. However, even an informed 
judgement is rendered difficult by the fact that measuring water volumes is deceptive. Here noting that 
very few households actually could analyse their service bill and then go beyond this and conceptualise 
actual usage in relation to a restricted 6kl or 12kl per month. Hence, in order for households to conceive 
the implications of the conditions of the Indigent Policy, households must have some experience or some 
sort of dialogue with the members of a household experiencing the Indigent Policy or indeed a household 
restricted due to default. 
Yet, as previously noted, restricted households are generally ashamed of their situations and subsequently 
do not readily share their experiences. Inadequate information procedures and guidance, narrow 
conceptualisations of volumes and limited experience or dialogue with restricted households has the 
138 
implication that households are not adequately informed as to the conditions of the Indigent Policy. Here 
it appears that households accept the prevailing Council message that the Indigent Policy reduces service 
costs and therefore readily sign up. The converse however, indicates that where a household is literate 
(able to navigate through the legalese and conditions of the Indigent Policy form) and able to 
conceptualise what the conditions would mean for their household or have some sort of experience with 
the arduousness of such conditions, it is able to make an informed decision: which is generally to reject 
the Indigent Policy - such is the case in the accounts below. 
I went to the police station to get the affidavits signed to get onto that subsidy policy [Indigent 
Policy]. I had to give them my unemployment forms and other stuff. Well, I was looking through 
the form and I started to see so many conditions. Electricity amperage gets reduced, your water 
gets restricted, and you have to sign to say that you have debt. I don't want my electricity reduced, 
my water limited. I have visitors sometimes, my family also. I need the service that I have now. I 
started to decide that I didn't want this policy, I didn't want to sign. I took the papers, went home 
and tore them up. This policy is not going to help me. It's not good (Adelaar Road, 16 December 
2005). 
This man was hustling with a customer services representative (CSR) to try and get his electricity box 
returned; which is possible on condition of Indigent Policy sign up, but implicates the restriction of the 
household's water supply: 
CSR: ... they will have to restrict your water. 
Man: You put it in; I will take it out. I'll take it out! I f my water is restricted my kids 
won't even be able to take a bath. I haYe seen it. You can't live with those things! 
CSR: You can [live with it]; thousands of people live with it. 
Man: No, I can't live with it! You don't have to live with it! That is why you are saying I 
can live with it. You live with it and you will then tell me, that no you can't live 
with it. I'll take it out! You can't put it in (Fieldwork notes, 15 March 2006). 
Ironically, with most welfare concessions, households will do anything to continue uptake; not so with the 
Indigent Policy. Households were often desperate to resume full services, but could only do so once full 
outstanding arrears had been paid or after waiting for a year to pass, allowing the contract to lapse. Both 
options appeared unfeasible: the first required large sums of money that households did not have and the 
second entailed prolonged privation and indignity. With no option, households simply defaulted on their 
monthly payments and removed restriction washers. That the rejections of the conditions attached to the 
Indigent Policy were done post- and not pre-sign up however, had implications. Households had already 
divulged their socio-economic status and labelled themselves as inegular payers. They were now within 
the gaze of the state. Any indiscretion was promptly noticed and because the state had administrative 
demographical access, and a signature enabling debt pursuance - debt collection and state surveillance 
were activated. 
2.2 Household perceptions of the state in giving service we(fare 
It is clear that the expectations of households regarding the Indigent and Free Basic Services Policies 
were not met. Such policies were framed in a language of benevolence; the message clearly dispatched as 
a measure 'to help the poor.' Households, whilst overestimating the potential relief simultaneously 
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underestimated the value placed on previously normal levels of service; and perhaps more pertinently did 
not imagine the sheer scope and misery of deprivation and burden that restrictions would bring. 
The reality accompanying the implementation of Indigent Policy and Free Basic Service conditions 
dawned quickly for poor households. There was a clear feeling that water was restricted below the levels 
required for the household to function optimally. In this regard households felt tricked and betrayed by 
Msunduzi because (1) they had expected to be assisted; (2) they felt the onerousness of conditions were 
not fully conveyed to them; and (3) they realised that they were now worse off than before. Moreover, 
anger towards the local state was more acute as households acknowledged an element of injustice in the 
miserly concessions received. The following lifestory and informal engagement excerpts elucidate such a 
perception: 
[Do you think the municipality is trying to help you, by being on the Indigent Policy?] No, in the 
indigency policy they helping one way; in the other way they are punishing us. I don't know if 
you get what I am trying to say? ... Ja, because they are helping us in the one way, like with the 
lights, they are helping us. And then they are punishing us with the water. I mean, they should 
have let the water come out in the toilet and in the kitchen, you know, just restricting a little bit, 
not so much (Lifestory 10,2 May 2006). 
They restrict our water and then they restrict our lives. We never asked for our lives to be 
restricted (Tarentaal Road, 27 August 2005). 
You are going back to a home where there are no lights. You are going to a borne where your 
basic water is restricted (Lifestory 9, 21 April 2006). 
[How does it make you feel, to be restricted?] Hew! I never really thought about how it really 
makes me feel! When I think about how it makes me feel, I always think to my mother, ayii life is 
really hard. When these people come and restrict the water, ifi was really not female, these 
people who come and restrict people's water; I wish I had big dogs and that when they come into 
the yard, I would just open the dogs and it just rips them apart because you know, because if these 
people, at least at least .. . 1 don't feel any sympathy for them or feel anything nice ... I can't 
describe how I really feel, but it is terrible, it is really terrible. But still we are living like this. 
You know it is Christmas just now, and we have nothing to show. We've got nothing to show, 
we've just got a smelling toilet, a whole lot of washing, but at the end of the day I know that it is 
not fair, it's not fair, it's not fair. And nobody can help you out with water, nobody! (Lifestory 17, 
21 December 2005). 
I don't see that helping business there. I don't see it as help. There is more of crook business on 
this here (Lifestory 15, 31 May 2006). 
When she [Msunduzi] is closing my water; do you think she is helping me? No, she is not helping 
me. When she is closing my water; she is not helping me. When I haven't got water; what must I 
do? Water, we are supposed to have water. When I need to do something in my house, I am 
supposed to use the water. You can't do something when you haven't got the water. Water is ... 
you are supposed to got the water. When you haven' t got the water now, what must I do? What 
must I do when I haven't got the water? I don't know, but they aren't thinking nice when they are 
closing the water. Now, this thing, we took it out, it's got a little bit hole. Too small! That is 
why, I never even got water, because when I opened the tap nothing came out (Lifestory 16, 25 
July 2006) . 
. . . I was angry that I thought fine, I can't afford to pay this but not because we can't afford to pay 
should we be treated in this manner. You know, at least have the decency to tell us ' this is what we 
are doing,' and they must come and see if they will be able to live like this, the way the water is 
dripping, 'would you be able to live under those conditions?' You know, come and see how the 
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water is coming out and ask yourself, 'could you live like this?' (Tamarisk Place, 15 March 
2006). 
Households swiftly drew the link between a restricted water supply and social control, the expansion of 
which they did not readily imagine nor endorse. There is a clear perception that the local state has 
transcended its normal place and has now reached into the homes and intimate spaces of the poor (see 
Foucault, 1991 ). Part of this extension need not be real in the sense of an augmented municipal apparatus 
(municipal offices, police stations, courts, social welfare offices) but "as the intensification of the 
symbolic presence of the state across all kinds of social practices and relations" (Painter, 2006: 758). 
Indeed, restricted water, disconnected or tripping lights, sending municipal officials to 'check' that 
services are still cut or distributing purportedly 'helpful' leaflets, sending registered letters or even 
telephoning homes to force payment; all serve as symbolic representations of the threat of the state (see 
later in Chapter 9 for state rebuttal to critique of invasiveness). In response to an 'education' leaflet 
issued by Msunduzi, entitled: Help, I have a high water bill, a woman retorted "government is in our 
home" (from Korhoender Road, 20 July 2005). Another woman added bitterly, "they are trying to run 
our lives" (from Rooiborsie Road, 20 July 2005). The perception of households therefore, was that the 
state, whether imagined or real had permeated into the everyday. That this presence was perceived as a 
disciplining or controlling force and in some cases insidious made the infiltration especially repugnant. 
2.3 Inconsistent gratitude: household perceptions of welfare services proper and 
free basic services 
International welfare scholars note that despite the tensions and contradictions within welfare, poor 
households are generally better off when receiving welfare than when not receiving it (Gough, 1979; 
Alcock, 1987; Walker, 1993). This suggestion is inconsistent with welfare services in the form of free 
basic service concessions in Eastwood. Indeed, whilst welfare services proper - pensions, disability and 
child support grants and other social wage programmes (e.g.) access to free anti-retrovirals, health care, 
primary education and school feeding schemes, were typically embraced with great appreciation 
(Lifestory interviews, 2006) - free basic services were not. 
Indeed herein lies a fundamental question: why is it that households typically express gratitude for 
welfare services proper and other anti-poverty measures but not free basic services? Common to both 
welfare services proper and free basic service concessions is the perception of insufficiency of benefits 
and onerousness of administrative procedures (Lifestory interviews, 2006). If indeed, as common to both 
welfare services and free basic services, we dismiss insufficiency of benefits and administrative burden, 
then we must look at the scope of free basic services via the Indigent Policy to effect real life 
improvements. Here it is clear that government has not delivered on its formative objectives to alleviate 
poverty, enhance affordability, improve public health, and promote gender and equity (DW AF, 2002a). 
Yet these unmet objectives appear not to tell the whole story of citizen unhappiness. Indeed, social 
policies fail all the time; objectives are frequently not achieved (see Ferguson, 1994; Painter 2006). 
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Where free basic services departs from standard policy performance is this: their roll-out has had 
retrogressive implications for households: 
And you find that that is when all the drugs come in. They start selling drugs to make money. 
They start stealing. The girls stan prostituting. Because they need to make ends meet. It's no 
more where you could sit and say, 'Oh, look at Mrs so and so's daughter, she's gone to the dogs! ' 
She was forced to go that way. And who forced her? The same people that are supposed to be 
helping us (Lifestory 9, 21 April2006). 
Post-free basic water and indigent policy implementation, the affordability crisis has worsened.53 
Household water security has become more precarious. Water flow has decreased. Social control and 
discipline has become more entrenched. Perceived quality of life has depreciated. Regulation of 
everyday activities has increased. Gender burden has intensified. Hygiene and perceived health has 
deteriorated. Dignity and social citizenship has been eroded. In addition to experiential policy inflections 
- systemic injustice, betrayal, deception, inequity and administrative callousness permeate citizen 
perceptions of free basic services. Indeed, in all my time speaking to citizens, interviewing households, 
sitting in at community meetings, standing in municipal queues, observing, eavesdropping and listening; I 
never once heard anyone assert that free basic services had had a positive impact on their lives, no matter 
how infinitesimal. Instead citizens, constantly and consistently, relayed the wretchedness of policy 
implications. 
3 HOUSEHOLD PERCEPTIONS OF THE LOCAL STATE 
Having dealt with the substantive burden of service conditions; this section aims to interrogate household 
perceptions of culpability. Here I move beyond policy and consider the administrative apparatus from 
front-line staff to middle management to wider municipal governance. I consider the limited space within 
which front-line staff operate; not to apportion blame but rather to present a realistic picture of 
operational truths. It must be noted however, that many of the citizens and households interviewed in this 
regard did not share my own leniency. The main Municipal Building operated as both pacifier and 
instigator: the prime avenue for voicing service delivery frustrations and the all-powerful administrative 
hub where policies were animated, payments enforced and punitive measures launched. 
3.1 Attribution of blame 
Households encountered the bureaucratic state most commonly and indeed most strongly at the main 
municipal payment and query point- the A.S. Chetty Building. This building embodied, for households, 
the nature of the state and indeed it was where blame was attributed. Their value as citizens - 'good' 
citizens at that - was lucidly perceived as wholly connected to timely and full payment. That the majority 
of poor households were unable to pay implicated the recanting of their identity as citizens, which caused 
tensions, animated within the context of the municipal hall and instrumentalised via high bills, restrictions 
and disconnections, debt collection threats and municipal surveillance. Perceptions and conceptions of 
5~ Note that comparisons of affordability problems etc. are limited to pre and post Free Basic Water and Indigent Policies. Although 
some community respondents refer to pre and post apartheid, such comparisons are beyond the scope of this thesis. refer to Chapter 
I on the scope of this thesis. 
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the failure of the state to recognise poor householders as citizens in their own right all converged in the 
municipal hall. The front-line staff in the Customer Services department epitomised, in a tangible form, 
an uncaring, inflexible and callous state. 
With few spaces to channel dissent, this, the prime citizen-state interface, was the place most used to 
direct citizen vitriol. While it is acknowledged that the Customer Services department was not the most 
effective arm of state to lobby, staff were merely following protocol and policy and were not in a position 
to bend or indeed even question policy, it was one of the few spaces that citizens still had relative liberty 
to access and importantly provided a visible 'antagonist'. This space however was limited, as it only 
allowed citizens to complain within the parameters of policy and not rage against the injustices of the 
policies themselves (see later). This meant that engagement typically reinforced animosity and 
perceptions of injustice. 
Here we briefly digress to note the architectural design of the Msunduzi offices. The payment clerks 
were distinguished from the CSRs via queue segmentation (payment, query, bill collection, electricity re-
connection and debt collector's queue) operationalised via designated areas, posters or stickers indicating 
differential assistance and seating arrangements. Municipal designers had replaced the windowless 
cosmos flowing between CSR and citizen with a glassed barrier and small, off-centred portholes (as 
opposed to a smattering of ' bullet' holes preferred by banks and 'no' holes preferred for the municipal 
payment clerks). Inquiries as to the rationale behind the porthole revealed that " ... this way it is more 
difficult for a customer to tlu·ottle you; although customers sometimes still try" (CS, 2006a: pc). To be 
fair, Msunduzi is responsible for the safety of their staff; however something must be said regarding the 
conduciveness of a thick glass window for appropriate communication (consistent with Walker's 
[1993: 157] observations of welfare offices). Privacy and dignity considerations were not apparently part 
of the administrative design: citizens 'marked' by the queue they joined were then to plead for clemency 
in a full, all-hearing all-seeing hall. 
I hate going in there because it is not private. You have to sit there and tell all your personal stuff, 
some of those ladies are so rude that when they answer you, it's like the whole place can hear what 
they are saying because they get rude, 'If you can't pay your water and lights, don't come and 
make it our problem!' You know, they need to train their people to at least have a way of telling 
the people. You know it is enough that you are embarrassed that you can't pay this thing, now for 
them to even announce it louder, how much more embarrassing is that ... (Lifestory 9, 21 April 
2006). 
The ladies are raw. They talk loud so everyone can hear (Tamarisk Place, 15 March 2006). 
They will talk to you harshly; you won't be able to talk to them. You have that fear now, how are 
you going to talk? (Lifestory 5, 24 February 2006). 
Attempts to contest certain municipal practices or punitive measures were made worse by the CSRs' 
apparent perfunctory attitude. Here it was clear that a standard neo-Taylorist response would not do. 
Perhaps a note should be made here on the purpose of engagement: citizens approach CSRs not to 
engage in banter about banal issues but (in most cases) concerns with serious ramifications. Citizens 
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voiced the need to 'feel' that CSRs listened to their concerns and thereby to offer advice on the best 
approach to resolution. This need was not forthcoming: citizens perceived that CSRs did not listen, they 
did not display an awareness of the seriousness of citizen problems nor did they necessarily assist/advise 
in the easing of affordability burdens, punitive measures or to resolve errors. 
I won't lie, I do feel nervous when I go in there because you don't know what is going to come out 
... when I went once, when I walked in there, I thought that maybe they would help me. And 
when I spoke to them and they said they could not help me. I felt very down and I felt like crying 
when I walked out of there and I didn't know where to go. They are not helpful. They really are 
not helpful. Because even if you are trying to explain to them the situation or the lifestyle that you 
are living, they don't care, they just want the payment and that is their job (Lifestory 8, 11 April 
2006). 
As long as they are getting their fat cheque ... (Lifestory 10, 2 May 2006). 
And then you go there, you sit there and you tell them your problem - because they want to know 
... And I mean, we have explained our situation, I mean I am not just talking for myself, but 
whoever has got those restrictions has got a [financial] problem ... and you made us express these 
problems to you guys and is this the way you help us now? You know, to me, that is not helping 
someone ... But you sat there, you listened to my whole problem that happened to me and then 
you turn around and you, you ... What help do I get? No help! (Lifestory 9, 21 April 2006). 
Customer services are supposed to help you. But they put people in there that, I think, I mean no 
disrespect to the people that are working there, but they put people there that are not sensitive to 
the people's needs. 'Cause there are a lot of people that have real issues, you know, you see them 
literally crying at those windows. I don't say that they must be sympathetic but at least be a little 
bit empathetic to the people who go there. A little bit flexible, give a little leeway man (Tamarisk 
Place, 15 March 2006). 
Unsurprisingly citizens approached Msunduzi offices reluctantly. More bluntly, citizens hated 
approaching the municipality: they found the experience intimidating, humiliating, frustrating and time-
consuming (again consistent with Walker' s [1993: 161) study on welfare claimants' perspectives of 
welfare administrators; and Verdery, 1996). Inevitably, women were the major pursuers of assistance 
from municipal authorities because men were simply not prepared to "waste their time in queues or to be 
treated like naughty children" (Lifestory interviews, 2006). Again the gendered impact of the negative 
implications of 'pro-poor' policies and municipal administrations was stark - women, purported to be the 
chief beneficiaries of a caring policy and system, were its greatest victims (consistent with Walker, 1993; 
Brown, 2006). 
Citizens felt that they did not have enough ' information' to engage confidently with CSRs: poor 
understanding of bills meant that citizens were not sure how to contest what they perceived as injustice or 
administrative irregularities; nor did they know how much leeway was provided in the administrative 
system. Households experienced a high level of anxiety when engaging with CSRs as they did not know 
how CSRs would respond to their problems. Commonly, instead of empathy and accommodation, 
citizens were belittled and scolded. This may have been tolerated if the desired outcome were 
forthcoming; but citizens indicated frustration that their issues were seldom resolved. Indeed, in many 
cases, a visit to the Customer Services department yielded greater distress. Indeed, it appeared that even 
thrusting themselves on the municipal payment floor and thrashing around in tight mad circles; made no 
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difference whatsoever. The municipal foyer echoed with the desperation and futility depicted in Camus's 
(1950) novel The Plague: 'Rambert' was simply replaced by poor women similarly desperate for relief 
and 'Oran' by Msunduzi. 
It's a bugger up. It's like when you get there, anywhere, you can swear, you canfucken,fucken, 
you can, you know they can call a mental institution, call the cops, you can just go off, and 
nothing, nothing. There is no ... no no, they are playing (Lifestory 12, 18 May 2006). 
What am I going to do? I get angry and then? I get very angry but what am I going to do? 
(Lifestory 11, 17 May 2006). 
I get nervous. We always lose. I think that they don't want you to win. What 1 am saying is that 
you never win with them, you always lose; they've always got the answer (Lifestory 11, 17 May 
2006) . 
... And you will never win a case with them, you will never. All you have to do is just pay, just 
pay (Lifestory 7, 11 April 2006). 
The apathy and disregard with which consumers were treated was indicative of the service delivery 
paradigm which sought to segment and manage poor people. Citizens sought assistance from the local 
state delivery and administrative apparatus as a response to systemic injustices. It was clear that the 
Customer Services department was unable to respond adequately to this crucial role: it governed \'ia 
policies and procedures that did not reflect the needs and expectations of poor citizens. Poor citizens, 
with heterogeneous problems, found little relief via a visit to the local Customer Services department. 
The quality and substance of assistance sought was dissimilar from the assistance granted. Indeed, 
citizens typically sought relief and leniency, yet none was forthcoming because policy parameters were 
unyielding and such amelioration was not the function of the Customer Services department. Hence, one 
found a mismatch - with frustrations on both sides of the barbed divide. The implication of course, and it 
was a disparate one, was that the administrative apparatus was frustrated but not personally affected; the 
poor citizen however, and this is important, received no respite from systemic injustices, had nowhere 
e lse to tum and bore these injuries alone. 
I went there, I told them it's through my unemployment [that I defaulted]. They say no it's your 
fault. Ja, they say it is my fault. AIJ they worried about is the money. I feel that they don't care. 
They don't care about our situation. They don't care. I don't think they care about anybody, as 
long as they are collecting their money. They don't worry about us. They're not worried. We are 
sitting here without lights, water, in arrears. They're not worried. They sitting in their offices, 
they say they want that R3 000, where's that money? We must get that money out of the air? 
(Lifestory 4, 15 February 2006) 
But they don't care for anybody. You think they care sometimes for any people? They care about 
money only. Do you think the ANC cares about other people? Ayii, they never do nothing. This 
corporation, she never do nothing. She never do nothing, uue (Lifestory 16, 25 July 2006). 
Maritzburg Municipality doesn't give a damn about us. It doesn ' t care a damn about us! They just 
cut the lights when you don't pay, and that is their job. They don't worry how you live. They 
don't worry. Those officials that work there, they don 't bother how you live. They don't bother. 
(Lifestory 3, I February 2006). 
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3.2 Household perceptions of accountability and crookery 
In August 1908, shortly before King Leopold II officially handed over the Congo to Belgium, 
King Leopold's young military aide Gustave Stinglhamber, whilst visiting a friend in the nearby 
Congo state office, sat on a burning hot radiator. Summoning the janitor for an explanation, the 
janitor replied, "Sorry, but they' re burning the State archives." The furnaces burned for eight 
days, turning most of the Congo state records to ash and smoke in the sky over Brussels. "I will 
give them my Congo," Leopold told Stinglhamber, "but they have no right to know what I did 
there" (cited by Hochschild, 2006: 294). 
Households expressed disdain for perceived municipal dishonesty and profiteering. The major indicators 
voiced were: inaccurate meter readings, billing errors, inflated and lengthy arrears, high bills and interest, 
unscrupulous debt collection, the soliciting of bribes by municipal contractors or employees to prevent 
disconnection or full water restriction, inability of municipal officials to take personal circumstances into 
account. No households (included in lifestories) articulated this as 'corruption.' but terms used were 
'crooking,' 'eating, ' 'money-making,' 'profit business' etc. This was because, unlike 'corruption,' which 
is generally held to mean the theft from the public purse; in Eastwood, households perceived this theft to 
be directly from their person - their own pockets. 
Why! Why are they robbing the people! And I can guarantee, those people that are working at the 
municipality, they are stealing. They know how to work it; they know how to steal. They are 
eating too much of our money, these people (Lifestory 3, 1 February 2006). 
They are crooking according to the bills that they are giving to the people. The municipality itself, 
ayii! They are crooking, they are crooking. Because we have people that are crying about this 
municipality, they are crooking. There is nothing that is right there. If they were doing their job 
properly, we wouldn't be living like this. People are owing, owing, frustrated (Lifestory 5, 24 
February 2006). 
I think it is a money-making scheme. They trying to cover up, I don't know monies coming in and 
I don't know, people that is running the interest, it is becoming a business place, this municipality 
in Maritzburg. I think they are business people here. They are running a business and profit-
running place here in Maritzburg. Because, this has been happening for years here . . . This is a 
business place here. It is really a business interest (Lifestory 4, 15 February 2006). 
They are really doing sin, this corporation. True. (Lifestory 10, 2 May 2006). 
Certainly it appeared that Msunduzi had something to hide. The mass exodus of senior and middle 
management (see Chapter 4), and the ongoing investigations into allegations of the involvement of ANC 
luminaries in municipal debt collection all pointed to something rotten. Yet, to date nobody has been 
prosecuted. Perhaps, like King Leopold II and his brutality in The 'Belgian' Congo, everything will end 
up in smoke? (cited by Hochschild, 2006: 294). But, if anyone just cared to look, they might "[be] 
looking for dirty needles in a stack of dirty needles" (Mckenzie & Cilliers, 2007: 231). Yet, settling on 
corruption as the cause of citizen discontent is strangely unsatisfying. Perhaps this is because of the 
cloudy characteristics of corruption which points to individuals and not the nature of the institution (see 
Gupta, 2006: 220-226). This will be explored, albeit briefly, at the end of the following section. 
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4 MSUNDUZI'S PERCEPTION OF HELPING THE POOR 
This section explores the views of Msunduzi front-line staff (and debt collectors) and middle managers 
(Municipal Consolidated Billing, Customer Services, Promis Income and Venn Nemeth and Hart Call 
Centre) of their own functional environment and poor citizens. This section took its data from semi-
structured interviews, informal engagement and observation. The views of middle management and 
front-line staff were revealing because (1) they were devoid of the political obfuscation so common when 
eliciting comment from top level management and politicos and (2) they showed more familiarity with 
the grassroots service delivery paradigm. 
It was clear that the attitude of front-line staff towards the poor vacillated between contempt and 
exasperation. Certainly the poor presented a problem. Front-line staff administered policy responses to 
household non-payment. Indeed, the municipality provided services and households should pay for them. 
The role of front-line staff was therefore to 'help ' households find the 'right package of services' and then 
cajole payment out of them. "Customers that could not meet their obligations within their package [of 
services) could not be helped further" (MCB, 2006a: pc). Perhaps it was a frustration brought about by 
the inability of front-line staff to truly ' help' that fed the citizen perception that CSRs did not care and 
were rude etc. Alternatively, front-line staff really did not recognise that non-payment extended beyond 
parochial conceptions of a 'culture of non-payment' and 'over-consumption.' Indeed, even if they did, 
there was not much they could do about it; they were constrained by policy parameters. The position of 
front-line staff was therefore an uncomfortable one. 
Climbing higher up the rungs, 1 found that the views of front-line staff resonated with middle 
management. Indeed middle management made it clear that they, not privy to policy development, must 
still manage cost recovery and poor citizens. Certainly they did not approach this role with grace and I 
sensed that frustration simmered beneath the contrived surface of 'efficiency and normalcy.' There had 
been a substantial increase in the numbers of complaints and numbers of households asking for financial 
relief. Households not satisfied with CSR flip-sheet responses endeavoured to seek assistance higher up. 
Consequently middle managers expressed that more consumers come knocking on their doors. 
Consumers are just complaining and complaining ... I don't know why they [consumers] don't 
pay and be done with it . .. There are few staff on duty. It is very difficult to carry on with normal 
work because we have to keep speaking to the consumers. Consumers are our top priority. We 
have to address their needs first. They come in constantly and complain. We have to leave our 
work and deal with things (Promis Income Consultant, 2005: pc). 
It was clear that Msunduzi was ill-equipped and lacked capacity (and space) to deal with such a barrage 
of consumer complaints. Yet, arrogantly, instead of recognising the wave of complaints as a 
manifestation of systemic problems and that households may have legitimate reasons for not paying in 
full , middle management responses reflected the municipal dogma that consumers were bucking the 
system; they simply did not want to pay. 
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The message therefore was that households should simply stick to their indigent conditions, pay their 
accounts, pay off their arrears and not use too much water and electricity. Indeed when I approached the 
Municipal Consolidated Billing department regarding the case of a desperately ill HIV+ women who was 
generously caring for her two daughters and five relatives on her disability grant; on seeing her water 
consumption of 20kl the tone of the municipal authorities quickly changed from empathy to 
admonishment. "How could [they] help her if she was using so much water? She's not even trying to cut 
down!" (MCB, 2006a: pc; consistent with Durban Metro's response to Thulisile Manqele, see Desai, 
2002: 67-76). The fact that there were seven other people in the house was seen as irrelevant - ' this 
[desperately ill] woman' was using too much water. Further to that, they then saw (on the computer 
screen) that she was, in fact restricted. Immediately they concluded that she was tampering and that she 
had the gall to send me to do her bidding in an effort to bring her arrears down! A few days later the 
woman told me that her water had been re-restricted. This time she did not remove her washer: her 
sister, brother-in-law, their three children - her caregivers - moved out. 
On another occasion I approached the Municipal Consolidated Billing department on behalf of a mentally 
challenged pensioner. She was living alone and never consumed more than 3kl a month. Registering as 
'indigent,' she had found her water restricted to lkl a month. She approached me, angry because it was 
very difficult for her to juggle her water activities. I again tried to reason with the authorities, with the 
sound logic that she never consumed more than 6kl , her constitutional rights were in jeopardy and really 
it was silly to restrict her. The response was that "it is policy and we can' t go around applying it anyhow" 
(MCB, 2006b) - even if a mentally challenged pensioner can' t cope and it makes no sense at all. 
Other occasions elicited quite different responses, however. For example: in one case a Municipal 
Consolidated Billing Manager simply checked a number of keys on his computer and erased R400 off a 
bill and went on to advise me on how to 'reclassify ' a house so as to avoid eviction (MCB, 2006a: pc). In 
another, a CSR leaned towards the porthole and gently advised on how a woman could avoid being 
disconnected; she whispered ... 
CSR ... does she have gates? 
Me Gates? Yes she has a gate. 
CSR Lock the gate ... just make sure you lock the gate. They [electricity disconnectors] are not 
allowed to jump over the gate. Lock the gate. They can shout, they can scream, they can swear at 
you. It is your property. They have no right to come into your property if you do not allow them 
in. They have to have permission; just don't let them in (Fieldwork notes, 3 January 2006). 
One never does know how municipal staff will respond to citizen dilemmas and indeed this is really the 
problem. My own experience of negotiating on behalf of citizens with the authorities bears this out. 
Sometimes municipal staff genuinely tried to help and yet other times responses were abrasive, letting 
loose a torrent of municipal restrictions and policing. It is clear that municipal staff are constrained in 
how much leeway they allow, and indeed how often. Perhaps it is dependent on whether a consumer can 
'touch' that person behind the porthole window or office door (and whether such messages are received 
in a favourable way). But mostly, it is imagined that municipal staff come to work and leave their 
humanity at home - the ones who can't do this don't stay in the job. 
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As stated in Chapter 4, municipal debt collection had been outsourced to two consortia. Noting that the 
anecdotal perceptions of public service employees towards poor citizens was altogether disenchanting, the 
relationship of private municipally-contracted debt collectors towards the poor raised further questions: if 
the municipality, a public institution, was hurting the poor, how much more so a private entity constructed 
to pursue defaulters? In a telephonic interview with the Venn Nemeth and Hart [VNH] Call Centre 
Manager (7 March 2006), I questioned her regarding how VNH saw its role. She responded as follows: 
When we won the contract 18 months ago in November 2004. the Mayor specifically told us that 
we must have the human touch - we must be compassionate. You know our debtors are flesh and 
blood. You can't kill the debtor. We must be compassionate ... we appeal to their conscience. 
Most of our debtors are poor black people. It is really horrible sometimes .. . we have people who 
cry in our offices, it is terribly sad. We have to help them and explain how they can pay off their 
debt. We do try and help as much as possible. 
Whenever I went to the Customer Services department, I made a point of sitting near the municipal debt 
collectors' windows. I heard many conversations between the debt collectors and defaulters, most of 
which appeared in contradistinction to the VNH Call Centre Manager's 'compassion.' I include one such 
conversation (Fieldwork notes, 16 March 2006), below (Venn Nemeth & Hart [VNH] and the woman 
[W]): 
w 
VNH 
w 
VNH 
w 
VNH 
w 
VNH 
w 
VNH 
w 
VNH 
w 
VNH 
w 
VNH 
w 
VNH 
My brother passed away. I'm here to find out about his account, I got told to come here. 
The total outstanding arrears is R25 000. You must pay 10% ofthat arrears, which is 
R2 500, and then the rest over the next year. 
How much? Shhoo! I don 't work, I will have to talk to my husband. 
R2 500, to First National Bank, here at Market Square. You must also keep paying the 
current account. 
R2 500. And the rest? 
I'll tell you, I must work it out (inaudible) ... You must pay or they will send you a 
warrant. What is your phone number, your address? 
[Tells VNH her phone number, her address.] 
When will you pay? 
I don't know, I will have to find the money. 
It needs to be soon otherwise they wi ll sell your stuff. Your first payment is March 
This month! 
Yes, the end of March. I'm telling you they will send you a warrant. 
I can' t pay before the end of March, can't we make it the end of April? 
When you going to pay? You must tell me. 
I can't pay before March. 
Can't make it end ofMarch, okay you can pay end of April but you must come and talk to 
me, you must show me the deposit slip and your ID. 
Okay [gets up, turns her back.] 
Okay, Ma'm, pay at First National Bank, must be before end of April. 
This conversation was particularly disturbing to listen to. No empathy was shown; the woman had just 
lost her brother. The tone of the VNH representative was taut and threatening; rebuking her for her 
brother' s defaulting. The VNH representative appeared to give the woman very little information or 
explanation; she rushed her into accepting maximum payment. The woman on the other hand, clearly 
shocked, couldn't engage further than the limited parameters of the conversation and clearly did not know 
what her rights were or how to negotiate. The VNH representative used fear to maximum effect via 
words such as "warrant" and "they will sell your stuff." In the case of the former, 'warrant,' the VNH 
representa6ve must have intentionally employed this term, which in actual fact was the incorrect term. 
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'Warrant' clearly denotes arrest, being 'locked up,' it was meant to frighten; although still threatening, 
what she was actually referring to was 'writ of execution. ' 
On 11 May 2006 I was waiting in a municipal queue in the A.S. Chetty Building. It was a particularly 
busy day with many people queuing to pay. The VNH Departmental Head of Debt Recoveries, 
apparently supervising the debt recovery section, marched into the Customer Services section and loudly 
(and zealously) addressed his colleague manning the VNH desk. His words suggested an altogether truer 
nature of private municipal debt collection. It left me examining the nature of' help.' I include his words 
and my immediate notes, as entered (unmodified) into my Fieldwork journal: 
"Getting lots of money ... [realising how boisterously he had spoken, he subsequently quietened 
his tone and said] ... helping the people." [He only said, "helping the people," because he looked 
up and saw the long line of dishevelled and desperate people (all trying to get their electricity re-
connected because this is disconnection week, and possibly a little unnerved by his own garish 
disclosure)] (Fieldwork notes, 11 May 2006). 
Indeed, perhaps VNH's Departmental Head of Debt Recoveries expressed it best: money was being 
made from the poor. Perhaps, this man and his staff are not nasty or malicious and maybe (to satisfy their 
conscience) they genuinely believe that they are "helping the people," but their power coupled with a 
pernicious indifference to the misery that their profiteering or inflexibility is causing - is wicked. And 
this leads us to the crux of the matter: corporations are purposively structured (and legally required) to 
maximise profit. The outsourcing of the debt collection mechanism to a corporation is never going to be 
sympathetic or lenient towards its ' clients.' In the same way, where municipalities are legally required to 
not only remain financially stable but also compete (nationally and now internationally) for funding by 
ensuring favourable credit ratings, poor citizens are going to be hurt. In this regard, the staff and 
management of this type of entity do not necessarily have to be particularly venomous; but because the 
institution is constructed - not to serve the greater public good but the imperatives of finance and profit; 
the result is going to be one of venom - and that is a fact. 
5 CONCLUSION 
Free basic water and the Indigent Policy were framed in the language of benevolence, poverty alleviation 
and equity. This message was widely accepted by poor communities. Yet the Indigent Policy offered 
false subsidies: water volumes and electricity amperage were restricted with an implication for time, 
quality of activity and dignity. This meant that whilst an ' indigent' household did have potential access 
to cheaper services; any benefit was substantialJy eroded as the small concessions granted were not 
comparable with the cost in attainment because of the accompanying torrent of onerous conditions. As a 
pensioner remarked, " ... they don ' t count the cost and now we . . . now we have to count the cost" 
(Lifestory 11, 17 May 2006). 
Because the conditions of the Indigent Policy are a restricted water supply and a reduced amperage, 
households had to manage these costs. Every time a tap was opened or a switch triggered, a cost was 
invoked. I showed that a restricted water supply increased unpaid domestic labour (time and quality of 
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activity etc.) and further negatively affected household functioning, intra- and inter-household 
relationships and dignity. It was a cost shouldered by all household members but disproportionally by 
women because of their unequal role in the domestic functioning of households. The concessions of the 
Indigent Policy could not be reconciled with the implications of the accompanying conditions. Indeed, 
the negative implications of restriction washers were so extreme and numerous as to raise questions 
regarding the intelligence of implementing volumetric restrictions. Domestic burden increased and 
standards of living, instead of improving, declined. The Indigent Policy exploited the domestic labour of 
poor women; already unpaid and undervalued. Just as a poor person's assets of time and labour are sold 
in the marketplace; the Indigent Policy bought time and labour in the home but instead of wages offered 
wholly inadequate subsidies whose conditions enacted a dual twist: restricted access and greater burden. 
Because this cost was borne in silence, in the intimate spaces where poor women dwelled, it was a cost to 
individual households and dappled communities, but not to the local state. The offering of free basic 
services for the purposes of credit and citizen control must be seen as an internecine measure, which 
although not affecting Msunduzi in the short-term; will certainly have an impact on the long-term 
security, governance and health ofMsunduzi. 
This chapter served not only to elucidate the experiences of households with regard to coping with water 
restrictions and other punitive measures but also to elicit citizen and household perceptions of the 
municipal apparatus. Here it was found that households were not fooled by 'anti-poverty' rhetoric. There 
were insidious measures at work and households felt it. Symbols of state power, 'guidance' and enforced 
discipline pervaded the homes of the poor. Articulation of such injustice meant that attribution of blame 
was firmly housed within Msunduzi Municipality's administrative and operating systems. Emerging 
strongly from this discourse was the fact that households could not obtain any relief via the official 
municipal channels. Municipal 'helping' did not extend beyond policy parameters nor did it engage with 
the cause of being unable to pay. The 'helping role' of Msunduzi and its partners was therefore to keep 
poor households within the ropes of a system that chaffed and bled them. In practice this meant pressing 
citizens into the 'right' menu of services (which they did not want); pushing citizens to make arrears 
payment arrangements with municipal debt collectors (which they could not afford) and proclaiming on 
the virtues of 'responsible citizenship' (from which their financial situation excluded them). It was all 
very self-righteous. Indeed apart from pressurising payment there was little help extended by municipal 
administrators to poor citizens. Attempts at relief came then from individual households themselves 
(explored in Chapter 9). 
Msunduzi was found to be in contravention with current flow rate regulations (under section 9 [ 1] of the 
Water Services Act), that is, restriction washers only allowed a maximum of 8.33 litres per hour, instead 
of the DW AF-issued regulations of 10 litres a minute. The implications of such contraventions, as shown 
via the experiences of Eastwood households, were found to be severe. However, DW AF is considering 
the future rescinding of flow rate regulations (Dugard, 2007: pc), that is, the repeal ofthe minimum flow 
rate of not less than 10 litres per minute (DWAF, 2002c:26; DWAF, 2003:45) to whatever flow rates 
municipalities choose as long as 6kl is delivered. The dangers of such a proposition, as elucidated by 
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Msunduzi ' s clever bureaucrats who carefully calculated just how big the restriction ' hole' and pressure 
should be to ensure 6kl was technically accessible if taps were run 24/7, are clear. This chapter shows 
that flow rate is important and has serious and very widespread implications for poor households, 
particularly women. Moreover, it appears that the retrogressive implications caused by restriction 
washers, and indeed the Free Basic Water Policy itself which served to harm existing/original access to 
appropriate water supplies raises certain constitutional questions. In this regard, it is useful to return to 
De Waal, Currie & Erasmus (2001: 432), who stressed that negative rights impose a duty on the state "not 
to act in certain ways," that is, they define a "a deliberately retrogressive measure," as "one which has the 
effects of denying individuals their existing access of water ... or preventing them from using whatever 
resources they have at their disposal to satisfy their water ... needs. More generally, law or conduct 
leading to a decline rather than progressive improvement in living and housing conditions would be a 
violation of this negative aspect of the socio-economic right" (De Waal, eta!. , 2001: 434-435). 
This chapter (8) explored the micro-implications of restricted welfare for the homes and communities of 
the poor and working poor and their political attitudes to welfare and the state. The next chapter (9) 
considers how these free basic services and indigent subsidies have strengthened the governance and 
disciplinary apparatus of the state. It explores the broader rationalities of the state in imagining free basic 
seJvices and indigent subsidies as a welfare measure and state strategies to enforce such an interpretation. 
Noting the experiences of households to state containment; Chapter 9 further considers household 
responses and approaches to the strategies employed by the state. 
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Chapter 9 
A STRENGTHENED GOVERNANCE APPARATUS, CITIZEN RESPONSES AND 
RESISTANCE 
Chapter 9 explores how free basic services and indigent subsidies have changed and perhaps strengthened 
the governance and disciplinary apparatus of the state and it explores the resistance and strategies 
employed by poor households to undermine the state's 'micro-powers.' It further considers the broader 
rationalities of the state in imagining free basic services and indigent subsidies to be a welfare measure, 
and state strategies to enforce such a view. Finally I consider the implications for community cohesion. 
The thesis proposed that, in the face of an increasingly restive populace who historically had to outwit 
racialised regulation, the post-apartheid state has used free basic services as a welfare hook to grasp a 
degree of control over poor households. State welfare requires state knowledge of subjects such as 
residential, demographic and socio-economic data. Ultimately, the offering of free basic services and 
indigent subsidies produced the appearance of fulfilling government's delivery mandate, but the onerous 
conditions have in many cases simultaneously facilitated the augmentation of the state's governance and 
disciplinary mechanisms. This chapter explores the micro-strategies of the local state to reinforce the 
state disciplinary apparatus, via the optic of three modes through which governments might exercise their 
power: panoptic, algocratic and bureaucratic. The chapter further seeks to illustrate that fear, threats and 
penalties remained core to this apparatus. Given that power is at the very least a two-way relationship, I 
explore household responses and strategies to the state apparatuses; which was typically rejection. To 
this end, I examine water and electricity tampering, the thought processes involved and the underlying 
rationales of households. Community perceptions of other households' tampering activity were also 
elicited to determine broader community tolerance or admonishment or tacit approval for illegality. The 
last section considers the changing nature of communities as a result of the state corporatisation and 
individualising agenda. Here I conclude by exploring the 'shut-down' of spaces for community dialogue 
and warn that protest in the township where poor people exercise some power is increasingly becoming 
the prime platform for dissent. 
The qualitative information referred to herein adheres to all the naturalistic techniques employed to 
establish methodological adequacy and data trustworthiness (Erlandson, et al. , 1993: 131-161). Data in 
this chapter is sourced, similarly with the previous chapter, via excerpts from fieldwork notes, lifestory 
interviews, interviews with Msunduzi officials, and informal engagements on Eastwood streets, in 
municipal offices and broader community meetings. 
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1 LOCAL STATE STRATEGIES AND TACTICS TO REINFORCE STATE 
DISCIPLINARY APPARATUS 
Aneesh (2002: 2) identifies three modes through which governments exercise their power: panoptic, 
algocratic and bureaucratic (the first is mechanised surveillance, the second and third coded power and 
the office, respectively). I add a fourth, although in the strictest terms it falls under panoptic: fear and 
penalties. 54 I discuss how government mechanises such power; and consider the qualitative implications 
of an enhanced ' reach' of the state into the homes and spaces of the poor and explore the perceptions 
thereof and responses thereto of poor households. I show how the introduction of free basic services and 
indigent policies has acted as a vehicle to govern poor households (Ferguson, 1994) via the expansion of 
the state security apparatus through increased visibility, monitoring and limited service provision. 
Indeed, the offering of concessions further beefs up state administrative and bureaucratic apparatuses and 
entrenches surveillance (Foucault, 1991 ; Piven & Cloward, 1993; Walker, 1993), justified lest the 
'undeserving' citizens deceive the state (Hobsbawm, 1969; Scott, 1985) or indeed as a 'pseudo-
protection' to ensure that all have equal access to services. 
1.1 Panoptic 
Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants (Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis; cited by 
Levitt & Dubner, 2005: 67). 
We asked for basic services and instead they gave us the police (Unnamed Khutsong resident: 
Fokus, 15 June 2008). 
During apartheid, the state regulatory apparatus over African people was chiefly mechanised via the 
'pass' system and a brutal security force. Yet during the years of apartheid, the government's control of 
urban 'black' townships and, increasingly, mobility was always precarious. Robinson (1996), in her 
seminal work on the spatial character of municipal apartheid The Power of Apartheid: State, power and 
space in South African cities, argued that from the late 1970s until the rent and municipal service boycotts 
of the 1980s and early 1990s, the apartheid state lost control of ' black' areas. Indeed one of the prime 
strategies used by struggle activists was to render such areas ' ungovernable'- the popular phrase used in 
the 1980s. This was achieved via the tactics of boycotts, stay-aways, and street committees and enforced 
sometimes brutally by comrades. Part of the apartheid government's answer, attempting to regain order 
and white power, was a violent militarised crackdown on revolt, a relaxing of influx control as well as the 
provision of improved, yet wholly inferior shelter: site-and-service schemes, and piecemeal upgrades 
(Robinson, 1996). Yet as Sparks (2003 : 53) noted, and consistent with Ramphele (1999): 
... instead of mollifying the black population, this inflamed them. Botha ... had failed to heed 
Alexis de Tocqueville's warning that 'the most perilous moment for a bad government is when it 
seeks to mend its ways: ' that revolutionary movements tend to arise, not out of circumstances of 
absolute deprivation and oppression, but when things begin to improve and loosen up and when 
the aspirations of the oppressed rise and they feel that they have a chance to liberate themselves at 
last. 
54 In Eastwood the starkest modality of power is enacted via fear and penalties. that is the blatantly coercive use of disconnections, 
restrictions. debt collection. dispossession and eviction threats and the police. 
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Post-apartheid South Africa repealed all apartheid influx controls and the Group Areas Act and abolished 
homelands. This saw a mass exodus out of 'homelands' and rural areas to urban locales as well as a 
general freedom of movement between urban areas as a response to decades of oppressive closures. In 
effect, the post-apartheid government assumed responsibility for a now de-racialised populace, which for 
between 20 and 30 years had been completely ignored or precariously controlled via the chief force of 
violent racial repression. 
Apart from delivering on its non-racialised development mandates; the ANC government needed an entry 
point to enhanced regulation and a way to claw back control of potentially highly charged and politically 
threatening urban townships. After the initial seven years in power, in particular the five years from 
1996-2001, with the effects of GEAR implying massive job losses and spiralling non-payment for 
services, and a cholera outbreak; the black majority started to question post-apartheid gains and became 
increasingly restless. Over 9 440 municipal protests took place between 200617 (Minister of Safety and 
Security, 2007) and unofficial payment and electoral boycotts and land invasions were threatened in some 
protests. With many households still without access to their promised services and an increasingly 
ungovernable urban populace; the ANC government needed to devise plans. I argue here that free basic 
services and indigent subsidies are core to these strategies. The offering of subsidised municipal services 
meant that government could ensure that it could quieten dissent, make good on its delivery promise; yet 
at the same time grasp control of its populace. 
Free basic service policies and indigent policies may be likened to a can-opener, prising the tin open and 
pouring light onto the once private lives of citizens. 'Pro-poor' policies advanced the capacity of the state 
to know who you are, where you live, how many people live in your home, and whether or not you pay 
your bill. Invisibility and access to municipal services (regardless of form) were no longer possible, the 
poor household had to submit to the state. 
The 'solar-state' penetrated further to illuminate the infinitesimal spaces within a home. It is this which 
Foucault (1991: 215) referred to as "disciplining the non-disciplinary spaces" -the extension of the 
disciplinary apparatus via the essential services of water and electricity. Bureaucratic visibility was 
facilitated through the volumetric metering of water and electricity. Every time a light was switched on, a 
tap opened: the meter dial turned. This information in tum was delivered along a labyrinth of scrutiny to 
return again in the form of a municipal bill or a visit from the municipal security apparatus. The 
installation of restrictions by technology (washers) made surveillance all the more conspicuous. The gaze 
of the state, on all walls, over all shoulders, in the tendons that turned handles or flipped switches, 
appeared unceasing (Foucault, 1991: 236). This filtered into personal consciousness reinforced by a 
dripping tap and blinking lights. Indeed it was the state's rendering of limited services through technical 
or tariff mechanisms which required fierce regulation, by both the household and the local state. With 
self-regulation the citizen ' assumed responsibility' when 'over-consuming' or 'volunteered' for restraints 
by requesting a restriction device. 
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The intentional sowing in the minds of citizens, that ' all have to suffer because some people cannot be 
trusted to behave in a normal, considerate manner' is reinforced by public pronouncements that people 
are stealing water, electricity, telephone cables, welfare grants etc., and in order to keep costs down and 
ensure the supply to all citizens; everyone must be under the state's gaze. The giving of free services 
promotes this view because the state ' has gone beyond its duty in ensuring that all have access to basic 
services,' invoking a heightened responsibility to respect and honour such gifts. The misuse/overuse of 
such basic services Uudged via ability to pay) is thus even more abhorrent. All citizens must therefore 
submit to and be the subjects of surveillance because 'some people will act out and "we" need a viable 
way of catching "them;" in this way all of "our" rights to access services will be secured. ' In short, the 
state will increase its gaze because some people cannot be trusted. In the same vein, this principle 
allowed for the restriction and disconnection of water and electricity as a penalty justified for the 
protection of the rights of others. The questioning of the sufficiency of basic services offered and indeed 
the arduousness of the conditions attached thereto was seldom part of such logic. 
The more organised a community was in terms of linear infrastructure, geographic indicators (post boxes, 
street names, house numbers), metered water and electricity, phone lines etc., the easier it was for 
communities and indeed, increasingly, individual households, to be monitored (Scott, 1998). They could 
be pursued and penalised for non-payment or apparent ' over-consumption.' Moreover, the lack of 
material accumulation further moved to prevent poor households from resisting the state's march. Where 
others might build higher walls, employ a pack of dogs or hire private security to prevent the intrusion of 
criminals or municipal meter readers; the poor had little capacity to create a fortress. As such meters got 
read, electricity got disconnected. big men banged on doors late at night and registered letters and 
summonses were signed for under duress. 
Citizens rejected attempts by the state to govern vta the manipulation of geographic order and 
developmental 'advancement. ' Resistance was registered via the removal of house numbers, the graffiti-
isation of street names, the denial of demographical acknowledgement, and even by the drawing of 
curtains and stillness of homes. Such strategies relied on the solidarity/complicity of neighbours and 
wider community not to divulge ' local knowledge' (a term used by Scott, 1998). Yet, as I will show later, 
the state was succeeding (perhaps only temporarily) in eroding the neighbourly ties that offered the most 
vulnerable a solid line of defence. 
1.2 Algocratic 
Farelo and Morris (undated: 1-2) define electronic government - 'e-govemment' - as 
the use ofiCT to promote more efficient and effective government, facilitate more accessible 
government services, allow greater public access to information, and make government more 
accountable to citizens ... e-government is about transforming government to be more citizen-
centred. 
Aneesh (2002) defines algocracy as power mechanised via codes. He differentiates algocratic power 
from panoptic or bureaucratic power by the supposition that " ... behavior is controlled not by telling the 
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person not to engage in illegal behavior, nor necessarily by punishing the person for their failure, but by 
shaping an environment in which there are no alternatives to acting as prescribed" (Aneesh, 2002: 15). I 
limit the examples of algocratic power within citizen-state contexts, specifically the Municipal 
administration leve l of the Customer Services department. I choose this because information and 
computing technology (ICT) that households experience most acutely are typically invoked in the 
Customer Services department. Specifically I look at the systems which customer service representatives 
(CSRs) use in order to provide 'customer services' to citizens. The instrument I focus on (like Aneesh) is 
the computer. 
ICT systems are programmed via commands. Data is manipulated to fit with these commands. Data is 
quantitative and specific. Code is black or white; not grey. Programmes operate on predetermined 
variables, reflecting administrative norms and values not the socio-economic realities of poor households. 
Operating systems at the CSR level enable simple data capture and file retrieval. When a citizen 
approaches the CSR window, the CSR calls up the 'case-file' via coded account number. The file is used 
by the CSR as a tool to inform a decision. The screen is not faced outwards so that the citizen can see 
what information is displayed on the screen - it is the CSR's private tool. The ICT systems being 
unfamiliar to the general populace can be intimidating and disempowering. Computer-based decision-
making absolves or perhaps disempowers the CSR of subjectivity, as she/he too cannot argue with the 
data presented. In this, the power of the CSR is displaced by the "smart machine," the computer takes on 
the role of the "controlling authority" (Aneesh, 2002: 15) and the CSR is restricted to the limits of the 
code. Importantly the reliance on computer-based decision-making at the citizen-state interface does not 
enhance trust and open communication between citizen and state. What it does is immediately reinforce 
the perception of citizens that the state is not prepared to listen. Power through the code reinforces the 
'deaf' state, sanctions and frustrates citizens. 
One cannot dispute the benefits of ICT; clearly computer records offer much quicker access to consumer 
information. I do however question the form, timing and purpose of how certain technology is used. Is 
the poor citizen ready for e-government? Can citizen problems be addressed and indeed represented via 
code? Is the improved data via new ICT programmes accessible to the citizen concerned or is it used 
against them? What information is held on computer systems and how is it used? If ICT systems are 
used to discipline and exclude households from information that they need to negotiate or manage their 
services, then as a mechanism, e-government is not acceptable. It is not enough that ICT enhances 
municipal administration; it must be accessible to and appropriate for citizen engagement. 
Households don't know what details are on the computer screen but they can be sure that it does not 
qualitatively show what their situation is. 
When I went and told them about me getting a pension, can I not pay my lights on pension day, 
that lady told me no, we can't fiddle with the computers (Lifestory 11, 17 May 2006). 
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.. . they don't explain you, they just put put put on their computer, and then say pay these lights, 
this, this, this ... And then they come and disconnect you ... You know and those computers are 
very easy, they just push the buttons and then they can see everything, where you are sitting. And 
sometimes they take a long time looking at that computer. And you are sitting there wondering, I 
wonder if they are going to take it or refuse it [partial payment]. And they are going to town on 
that computer. And you just want to walk out (Lifestory 1, 24 January 2006). 
They will just go to the computer. Check it, check it, check it . .. I don't know how they work it 
out? They don't explain anything they just say this is the amount I must pay. Because you ask 
them and they don't tell you (Lifestory 15, 31 May 2006). 
In most cases, as already indicated, the citizen finds herself alone in front of a CSR and the ubiquitous 
computer. Intense disaffection moreover may result in a complete breakdown in communication with 
implications for citizen-state relations, resulting in disengagement from the system and for both sectors, a 
weakened service delivery regime. Indeed, even in a so-called traditional system, citizens indicate great 
frustration at the perceived inability of government to listen and respond adequately to demands. Yet, the 
algocratic machine actively shuts down public platforms and directs individual communications via those 
channels deemed officially appropriate. Where citizen voice is channelled via the state into dead-end 
one-way communication traps, whilst not given the space to choose whom to talk to and how engagement 
is to occur; dissatisfaction is bound to result in rejection. 
1.3 Bureaucratic 
The bureaucratic state employs dual tactics of municipal inefficiency and efficiency in different 
circumstances and to further different ends. Piven and Cloward (1993), Walker (1993), Althusser (2006), 
Brown (2006), Gupta (2006) and Weber (2006) have identified various bureaucratic administration tactics 
which serve to delay government support to citizens in general and poor people in particular. Indeed, 
Hasek·s The Good Soldier Svejk and His Fortunes in the World War (2000), presents a bitter-funny 
parody that poignantly illustrates the verity that the state is meant to be bureaucratic; it is structured 
purposively to frustrate. In this regard, it is naive to locate such tactics within the realm of pure 
inefficiency and dispassion; rather, in most cases, bureaucratic hurdles are intentional. In a municipal 
milieu, such tactics serve to deny access by poor households to information or personnel whilst at the 
same time operating to reinforce timely payment and general adherence to municipal by-laws by the 
employment of monetary and technical penalties. 
Indeed citizens were increasingly being required to divulge more and more personal infom1ation: sign 
more contracts, agree to more sanctions, organise affidavits, apply and reapply while the state 
simultaneously ensured that citizen access to personal and public information was progressively 
unobtainable (Freedom of Expression Institute website: www.fxi.org.za.icontent/view/15/29/, accessed 12 
March 2008). This despite the popular information access messages in the media and via recent charters. 
Yet Abrams (2006: 115-121) has suggested that such closure is inherent to the state. Indeed, he noted 
that the state "resists discovery," it will not be "unmasked" and indeed it is the ability to remain "hidden" 
that facilitates its "powerfulness." Perhaps then, it is useful , in the Msunduzi context, to explore these 
new closures and indeed what a concealed state serves and produces. Earlier I noted the difficulty 
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households experienced in accessing information pertaining to household bills, service packages, and 
historical debt. Such reflections were consistent with Walker (1993) who noted that information was 
purposively omitted, withheld, unwieldy and sometimes outright inaccessible. Such tactics had the effect 
of deterring further pursuit as they acted to humiliate and frustrate and incurred the costs of time, dignity 
and money. Saliently however, such tactics had a critical purpose in ensuring that the poor did not have 
access to the resources and information required to demand their rights or indeed decide, within the 
various options, which service package etc. was most appropriate. Typically, therefore any request for 
information or access to the person in charge of a particular jurisdiction would be accompanied by a 
volley of suspicious interrogation. In this regard 'customers' were commonly sent to the wrong person or 
were seen wandering along the municipal halls, up stairs, down lifts, stymied by receptionists and security 
guards, knocking on doors - told to go and see 'so and so,' who was either never in the office or did not 
have jurisdiction over the particular complaint. 
... when you go there they send you from one person to another (Lifestory 15, 31 May 2006). 
You see the problem here at the municipality, is others give you wrong information, and then the 
others give you some information, they just tell you to go and pay (Lifestory 3, 1 February 2006). 
Too many systems at the Municipality! Too many ... changing all the time. Today they talk one 
thing, tomorrow they talk another. The other department doesn't know what the other 
[department] has changed ... How do we know, when they don't [know]? (KwaMpande, 3 May 
2007). 
I wanted to test this phenomenon, particularly because middle management had expressed exasperation at 
the steady flow of citizens making their way up the stairs and directly obstructing their normal work 
duties. I envisaged that this may force either one of two responses: (1) are-look at policy for the poor or 
(2) a restriction or shutting down of avenues for dissent. At that time, via lifestory interviews, I knew of 
more than ten households who were struggling to pay off their municipal arrears, some of whom still had 
their homes on the list for auction. After identifying the correct bureaucrat dealing with arrears, we 
appraised whether households could access him directly. I had accompanied two such women to the 
Municipal Consolidated Billing Manager's (MCB) door; which entailed signing in (and being 
interrogated) at the main security gate entrance, climbing two flights of stairs, presenting ourselves at the 
MCB's receptionist on the floor (announcing our intention), being buzzed through, getting pem1ission 
from the MCB's personal assistant (PA) (more fierce interrogation) and then waiting to see him. The 
third and fourth women (accompanied by one woman who had followed the process above), made it 
through the gauntlet but with great difficulty and a fierce reception from the MCB who did little more 
than dismiss them. The fifth man said that he got right up to the door of the big man, but was told that he 
first must make an appointment; but not then, he had to phone the PA (who was then, right in front of 
him). At home, he phoned. He phoned and phoned; when he eventually got through he made an 
appointment. On the day and at the set time, the MCB never showed. He decided to try again but this 
time, just arrive at the office. This time the ground floor' s security official had to phone through to the 
MCB 'sPA - he was not allowed past the security gates. 
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As this experience has shown; middle management opted for the latter response; all manner of barriers 
had been put in place to obstruct access to the top (consistent with Althusser, 2006). Although this 
experience is disturbing as here was the 'right man,' to address the arrears problem; it was indicative of 
the impossible quest to secure a response to citizen grievances. The stage remained the same yet the main 
actors became increasingly reluctant to play their part and the props were augmented at each knock of the 
door. Indeed, such an experience resonates with Hasek' s (2000) charge that bureaucracy humiliates you; 
it is supposed to humiliate you. The maze pursued to secure relief or resolution was tortuous and acted as 
a deterrent. Indeed, although a refusal to enter may not be the most common cause of defeat; the 
systematic wearing down by the dictated moving from one department to another, filling in complaint 
forrns, making appointments which are not honoured or calls that are not answered all served to 
exasperate. In this regard, households indicated that they typically tried three times to access help, 
thereafter if all efforts had come to nought, this pursuit was abandoned. In this regard, the state had 
effectively diffused and frustrated such attempts at relief within sanctioned channels; the state had not 
addressed the issues - it had simply pushed dissent outside official space. Citizen dissent was still there, 
it was just not visible. 
The deliberate sluggishness when attending to citizen complaints or to restore services after penalties had 
been paid was in sharp contrast to the zealousness with which the municipal apparatus, through its 
outsourced disconnection and debt collection consortia, responded to non-payment. This point was not 
lost on households and it certainly did not encourage public trust. I include an example of such an 
experience below - it is useful to note that most households told similar stories. 
The corporation came to cut our lights. I told the guy to go away. I went quickly to talk to them, 
there at the electricity department. I explained our situation ... when the insurance money and the 
disability grant comes in, we will settle our account. I even took all the documentations to prove 
to them that what I was telling them was true. I told them that when our monies come in, then we 
will settle the account. They said okay, they would not cut the lights. They said they understood. 
In the next day or two, the came back and cut our lights. They said they understood? (Shad Place, 
12 December 2005). 
A common theme throughout the lifestories was that of the "social-spatial unevenness" or "porous 
geographies" of"statization" (Painter, 2006: 764). That is, the state's gaze and force functioned through 
a matrix of variation and effects: disruption and failure, disinterest, compassion and leniency or threats 
and punishment (Painter, 2006). Msunduzi's state apparatus appeared to be dormant until disturbed; 
thereby unleashing its full force. Such a situation reinforced the suggestion that the state struggled to 
grasp its citizens; it was only when approached or when new citizen information was introduced that the 
bureaucratic machine became re-activated. This ' reawakening' was facilitated by the sign-on to the 
Indigent Policy and when households approached the municipality with complaints, innocuous attempts 
to negotiate the late payment oftotal bills or debt or to have electricity reconnected or restriction devices 
removed. In this regard the CSR's porthole was more akin to a "Judas hole"55 whereby citizens rendered 
themselves open to municipal scrutiny. This might explain the common perception of households that a 
~~ The peephole through which wardens could peer into a prison cell to keep watch over prisoners (see Applebaum·s Gulag: A 
History. 2003: 152-158). 
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visit to the Customer Services department (or other municipal department) and attempts to explain their 
socio-economic situations, yielded greater distress and active pursuit; and indeed why some households 
appeared to escape the eye of the state and prosecution. It further illuminated the irony of a system which 
relied on public trust to be able to pursue and penalise those seeking assistance. Moreover, for poor 
citizens, after having approached the municipality, they tumbled deep into a rabbit-hole akin to that in 
Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (Carroll, 1984). It made no sense but there was no escape, they were 
caught in the trap of a bureaucratic nightmare. Indeed, it was here that the state became an ungraspable 
phantom, dissipating into fantasy and illusion (Abrams, 2006: 114). 
1.4 Fear and penalties 
... there is a fear, oh God, this fear, it is terrifying (Lifestory 11, 17 May 2006). 
The intentional withholding of information and inability to secure closure to citizen anxieties resulted in a 
profound powerlessness that entrenched fear (Nietzsche, 1961). That the framework was already 
conducive to fear meant that any augmentation, real and symbolic, served to immediately reinforce the 
state legitimising apparatus (Abrams, 2006: 122) and disciplinary mechanism. Msunduzi utilised an array 
of strategies and tactics to force payment: restrictions, disconnections, removing water and electricity 
meters (and hence the service itself), interest and arrears, financial penalties for tampering, the handing 
over to municipal debt collectors, litigation, dispossession, eviction and potentially even criminal 
prosecution (as per credit control and debt management policies). Of the above-mentioned penalties, 
households indicated that the cruellest, and from the municipal side the most 'effective,' was the removal 
of meters. Electricity was the first point of disciplinary entry as it is easiest to disconnect and is less 
politically uncomfortable than water restriction/disconnection. Households found to be tampering with 
electricity and water meters had their meter boxes removed and faced a huge administrative and financial 
struggle if such infrastructure was to be returned. It is important to note that fear was particularly 
gendered. 
[There seems to be a credible threat from the municipality that you must pay your bill, people are 
very scared of the municipality ... ]. Because you would have no services; you would have no 
electticity, you would have no water, they will come and repossess things in your home for the 
money that you owe them. And it is very scary if they come and want to take away your 
electricity box (Lifestory 12, 18 May 2006). 
There are a lot of people here in Eastwood, through the municipality, they lost their houses. 
Because it's poor people like, me for instance, that have this problem and I have to sell my house, 
get rid of my house, sell my house, or the lawyers come and evict them, or they have to sell the 
house; there' s a lot of people who shifted out here because of circumstances with the municipality. 
They come to you, they say they want their money; they cut the lights, put you under the lawyers, 
there the people sitting their worried now ... I know a lot of houses. There I saw, with my own 
eyes. Even my sister-in-law, she had a corporation house. She had to sell the house. There she is 
in the street now. Staying here and there, renting. Yet, she had a house before. And they are in the 
street! There's hundreds of them! (Lifestory 4, 15 February 2006). 
My house is my only vulnerability; the municipality knows this and they know that I will do 
everything to pay my bill and the lawyers. This is how they've got me and I live and work to 
make sure that they don't take away my home. This is all I have; I cannot lose it (Tarentaal Road, 
14 April2006). 
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[Why don 't you take out your water restrictor?] I feel it is wrong. I feel it is very wrong. Isn't it 
that you go to court and all of that? I'm scared. They will lock me away .. . No, no, no, no too 
scared. Look at my heart. How will I go to court and pay all of that? Rather leave it like that. 
Rather suffer (Lifestory 6, 15 March 2006). 
This response from an elderly woman struck me with foreboding; there is something particularly brutal 
when a 74-year-old woman fears that she may be 'locked away.' 
It is clear that rumours and perception of credible action played a key role in ensuring compliance. 
Almost everyone had heard of someone who had had their meter box removed or had been evicted from 
their homes for defaulting on their service payments. That ' these people' were 'just down the street from 
us,' 'my neighbour,' ' my sister' etc. invoked a real fear and tangible threat akin to Foucault's (1991) use 
of punishment as a public spectacle. Such extreme actions struck fear into other households who were 
currently tampering or considering tampering in the future. 
Adult son: 
Me: 
Adult son: 
Old woman: 
Adult son: 
If we get caught they may take that whole thing away: the meter, take 
the pipes out. Like what they did to that one house, they took the pipes 
and everything out. 
Where? Somebody here in Patrys? 
Ja (pointing down the road). They were tampering. The people have left 
the house now. The new ones that come now, they have to get all the 
pipes back. That was about two years ago. 
Ja. And bringing all those pipes back. We can't afford it. 
And we don 't know how they got caught. But they got caught. That's 
the thing (Lifestory: 6, 15 March 2006). 
My son, he said, he would open the lights, but I said that I am frightened to open the lights because 
sometimes they (Msunduzi) take out the meter box. My aunt, down there in Adelaar, she opened 
the lights, they were closed and the corporation came and took out the meter box. For two years 
she didn ' t have the meter box. Ja, and then after that, they closed her water, same like me, the 
water is just coming out a little bit. They took her meter box and she didn't have lights. Now I am 
frightened that ifl open the lights; they will do the same to me (Lifestory 16, 25 July 2006). 
To reinforce active punitive measures, citizens were bombarded with anti-social messages that tampering 
is a criminal offence. The theft of water and electricity was framed in the same language as the theft of 
private goods for the purposes of greed and self-enrichment. This was an unfair association. Poor 
households did not tamper out of selfish avarice or materialism (see later). Yet, such dirty propaganda 
invoked the perception of criminality (Dean, 1991; Foucault, 1991). This was done at a national level via 
television, radio and the printed media as well as at the local level via municipal ' participatory processes.' 
Local politicos and bureaucrats were adept at spreadjng the mellifluous message of praising the 'valued 
ratepayer 's' entitlement to municipal value, whilst spewing vitriol on the ·scroungers, freeloaders, rogues 
and burdens to society.' 
[You said you were scared the time you were tampering; can you tell me more?] Because, I 
thought they were going to lock me up, if they had found me. [But why would they lock you up?) 
Because I am stealing government property! You are izinyoka [snakes]. The TV ads on Eskom. 
That izinyoka from Eskom (Lifestory 12, 18 May 2006). 
Below is a conversation I had with a 35-year-old single woman, Queenie (name changed) where she 
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recounted her experience at the hands of electricity disconnectors and their security men. Queenie's 
story highlighted the resentment at the denial of her identity, the shock that 'the men' did not honour 
traditional places of safety, the excessive force and criminalisation, and lastly her powerlessness and 
vulnerability in the face of a masculine punitive system: 
... on Friday around 8pm two electricity guys and five security people came knocking at my door. 
I was in the bath; my kids were at a youth group meeting. Well they didn't really knock; they kind 
of banged on the door. I thought to myself, you know this isn't a neighbour. I looked through the 
curtains, saw all these men and got really scared. I wrapped myself in a towel and opened the door 
a little and shouted that I was getting dressed. All the while thinking you know, what have I done? 
It gave me time to think ... I then opened the door and I was really terrified, all these big men so 
late at night. They asked me if 'Queenie' was home. I said 'no, Queenie is not here, I think she is 
in Church ... she let me bath at her place.' I denied myself I denied myself I was shaking and 
ten·ified. So I go outside and I see 'Oupa ' and I say 'Oupa, you seen Queenie?' Oupa says, 'Ja, I 
think I saw her walking down the street about half an hour ago.' So, than I quickly ran to the 
neighbours but I heard one of the security guys saying ' let's go take her out of church.' Jislaaik, I 
was really scared hey. I got my kids from their group and we only went back much later. At home 
we saw that they had taken away my box (electricity) (Korhoender Road, 11 October 2005; her 
emphasis). 
[Why did you stop tampering with your electricity?) I did used to tamper sometimes, when I was 
really desperate. But, I used to be very scared of the men who always came to check if the lights 
in the road had been tampered with. They used to come around even late at night. I got tired of 
ducking and diving (Shad Place, 22 December 2005). 
I was frightened (of tampering), I was very frightened. They used to come here almost often, 
every time to see if we've got lights, every time (Lifestory 13,22 May 2006). 
To entrench fear and therefore compliance, the state had to be seen to be activating punitive measures 
regularly. Disconnections of electricity and restriction of water had increased substantially since 2001 
(MCE, 2005: pc). Two factors have increased the frequency of penalties (both perceived and actual): 
electricity disconnection, a previous state-run activity, has been outsourced and; the advent of the 
Indigent Policy, with restriction conditions. As a subsequent effect, more stringent punitive measures 
such as meter box removal and evictions were perceived as a nearer threat. 
1.4.1 Monitoring compliance/non-compliance 
The telescreen received and transmitted simultaneously. Any sound that Winston made, above the 
level of a low whisper, would be picked up by it: moreover, so long as he remained within the field 
of vision which the metal plaque commanded, he could be seen as well as heard. There was of 
course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any given moment. How often, or 
what system, the Thought Police plugged in on any individual wire was guesswork. It was even 
conceivable that they watched everybody all the time ... You had to live - did live, from habit that 
became instinct - in the assumption that every sound you made was overheard ... every movement 
scrutinised (Orwell, 2000: 4-5). 
Orwell's narration of the intrusion of the Thought Police into the homes and lives of the outer party 
resounded with the Benthamian notion of disciplinary power "being visible yet unverifiable" (Foucault, 
1991: 201 ). This showed in the monitoring personnel and tools employed by Msunduzi to peer into the 
lives of poor households and propel the move to 'self-regulation.' Let us first identify the staff. 
Municipal administrators monitor via ICT systems and CSRs, meter readers and private contractors and 
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security men. Secondary monitoring is performed by community whistle-blowers, ward councillors and 
their committees and the South African Police Service. 
Monitoring tools include both physical and administrative checks. Physical checks include inspections of 
meter boxes and house visits at irregular times of the day and night. Administrative checks include ICT 
systems with programmes registering electricity irregularities. Ironically, meters were also supposed to 
be a tool to assist households in monitoring consumption. However, the study found that very few 
households (2% of 336) monitored their water consumption via meters. In effect, the meters served as a 
constant reminder that households were being monitored by the municipality. 
I've stolen light, when my lights used to be cut and instantly, the doctor said I've got a problem 
with my heart. Instantly! My doctor says that my heart is not working right ... I never used to 
sleep, I used to watch those people corning with the mountain bikes, I had to borrow and steal, 
borrow that money to pay. Because I was so terrified. I don't want to be in trouble with anybody. 
Butja, you hear that they are coming tomorrow, you better get up, I was terrified, I was frightened 
because I know now they are going to put extra money [on the bill] and where am I going to get 
that money from? And people going around taking people's boxes and I'm thinking they will 
come and take mine and then you have to pay a lot of money to bring the box back. Ohhh God 
please! (Lifestory 11, 17 May 2006). 
[Would you tamper?] I would leave it, I'm too scared, I'm very nervous, I 'm very frightened. 
'Cause you don't know who is watching you. Sometimes your own friends, your neighbours, you 
don't know what's in the persons hea1t (Lifestory 1, 24 January 2006). 
[You said that the municipality seems to know when you have tampered with your water restrictor, 
can you elaborate] I worry about the water; the water is the main thing. The moment you open the 
thing, they know ... I don' t think it is the neighbours. I think they see on the light account how 
come we are paying R1 00 and something for water. It can be that. . A whole lot of neighbours 
around here are doing the very same thing. The same thing and yet they don't get caught. But it's 
funny only here, they come, the moment you open that thing (Lifestory 15, 31 May 2006). 
This comment above pointed to a phobia which predominated in Eastwood, whereby struggling 
individual households felt that they were being personally hunted by the state. Such a perception revealed 
the heavy gaze of the state, but more particularly pointed to the closure of community voice. Residents 
through pride or shame did not typically disclose their problems to their traditional support circles. This 
meant that households experienced their problems alone, thus imagining that they were the sole targets of 
state subjugation. 
Perhaps it is prudent to consider whether Msunduzi's monitoring systems are effective. As a system, 
there is little symmetry, but as a whole, all the personnel and tools serve to provide a large-scale gaze, 
which is clearly felt by tampering and non-tampering households alike. Indeed, all combine to feed a real 
and perceived notion of great risk or indeed, at the very least, uncertainty as to the technological reach 
and efficiency of municipal computing systems in monitoring consumption and tampering. 
I was frequently approached by residents asking me if they should tamper or not. Unlike electricity 
tampering which is known to elicit a prompt visit from the authorities and re-disconnection or removal of 
the box, many households did not know how vigilant authorities were with regards to water tampering 
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and indeed if they could 'see' whether a household had tampered or not. The question was put to me 
therefore not as a moral one but a technical one. Residents wanted to know if I knew how water 
tampering was monitored and what the ' chances' were of being caught. Not knowing, I put this question 
to Municipal Consolidated Billing; to which they responded " ... no, not yet but we are working on a 
system that will flash if there is a marked difference in individual household consumption" (MCB, 2006c: 
pc). In the Foucauldian sense of disciplinary power, households not knowing when the state was 'looking 
or not,' always presumed that they were (Foucault, 1991: 201). Certainly, as with all welfare measures; 
poor households must submit to the harsh glare of ongoing scrutiny. 
2 BEATING THE SYSTEM OR BEING BEATEN: HOUSEHOLD 
RESPONSES AND STRATEGIES 
Why, despite the risks involved in tampering, so stark and so extreme, do households still tamper? For the 
reader that may not connect with the reality in which poor households exist, Di Giovanni's (2006) 
technique of framing an experience in a language and form which genuinely connects the reader to the 
written word thereby creating a joint consciousness is applied. The reader needs to imagine what it is like 
to wake at Sam, walk to work in the rain or take two kombis to a demeaning job; stand all day on a 
factory floor putting in electronics for an alarm, soles on shoes, meat in pies, shovel metal into burning 
aluminium smelters, make boxes, man a till, dig trenches, sweep dirt off the streets; all the while micro-
managed by your foreman or madam; and then come home at 6pm in the cold and rain to a dark house 
with three hungry kids, when you have no way to provide warmth, light, a cooked meal, a hot bath, clean 
clothes and a warm bed. The voices of households could be heard - living without lights and either no 
water or a trickle is wretched. 
2.1 Why households tamper 
There have been many theories put forward regarding the reasons for tampering (see Hobsbawm, 1969; 
Fjeldstad, 2004). Indeed, as explored previously, it was suggested that tampering was related most 
clearly to need and inability to pay. Another theory which resonated and indeed might explain the 
preponderance of tampering was linked to the impossibility or futility of households attempting to 
"confront the state directly" (Mbembe, 2006: 391). In the absence of space to negotiate in a logical and 
effective way, households were forced to employ a myriad of strategies to "bridle, trick and ... toy with 
power" (Mbembe, 2006: 391 ). Consistent with the theory of need above, it is suggested that such actions 
were not in themselves overtly political (but they were still political); the capacity to tamper was merely 
within their control (Scott, 1985) and importantly was the one way in which households could access 
immediate relief. Indeed, such a theory follows a more straightforward trajectory: tampering is not a 
choice; poor households tampered simply because they must. Theirs was not necessarily defiance, nor 
deviance. it was not part of a so-called 'culture of non-payment,' nor anti-ANC: in Eastwood, households 
tampered - 'nje' [just because] - as a reaction to secure a human need, as a rational and distinctly 
contextual response. Tampering became an act that was done in the best interests of the household. 
Indeed one of the clearest endorsements of such a proposition above is that households, once having 
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improved their financial circumstances (via the securing of employment or social grant), typically opt to 
secure their electricity and water services legitimately. This is a natural phenomenon whereby 
households will settle arrears etc. so as to improve credit ratings or remove themselves from 'black lists' 
so that, in the future, loans or bonds or other credit products can be secured. That is, households stop 
tampering and start paying. Such a desire is what Desai (2006: 6) refers to as to "be placed within 
'normal' relations of oppression and exploitation." In this regard, there is a strong argument that the 
adequate provision of free basic services would allow for the social upliftment that free basic services 
intended. Yet current state practice thwarts this - in a twist of irony, the traditional deviant had been 
displaced by the local state. It was the state that operated a cunning and jaundiced malice. The state, not 
citizens; was seen to be imbued in corruption and trickery. 
The chief reason why Eastwood households tampered was because they became desperate and could not 
secure services at all or the quantity of services deemed necessary to meet their needs. This was directly 
related to insufficient money to pay for total bills, service penalties, lump sums on arrears or securing the 
return of water pipes or electricity meters. Their desperation aside, importantly, there was an element of 
justification for tampering in that the municipality was being unfair in overcharging, handing households 
over to municipal debt collectors, disconnecting, providing miserly volumes far below that which was 
required and reneging on the promises of providing basic services. Inefficient or 'crooked' administration 
of bills and meter reading was also a prime mover with regards to legitimising tampering. 
[Why did you tamper with your water?] 'Because how are we going to live with water like that? 
The toilet, we must flush it. The toilet we've got to flush. How are we going to live with no 
water? Just a drop, drop, drop of water, how are we going to live? Ayii, this blerrie corporation 
(Lifestory 15, 31 May 2006) . 
... not having lights is hell. (Lifestory 14, 30 May 2006). 
Oooh, it was working on our nerves! It was. You see when the toilet was dirty, the whole house 
smells. The house stays unclean every time, because of the water. Unclean, ayii! (Lifestory 4, 15 
February 2006). 
Oh, it was a little bit ... you know like you wait for a bucket to fill and then you can do what ever 
you are doing. And I saw, no I can't live like this ... I was very sick [at that time]. And the water 
was very little, that is why he [my friend] had to come and open it because a Jot of days I was 
nauseous, I used to vomit a lot, the blankets were needing to get washed. With that little bit of 
water, nothing can get done. And you know, I needed a lot of water because every day, where I 
am sleeping they would move the blankets, put new things. And nothing like that could get done. 
And the bathing water, because they used to bath me every time, to prevent like sores from coming 
out (Lifestory 14, 30 May 2006). 
I first met Janine (name changed) in the municipal payment hall. She was desperately trying to negotiate 
her bill of approximately R390. She did not succeed. I left my place in the queue and followed her out 
the building. I figured her age to be about 22, yet her gait indicated a burden not meant to be shouldered 
by someone so young. She told me she lived in Eastwood and agreed that I could meet her later that 
afternoon. Janine and her sister have five little boys between them, ages six months to eight years. They 
take care of their mentally handicapped brother and their auntie's two children, ages six and thirteen. 
Together, they are ten in the house. They are on the Indigent Policy. Their lights and water account 
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comes to R389 per month and their rates (on a separate bill) comes to Rll7 per month. Their lights and 
water account is in arrears of R600 and their rates for R3 000. They have been handed over to VNH and 
pay Rl50 per month. They live in their late mother' s council house and pay R75 per month, with R2 500 
left to pay for full ownership. Both Janine and her sister are unemployed. Their brother cannot access a 
disability grant as the "papers always get lost at welfare." Their mother's pension used to help but she 
has passed away, and with it the pension. The family survives on five child-support grants and the 
sometime assistance from an auntie, who, when she does help, has to hide this from her husband. 
Of all the stories I had and would hear, hers was the most profoundly distressing. It was a terribly 
difficult interview. The weather was miserable. The little boys were all inside and the house was bitterly 
cold. No shoes, no jerseys. Little ragged shorts and light T -shirts- worn and dirty. The concrete floors 
had no carpets. The doors and windows were wide open as an attempt for light and fresh air. While I 
was talking to Janine and her sister the little boys were shivering, sniffling, and coughing ... 
... we were caught tampering, [Janine told me]. After they found we were tampering they took the 
box away and then we had to pay for it to come back .. . what was it? R2 000, Rl 000 to get the 
electricity box back. 'Cause at that time when our lights were off and we couldn't afford to pay ... 
There was actually a time where for five months, we did not have lights. So we had to go and get 
woods from the jungle, the bush, to cook outside. And then on rainy days we couldn' t get the 
woods to cook ... and then because we had to buy this paraffin stove and we have asthmatic kids 
living in this house here and once you switch that thing on it fumes up the whole house and it 
smells and you have to leave the doors open because of these kids and the candles too. So, each 
time now it is very hard because as you can see every month we are getting disconnected, 
d isconnected because of trying to keep up with this money that they want (Lifestory 8, 11 April 
2006). 
Janine's family started to tamper with their lights when their mom got sick. The municipality removed 
their electricity box. They could not immediately pay to get it re-installed. It took them eight months to 
get it back and this was largely due to their signing on as ' indigent.' In those eight months, five were 
tamper free. Only when the winter months rendered life intolerable did they again resort to tampering. 
When the weather was still warm, the family used to collect wood from the bush for cooking and heating 
water. This was in itself very difficult as there was a rush on collecting whatever twigs and branches 
were left in the suburbs. In the words of Barbara Kingsolver (1999: 92):" ... ' Fire' meant gathering up a 
pile of sticks in a village that had already been gathering firewood for all the years since God was a child, 
picking its grounds clean of combustibles as efficiently as an animal combing itselffor lice." It was also 
deeply embarrassing and humiliating, perceived as ' primitive' and ' uncivilised.' When winter came, the 
twigs were often damp and it was wretched to cook in the cold. The family decided they should buy a 
paraffin stove and use candles. This was expensive but more importantly it exacerbated the children ' s ill-
health. The boys became sick and started coughing and wheezing. It was very cold in the house. 
Paraffin and candles were also dangerous. Janine and her sister had to be always vigilant with seven little 
boys running around inside the house. After five months, they couldn't afford the coughs and the asthma 
and the flu and the danger and the cold, and so they tampered again with their electricity. They tampered 
out of desperation. They tampered because they simply had no alternative. 
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Another disquieting story was recounted to me by a young matric scholar, Sibusiso (name changed). His 
mother, brother and he moved to Eastwood from the Transkei after his mother secured a nursing job at 
Greys' Hospital in 1996. In 2004 his mother got very ill and passed away. Sibusiso' s brother went to 
live in Johannesburg. Alone, Sibusiso remained in the house to finish off his schooling. Sibusiso's story 
reflects that of Janine's (as well as the following excerpts below). It showed that tampering was done out 
of desperation, when no municipal humanity was forthcoming, an attempt to regain pride and not 
overburden his neighbours, and indeed for survival and attempts to gain an education and a way out: 
When my mom got sick she went to the municipality and told them that she was sick and couldn' t 
pay the bill. A few days later the corporation came and cut our lights. [Have you ever tampered 
with your electricity?] I'm not going to lie to you. I wrote my matric this year. It was very 
difficult to study late at night without any lights. I did used to tamper sometimes, when I was 
really desperate. [Why did you tamper with your water?] It is very difficult, I go to school, I have 
few clothes, they must be clean, I have to wash often, but the water just trickles. I live by myself; I 
must keep my home clean. I don ' t want people to feel sorry for me. I have my pride, my place 
must be clean. Also, ' cause I have no food, the neighbours sometimes give me some and I 
sometimes get some food from the church. I have to rely on water the most, you know, to fill my 
stomach. I had to study hard for school, you know, I need a full stomach. Even water, it was 
difficult to get, to full my stomach (Shad Place, 22 December 2005). 
[When you were stealing, why were you stealing?] I couldn't afford to pay and I couldn't afford 
to pay the actual amount that they had asked for (Lifestory 12, 18 May 2006). 
The corporation makes us do these things; they make us plead and lie to try and survive (Lifestory 
10, 2 May 2006). 
I've got lights, but the municipality forced me to tamper. They forced me to steal (Patrys Road, 13 
May 2006). 
They are pushing us to do it [to tamper]. We do it because they make it so hard to pay. They are 
crooking us. We are just trying to survive. If they were fair; we wouldn't have to tamper. They 
make us do it (DuifRoad, 15 February 2006). 
We are learning from the government. They taught us how to crook. They steal from us; we steal 
from them. When the guy comes to disconnect my electricity, I wait with my cord. I tell him, 
"listen here, you can disconnect me but by the time you walk out of my gates my lights wi ll be 
back on." No, I'm telling you, we are learning from the government. They are crooking and we 
have to live. We beat them at their own game. My lights, ahhh! My lights are never off. As soon 
as that man walks out the gates, they are already shining (Tarentaal Road, 15 February 2006). 
[Angie King, mother of Marcel King murdered on 24 July 2004 by eThekwini security]. Nobody 
must be scared, nobody must stop and nobody must back off. What's going to happen with the 
next vote? Are you going to offer us another plate ofbreyani? Just to vote and get your high seat 
and buy your new car and buy your new house. While we are sitting here with ten people in our 
one bedroom-lounge-kitchen. With no income, no jobs. As long as you leave us like this, then yes 
as a mother I will steal your lights, I will steal your water and you will do me nothing. You will 
do me nothing! And people out there, whoever you are, if you are doing what I am doing, 
continue! Stand with me! I will do it and I am asking you to do it too. They can kill one but they 
cannot kill us all (From: Marcel King is Dead, see Bohmke, 2004). 
Yet, and this is important, despite the pockets of resistance, tampering was neither paraded nor extolled. 
It was typically a silent and private action. With this position in mind, fault is perceived to lie with the 
tampering household; it is rendered as an individual problem. No one was proud of the circumstances 
which made them tamper. Indeed, if one visited a tampering household, they would rarely declare their 
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position. Yet, the signs were obvious: flattened cardboard boxes or blankets, curtains etc. pressed against 
windows and other fissures that might disclose the stolen light. 
2.2 Why households don't tamper 
This section will briefly consider the rationale for not tampering as many of the reasons have already been 
covered in section 1.4: fear and penalties, and section 2.1 above. Very few households had never 
tampered at all in response to inability to pay. The picture was one of households that did at one time 
tamper and now they did not. This was related to an improvement of financial conditions (typically either 
the securing of a state pension or disability grant, a retirement enabling the access to a provident fund, or 
getting a job), fear and penalties and social exclusion or pride (Lifestory interviews, 2006). All of these 
reasons were implicated on the duration of disconnection or restriction. Generally speaking, if a 
household faced temporary privation they might decide not to tamper yet, if privation persisted beyond 
the temporary, tampering was sought as relief. 
Regarding electricity, both tampering households and non-tampering households generally fluctuated 
between tampering or not at different times of need or threat. Hence, a non-tampering household might 
distinguish itself from a household that did tamper merely by the terms of frequency. Water tampering 
did not permit such flexibility: either the restriction washer was illegally removed or it was not. The 
difference between the ability to remove and then reconnect within seconds or not at all distinguished the 
permanent tampering of water and provisional tampering of electricity. 
The security and surveillance apparatus played a large part in the decision not to tamper. As already 
stated, the 'security' apparatus was activated with zeal culminating in the tampering household being 
found out. The question therefore was not ifbut for how long the household could fool the municipality. 
The extent therefore of the monitoring web and the penalties imposed played a large role in the reversion 
of tampering. The greatest penalty was the removal of the electricity box or water pipes. Both entailed a 
significant cost and administrative burden for reinstallation. In poor households the reward for 
compliance could still mean no lights and a trickle of water and still a monthly payment to the municipal 
debt collectors. Indeed, with such miserly rewards, the majority of Eastwood households took the 
rational risk and tampered even if they then faced removal of the electricity box. 
Yet, electricity tampering would be the first to cease and initially only visibly- tampering might continue 
but more cautiously and under the cover of night. This was because it was more visible than a tampered 
water supply. Water tampering would only be abandoned if the municipality replaced the restriction 
washer and conveyed an unquestionable threat of imprisonment or pipe-system removal. 
2.3 Perceptions of households' tampering 
The prevailing community perception regarding tampering is unambiguous: households that could not 
afford to pay were justified in their tampering: households that could afford to pay - must pay. Here it 
was further evident that the view of tampering as theft was a contextual and not a moral one. Such a 
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perception was based on a simple premise: water and electricity were basic needs, services were too 
expensive and municipal restrictions and disconnections were unjust and harmful. 
People who are really struggling, I have no problem with that but those that can afford to pay, 
please, they must pay. And you know that they can afford to, and they don't get into trouble! ... 
But there are those that take ... that steal lights, they are really battling, I have no problem with 
that (Lifestory 11 , 17 May 2006). 
Because of the same restrictions and things they have. I mean, I don't blame them (for stealing). 
What must they do? I mean it gets to us because we are saying but we are paying, we are trying to 
pay, why can't they? Some of them are worse off than us, they can't even try. Try where? 
(Lifestory 9, 21 April2006). 
People must pay for their lights and water, but right now I'm not in that position. When I am, I'll 
settle. I'll settle in full (Shad Place, 12 December 2005). 
Even if they are taking those water restrictions out, they are doing it because they want to survive. 
They don't want to live like how they are living now ... The people are doing this because they are 
suffering! It is because of them [the Municipality] that the people are doing this. Because they 
[the Municipality] are coming to do their own things that they want to do. The restriction washer: 
the water is not supposed to come out so slow. That is just a little dot. Why didn't they make the 
restriction washers, the holes a little bit bigger, let people at least get a flow of water? Not that 
drop, drop, drop. At least a flow. A flow. Give the people a flow and then there will be no 
problem (Lifestory 3, l February 2006). 
The skills needed to reconnect electricity and remove restriction washers were generally well known and 
passed on as a gesture of humanity between neighbours, friends and families. Yet it is clear that 
tampering was a closed affair, that is, there was no broad social campaign existing in Eastwood to 
advocate tampering. 56 Tampering is conducted not without irritation and anger for those who seem to 
cause it. If the ' system' was fair, and just and responsive; households would not tamper. It is not - they 
do. This is not to say that little thought goes into tampering. On the contrary households think very 
carefully prior to tampering. Initially household need and relative deprivation submits to the 
uncomfortableness, anxiety and shame of 'what people will think,' 'what tampering will say about us,' 
perceptions that tampering is equated with theft and criminality, 'what happens if we are found out?' 
Indeed, the first disconnection of lights or restriction of water usually implicated that households first try 
to make do. In the case of electricity, alternative energy sources would be sought. In the case of water, 
households would compromise their activities and try to function with the meagre flow. Some may even 
ask neighbours and friends to supplement their supply; this might mean plugging into a neighbouring 
electricity supply at certain times of the day or ' bon·owing' buckets of water. Monies might even be 
offered to pay for the services shared. Ultimately however, such an option is short-lived. The act of 
sharing, be it electricity or water, severely strained inter- and intra-household relations. Moreover, the 
56 It is clear that fear has much to do with the apparent lack of a 'typical' community-wide social protest in response to tampering 
and affordability problems. This is primarily because of the individualisation of such problems- bills and summonses get sent to a 
panicular household, water is restricted and electricity disconnected at a panicular erf. Protest in this regard takes on a quieter more 
personal character. This is not to say that broader community protest does not occur. Protest does take place, probably more 
serendipitously than the ' typical" social protest, and in Eastwood as a response to housing dispossessions and evictions. lack of 
housing delivery (in neighbouring c01rununities whereby Eastwood residents have supported such protests), kombi fare hikes. lack 
of speed humps etc. That is, where issues are unlikely to result in an individual attack. fear has a weaker foothold. I don' t wish to 
explore the modalities of the protest as it exists in Eastwood funher because although trust was given. divulging the intimate 
workings of tbe resistance apparatus is not mine to tell. 
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search for non-secure sources of energy and water was simply exhausting. All of the above meant that 
although initial behavioural modifications and alternative sources of the resource were sought; in the end, 
pure need transcended all else. The importance here is that the initial disconnection or restriction 
implicated great effort to make do. Tampering was the culmination of attempting to survive the 
retrogressiveness and lack of service alternatives that put families' health and welfare in danger, with 
infrastructure rendered unusable by the state and the burden transferred to other households; which 
ultimately led to a resigned acknowledgement that households simply could not comply with state 
containment. Because the first disconnection or restriction implicated such a thorough decision-making 
and experiential learning process; the second or third disconnection/restriction often resulted in 
immediate tampering. 
3 CHANGING CITIZEN-STATE RELATIONS 
It is odd how the character of a public space changes when it is empty; the abandoned amusement 
park, the shuttered opera house, the vacant hotel: in films these often feature as backdrops for 
events intended to frighten (Hamid, 2007: 155). 
The governmental apparatus actively sowed alienation and broke up communities to reveal the vulnerable 
underbelly of individual households. Such a project was not uncommon in a state that was moving to 
commodify services and commercialise service delivery. Ultimately municipal service bills got sent to 
individual households. And if households could not afford to pay what the state demanded, water was 
restricted and electricity disconnected. In a fragmented community the neighbour disappeared and 
isolation emerged. Post-apartheid communities, traditionally united against the threat of the state, became 
increasingly tenuous, alienated and suspicious. 
Yet the nucleus of the attack, the individual household, was also the source of hope. Small pockets of 
people, all around South Africa were refusing to be silenced, discriminated against and contained. They 
bore a considerable burden, even ordinarily, yet by way of small everyday actions and quiet (and not so 
quiet) resistance - were taking back their power. The stage-managed pseudo-participatory spaces offered 
up to communities for dialogue were rejected and greater contestation was being fought for real space, 
where ordinary people had power. 
3.1 Assault on community: individualisation and isolation 
The term 'assault' is employed; as it appeared that the fragmentation of communities was intentional. 
Manipulating the access to and volume of services offered by segmenting traditionally equal communities 
and instituting new paradigms of payment, acted to dismember communities and ultimately changed their 
form and function. It was apparent that inter-household relations had changed since the early 1990s. This 
was due to two effects, both correlated: (1) the monetarisation of service access with implications for 
inter-household relations and; (2) the structural change within communities. Colin Ward, cited by Pilger 
( 1999: 608), noted " . . . this is not a tragedy sui generis but the effect of a global logic from which no 
region of the world is immune. This is the logic of capitalism which breaks down all bonds between 
people" (Pilger, 1999: 608). Where households could not access or pay for services they typically sought 
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relief from relations, neighbours and friends. Where resources and/or finances were limited; any relief 
usually implicated a burden on behalf of the sharer or the giver. Ironically as the pressures to maintain a 
dignified life had intensified; the ' circle of relief had constricted. In effect, both the scope of givers and 
capacity to give had been diminished. 
I present an observation which, ostensibly of small import, is a profound and ubiquitous indication of the 
first effect. The move to cost recovery in water services Jed to the pervasiveness of topless, locked or 
secured outside taps. The implications of cost recovery were visible. Children no longer drank water at 
neighbouring household taps. Children (after playing soccer, 'catchers' or other games) no longer 
collected around a household tap, splashed their faces, quenched their thirst or god forbid splashed one 
another and squealed with delight. The tops of outside taps had been taken off or locked, or fences had 
been built around yards, preventing people from using another's water, preventing kids from 
serendipitously drinking water and desperate people from stealing water. In this regard, responses 
relating to why the tops of taps had been removed or locked, suggested that water was expensive and it 
must be secured and guarded. Such a phenomenon reflected the realisation, by households, of the 
changing nature of water from a public good to a private good, and with it the need to defend a 
commodity with a relative high economic cost. In this regard, the guardianship of water was 
individualised instead of communal; consequently decisions concerning the use of household water 
supply were located primarily as a benefit/disadvantage at individual household level. As this 
observation shows, the effects of cost recovery. extended well beyond water services and gradually 
changed the way communities socialised and assisted one another. 
We took the top off our tap. We took it off to stop other people from coming past and using our 
water. People come past and fill up their buckets and then I have to pay for that water (Lifestory 
2, 26 January 2006). 
We have an outside tap but we took the top off. Children where playing with it, you know. We 
took it off about three or four years ago, you know, the time the water and lights got cut (Lifestory 
6, 15 March 2006). 
We have an outside tap but we don't want to use it. We take the top off. You see because the 
children when they are playing here, they come and drink the water. So I say I take that thing off 
... We just put the top on when we need it. Before we used to have to lock the taps, you know 
when people started stealing water. Aahh, from there I just said take that thing off. I just keep it 
here in the drawer. We had a garden too, but not any more (Lifestory 15, 31 May 2006). 
We have an outside tap but we don't use it, we are trying to save water. Ja, like normally when 
people come, and walk past, they come and ask for water, but then people come often ... too often. 
You know what I mean so we don't give it. None of the kids use the outside tap, they don't play 
and go and drink at the tap. No more of that, kids can't do that anymore. We don ' t use it. You 
know in those days when we werefi-ee, in those days you know we could use it, even use a 
hosepipe and try and plant. You can't even plant (vegetables) now because you need to save 
(Lifestory 7, 11 April 2006, her emphasis). 
Community, falling into Foucault's (1991: 203) trap of internal ising the "constraints of power" 
effectively started to build their own walls, thereby further isolating themselves and excluding the other. 
"Can you see," says William Bothman, pointing to his house, "I put the fence around my house very far 
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because I don't want other people next to me. If my house burns, my place must burn alone, you see!" 
(Bothman cited by Nyandu, 2002: 129). 
In relation to the second effect and (in some ways very closely) linked to the first, was that communities 
were increasingly transient. Kinship ties have been rapidly dismantled (pragmatically via the repeal of 
influx controls etc. [Robinson, 1996] and insidiously via the transition of public goods to private 
commodities). It was common that neighbours were not known; streets were inhabited by strangers: 
There are a lot of changes, the people, like our neighbours, people that we know, are shifting out, 
other new people coming every month. Every month, people's houses are getting sold ... there's 
people shifting in, buy, sell, they coming every month ... these people are staying; others are 
shifting out (Lifestory 4, 15 February 2006). 
As such, the solidarity (and active empathy) previously available to assist with individual cases of 
resource in-access or to jointly 'stand against perceived injustice' were lessened. Saliently, community 
trust was no longer guaranteed nor indeed a type of beneficent ' watching over one another'. Maybe the 
villain was not as palpable as in the past? Whatever the influence or form, the ' new' antagonist was 
clearly watching ... and her minions might be living next door. Hence, giving rise to a kind of perversion 
of the concept of 'neighbourhood watch,' employed in the anti-apartheid tradition to secure a 
neighbourhood against the state; now employed to secure the state against neighbours; hence giving rise 
to a 'public regulation.' The implication of the move to individualisation and erosion of community was 
that the cohesive glue, binding households together as a street or neighbourhood unit, had been removed 
and instead re-stuck at the intra-household level. Problems, now individualised, denoted that households 
took personal responsibility. Tampering entered the realm of the secret: in a context of suspicion - such 
closure provided some security - if a neighbour did not know; then the municipality might not know 
either. Households were very careful to whom they declared their status. 
Indeed, an unfair and increasingly comodifying state had much to benefit from the individualised 
household. Primarily such a switch removed the culpability of the state by depoliticising service delivery 
(Ferguson, 1994; Rose, 2006). Local government was fragmented and aligned to respond to specific 
issues in isolation, not as a result of or within policy parameters; hence giving rise to an ' expert 
technocratic' intervention (Rose, 2006: 155) dealing with small, individual and isolated problems- or not 
at all. In such a way, government departments could purport to provide a 'better' service, in line with a 
neo-Taylorist approach, but within too narrow a framework to render real relief. In an 'ideal' service 
delivery paradigm such a move might be acceptable within the context of an equal citizenry with the 
capacity to pay for services and the state able to deliver quality, affordable and fair services. But this was 
not the case: South African society had the highest gini-coefficients in the world (Landman, Bhorat, van 
der Berg & van Aardt, 2003; Gelb, 2003); apartheid backlogs and racially-based service discrimination 
remained a major constraint (Hunter, May & Padayachee, 2003; Remson, 2004; Cottle, 2004); poverty 
was widespread and life, in general, was typically a struggle for many poor households (May, 1998; 
Hallowes & Butler, 2004). 
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Importantly social cohesion gave way to a "social obligation and social responsibility," which was all part 
of a move towards "social responsibilization and fate" (Rose, 2006: 152). It was simply the embedding of 
responsibility at the individual household level (Taylor-Gooby, 1998). Personal responsibility was now 
taken for being poor, and the resultant inadequate service access. If services were unaffordable, 
inaccessible or inadequate it was not because tariffs were poorly equilibrated or because quantities 
offered were miserly, or even that citizens were being ripped off; it was because the household could not 
secure a decent job, did not work hard enough, could not budget correctly, over-consumed etc. In short it 
was the individual household's fault. The switch, which bore no relation to the capacity of households to 
absorb the burden of their new role, was nevertheless theirs to submit to (see Ford, 2000). Indeed, the 
system of blame and propaganda encumbered so heavily on the poor that they themselves started to 
believe that they were responsible for their misery (Alcock, 1987). In this regard the Indigent and Free 
Basic Water policies acted as a tool of neoliberalism, which by seeking to commercialise all aspects of 
life, rendered those who were excluded from the critical capacity to spend (Hutton, 1996) - at the mercy 
of their stations. In the context of post-apartheid, such a responsibility was ludicrous in its injustice. 
[Do you blame anybody, when you struggle to pay your bill?) Not really, you just get frustrated 
with yourself, because you cannot meet [the payments] (Lifestory 2, 26 January 2006). 
Foucault's (1991: 200) description and analysis of Bentham's panopticon, which seeks to eliminate all 
communication between inmates via a "lateral invisibility" resonates with the contemporary breakdown 
of community. In a Bentham ian sense, the walls are real; in reality, systems are purposively assembled to 
break up citizen cohesion and, linked to algocracy, limit communication to that of guard-convict/convict-
guard. Importantly, the concept of the panopticon removes the traditional support base and renders the 
citizen isolated and intensely vulnerable. Such a construction renders the convict at the mercy of the 
guard and, ironically within the milieu of welfare, makes the household even more dependent on the state 
(see Brown, 2006). This, together with the fragmented state, served a greater purpose as it further 
dispersed and diluted the greater threat, that of joint experience, consensus, plot or protest. 
Yet the individualisation project cannot be sustained forever; it is always going to face resistance from the 
fact that humans are, after all, social beings; it is natural to share and discuss - attempts to block such 
ordinary acts, are simply contrary to life. So, although the dialectic of the human mind (linking the 
individual experience to those of the other) [Cole, 2005: pc] may be obstructed; it cannot be impeded 
forever. 
3.2 Space to protest 
Noting that households could not resolve concerns via bureaucratised channels, this section explores 
access to political space. The last several years had seen a flurry of municipal democratisation. For 
example: izimbizo, budgetary consultations, Municipal Systems Act (s78) processes, consultations on 
Integrated Development Plans, Water Services Development Plans - even public invitations to the turning 
on of the ubiquitous municipal Christmas lights. Ironically as spaces to engage in real, meaningful debate 
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and consensus had closed, pseudo-participatory spaces had abounded. In this regard 'citizen 
participation' was carefully crafted. Gatherings and agendas were dictated by the annual deadlines 
imposed by the developmental duties of municipalities; not by the demands of citizens. Such spaces were 
wholly inadequate in terms of addressing issues/needs, dialogue or real debate, time, language and prior 
perusal of relevant documentation (budgets etc. are typically thrust in one's hand on arriving at the 
meeting). 
The general format of ' popular engagement' (that I attended) unfolded as follows: the meeting started at 
least half an hour to an hour late, luminaries were introduced (this can be extensive if a full council is 
attending), the mayor or similarly senior official gave a speech, this was followed by an 'overview' from 
a politico/bureaucrat (who typically read off a brief pamphlet, providing little substance), all the while the 
politicians were joking and laughing and moth-jostling for I ight, the microphone was finally handed to the 
floor and a citizen rose to talk, this was followed by a belittling explanation from a politico/bureaucrat -
usually a clarification - circuitous and lengthy, stealing time for the top of the stairs; the next citizen rose 
up, spoke and a response was given. Typically, after the fifth citizen had finished her/his input the floor 
was told that time was running out and two or three more inputs would be taken, amid pleas for brevity. 
If any rowdiness was detected from the floor this last step might even be shut down altogether. Then the 
Mayor or most senior luminary in charge would thank the public profusely, saying something to the effect 
of "the views of our faithful ratepayers are critical to the success of our city." Lots of clapping (loudest 
on the stairs) and the curtain firmly closed. 
In light of South Africa's rich history of popular dialogue in the anti-apartheid movement engaging in a 
process such as that indicated above is an exercise in futility. If anything, such spaces discourage further 
engagement with the local state. Importantly, in light of the nationwide community protests, the state will 
be disappointed if it continues to believe that it can pull real dissent off the street into stage-managed 
pseudo-participatory spaces. 
Indeed there is very little space for communities to engage formally with the state. Yet, and this may not 
be entirely unsurprising - communities will still exhaust all formal channels (Lifestories, 2006). They 
will engage with a frustrating government. They will listen when officials respond to citizen criticism or 
questions with patronising explanations. They will hear officials implore that government policies are 
indeed correct, citizens merely do not understand them - clarity is what is needed. They will be drawn 
into wasteful meetings, they will respect their 'public representatives' and they will do all that good 
patient citizens are expected to do (Pithouse, 2005). It is the impoverishment of response, the delay 
tactics, the disregard of the seriousness of concerns and the inadequacy of dealing with demands that 
causes communities to go to the street: " ... the only language they will understand is when we put 
thousands of people on the street" (Zikode, 2006: 2). 
Yet sustaining an organised mass resistance 'on the street' is difficult. Indeed it is also dangerous. 
Government has sought to shut down dissent to threaten the citizen voice. Violence and intimidation and 
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all manner of insidious tactics are used to batter public revolt (Desai & Pithouse, 2003). In Eastwood, a 
prominent advocate leading an emerging grouping found a chicken's head wrapped and tied to his gate, 
this was followed by a pig's head and then a coffin. His wife received threatening phone calls. In Cape 
Town, members of the Anti-eviction Campaign became part of the ' Tafelsig Water War,' and held 
running battles on the street with metro police officers. Leaders were brutally assaulted. AshrafCassiem 
had his teeth kicked out. Rubber bullets and live ammunition were used to disperse protestors. In 
Durban, Marcel King was shot dead whilst trying to defend his mother from municipal security police 
who had come to threaten residents for 'stealing lights.' A 25-year-old Umlazi woman was killed when a 
policeman shot her in the back whilst she was walking past a small gathering of women sitting on the 
main road, a quiet protest against their councillor. Durban also saw the Abahlali BaseMjondolo being 
violently assaulted by the local police for demanding housing, electricity, water and toilets. Harrismith 
saw 17-year-old Teboho Mkonza murdered by police whilst taking part in a municipal services protest. 
In Johannesburg, members of the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee marched to the Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Mayor Amos Masondo 's home where they were promptly shot at by his security guard and 
arrested. They became known as the Kensington 87, with old women and young children held in police 
cells for days without bail. The notorious Red Ants, hired demolit ion men, pull down shacks and throw 
out their occupants, assaulting and beating as they go. In Cape Town, attack dogs and metro police 
similarly armed to the teeth evict illegal occupiers tired of waiting for the elusive roof over their heads. 
Freedom of speech, movement and association is, after 14 years, under attack. "Those who make 
peaceful change impossible make violent change inevitable" (cited by Soyinka, 1983: xx.iii). 
Despite the risk, citizens do still resist. Despite the state's indiYidualisation project, the commodification 
project, the surveillance apparatus, the propaganda, the repression, the violent assault on humanity, the 
small gains levied as large ones, the fracture of community structures and the intense monetary pressures 
to secure housing, rent, food and transport, despite the AIDS pandemic, the job losses and the drugs and 
the crime. Despite all state and capital interests that shut down and obstruct dissent, resistance still finds 
a space. Indeed, I suppose it has to (see Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth, 1963). 
Indeed, regardless of form, the importance is that the action happens. The form of such resistance is 
malleable. Its greatest trick is that it resides within poor people (Scott, 1985 & 1998), in the places where 
"power is also to be found" (Mckenzie & Cilliers, 2007: 18). It takes many forms: it can be overtly 
political such as Zikode's (2006) masses on the streets or silently personal such as an Eastwood mother 
reconnecting her family's lights. It is this very consciousness, rendered so dangerous, which provides the 
exit point to a system constmcted without the consent of the citizens. Fear is still there, but every attempt 
to grasp at humanity renders fear weaker. An innocuous sharing of experience. across homes- across 
misery and injustice - cannot be locked in. It is this, the simple human act of speech, joint consciousness 
and reclaimed humanity, which threatens an apparatus intent on shutting down and building walls. 
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4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter framed the offering of municipal services in the form of welfare in the context of a state that 
is struggling to control its urban populace. The Msunduzi case showed how useful this new form of 
welfare was for state bureaucracies. The greater the burden, the more households approached the state for 
relief. In doing this, 'neediness' announced itself for segmentation and targeting; the disciplining 
apparatus no longer dormant. Yet, there was something perverse about this system which relied on public 
trust to penalise and chase. Households, it appeared, were shocked in this regard; the release of a 
punishing state when clemency was expected was difficult to decipher. It left households very confused. 
Indeed, I likened their experiences to the disorientation and bewilderment suffered by Alice in the fantasy 
of Lewis Carroll's (1984) Alice's Adventures in Wonderland. Notions of an "illusory state" (Abrams, 
2006: 114) however served to actively mask state intentions. State mechanisms and how it 'sees' were 
hidden. Access to recourse, public information or even a bureaucrat who could explain the binary 
juxtaposition of a state that forced visibility and disclosure in the private realm of the home yet concealed 
the state in darkness was obscured. Households could no longer trust the local state. Relief had to be 
sought from within homes and community. 
Yet the traditional safety nets to guard against the threat of the state had been unravelled. Fragmented by 
the state's commodification machine, requiring individual payment for household services, which, in the 
context of socio-economic difficulties, actively disintegrated community solidarity and replaced it with 
the individual, ensured that households were increasingly isolated. In the context of a penalising, deaf 
and unresponsive state, justice was more difficult to grasp and indeed more risky. Yet, with nowhere else 
to go, and despite the danger; attempts at relief and justice started in the home. In Eastwood women with 
families to raise put their labour and dignity and the needs of their families before the cost recovery, 
credit control requirements and profiteering of the state. Tired of waiting for water that was reluctant to 
flow, lights that tripped, unprepared to accept that the state had stolen their chance at a better life and 
refusing to put their families ' lives in danger through the use of paraffin or unsafe water sources -
households used the only mechanism that was within their control; they tampered. It was a strategy to 
gain immediate relief in the face of a state that offered mirage services and when found out refused 
negotiation. Tampering is but a manifestation of state failure. It says that the state has not delivered the 
quantum of services necessary for a productive and dignified life. It bas failed to see poor people as 
citizens in their own right. It has denied the decades of oppression and violence. It has denied the poor 
their humanity. Quite simply, the state created the context for tampering and the emerging municipal 
serYices crisis. The project of shutting down citizen-state dialogue and limiting any meaningful 
participation in governance has resulted in a chasm between the state and its citizens. Yet this disconnect 
goes deeper than discourse; that the state offered services that were perceived by households as 
retrogressive and violent meant that there was also a breakdown in public trust. The myriad ways in 
which civil justice, or dissent or even revolt is enacted is indicative of a state that provided no space for 
citizen involvement in governance, no reasonable dialogue nor rational solutions. In a context where 
citizens had nowhere else to go, the first space to be reclaimed is the home - and thereafter the street. 
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Chapter 10 
CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation was an in-depth case study of urban water services to poor households, particularly 
women in the community ofEastwood, Pietermaritzburg, in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa for 2005-2007. 
It explored in great detail how urban water services are administered, priced, delivered and framed in the 
language of welfare, and how this afforded the state spaces and justification to intensify its apparatus to 
discipline, control and govern poor households. This thesis argued that pro-poor programmes often do 
not alleviate the poverty, daily grind and struggles of poor households, but instead intensify the domestic, 
social and economic burden of the poor, particularly women. Section one of this chapter revisits the 
study' s objectives by summarising the core findings within the framework of the study. Section two 
considers the possible theoretical implications of the study. 
1 CORE CONTRIBUTIONS 
This section outlines the major contributions of the study within the broader research question. The study 
dealt with six objectives relating to: notions and conceptions of appropriate water needs of poor 
households; water tariffs, payment responses and affordability; the contribution of the social wage to the 
alleviation of household poverty; the micro-implications of restricted welfare for poor households; the 
broader rationalisations of the state in offering municipal services as welfare; and the household and 
community resistance and coping strategies to the strengthened governance and disciplinary apparatus of 
the local state. 
1.1 Water tariffs, bills, payment and affordability 
Weak national policy and regulation mechanisms culminated in poorly equilibrated and inequitable tariff 
structures, the municipal manipulation of social policy and service delivery, and the pursuit of ruthless 
cost recovery and service financialisation. Low-volume consumption above 6kl , was deliberately 
charged at punitive tariffs, pushing poor households into debt. Households received average bills ofR564 
monthly for all their municipal services, with water comprising ±Rl 09 (19%). Tariffs and interest 
charges promoted default and prolonged indebtedness. The goal was part of a broader financialisation 
mechanism whereby Msunduzi, in the face of a limited base of billable consumers, extensive new and 
underfunded infrastructure burdens and high levels of unaccounted-for water passed the pressures of cost 
recovery onto billed domestic consumers. This was done by retaining high uniform water tariffs after 
6kl , levying flat rates (for sanitation, electricity amperage, refuse and rates) and restructuring the 
payment and debt collection regime into a very effective debt-related financial services mechanism. The 
analysis of Eastwood household payment rates, notions of payment and affordability thresholds revealed 
a distinct ' culture of payment' and compliance. Households made real attempts to pay their bills and 
municipal-related debt was taken very seriously. Households able to, cut their consumption and, despite 
attempts to pay and oscillations between payment strategies, 44% of surveyed Eastwood households were 
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caught in a cycle of heavy arrears, and the resultant non-service items accounted for 30-40% of total bills. 
Poor households were targeted for debt collection. 
Stressed households faced two scenarios: (1) to register as ' indigent' or (2) if excluded from indigency, to 
be labelled as 'bad' debtors and be ruthlessly pursued. The Indigent Policy however, aimed at assisting 
only very poor households, with the rest excluded due to higher than allowed income. Struggling 
working class households excluded from 'indigency' in time became 'bad' debtors. Ultimately ' indigent' 
households were not much better off. The Indigent Policy was carefully crafted within an 
uncompromising framework. Ninety-one per cent of Eastwood 'indigent' surveyed households still could 
not afford to pay total bills consistently and in full. This resulted in service subsidies being erased by the 
reintroduction of interest on historical debt. Msunduzi systematically recovered 66% of the potential 
social wage concessions granted. The Indigent Policy provided a nominal financial gain of Rll3.24, but 
once interest, service penalties and fixed charges were deducted, a net social wage gain of a mere R39 .05 
remained. ' Indigent' households indicated that concessions were not worth the effort to meet conditions 
of uptake. 
This municipality tried to contain the problem of the poor by drastically curtailing consumption and 
loading households with major debt. Municipal debt collectors resumed their chase. The clearest sign of 
a failed Indigent Policy is that 'indigent' households wanted out: they preferred to take their chances with 
their 'bad' debtor sisters/brothers. The implications of a failed Indigent Policy, meant not only a major 
service affordability crisis in Eastwood and broader Pietermaritzburg low-income communities, but 
provided an acute warning of an emerging social crisis. 
The outsourced debt collection and electricity disconnection mechanism was a political strategy to 
remove debt collection with its critical sensitivities from public administration, to the merciless realm of 
private propensity. It not only ensured that defaulting households were more ruthlessly chased, but also 
that private pockets were enriched to the detriment of the poor - with some of those pockets sewed to the 
trousers of ANC luminaries, adding an altogether more insidious element. Public 'representatives' are 
supposed to negotiate annual tariff increases, payment, credit control and debt collection regimes in 
favour of their constituencies, not their own financial interests. In this, the iniquitous tariff design which 
caused 35% of all billed domestic households in Msunduzi to be handed over to the debt collection 
consortia, may suggest a conflict of interests. In this regard, although I proposed a variant of ' corruption' 
in the fiscal system; I could not confirm its exact form. Yet, unlike Atkinson (2007), I do not posit 
corruption as the cause for municipal failure. Instead, I locate Msunduzi's failure to absorb the needs of 
the poor within its institutionalised commodification and commercialisation framework. Msunduzi's 
special brand of corruption may indeed be 'legal,' facilitated by a porous and weak regulation system and 
strongly linked to commodification, financialisation and inadequate political representation. It is within 
this category too that Umgeni Water's turnaround is placed: profits at the expense of the poor. 
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1.2 Free basic water and water use 
Free basic water benefitted only 6% of Eastwood and 10% of Msunduzi's non-'indigent,' not restricted 
billed domestic households. Msunduzi 's interpretation of free water, whereby a household could only 
access a guaranteed free basic water allocation if consumption was equal to or less than 6kl per 30-day 
period, or if a household qualified as 'indigent,' severely curtailed its scope. All households in the 
'conventional' group, with the exception of 'restricted' households and a minority of small households 
exceeded the free 6kl water offering, implicating that all water used had to be paid for. The free basic 
volume of 6kl had no resonance with actual water volumes consumed (households within the 
'conventional' service package consumed ±14.1kl per month - mean household size of 3.7 members) nor 
the value or fluidness of usage by the majority of Eastwood households. Moreover, tampering and non-
payment were unrelated to consumption volumes. Consumption, across household size and service 
packages, was moderate. The study showed that assumptions of irresponsible and reckless usage were 
incorrect. 
The access to free basic water for 'conventional ' households was conditioned on small household size (1-
4 members). However, a small household was not enough to secure access alone; households with 2-4 
members further had to reduce consumption ( 41-70%), predicated on the modification of normal water 
activities and lifestyle. That is, single-member households appeared to be in the best position to benefit 
from free basic water, whereas all other households may access free basic water, but only at a 
disproportionate social cost. A starker example of this latter scenario was the case of ' restricted' 
households, which although accessing free basic water; did so via a technical limitation. Water delivered 
via a restriction washer provided only 4.1-4.3kl per month (a direct contravention of the Water Services 
Act) which was ±65% less than what equivalent ' conventional' households were consuming. The 
negative implications of severe water reductions, coupled with the low flow rate meant that such 
households derived no benefit from free basic water but, more significantly - free basic water acted 
retrogressively not only on water supplies accessed but more broadly on quality of life. In this regard, I 
suggested that free basic water was in contravention with the negative rights afforded by South Africa's 
constitution and that Eastwood citizens have not been adequately protected against the state's ''deliberate 
retrogressive measures" (De Waal, et al., 2001: 434). 
The Indigent Policy, as an instrument to augment the Free Basic Water Policy, widened the scope of free 
basic water access - not by offering higher volumes of free water but simply by not removing it if 6kl 
was exceeded - thereby accommodating not only more households but larger households as well. 
Nevertheless the capacity of the Indigent Policy to bring real relief was limited by uptake procedures 
which acted as a disincentive to application; conditional water services restriction as well as the uniform 
delivery mechanism which discriminated against larger households. 'Restricted' ' indigent' households 
felt that the financial saving (±Rl8) entailed disproportionate social deprivation. Ironically, 'indigent' 
households which tampered salvaged the free basic water benefits. Such actions resulted in: ( l ) the 
delivery of an unrestricted flow; (2) the righting of the indigent contract breach of accessing l2kl instead 
of the 6kl; and (3) the enabling of the access to a maximum water subsidy in the first block and part or 
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full subsidy in the second block. That the locally-manipulated social policy necessitated 'criminality' to 
exact legitimate gains, served as a broader parody of the policy and delivery apparatus. 
This study, via the optic of Eastwood households suggests that DW AF failed in facilitating sufficient 
funding for the roll-out of free basic water, ensuring tariff transformation to facilitate affordability after 
the first free 6kl and issuing more rigorous injunctions on Free Basic Water Policy interpretation. 
Moreover, it suggests that DW AF was far too short-sighted in contextualising free basic water, focusing 
disproportionally on volume roll-out instead of the tariff framework and implementation strategy so 
essential for the achievement of free basic water goals. DW AF's free basic water objective of making 
water more affordable for poor households was limited by constructing affordability only in relation to 
the 6kl free volume and not supply per se (DW AF, 2008a). There were no regulatory or institutional 
mechanisms to promote affordability beyond the 6kl offering. The irony of integrated block tariffs (IBT) 
is that they can actually be structured to make sound economic sense and accommodate the poor. But 
neoliberal and government technocrats failed to design tariff parameters and prices to accommodate the 
poor. By settling on such a narrow first block which had no relation to the appropriate water 
requirements of poor households and within a cold regime of harsh commodification; affordability 
measures beyond the 6kl were critical. Yet, DW AF obstinately ignored the impact of its 'basic' water 
offering and further refused to regulate municipalities that flouted its tariff principles. These messages 
together with regulatory inertia were ruthlessly capitalised on by street-level bureaucrats. A prime aim of 
the Free Basic Water Policy I argued was its role as a strategy to depress consumption and confine poor 
households to a 'sustainable' 6kl offering. Free basic water, as interpreted by Msunduzi, instead of 
making water more affordable and available for poor households, actually achieved the contrary - it 
eroded forn1erly unlimited water supplies via the imposition of restriction devices, or exclusion via high 
tariffs, and exacerbated and contributed to the emerging household affordability crisis. Msunduzi twisted 
and manipulated a potentially important social policy to meet its own financial and resource ends. 
1.3 Access to relief and citizen perceptions of the state 
Space to negotiate with the local state was limited. Citizens used the correct channels to approach the 
state but it appeared that such channels were purposively structured to deny resolution. Policy parameters 
were nan·ow, they were not pliable and nor were they designed to provide substantial relief. Municipal 
staff had no power to deliver help. This led to frustration for citizens as they felt staff simply did not 
listen to or understand their socio-economic circumstances. Citizens felt that their grievances were 
j ustified- they did not want patronising explanations nor did they want to be chastised or belittled- they 
wanted to be acknowledged as human beings, to engage with dignity and receive a rational response. 
Citizen blame for perceived injustice, their spiralling affordability crisis and misery was attributed to 
Msunduzi with municipal front-line staff bearing the brunt of dissatisfaction. Eastwood households 
appeared not alone in this regard, many other Pietennaritzburg communities localised discontent at the 
door of this sphere. In this, I suggest that national government, publically remonstrating local 
government, has been privy to this routing of popular anger against the local state. That is, local 
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government cannot solely be blamed; national government has directly facilitated such twists. National 
government and local government, at least in some respects, actually appear at war with each other. 
National government has displaced accountability and responsibility for its citizens onto the reluctant 
shoulders of the local sphere without first ensuring that the local state can actually deliver. Lack of 
funding and regulation allow the local state to manipulate policies and erode social gains to their citizens. 
Subsequently, whereas local citizens should actually be joining with local government in lobbying 
national government; citizens are fighting the local sphere and vice versa. 
1.4 Strengthened governance apparatus~ citizen responses and resistance 
This chronology from free basic services in general to its provision via the Indigent Policy implicated a 
swift tum in intent. It signalled a profound shift in the management of poor households. Free basic 
services were initially conceived as a universal entitlement. In Msunduzi, the first limitations centred on 
a volumetric cap. This limitation was useful but it was inadequate in addressing the need for Msunduzi to 
know its poor citizens. The introduction of the Indigent Policy satisfied this gap: the disclosure of citizen 
information was a condition of subsidy access. Msunduzi's cost recovery regime, undifferentiated and 
punitive, together with derogatory state discourse and ubiquitous surveillance and threats, and with 
enticing concessions, the return of the electricity meter box, and state messages of benevolence ensured 
that poor households ' voluntarily' approached the state and submitted to municipal ' help.' 
There was no need for expensive and protracted means-testing and tracing: poor households not only 
announced that they were financially unreliable but proved it too. The dormant state was reawakened. 
Segmentation and targeting was then easy. The municipal apparatus simply channelled ' deserving' 
households into indigent service packages or pressed 'undeserving' households into 'bad' debtor 
categories which implicated service cut-offs or being passed on to debt collectors. Both of which were 
perceived with confusion by citizens as they implicated harsher regimes of control and constrained 
service access. There was always something perverse about this system which relied on public trust to 
penalise and chase. Relief was packaged like a Trojan horse and welcomed into the intimate spaces of 
home. When the real intent burst, households were shocked at the trickery - citizens had not anticipated 
such an outcome, they had expected real help. For households newly registered as 'indigent,' promises 
quickly dissipated: irregular payment meant that frozen debt thawed and historical debt with interest 
returned, lights dimmed and then were again disconnected and there never was any intention to provide 
the promised 12kl water. Subsidies were systematically eroded. 'Bad' debtors were ruthlessly chased; 
water restricted, lights cut and debt collectors had constructed debt-repayment terms which were difficult 
to avoid. There was no relief - the package was viewed not as augmenting services, providing subsidies 
and restraining debt collectors but simply a debt management package constraining services, maximising 
debt collection and disciplining households. Households felt betrayed, became profoundly bitter and 
questioned "Where is Msunduzi Municipality taking us?" The containment was rejected: pro-poor 
policies that actively caused poor households to regress resulted in the rejection of restrictions by the 
majority of households. 
182 
It is clear that Msunduzi made a number of substantial errors in its management of the poor. Msunduzi 
was far too coldly neoliberal in its approach. It failed to recognise that by crafting service packages that 
prohibited the access to appropriate needs of the poor; large numbers of poor households would certainly 
require more. Where no official space or relief mechanism was granted to augment this need; households 
would be forced outside of official structures and therefore beyond municipal control. Ultimately, 
households would resist regardless of the threat, simply because they had to (see Fanon, 1963 ). Citizen 
'criminality' in the form of tampering, hiding from the state, falsifying documents, welfare fraud etc. 
would more likely be pursued as a desperate attempt to access some form of relief. In short, where a 
neoliberal agenda fails to account for the basic needs of poor households, the whole system will fragment. 
Msunduzi ' s second mistake was that it provided inadequate rewards for compliance. Rewards looked far 
too much like punishments. Thirdly, Msunduzi misjudged how crucial public trust - core to the welfare 
hook - is to governance. In this regard Msunduzi 's bashing of public trust may have been withstood if it 
were not so unrelenting. The implications of such sustained smashing have, I suggest, yet to be felt. The 
fourth error made related to Msunduzi's underestimation of the conditions under which it had not only 
forced struggling households to Jive but the wider context of hurt and adversity upon which micro-
municipal punishments were cascading. Lastly, Msunduzi failed to recognise that no matter how 
ingenious the municipal apparatus was, people, especially desperate people, will always beat the state. 
This is because the former is simply 'governing' -the second is fighting for her life. In this regard, it is 
far better to govern fairly and transparently, with humanity at the centre of social policies, then to engage 
in a cold war against one's own people. Communities in flux and fragmented by commodification turned 
inwards to seek relief. The fight was measured and quieter because potential backlash was more acute 
and neighbours and streets would not automatically shield. This invoked new kinds of resistances; 
personal and distinctly individualised guerrilla-type tactics, which were and will be much harder to 
suppress than open-street protest and certainly with a myriad in-home leaders, much more difficult to 
'organise' and lure into and placate (and disempower) in a boardroom. 
A theme throughout this thesis has been the systematic denial of the humanity of poor citizens, the denial 
of dignity, of equality, of citizenship; the denial of space to negotiate, to rational response; denial of the 
effects of apartheid - brutal, racist, oppressive; and the denial of substantive redress. Poor households 
have been treated with contempt: ridiculed, beaten and hurt. They have also been cheated. Msunduzi 
measured citizen worth in relation to contrived thresholds of payment. Mothers, grandfathers, sisters, 
uncles and widows were stripped of their humanity because Msunduzi administrators failed to apply their 
minds to the implications of not recognising the effects of poorly equilibrated tariff structures, not 
differentiating debt collection mechanisms, instituting ruthlessly inequitable cost recovery and 
financialisation mechanisms on citizens who did not 'fit' their narrow qualifications of people deserving 
poor relief. For this, Msunduzi was rewarded for its short-term financial eminence and sparkling credit 
ratings with the accolade of being South Africa's seventh Metropolitan City. That this came at the very 
expensive social cost of socio-economic equity, real people-centred development, public trust, stability 
and an inclusive, responsi\·e and humane state; was not acknowledged. Such institutional 'success,' 
particularly in post-apartheid South Africa, is disappointingly narrow-minded and callous; poor citizens 
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deserve more, they deserve a different type of state and a different type of development. Short-term 
financial gains and vulgar financialisation in a context of acute deprivation, dispossession and desperation 
should not be rewarded; they should be condemned. There appears no space for the poor in the new 
municipal system. What might be forgotten is that if no space is provided, it will be taken. 
2 THEORETICAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF STUDY 
I have limited the theoretical implications of the study to the major themes covered in this study: free 
basic water, the social wage and the relationship and position of the state and citizenry. Municipal 
bureaucrats (especially of a certain class and geographic residence) expected to juggle contested financial 
resources and 'meet' popular pressures are always going to manipulate the spaces created by welfare or 
other social mechanisms to further their own insular agendas. 
2.1 Theory on free basic water 
The analysis of free basic water via the optic of the household, particularly women, provided substantial 
insight into the volumetric allocation and measurement of water services within an orthodox economic 
framework. The limitation of water services via the policy of free basic water amplified the ideological 
constructs of water volumes and measurements and the implications of such propensities. In this regard 
the interpretation of the retrogressive impacts experienced by the majority of Eastwood households was 
found in deconstructing the foundations of free basic water's conception framework. That is, local failure 
in the Free Basic Water Policy is not simply one of interpretation and implementation, but with the policy 
foundations itself. The prime point at which free water deviated from its core mandate is located within 
the myopic 'Durban research experiment,· which led up to its adoption. The research which informed the 
Free Basic Water Policy linked a linear ideology of economically constructed scarcity, technocratic and 
expert calculation, underlying racist and patronising ' help,' cost containment, bureaucratic administration, 
haste and arrogance. In this regard, Taylor-Gooby's (2000: 11) warning rang true: that where policies 
are formulated without the necessary contestation of professional expertise, the resulting policies may in 
fact be detrimental to society. 
Importantly, this research infonned a policy that impacted millions of households at the most 
infinitesimal level; perhaps it demanded more rigour and contestation before it was expanded to deliver 
limited volumes of water to households in entirely different contexts. This thesis has interpreted and 
contested the Free Basic Water Policy in a framework entirely removed from the framework of 
conception. Through the lens of Eastwood households, this thesis has shown how important this 
differentiation was to free basic water's impact. I have suggested that the Free Basic Water Policy should 
not have transcended beyond this scenario of incipience, addressing non-permanent, insecure access to 
established areas of historical, full-pressure and grid-access without significant adaptation. 
Let us now move onto three major principles elucidated via the study. Firstly, the findings reinforce 
Harvey' s (1977, 1996) assertion that water needs are not universal. However, the findings go beyond this 
and show that not only is the usage and quantity of water within a domestic context fluid, but also 
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distinctly personal. The implication of this first principle is that a quantitative physiological calculation 
alone is not a sufficient measurement mechanism, but requires a careful qualitative component. 
Measurement of water requirements has to be contextual. The notions and perceptions of the user 
regarding water's usage and value should be core to any investigation on water volumes required. 
Secondly, the thesis has illuminated the proximity of notions of humanity and dignity to water's access 
and delivery mode, particularly acute in the post-apartheid context. This implicates a greater emphasis on 
the value of water beyond mere biological need and, when restricted, may explain new forms of social 
conflict, resistance and a deterioration of public trust. Thirdly, water as a life-source, means that it 
demands a particular type of sensitivity if it is to be constructed as commodity. That is, water's 
commodification must either be accompanied by careful safeguards or rejected, because water services 
deliver a particular type of value to society. 
Noting my initial critique of the methodological construction of free basic water, coupled with the above-
mentioned principles, which I suggest were not satisfied; at the very least, the roll-out of free basic water 
should have included very careful monitoring procedures and very clear municipal oversight. This 
because any attempt to analyse what households with previous access were actually using; any real 
discussion with women regarding how water is valued, used, and what delivery mechanisms are 
preferred; and simple common sense would have shown that the policy, as interpreted by Msunduzi, 
would act retrogressively on previous secure access. That is, neoliberally-minded bureaucrats had to 
know that maintaining the offering at 6kl within a commodification framework would restrict and 
exclude poor households from accessing their appropriate water requirements. Because there was no 
caution, no regulation and no modification; space opened for free basic water's critique as a 
Machiavellian strategy. It moved it into Muller' s (2001 :1) "innovative strategy" to subjugate and manage 
poor citizens, to reduce water consumption by those who may struggle to pay for it and thereby to contain 
costs, to maintain the cost recovery project and to segment and separate citizens. 
The literatures of international anti-development scholars: Harvey (1977, 1996), Illich (1993), 
Gronemeyer (1993) and Escobar (1993), in particular resonated with this theory. 'Need ' was constructed 
and then ' remedied,' divorced from the problematisation or input from poor citizens themselves. Expert 
technocratic calculations determined final volumes offered (consistent with Rose, 2006), based on 
particular notions of physiology and costs, not the real-life values and experiences of water usage within 
homes; with mercurial international universal ' recommendations' posited to add credibility to local 
'exploration.' Lastly, more time was spent on determining how the concessions could legitimise the pull-
back of state control and augment the state disciplinary apparatus than actually improving the lives of 
recipients. Free basic water became a prototype of ferguson's (2006: 271) thesis whereby poverty relief 
programmes "serve to govern" poor people; it exemplified how municipal services, in a context of acute 
inequality and urgent developmental needs, could be manipulated to control populations (consistent with 
Ruiters, 2005; Naidoo & Veriava, 2005; Naidoo, 2007) and ultimately reinforced Gronemeyer's (1993) 
assertion that development's value is not in what it brings to the ' receiver,' but what it provides for the 
'giver. ' 
185 
In short this thesis, via the case of Eastwood, has shown that the offering of free basic water is not about 
meeting water needs or making water more affordable or even improving the lives of poor households. It 
is simply about using a social policy legitimised under the guise of utilitarianism, environmental and 
economic 'scarcity,' 'expert' calculations, universal ' recommendations' and even the realisation of socio-
economic rights to exclude certain people from accessing their required water volumes so as to lessen the 
economic burden on the local state. Contesting free basic water then, is not about finding better ways to 
calculate water need, different modes of delivery or different tariff structure designs - it is about 
contesting state control shrouded in the dominant ideology which puts narrow economic objectives before 
people. 
2.2 Theory on the social wage (and offering municipal services as welfare) 
South Africa embarked on its "third way of a special type" (Marais, 2001: 271) at a time when it was 
grappling with a number of disparate pressures: municipalities were facing a financial crisis; pervasive 
economic orthodoxy demanded that municipal services be paid for in full in a context where poor citizens 
had little money, no jobs and were facing a vicious HIV/AIDS epidemic; rapid urbanisation concentrated 
an impatient and largely unknown populace in cities struggling to reform and deliver; citizens desperately 
needed major post-apartheid promises to be realised; income poverty statistics were splintered and bleak; 
and the ANC needed to re-legitimise itself as a party that would deliver on its social redistribution 
mandate. A key component of the third way was welfare reform, and in 2001 the South African 
government moved to refashion and augment social expenditure. 
After ±7 years in power; the ANC had to deliver and indeed be seen to deliver certain concessions to its 
people without actually incurring the cost of paying for supplies that would not be paid for. The question 
then was how such concessions could best be structured to provide optimal utility for the state? National 
government could have increased the value of welfare services proper, but this may have been declined 
due to limited scope (widespread relief was required); could not be guaranteed to be used to pay for 
services (resounding with Malthusian spin, poor households instead of putting monies towards paying 
services might simply 'smoke and drink away the monies'); would have entailed a jumble of ideological 
resistance - competing against minimum wages, demands of capital, disincentivising work and 
investment, locking the state into welfare and fostering dependency - internationally unpopular with 
countries that were promoting the third way; and certainly under the leadership of Mbeki-Manuel. 
National government could have channelled the additional funding into a direct subsidy on services. This 
however would have been very expensive, contrary to economic orthodoxy and not sufficiently visible. 
Municipalities would have had to overhaul their tariff systems to accommodate poor households and 
ultimately halt the municipal commercialisation project. National government would have encountered 
resistance from local bureaucrats distrusting of the national sphere. and would have necessitated a change 
to municipal legislation. Moreover, national government would have had to admit that its municipalities 
really were underfunded. Importantly, a direct subsidy may not have deten·ed civil dissent, poor citizens 
(as the ideology goes) may simply have been encouraged to over-consume, as the 'true' value of services 
would have been obscured, and all competing pressures would not have been sufficiently addressed. 
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National government had to intervene in the municipal service crisis - post-haste and smartly. Services 
would be subsidised but targeted to specific groups and conditional on certain consumption 
modifications, educational components and offered under the guise of ' empowerment' and renewed 
citizenship. Concessions had to therefore, take on the characteristics of welfare. Augmented social 
expenditure therefore was restructured to coincide with the introduction of free basic services in 2001 and 
the Indigent Policy in 2003. Monies would be channelled directly to municipalities, who would then 
decide who would receive subsidisation, what conditions would have to be met in its uptake, how and for 
what purposes it would be used. Why the state chose to use the social wage as an instrument to manage 
these competing pressures is found within the paradox of welfare itself. Granting service concessions via 
the social wage served many ends. In a nutshell: to manage and appease an unruly populace, avoid 
embarrassing poverty and access statistics, stabilise municipalities and retain the core principles of 
economic orthodoxy, and with it new regimes of insidious outsourced punitive entities (consistent with 
international welfare scholars: Gough, 1979; Alcock, 1987; Dean, 1991; Piven & Cloward, 1993; 
Walker, 1993; Painter, 1995). In this regard, the 'shifts' resounded with Painter (1995) and Rose (2006): 
social expenditure was simply restructured but the predominant neoliberal ideology remained firmly in 
place. 
The social wage is still in its infancy implicating that all the effects for poor citizens and benefits for the 
state are yet to be played out. Nevertheless, it is possible to theorise on the usefulness of the social wage 
for the state. I will discuss these in terms of primary and secondary effects as evidenced in Msunduzi, 
although noting that such differentiation is simplistic. T he primary effects of re-directing social 
expenditure to struggling households via municipal administration systems meant monies could be 
directed exclusively to the payment of municipal services: (1 ) municipal revenues normalised and 
augmented (municipal bail-out and help with new developmental role); (2) municipal revenue stabilised 
(consumer groups segmented: services either subsidised or targeted for debt collection); and (3) 
struggling households would acquire immediate financial relief and access to basic municipal services. 
The secondary effects included: all consumption metered and monitored; cost recovery continued 
unhindered as poor have allegedly been accommodated (if consumers need more (a) they are not poor 
(the poor only need the ' basics') and (b) only if consumer can pay can they have more); tariff designs 
were not amended; services can be legitimately restricted (through notions of 'scarcity' and guarding 
against ' naughty' people taking more than their due); knowledge on populace improved, state's gaze 
reactivated and social control improved and 'justified' ; ' disobedient' citizens brought back into the 
municipal accounting system and a ' culture of responsibility' fostered; poverty statistics consolidated and 
more reflective of government commitment to poverty alle\·iation interventions; the emergence of a 
benign state re-legitimised through new promises seen to directly address municipal service needs and 
affordability constraints of poor households; unruly elements temporarily appeased and silenced as ANC 
promises realised, the electoral vote secured and municipalities wrestle back control of cities. 
A conundrum that has refused to be silenced throughout this study is whether the primary aim of the state 
is social control or simply to govern cheaply. Evidently, citizens cannot be governed cheaply without 
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strict social control (consistent with Foucault, 1991: 281). In this regard it does not really matter where 
the primary aim of the state lies: cheap governance and social control are not mutually exclusive. For 
example: the Msunduzi administration may not have intentionally been attempting to control their 
populace, but the result of meeting orthodox financial imperatives meant that households which struggled 
to pay for services received had to be reined in. This by way of curtailing the volumes or quality of 
services received and a dual chasing/punishing when households defaulted on payments. Cheap 
governance leads to social control where the services offered are less than that required by poor 
households. For a monthly saving of R39.05 , poor Eastwood households had to submit to containment 
and a myriad of disciplines. Governance was cheap. The imperatives of the third way mean that 
government must be leaner, more efficient; governance must be cheaper and citizens must take greater 
responsibility for their futures. Clearly, the South African government is following such a trajectory; 
whether such an approach is appropriate or indeed if its people are ready for this new type of governance 
or not, and their enforced new role is an entirely different matter. It is clear that my explorations into the 
implications of the state's adoption of the third way are tenuous. However, in Msunduzi 's case, it appears 
that the third way's tokenistic welfarism, non-transfonnative and retrogressive, has allowed the local 
punitive state not only a cover for its vicious neoliberalism but also a springboard. In this regard, the 
study has provided plausible scope to imagine that offering municipal services as welfare concessions has 
amplified the space provided to neoliberally-minded state bureaucrats by the already porous national 
framework, devoid of political will and oversight, to subvert redistributive agendas, justify the non-
provision of adequate services, regulate the poor cheaply, maintain municipal economic orthodoxy and 
grasp its poor populace. 
Men fight and lose the battle, and the thing that they fough t for comes about in spite of their defeat, 
and when it comes turns out not to be what they meant, and other men have to fight f or what they 
meant under another name (Morris, 1896: 31). 
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Appendix A: Lifestory interviews 
Lifestory 1: 24 January 2006, Salm Place 
Lifestory 2: 26 January 2006, Patrys Road 
Lifestory 3: 1 February 2006, Shad Place 
Lifestory 4: 15 February 2006, Weaver Road 
Lifestory 5: 24 February 2006, Patrys Road 
Lifestory 6: 15 March 2006, Patrys Road 
Lifestory 7: 11 April 2006, Rockcod Road 
Lifestory 8: II April2006, Rockcod Road 
Lifestory 9: 21 April 2006, Tamarisk Place 
Lifestory l 0: 2 May 2006, Korhoender Road 
Lifestory 11: 17 May 2006, Duif Road 
Lifestory 12: 18 May 2006, Korhoender Road 
Lifestory 13: 22 May 2006, Snoek Place 
Lifestory 14: 30 May 2006, DuifRoad 
Lifestory 15: 31 May 2006, King!< lip Place 
Lifestory 16: 25 July 2006, Banksia Place 
Lifestory 17: 21 December 2005, Shad Place 
Additional major interviews to complement lifestories: 
I. Tarentaal Road: 27 August 2005 and 15 February 2006 
2. Duif Road: 7 December 2005 and 15 February 2006 
3. Shad Place: 12 December 2005 
4. Shad Place: 12 December 2005 and 22 December 
5. Adelaar Road: 16 December 2005 
6. Tamarisk Place: 15 March 2006 
7. Tarentaal Road: 14 Apri12006 
8. Korhoender Road: 21 April2006 
Appendix B: Example of withdrawal of free water if 6kt exceeded, and disconnection warning 
The M 5 u n d u zi M u n i c i p a I ity A.S. Chetty Centre, 333 Church Street, Pietermarttzburg, 3201 
TAX INVOICE I8J 261,Pietermantzburg,32oo 
VAT REGISTRATION NO. 4600107835 ~ (033) - 3951111 Fax:(033)-3951517 
ACCOUNT DATE ELECTRICITY/WATER ENQUIRIES 
29/12/2005 033 3951225/722/746 
STREET ADDRESS I STAND 
PMB - P ~ETERMARIIZBURG 
05/-12 
02/12 
29/1 2 
29/12 
;29/12 
29/12 
' 29/12 
02/12 
06/12 
02/12 
29/12 
02/12 
29/1 2 
02/12 
29/12 
02/12 
29/12 
29/12 
BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD 
GENERAL DEBIT /CREDIT: 
PAYMENT THANK YOU 
dlt ASSESSMENT RATES : 
INTEREST ON ARREARS 
RATES RESIDENTIAL - IMP 
RATES REB1 RESIDENTIAL. - IMP 
RATES RESIDENTIAL - LAND 
RATES REB1 RESIDENTIAL - LAND 
RATES REB2 RESIDENTIAL - LAND 
ELECTRICITY - FIXED CHARGES : 
VISITATION/DISCONNECTION FEE 
Reversed by DIS0130527 
VISITATION/DISCONNECTION FEE 
Reversa l of item 1/37 
ELECTRICITY BASIC1 
INTEREST ON ARREARS 
DOMESTIC SINGLE PHASE AMPS- A1 
30 .00AMP 
i> ELECTRICITY CONSli'IPTION 1 
INTEREST ON ARREARS 
DOMESTIC SINGLE PHASE - KWH-A 1 
ReadDt=29/11/2005 
Curr=21671 Prev=21411 
Constant 1.0 Cons=260.00 
260.00kWh 
W REFUSE1 
INTEREST ON ARREARS 
REFUSE DOMESTIC 
~ SEWERAGE1 
INTEREST ON ARREARS 
SEWERAGE DOMESTIC 
..., WATER CONSll1PTION: 
W/CONS UMP DOMESTIC - 2 ~ 
ReadDt=29/1 1/2-005- Days=29 · 
Curr=3785 Prev=3779 --:~ 
Cons=6 00 .lf-
5.80k"l ·. ... 
0.20kl 
90 DAYS+ 60 DAYS 
0 . 00 
30 DAYS 
297.65 
VAT REGISTRATION NUMBER 
CASH 0 . 00 
DEPOSIT 
GUARANTEE 
LAND 
9900 
0. 180000 
0 .015280 
0.003507-
0.077604 
0.032764-
0.008968-
0.000000 
0.000000 
0. 180000 
2.590000 
0. 180000 
0.202500 
0. 180000 
43.150000 
0. 180000 
66.700000 
3.716666 
7 . 340000 
CURRENT 
376 .88 · 
1. 09 
56.02 
12.86-
64 .02 
27.03-
7.40-
206. 10 
206 . 10 -
1 . 17 
77.70 
1.00 
52.65 
0.65 
43. 15 
0.14 
66.70 
21.56 
1. 47 
VALUATION 
IMPROVEMENTS 
44000 
0.00 
0 . 00 
0 . 00 
0 . 00 
0.00 
0.00 
28 . 85 
28.85-
0.00 
10.88 
0.00 
7.37 
0.00 
6.04 
0.00 
9.34 
3 .22 
VAT TOTAL 
36.85 
0.00 
TOTAL VALUE 
53900 
664.55 
366.90-
1.09 
56.02 
12.86-
64.02 
27.03-
7.40-
234 .95 
234.95-
1. 17 
88.58 
1. 00 
60.02 
0.65 
49. 19 
0.14 
76 . 04 
26.25 
TOTAL. DUE 
674.53 
FINAL. DATE FOR PAYMENT 
·ELECTRICITY 0822350841; MET"ER READERS 0822350847; SWrrCHI~OAI~O 
UP TO 2g DECEMBER 2005 (INCLUSIVE). 
~ ~ ~-- ---- ---~------- - -- - -- -· 
31 / 01 / 2006 
-
Appendix C: Example of fixed sanitation and refuse charges 
TAX INVOICE 
VAT REGISTRATION NO. 4600107835 
BALANCE BROU 
GENERAL DEBIT/CR.EDIT: 
26/09 PAYMENT THANK YOU 
• 
. . 
ASSESSMENT RATES : 
06/09 INTEREST ON ARREARS 
29/09 RATES RESIDENTIAL - IMP 
29/09 RATES REB1 RESIDENTIAL - IMP 
29/09 RATES RESIDENTIAL - LAND 
29/09 RATES REB1 RESIDENTIAL - LAND 
29/09 RATES REB2 RESIDENTIAL - LAND 
!CITY - FIXED CHARGES: 
09/09 VISITATION/DISCONNECTION FEE f.~' 
• I 
BASIC: ..ar-· 
" r 06/09 INTEREST ON ARREARS r. 
29/09 DOMESTIC SINGLE PHASE AMPS- '•M-~ 
30.00AMP 
~ ELECTRICITY CONSLMPTIPN: 
06/09 INTEREST ON ARREARS 
29/09 DOMESTIC SINGLE PHASE - KWH-A1 
Read0tc29/08/2005 
Curr=25103 Prev=24397 
Constant 1. 0 Cons=706.00 
706.00kWh 
REFUsE: 
06/09 INTEREST ON ARREARS 
29/09 REFUSE DOMESTIC 
SEW5RA6E: 
06/09 INTEREST ON ARREARS 
,."':'" 29/09 SEWERAGE DOMESTIC 4..:; . . ' 
...., WATER CONSLMPTION: 
29/09 W/CONSUMP DOMESTIC - 2 
ReadDt=24/08/2005 Days=30 z:.· 
Curr=O Prev=O 
Est=14.00 
6 .00kl 
8.00kl 
06/09 INTERESl ON ARREARS 
, NB; INTEREST WILL BE CHARGED AT 18% PER ANNUM ON ALL 
. CELL TO CELL ACCOUNT ENQUIRIES· ELECTRICITY 0022350841 
. STATEMENT INCLUDES RECEIPTS UP TO 29 SEPTEMBER 
..- -
( 
·~. 
"~ ""'"'Y '-'"ntre, ;~;~;,~ c..;hurch Slreel, Pielermaritzburg, 3201 
~ 261, Pielermaritzburg , 3200 
~ (033) - 395 1111 Fax: (033) - 395 1517 
0. 180000 1.01 0.00 
0.01528,0 49.66 0.00 
0.00350'7"-'l 11.40- 0.00 
-{;'0/077604 60.79 0 . 00 ~03276~::- 25.67- 0.00 
0'~008968 ' 
·Y$ 1 .o3- 0.00 
·k~ 
o.ooq.ooo .: ~- •206. 10 28.85 
. ;rl 
b. 180600 
-
1. 17 0.00 
" 
. -, j 10.88 
2 : 5900QO ·· +'• 77.70 
.. 
0. 1800.,90 ~ . 2. 12 0.00 
20.02 
. 
"<P'-
; i 
.~ . . 
0.292500 142.97 
.. 
.... a_.....: 
0 . 180000 0.65 0.00 
. 43 .;150000 43- 15 6.04 
0. 180000 1.00 0.00 
i.~ :.~fP£0f} ;; !'"!,,1' 66.70 9.34 ~~ l.~ ; ·~. L~ 
-: , ..,. ... _ """' - ~ 
~ 7 
pi·: 
'"; -~ 11 . 34 L• . 
3.716666 22.30 
7.340000 58.73 
0. 180000 1. 13 0.00 
1535.00-
1.01 
49.66 
11.40-
60 . 79 
25.67-
7.03-
• 234.95 
1. 17 
88.58 
2. 12 
162.99 
:\ 
., 
e:-J 0.65 49. 19 
1.00 ~ 76.04 
92.37 
1' 13 
Appendix D: Two examples of letters of demand sent by Natal Debt Corporation to households 
/. .'·,·· 
NDC- Natal Debt Corporation 
• Debtors Management 
• Debt Collection 
• Consulting 
ietermaritzburg 
3201 
Dear Sir I Madam, 
LETTER OF DEMAND 
-· 
'• 
Account ref : 
P.O. Box202 
Pietermaritzburg, 3200 
Email: pmb@ndcorp.co.za 
2nd Floor, LMD H0use 
16 Buchanan Street 
PIETERMARITZBURG 
Tel: 033 342 2621 
Fax: 033 345 0386 
Date : 13 September 2006 
Our client: The Msunduzi Municipality 
We are advised by our client that you are indebted to them in respect of arrear municipal 
services, and we have accordingly been instructed to demand from you, as we hereby do, 
for payment of _our client's claim, interest and costs to' be paid tci our offices within seven 
(7) days from date hereof. 
The present- settlement balance on your arrears account, inclusive of our costs is 
R25574.40. This amount excludes_any charges for current municipal services, which may 
still be billed against your account in subsequent months and. excludes any further 
collection costs and/or interest should this settlement amount not be paid within seven 
days. Failure to pay or failure to enter into a suitable written arrangement to repay in 
instalments will result in SUMMONS being issued against you, the costs of which you will 
be liable for. 
We confirm that NDC has been mandated by the Municipality to recover all arrear 
amounts from you on a "pre-legal basis"; failing which the matter will be referred to our 
joint venture partners, Messrs Cajee, Setsubi, Chetty Inc (attorneys) for immediate legal 
action without further reference to you. 
Yours fai~hfully 
NATAL DEBT CORPORATION 
PRE-LEGAL COLLECTIONS 
DIRECT BANK DEPOSITS MAY BE PAID INTO OUR 
• FNB ACCOUNT. PLEASE FAX YOUR DEPOSIT SLIP. 
Ace Name :NDC MSUNDUZI MUNICIPALITY TRUST 
ACCOUNT 
Bank : First National Bank 
Branch : Pmb East- Branch Code : 220925 
ACCOUNT NUMBER : 62068207838 
Natal Debt Corporation 
• Debtor:s Management 
• Debt Collection 
• Consulting 
stwood 
Pietermaritzburg 
3201 
Dear Sir I Madam , . 
'· 
Date : 07 
Our ref: 
RE: FINAL LETTER OF DEMAND 
P.O. Box202 
Pletermarltzburg, 3200 
Email: pmb@ndcorp.co.za 
2nd Floor, LMD House 
16 Buchanan Street 
PIETERMARITZBURG 
Tel: 033 342 2621 
Fax: 033 345" 0386 
We refer to our previous correspondence and note WITH REGRET that you have FAILED 
to respond thereto. 
You are now requested to report to our offices by no later than 15 August 2006 to make 
arrangements regarding your outstanding account. 
TAKE NOTICE THAT if arrangements for payment of this outstanding account is not 
made ,we will proceed through our attorneys to issue 
SUMMONS 
ag~inst you through the MAGISTRATES COURT . 
"TAKE NOTICE THAT failing response to the SUMMONS , further LEGAL ACTION may 
be-instituted against you which may result in your appearance before the MAGISTRATES 
COURT. You will be liable for the costs of the LEGAL ACTION . 
FAILURE to adhere to the terms of the ORDER which may be made by the. 
MAGISTRATES COURT may give the court authority to issue a 
WARRANT OF EXECUTION 
against your property . 
You are therefore required to report to our offices IMMEDIATELY to avoid the possible 
LEGAL ACTION and SUBSEQUENT COSTS • 
Yours faithfully 
~BM 
COLLECTIONS DEPARTMENT 
NATAL DEBT CORPORATION 
OPEN SATURDAYS TILL 12:30 
0 All costs Incurred are In accordance with The Debt Collectors Act, Act 114 of 1998 
0 Debt Collectors Council Registration Number : 000 4320/03 
0 Association of Debt Recovery Agents Registration Number: 1199 
0 Vat registration number: 4500150851 
Appendix E: Restriction washers 
Appendix F: Example of disconnection and rates penalty, and historical debt 
'fhe Msunduzi Municipality 
COPY TAX INVOICE 
VAT REGISTRATION NO. 4600107835 
8 ASSESSMENT RATES : 
04/10 INTEREST ON ARREARS 
28 /10 COLLECTION CHARGES 
30/10 RATES RESIDENTIAL - IMP 
30/10 RATES REB1 RESIDENTIAL - IMP 
30/10 RATES RESIDENTIAL - LAND 
30/10 RATES REB1 RESIDENTIAL - LAND 
3 0/10 RATES REB2 RESIDENTIAL - LAND 
RATES HANDED OVER: 
04/10 INTEREST ON ARREARS 
ELECTRICITY - FIXED CHARGES : 
04/10 INTEREST ON ARREARS 
07/10 VISITATION/DISCONNECTION FEE 
ELECTRICITY BASIC: 
04/10 INTEREST ON ARREARS 
30/10 DOMESTIC SINGLE PHASE AMPS- A1 
10.00AMP 
REFUSE: 
04/10 INTEREST ON ARREARS 
30/10 REFUSE DOMESTIC 
30/10 DOMESTIC REBATE - INDIGENT 
tl SEWERAGE : 
04/10 INTEREST ON ARREARS 
30/10 SEWERAGE DOMESTIC 
30/10 DOMESTIC REBATE - INDIGENT 
SERVICES - BALANCE B/ FWD : 
04/10 INTEREST ON ARREARS 
~ WATER CONSUMPTION: 
04/10 INTEREST ON ARREARS 
30/10 WATER CONSUMPTION - INDIGENT 
ReadDt-27/09/2005 Days~32 
Curr•3823 Prev=3811 
Cons•12.00 
6. 40kl 
5 . 60kl 
30/10 W/CONSUMP . REBATE 6KL 
6. 40kl 
5 . 60kl 
AS Chetty Centre. 333 Church Street, Pietermarltzburg, 3201 
121 261, Pletermaritzburg, 3200 
W (033) 395 1111 Fax: (033) 395 1517 
0.180000 37.90 0.00 
0.100000 81.55 0 . 00 
0 . 015280 68.76 0.00 
0.003507- 15.78- 0.00 
0.077 604 43.97 0.00 
0.032764- 18.56- 0.00 
0.008968- 5.08- 0.00 
0 . 180000 71.02 0 . 00 
0 . 180000 6.53 0.00 
0.000000 206.10 28.85 
0. 180000 1. 47 0.00 
1. 09 
0.780000 7 . 80 
0. 180000 4.26 0.00 
43 . 150000 43 . 15 6.04 
1.000000- 17.97- 2.52-
0.180000 4 . 57 0.00 
66.700000 66.70 9 . 3 4 
1.000000- 38.59- 5.40-
0.180000 134 . 23 0 . 00 
0.180000 4 . 55 0 . 00 
5. 67 
3 . 71E666 23.79 
2.990000 16.74 
3.33-
3.716tJ66- 23.79-
0.000000 0.00 
28043 . 56 
~ 37.90 ir.#-
15.78-
43.97 
18.56-
5.08-
71.02 
6.53 ~ 234.95 
1. 4 7 
8.89 
'4. 26 
49 .1 9 
20.49-
4.57 
76.04 
43.99-
134.23 ~ 
4.55 
46.20 
27.12-
03 / 11 
29/11 
29/11 
29/11 
29/11 
29/11 
03/11 
03/11 
09/11 
09/11 
17/11 
03/11 
29/11 
03/11 
29/11 
29/11 
03/11 
29/11 
2 9/11 
03/11 
03/11 
29/11 
29/11 
The Msunduzi Municipality 
COPY TAX INVOICE 
VAT REGISTRATION NO. 4600107835 
8 ASSESSMENT RATES: 
INTEREST ON ARREARS 0 . 180000 
RATES RESIDENTIAL - IMP 0.015280 
RATES REB1 RESIDENTIAL - IMP 0.003507-
RATES RESIDENTIAL - LAND 0. 077604 
RATES REB1 RESIDENTIAL - LAND 0.032764 -
RATES REB2 RESIDENTIAL' - LAND 0.008968-
RATES HANDED OVER: 
INTEREST ON ARREARS 0.180000 
ELECTRICITY - FIXED CHARGES : 
INTEREST ON ARREARS 0.180000 
VISI TATION/DISCONNECTION FEE 0.000000 
Reversed by DIS0123339 
VISITATION/DISCONNECTION FEE 0.000000 
Reversal of item 9/36 
VISITATION/DI SCONNECTION FEE 0.000000 
15/11/05--SPECIAL DISC 
ELECTRICITY BASIC: 
INTEREST ON ARREARS 0.180000 
DOMESTIC SINGLE PHASE AMPS- A1 
l O. OOAMP 0.780000 
.fj REFUSE : 
INTEREST ON ARREARS 0.180000 
REFUSE DOMESTIC 43.150000 
DOMESTI C REBATE - INDIGENT 1.000000-
"SEWERAGE : 
INTEREST ON ARREARS 0 .180000 
SEWERAGE DOMESTIC 66. 700000 
DOMESTIC REBATE - INDIGENT 1. 000000-
SERVICES - BALANCE B/FWD: 
INTEREST ON ARREARS 0.180000 
~ WATER CONSUMPTION: 
INTEREST ON ARREARS 0.180000 
WATER CONSUMPTION - INDIGENT 
ReadDt=01/11/2005 Days•35 
Curr=3837 Prev=3823 
Consm14 . 00 
7 . 00kl 3. 716666 
CONTINUED - BALANCE C/FWD: 
7.00kl 2.990000 
~1/CONSUMP . REBATE 6KL 
7 . 00kl 3.716666-
7.00kl 0.000000 
AS Chetty Centre. 333 Church Street, Pletermaritzburg, 3201 
121 261, Pietermaritzburg, 3200 
V (033)3951111 Fax:(033)3951517 
28786.62 
39 . 54 0.00 39.54 
68 . 76 0.00 68 . 76 
15.78- 0.00 15.78-
43.98 0.00 43 . 98 
18.57- 0.00 18.57-
5.08- 0. 00 . 5. 08-
71 . 02 0.00 71.02 
9.62 0 . 00 9.62 
206.10 28 . 85 234.95 
206.10- 28.85- 234 .95-
206 . 10 28.85 234. 95 
1. 58 0.00 1. 58 
1. 09 8 . 89 
7 . 80 
4.69 0 . 00 4.69 
43.15 6.04 49.19 
17.97- 2.52 - 20.49-
5.05 0.00 5.05 
66.70 9.34 76 . 0 4 
38 . 59- 5. 40- 43 . 99-
134.23 0.00 134 . 23 
4.55 0.00 4.55 
6.57 53.52 
26.02 
29488 . 32 
20.93 
3.64- 29.66-
26.02-
0.00 
~ 
Appendix G: Example of household receiving free water but charged standard sanitation tariff 
The Msunduzi Municipality 
TAX INVOICE 
VAT REGISTRATION NO. 4600107835 
A.S. Chetty Centre, 333 Church Street, Pietermaritzburg, 3201 
~ 261, Pietei1Tiaritzburg, 3200 
'fr (033) - 395 1111 Fax: (033) - 395 1517 
ACCOU NT DATE ELECTRICITYJWATER ENQUIRIES RATES ENQUIRIES 
STREET AIDDRESS I STAND 
~BURG 
30/03 BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD 
f£i ASSESSMENT RATES: 
04/04 INTEREST ON ARREARS 
28/04 RATES RESIDENTIAL - IMP 
28/04 RATES REB1 RESIDENTIAL - IMP 
28/04 RATES RESI DENTIAL - LAND 
28/ 04 RATES REB1 RESIDENTIAL - LAND 
28/ 04 RATES REB2 RESIDENTIAL - LAND 
04/04 
04/04 
04/ 04 
28/04 
04/04 
28/04 
04/04 
28/04 
04/04 
28/04 
04/04 
28/04 
04/04 
RATES HANDED OVER: 
INTEREST ON ARREARS 
ELECTRICITY - FIXED CHARGES : 
INTEREST ON ARREARS 
ELECTRICITY BASIC: 
INTEREST ON ARREARS 
DOMESTIC SINGLE PHASE AMPS- A1 
15.00AMP 
<jl ELECTRICITY CONSIJIIPTION: 
INTEREST ON ARREARS 
DOMESTIC S1 NGLE PHASE - KWH-A1 
ReadDt=30/ 03/2006 
Curr=4406 Prev=4225 
Constant 1.0 Cons=181.00 
181.00kWh 
W REFUSE: 
INTEREST ON ARREARS 
REFUSE DOMESTIC 
~ SEWERAGE.: 
INTEREST ON ARREARS 
SEWERAGE DOMESTIC 
SERVICES - BALANCE B/FWD : 
I NTEREST ON ARREARS 
~ WATER CONSIJIIPTION: 
W/ CONSUMP DOMESTIC - 2 
ReadDt=29/ 03/ 2006 Days=30 
Curr=O Prev=O 
Est=5.00 
5. OOk.l 
INTEREST ON ARREARS 
CONTINUED - BALANCE C/FWD: 
6K1 
30 DAYS 
VAT REGISTRATION NUMBER 
CASH 
LAND 
8000 
0.180000 
0.015280 
0.003507-
0.077604 
0.032764-
0 .008968-
0 . 180000 
0.180000 
0. 180000 
, . 550000 
0. 180000 
0.202500 
0.180000 
43.150000 
0. 180000 
66 . 700000 
0.180000 
3 .716666 
0.180000 
3. 716666-
CURRENT 
IMPROVEMENTS 
47000 
41. 15 
59.84 
13.73-
51.73 
21.84-
5.97-
41 .01 
12.65 
6.46 
23.25 
5.80 
36.65 
6.27 
43. 15 
8.06 
66.70 
9.57 
18.59 
7: 14 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0 . 00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
3.26 
0.00 
5. 13 
0.00 
6.04 
0.00 
9 . 34 
0.00 
2.60 
0.00 
2 .60-
TOTAL\tALOE 
55000 
16070.23 
41. 15 
59.84 
13.73-
51.73 
21.84-
5.97-
41.01 
12. 65 
6.46 
26 .51 
5.80 
41.78 
6.27 
49. 19 
8 . 06 
76.04 ~ 
9.57 
21. 19 ~. 
Applied indiQ:ent applications forms and concessions Appendix H: ~ 
CITY AD:MINISTRATION DEPARTMENT 
The Msunduzi Municipality 
~ 
City Hall _Commercial Road 
Pietermantzburg 3201 
Private Bag 321 
Pietermaritzburg 3200 
Tel. 033-3951111 
Fax. 033-3951501 
ENQ: OUR REF: 
YOUR REF: 
plEfERMARITZBURG 
MSUNDUZI 
u fA. '1;; -J 
_7..:.__ __ / '-I. 12005 
City Treasurer 
Credit Arrangements 
Application for Indigent Status 
Please assist 
ID N I residing 
to attain Indigent Status. 
Lights Account No. ~ Rates Account No. ________ _ 
I '1-- I STATE PENSIONER --[Z]_ GRANTEE 
0 Unemployed-must produce job seekers card or affidavit 
~House value between RJO 000 and R40 000 ~ 
_ ~RESTRICTION WASHER to be inserted to reduce water consumption/a 12kl/month. ~ 
0 20 AlYfP MCB 
lmJ Make payment on any current amount owing by due date. ~INCOMEBELOWRl 718.00 
~Consideration should be given to withdrawing Applicant/s file from the Attorneys for 
outstanding rates. CE::J Reconnection of electricity R20)J;O to pay. 
Thank you in community serviJttlelivery 
Yours sincerely 
If any problems please contact me at 
AFFIDAVIT BY DEBTOR RE FINANCIAL ASSESSMENT TO DETERMINE 
MONTHLY PAYMENT TOWARDS REDUCTION OF 
ARREAR RATES AND SERVICE CHARGES 
l .N~ME: 
For Internal Use 
Account Ref. Arrear Debt. 
ADD: Rates------- R 
Cons. Bill, ______ _ R 
Sun.Dbtrs. ______ _ R 
TEL: (H) ________ _ Other R 
(W). _____ _ _ Total arrears R 
as at-------
2. CAPACITY: PROPERTY OWNER/TENANT (Delete where not applicable) 
3(a) ARE YOU THE HEAD OF THE HOUSEHOLD? YES/NO (Delete where not applicable) 
(b) If not, give details of 
person who is: NAME: _____ ____________ _ 
RELATIONSHIP: _____________ _ 
AGE: 
·-----
DETAILS OF CURRENT EMPLOYMENT: _____ _ 
4. NUMBER OF OCCUPANTS IN RESIDENCE AT GIYEN ADDRESS: 
~ ~ Relationship to Consumer/Debtor 
4 .1 
4.2 
4.3 
4.4 
4.5 
4.6 
4.7 
4.8 
5. A~fLICANT' S GROSS I~COME R 
(Proof to he supplied) 
-2-
6. DISPOSABLE INCOME OF HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS 
Employer Other Income Net Pay as per pay slip (week/month) 
6.1 
6.2 
6.3 
6.4 
6.5 
6.6 
6.7 
6.8 
eg grants, pension, 
alimony, investments, 
rentals, etc. 
*Please produce documentary proof of earnings. 
* R 
7. HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE: FACTORS IN RANDS FOR EXPENSES LISTED 
BELOW. 
7. 1 Food 
7.2 Clothing 
7.3 Water/Elect. 
FACTORS IN RANDS 
R75 per adult 
R50 per child 
RlOO per family 
R 150 per household 
7.4 Medical Expenses R50 per family 
7.5 Rates R50 
MULTIPLY BY 
NO. OF PERSONS TOTAL £R) 
-3-
FACTORS IN RANPS MULTIPLY BY 
NO. OF PERSONS TOTAL (R) 
7.6 Insurance 
7 .. 7 Maintenance 
(ex family) 
7. 8 Transport 
7.9 School -
RIOO per family 
R50 per person 
R50 per person actually 
using transport 
Pre-primary R60 per child 
High 
Tertiary 
7. 1 0 Other - (details 
to he provided) 
8. TOTAL NET DISPOSABLE INCOME (as per (6)] 
DEDUCT TOTAL EXPENSES (As per 7] 
Balance of income available towards arrear debt reduction 
9 . SUMMARY OF DEBTORS FINANCIAL POSITION 
TOTAL: ~R __________ _ 
= R 
= R 
----
R. _____ _ 
9.1 Debtor is unemployed, a~d has no means of support other than income 
from grants, alimony, rental etc. of R ____ ;..__per month. 
9.2 Debtor is unemployed, hut is assisted financially hy other occupants 
·in residence. and gross income is R _____ per month. 
9.3 Debtor is employed and gross income from employment is R ____ _,per mo~th. 
Debtor is also in receipt of sundry income of 
Proof of earnings to he submitted. 
9.4 Dehtor agrees to pay the sum of 
in settlement of arrears. 
R _____ per month 
R. _____ monthly 
-4-
10. REMARKS: 
DEBT9R 
I hereby certify that the deponent has acknowledged to me that he knows and understands the 
contents of this affidavit which was sworn to and signed before me at Pietermaritzburg on this 
. day of 19 , the regulations contained in Government 
Notice No. R3619 of 21st July 1972 and R1648 of 19th August 1977 havi~g been complied with. 
ASSESSED BY:. ________ _ 
NAME SIGNATURE 
DATE ASSESSED: _______ _ 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DEBT COMPLETED YES/NO. 
rtfUI.aa . fm$ 
PIETERi\llARITZBURG-MSUNDUZI TRANSITIONAL LOCAL COUNCIL 
RefNO.: ________ _ 
I, the undersigned Owner/Consumer/Tenant hereby confirm that details as indicated hereon 
. of the agreement between myself and the Transitional Local Council, have been explained 
to me and I fully understand the terms thereof that I agreed to. 
·. Consolidated Bill 
Rates 
Sundry Debtors 
Housing 
Current + Arrangement 
Frozen Account 
Eleccriciry Consumption 
Water Consumption 
MCB 
Restriction Washer 
AIS 
Current + Arrangement 
Interest 
Collection Charges 
Amount 
Legal Charges 
Rent 
Instalment 
Payment of Accounts 
Payment includes any or all the above 
current accounts PLUS the amount agreed r----....----, 
upon toward my arrears. I~.... _______ ...~ 
DATE: ____________ __ SIGNED: 
..,lETERMARITZBURG-MSUNDUZI 
TftANSITIONAL LOCAL COUNCIL (i) Cons Billing 
( ii ) AIS 
( iii ) Rates 
( iv) Hse Instal 
( v) Hse Rent 
< (vi) Collections 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF DEBT 
I, the undersigned consumer, ( first names and surname ) 
Date of Birth: ~------------------ 1.0. No. : 
I 
Residential Address : 
Business Address : 
Pay or Work No. : 
1. 
Acknowledge that I am lawfully indebted to the Pietermaritzburg-Msunduzi Transitional Local Council (the Council) in 
the sum of R (''the Capital sum") being in respect of : 
1 
2 
3 
4 
2 
Undertake to repay the debt at the offices of the City Treasurer, at 333 Church Street, Pietermaritzburg, in the 
following manner : 
(a) An initial repayment in the sum of R 
and 
.. 
(b) The outstanding balance of the debt, 
by way of monthly I weekly instalments of R 
the first instalment of which shall be paid before the last working day of and thereafter 
on or before the last working day of each succeeding month until the capital sum thereof has been paid. All payments 
shall be made free of exchange or deductions. Ml.l. r-l. PM~ . 1<.4-. 
3 
If this acknowledgement relates to rates I accept that, in accordance with the Local Authorities Ordinance 25 of 1974, 
penalties calculated at 1 ,5 % per month and collection charges calculated at 10 % per annum shall accrue to the 
capital sum and shall form part of this acknowledgement. 
4 
In addition to the instalment referred to in paragraph 2 I undertake to pay-
4.1 all current amounts owing in respect of electricity and water consumed and 
refuse removal and sewerage charges, and assisted installation scheme (AlS) 
instalments, and 
4.2 an amount of R per month being a contribution 
towards current rates including penalties and collection charges (if any). 
4.3 all current amounts owing in respect of housing instalments I rental 
(if any). 
and accept that, at the discretion of the City Treasurer, any amount lawfully owed by me to the council may be 
consolidated on my consolidated billing account 
S(a) 
Hereby agree that should the electricity MCB (Mini Circuit Breaker) on my property be altered to a 15 AMP capacity, 
I hereby indemnify the Council and its servants or agents against any damages, direct or indirect, I may suffer as 
a result thereof. 
S(b) 
Understand that if the electricity supply to my premises is currently discontinued, the ·council will reconnect the supply 
of electricity to my residence after the alteration of the MCB to 15 AMP has been completed and I have signed this 
acknowledgement. 
S(c) 
't,Jnderstand and agree that the electricity supply to my residence will not be reconnected unless and until the initial 
payment has been duly made;· 
6 
Should I fail to make any of the payments referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 on the due date or if the Mini Circuit 
Breaker or electricity meter is bypassed or tampered with all amounts owing in terms of this acknowledgement 
:;hall immediately become due and payable without further notice or demand and the Council may then take 
Nhatever action it deems appropriate. 
7 
hereby renounce all benefits from the legal exceptions, non numeratae pecuniae, non causa debite, errore calculi, 
evision of accounts (and de duobos vel opluribus reis debendi) and all other exceptions which might or could be 
leaded by me in Bar to the validity of any claim which the Council may have under this acknowledgement and I 
ereby acknowledge myself to be fully acquainted with the full meaning and effect of the aforementioned 
xceptions. 
- . l 
0 
...... .. 
In terms of section 45 of the Magistrate's.pourts Act, I consent to the Council instituting any legal proceedings 
against me to enforce any of its rights under this Admission if it so elects, in the Magistrate's Court in any District 
having jurisdiction in respect. of any person. ln the event of it being necessary for the Council to institute legal 
proceedings against me, I undertake to pay all legal costs, including tracing fees and collection commission, on an 
attorney and client scale. 
9 
Any notice to be given to me under this Acknowledgement or any summons or other Court process in respect of any 
claim arising therefrom shall be considered to have been validly served on me if delivered to or sent by prepaid 
registered post addressed to 
· . .. _t' 
at which address I hereby accept domicilium citande et executandi for the purpose of any legal proceedings which 
may be taken under this Acknowledgement. Any notice given by post in terms of this Clause shall be deemed to have 
been received by me on the day following the date of posting thereof. 
10 
Understand that any indulgence granted to me by the Council in respect of the debt in no way restricts its rights to 
enforce its bylaws, and I fully understand that the terms of this acknowledgement do not constitute a waiver 
of the Council's rights in respect of the debt or any other amount whatsoever, lawfully owed by me to the 
Council. 
11 
' .. \ 
This acknowledgement of liability and undertaking :epl~ces the admission of liability and undertaking signed on 
___________ provided that this ac,knowledgement shall not constitute a novation of the claims 
referred to in paragraph 1. 
SIGNED AT PIETERMARITZBURG THIS 
r:\S WITNESSES: 
1. 
2. 
IGNED AT PIETERMARITZBURG THIS 
3 WITNESSES: 
1. 
2. 
DAY OF 
-----
!I 
\' 
... THE CONSUMER 
DAY OF 
-----
Pietermaritzburg-Msunduzi 
Transitional Local Council (admiss1) 
NON NUMERATAE PECUNIAE 
NON CAUSA DEBITI 
ERROR CALCULI : 
REVISION OF ACCOUNTS 
Amount due was not known at the time of signqture and may 
have been omitted, e.g. signed in blank. 
\.~ . 
No cause for the debit ( I don't owe the money ) 
Error in calculating the amount ( a form of estoppel ) does 
not ihvalidate Acknowledgement of Debt. 
The amount initially incorrect and on rechecking the books 
one arrives at a different amount will not invalidate 
Acknowledgement of debt 
DE DUOBUS VEL PLURIBUS REIS DEBENDI : If I owe money for another d~f;~.'this can be 
recorded separately, i.e. this Acknowledgement of Debt 
does not wipe out any other obligations towards creditor I 
may have. It does not supersede any other cause of action. 
.. : 
.. 
-...:- -~ 
;, .tHODES \~ ~ l!i,lYiiflSiTY ) 
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